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Abstract 
The decline in the number of operating public companies in Canada over the past decade 
is startling and the trend shows no sign of reversing.  Since robust public markets are 
widely understood as serving a critical role in a healthy economy, the decline is 
particularly concerning for Canadian policy makers.  Moreover, the Canadian trend is 
reflective of similar declines in the United States and Western Europe.  
Many possible contributing factors have been posited to explain public company decline 
based on speculation and anecdotal evidence. Amongst the factors most frequently cited 
as contributing to public company decline is regulatory overreach. As such, participants 
in the public company ecosphere have been advocating for regulatory reform to 
streamline the IPO process and reduce the cost and complexity of ongoing public 
company compliance.  To this end, Canadian securities regulators have recently 
undertaken an analysis of public company burden reduction through CSA Consultation 
Paper 51-404, spawning the ongoing Ontario regulatory reform process under OSC 
Notice 11-784. 
Yet, no significant effort has been as of yet undertaken to empirically validate whether 
regulatory overreach is indeed the primary factor in the public company decline 
phenomenon or to determine which of the other potential factors are, in fact, most 
influential for key decision-makers in making the go-public / stay-private decision.  The 
research project underpinning this dissertation addresses this critical knowledge gap, 
comprising an extensive survey of senior business decision-makers and other key public 
markets influencers in Canada.  Using both qualitative and quantitative survey 
methodologies, the study evidences that the phenomenon of public company decline is 
complex and multi-factorial.  Although regulatory overreach is certainly a relevant factor 
in the mind of business decision-makers, it is only one of a number of interrelated factors.  
Moreover, many of these factors are unrelated to increased costs and regulatory 
complexity and therefore cannot be addressed directly through regulatory reform at the 
securities commission level.  As such, it is naïve to expect that regulatory streamlining 
and cost reduction initiatives alone will be successful in stemming the further decline of 
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operating public companies.  Rather, preservation of robust public markets in Canada 
requires an integrated and aggressive multi-pronged intervention supported by federal 
and provincial governments, securities regulators and other key players in the public 
markets ecosphere. 
Keywords: 
securities regulation, public company decline, operating public companies, regulatory 
complexity, regulatory streamlining, regulatory overreach, burden reduction, short-
termism, private capital proliferation, public markets ecosphere, systemic market change, 
CSA Consultation Policy 51-404, OSC Notice 11-784 
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Lay Abstract 
The number of operating public companies listed in Canada has been declining 
significantly for more than a decade. This trend shows no sign of reversing. Similar 
trends have been observed in the United States and Western Europe. As maintenance of a 
robust public markets is understood as being important to the broader economy, this trend 
has been particularly concerning to public markets observers, governments and securities 
regulators. 
Participants in the public company ecosphere have been advocating for regulatory reform 
to streamline the IPO process and reduce the cost and complexity of ongoing public 
company compliance. To this end, Canadian securities regulators have recently 
undertaken an analysis of public company burden reduction through CSA Consultation 
Paper 51-404, spawning the ongoing Ontario regulatory reform process under OSC 
Notice 11-784. 
Many potential contributing factors have been suggested by academics and industry 
experts to explain why public company decline is happening. However, empirical 
evidence has been notably absent in studying the phenomenon. 
The research project underpinning this dissertation focuses on addressing this critical 
knowledge gap, comprising an extensive survey of senior business decision-makers and 
other key public markets influencers in Canada. Using both qualitative and quantitative 
survey methodologies, the study evidences that the phenomenon of public company 
decline is complex and multi-factorial. 
Although regulatory overreach is certainly a relevant factor in the mind of business 
decision-makers, it is only one of a number of interrelated factors. Moreover, many of the 
factors contributing to public company decline are unrelated to increased costs and 
regulatory complexity and therefore cannot be addressed directly through regulatory 
reform at the securities commission level. As such, it is naïve to expect that regulatory 
streamlining and cost reduction initiatives alone will be successful in stemming the 
further decline of operating public companies. 
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The study demonstrates that preserving robust public markets in Canada will require an 
integrated and aggressive multi-pronged intervention supported by federal and provincial 
governments, securities regulators and other key players in the public markets ecosphere. 
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1 
 Introduction 
1.1- The Disappearing Public Company 
A recent headline discloses that only a single initial public offering ("IPO") was 
completed on Canada's sole senior stock exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (the 
"TSX"), during the first three quarters of fiscal 2019.1  The Canadian business media 
notes the lack of IPO activity, blaming a variety of potential causes.2  In short, Canada's 
recent IPO market has been abysmal.  Is this terrible IPO market in Canada simply a blip 
or the latest headline evidencing a disturbing long-term trend of public company decline?  
Sadly, a quick look beyond the headlines to the underlying data demonstrates that it is the 
latter. 
The number of Operating Companies3 listed and traded on the public markets in Canada 
has declined significantly over the past dozen years.4  Fewer initial public offerings 
(“IPOs”) are being completed on Canadian stock exchanges.  Existing public companies 
are pursuing going-private transactions or being acquired by other companies at a 
1 PriceWaterhouseCoopersLLP, "Quarterly Report on IPOs in Canada" (2 October 2019), online:<
https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/media/release/third-quarter-canadian-ipo-market-falls-further-behind-
2018.html >.  On the junior Canadian stock exchanges, six new listings were added to the TSX Venture 
Exchange (the "TSXV") and 22 new listings were added to the Canadian Stock Exchange (the "CSE") over 
the same six-month period.  However, the total funds raised in conjunction with those 28 new junior 
exchange listings totaled less than $20 million (Cdn.), an average of less than $ 1million in capital raised 
per new listing. 
2 Sean Silcoff, “Private is the new public:  The problem with tech starts chasing private money as they
don’t file IPOs” The Globe and Mail (10 January 2020) online:< https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
business/technology/article-private-is-the-new-public-the-problem-with-tech-stars-chasing-private/>. 
3 “Operating Companies” as used in this Dissertation references companies which make products or deliver
services; ie, companies that generate economic value added to the underlying economy. Operating 
Companies excludes entities that are investment vehicles and merely hold passive minority investments in 
operating entities.  These non-operating entities include mutual funds, exchange traded funds and closed-
end funds, are often described as “Frankenstocks”, and are proliferating at a rapid rate in Canada.  See J. 
Ari Pandes, “Are the Canadian Public Markets Broken?”  (Presentation delivered at the CIRANO 
Conference in Montreal, Quebec on 25 October 2016), online: <https://cirano.qc.ca/actualite/2016-10-
25/pdf/20161025_Are-the-Canadian-Public-Markets-Broken_J-Ari-Pandes.pdf>.   
4 Bryce Tingle, J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, “The IPO Market in Canada: What a Comparison
with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem” (2013) 54 CBLJ 321. 
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significant rate.5  Excluding closed-end funds (“CEF’s), exchange-traded funds (“ETF’s) 
and real estate investment trusts (“REIT’s), there were 751 public Operating Companies 
listed on the TSX as of November 18, 2019.6  By comparison, there were 1,292 operating 
public entities listed on the TSX on January 1, 2008,7 evidencing that the number of 
Operating Companies listed on Canada’s senior exchange has declined by nearly 42% in 
the past dozen years.  In fact, the average yearly drop in the number of Operating 
Company listings on the TSX has held steady at approximately 3% on an annualized 
basis.  If this trend continues, one does not have to extrapolate too far into the future to 
envision a hollowed-out public markets landscape with little relevance to the broader 
economy.   
The precipitous nature of the decline of Canadian public companies has been alarming 
for many capital markets observers, with several commentaries recently published in the 
Canada business news media.8   Yet, the decline in the number of Operating Companies 
listed and traded in the public capital markets is not a phenomenon unique to Canada.  A 
similarly concerning trend in the United States has been documented in numerous 
 
5 Ibid at 334.  
6 TSX Market Intelligence Group Report, November 30, 2019, TMX Group, online< https://www.tsx. 
com/resource/en/2030/mig-report.pdf>. 
7 Source: Ari Pandes and Bryce Tingle, “The Decline of Canadian Public Capital Markets”, upcoming in 
University of Calgary Public Policy Journal; Also, Number of Listed Issuers by year, provided by TSX 
Market Intelligence Group and Bloomberg Markets company listings. 
8 See, for example: (i) Drew Hasselback, “The Amazing Disappearance of the Canadian Public Company” 
The Financial Post (30 May 2016) online:< https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/the-amazing-
disappearance-of-the-canadian-public-company>; (ii) Jason Kirby “Public Companies in Canada Are 
Going the Way of the Dodo”, Macleans (25 August 2016), online: https://www.macleans.ca/economy/ 
economicanalysis/public-companies-in-canada-are-going-the-way-of-the-dodo>; and (iii) Tim Shufelt and 
Christian Pellegrini, “The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market, The Globe and Mail (12 November 2017), 
online:< ttps://www. theglobeandmailcom/report-on-business/invisible-ipos-whats-to-blame-for-the-
exodus-from-publicmarkets/article 34910200>. 
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academic studies9 and in the business media,10 with Western Europe also evidencing 
significant reductions in the number of public Operating Companies during the same 
interval.11   In fact, it is widely recognized that the number of Operating Companies listed 
and traded on public exchanges has been declining from its peak in the early years of this 
millennium in all industrialized western democracies with mature capital markets.  This 
decline is particularly acute amongst small and medium sized enterprises (“SME's”)12, 
where the percentage drop of public Operating Companies is even greater than for larger 
public enterprises.13 
1.2- Relevance and Possible Causes of the Decline 
Understanding that this trend of public company decline is happening throughout the 
industrialized western world, two critical follow-on questions immediately arise: (i) Does 
the decline in the number of Operating Companies in the public markets actually matter? 
and (ii) What factors are most important in relation to the decline in the number of public 
Operating Companies?   
 
9 See, for example: Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stulz, “The U.S. Listing Gap” (2017) 
123 Journal of Financial Economics 464; and Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter and Zhongyan Zhu, “Where Have 
All the IPOs Gone?” (2013) 48:6 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1663. 
10 See, for example: Bloomberg Editorial Board, “Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?”  
Editorial, Bloomberg Opinion (9 April 2018) online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-
09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone>. 
11 Kate Burgess, “IPOs Are Going Downhill Fast” Financial Times (22 November 2015) online:< https:// 
www.ft.com/content/08779c32-ce57-11e4-86fc-00144feab7de>; and Adrian Rollins, “The Disappearing 
Public Company: Why Firms Don’t Want to List” (1 November 2017) Australian CPA Society Website, 
online:< https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2017/11/01/disappearing-public-companies>. 
12 “SME” is a term used in many countries throughout the world, although the definition of an SME varies 
from industry to industry and country to country.  In this Dissertation, the definition of “SME's” utilized is 
the one adopted by Statistics Canada in its ongoing research, which defines SME’s as companies that (i) 
have fewer than 500 employees; and (ii) have less than $50 million ($Cdn) in revenue.  Susan Ward “SME 
Definition (Small to Medium Enterprise) The Balance Small Business Website (10 December 2018), 
online:< https://www.thebalancesmb.com/sme-small-to-medium-enterprise-definition-2947962>.  
13 Marshall Lux and Jack Pead, “Hunting High and Low: The Decline of the Small IPO and What to Do 
About It” Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government: Associate Working Paper Series No. 
86 (April 2018), online:< https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files 
/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/86_final.pdf> at 8. 
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With respect to the first question, there are certainly differing opinions in legal and 
business academia circles as to the degree of concern that the declining public markets 
should engender.  Yet, there is an overriding consensus amongst observers that having 
robust public capital markets with a strong cross-section of Operating Companies from a 
variety of industries is an important part of a healthy economic ecosystem.14    
Among the arguments most commonly advanced as to why the decline in Operating 
Public companies is an important public issue are the following: (i) Operating Companies 
play an important role in the public markets as drivers of employment growth;15 (ii) 
access to the public markets reduces the cost of capital for Operating Companies, creating 
capital that drives innovation and productivity across the economy; (iii) having robust 
IPO markets as eventual outlets for private-stage investor liquidity encourages early-stage 
investment; (iv) public capital markets often place a greater value on corporate social 
responsibility than private markets, thereby facilitating greater investment in socially-
desirable innovation; (v) public markets provide an opportunity for direct participation of 
the middle class in Operating Companies, as smaller investors lack equal access to 
private company investment vehicles compared to high net worth investors or 
institutional investors;16 (vi) more public Operating Companies creates better overall 
corporate governance as evolving best practices are adopted more quickly in public 
entities and eventually filter through to private companies; and (vii) the information 
derived from public company filings is important for both government and private 
analysts to assess economic trends, performance and pricing data that drive policy 
formulation and economic planning (which information is simply not accessible to the 
same degree from private entities).   
 
14 Supra note 4 at 323. 
15 Jay R. Ritter, “Reenergizing the IPO Market” (17 December 2012) online at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2184961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172332 at 7. 
16 As articulated by Mike Silagdaze, CEO of Canadian technology company Tophatmonocle Corp., “[t]he 
reallocation of capital to private markets from public really sucks for the average retail investor because 
now the only people that are getting access to these hyper-growth businesses are basically rich dudes”.  
Supra note 2. 
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Even Dr. Jay Ritter, who is amongst the least alarmist of the academics writing on the 
decline of public markets, states that “ensuring a viable IPO market, alongside venture 
capital and commercial bank financing, is an important part of a well-functioning 
ecosystem to fund investment”.17 
Further validation of the significant public importance of this issue for long term 
economic health is underscored by the fact that both the United States and the European 
Union governments have established taskforces to better understand and respond to the 
challenge of public company decline.18   
In Canada specifically, an additional argument can be advanced as to the heightened 
importance of public company decline by virtue of the fact that the proportion of SME's 
in the Canadian public markets has always been significantly higher than in the United 
States.  With the public markets decline phenomenon more concentrated amongst SME's 
than larger enterprises, the situation is a matter of significant concern with respect to the 
overall growth and trajectory of the economy. 
Turning to the second question, a review of the academic and media analysis of the trend 
evidences that the focus of the literature thus far has been on quantifying the extent of the 
decline in the public markets and then simply hypothesizing as to the root causes.19  
Although there is a significant volume of analysis positing a variety of factors as 
potentially contributing to the decline in public Operating Companies, nobody thus far 
has published any empirical research to validate the actual relevance of those factors to 
 
17  L.D Wilson interview with Dr. Jay Ritter, Joseph B. Cordell Eminent Scholar in Finance, University of 
Florida; interview held at Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary (September 15, 2018) 
18 U.S. IPO Task Force, “Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market 
Back on the Road to Growth” Presented to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (20 October 2011), 
online:< https://www. sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf >; and European IPO 
Task Force, “Rebuilding IPOs in Europe: Creating Jobs and Growth in European Capital Markets” EU 
Task Force Report, posted by Federation of European Securities Exchanges (23 March 2015), online:< 
http:// www.fese.eu/images/documents/speeches-reports/2015/Final_IPO_Task_Force_ 20150323.pdf> 
19 The academic and business media commentary on this topic are reviewed in Chapter 2- Literature 
Review on Public Company Decline hereafter. 
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the decision-making process at the critical inflection point in a private company’s growth 
cycle where a path to pursuing an eventual IPO or alternative private financing source is 
determined. 
The broad categories of factors most frequently cited in the academic literature as 
potentially contributing to the decline in the number of public Operating Companies are 
the following:  
(i) Regulatory Overreach and Resulting Cost Increases- the belief that a string of 
regulatory amendments by securities regulators beginning in the early-2000’s has made 
ongoing compliance too costly and time-consuming for public companies;  
(ii) Private Capital Proliferation- the belief that there has been a significant increase in 
availability of private capital (private equity or private debt financing) to fund anticipated 
development and growth, thereby allowing more Operating Companies to choose to 
remain private for longer periods, even in perpetuity;   
(iii) Litigation Risk- the belief that increased litigation risk for public companies from 
securities class action lawsuits is a public market deterrent;  
(iv) Lack of SME Analyst Coverage- the belief that a combination of changes to the 
public markets trading structure reducing tick sizes for market makers, and new rules 
prohibiting mutual support between the research and investment functions at investment 
banks, disincentivizes support of IPOs and smaller public company research, thereby 
reducing valuations and liquidity for SME public companies;  
(v) Shareholder Short-Termism- the belief that shifting economics in the trading 
ecosystem away from long-term value investing to short-term high-frequency 
computerized share trading programs by institutions and day-traders, along with the 
decline in the number of value investors actively managing their own portfolios 
(choosing to delegate to fund managers), collectively deters public markets (which 
include the proliferation of short-sellers);  
(vi) Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis- the belief that the increasing rate of 
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technological change has made it more advantageous for smaller companies to be 
acquired at an earlier stage in order to compete effectively in the market, thereby pushing 
companies to pursue strategic sales instead of IPOs.    
To this list of six factors highlighted in the academic literature, four additional potential 
factors can be crystallized from business media analysis and conversations with senior 
business executives and professional service providers on the topic of public company 
decline:20  
(i) General Public Company Distraction Fatigue- reflecting the belief that lost 
productivity resulting from the demands of continual interface with public company 
shareholders, proxy advisors, analysts and investment bankers deters senior executives 
from public markets;  
(ii) Quarterly Target Perseveration- referring to the ongoing tension in public entities 
between managing for long-term shareholder value creation versus managing towards 
analyst targets on a revolving quarterly basis;21  
(iii) Public Disclosure Disadvantage- referring to the belief that there are material and 
inherent disadvantages facing public companies as a result of mandatory disclosure of 
critical information to competitors, customers and suppliers as well as the aversion of 
senior management to the breadth and universal accessibility of contemporary executive 
compensation disclosure; and 
(iv) Social Agenda Weaponization- referring to the evolution of the corporate social 
responsibility movement and the increased willingness and capacity of secondary 
stakeholders to exert pressure on public companies through means only available in the 
 
20 The academic and business media sources consulted are discussed later in this Dissertation under  
Chapter 2- Literature Review. 
21 This factor is another manifestation of market short-termism generally, but is distinguished from 
shareholder short-termism in that the impetus for this form of short-termism is driven by analyst 
expectations and the reporting cycle rather than the investment horizon of shareholders. 
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public markets. 22 
Amongst the preceding list of the ten categories of factors posited as being likely 
contributors to the decline in the number of public Operating Companies, which ones are 
actually most important to the senior business decision-makers determining whether to 
take a particular company down a public or private path?  
Where academic and media commentators have frequently endeavored to articulate the 
likely factors contributing to the capital markets decline, the explanations are thus far 
derived solely from anecdotal evidence gleaned from a limited number of industry 
experts (often senior securities regulators) who are relaying opinions influenced by their 
personal experiences and observation.  While certainly well-informed, individual 
opinions from observers do not equate to empirical data.  In the very few instances where 
academics have attempted to apply empirical research methodology to the problem thus 
far, such studies have been limited to utilizing available listing, trading and other 
financial data to test the relevant author’s hypotheses that a particular factor included in 
the preceding list can be empirically validated as contributing to the phenomenon based 
on the hard data.23   
Prior to this Dissertation, no research project has yet been published which attempts to 
empirically validate the degree to which the categories of potential contributing factors 
outlined above are considered as important in the decision-making process by the specific 
individuals who are responsible for making the ultimate decision to take a company 
public. 
 
22 An 11th category of factors can also be added, not heretofore discussed in any of the literature: Systemic 
Portfolio Shift- referring to the migration of investment capital away from actively-managed funds willing 
to invest in IPOs into passively-managed funds (such as ETF's) that only invest in benchmark stocks tied to 
indexes.  This factor was brought up exclusively by investment bankers in the open text response questions 
and in live presentations. 
23 For example: Gao, et al, Supra note 9; and Michael Ewens and Joan Farre-Mensas, “The Deregulation 
of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs” (2018) Cornerstone Research, Working Paper, 
online:< https:// westernfinance-portal.org/viewp.php?n=546476>. 
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1.3- Seeking to Arrest Public Company Decline Through 
Regulatory Reform 
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical data as to which of the possible contributing 
factors are most important in contributing to public company decline, there has been an 
overriding assumption made throughout developed western democratic nations that 
regulatory overreach is, at the very least, one of the major factors.  Following from this 
assumption is the belief that implementing securities sector regulatory reforms reducing 
the time, complexity and cost of public company compliance is an important step to 
arresting the further erosion of the number of public Operating Companies.   
The United States was the first country to bring in a regulatory reform package directed 
at reducing perceived regulatory overreach and thereby reversing the decline in IPOs with 
the April 2012 passage of the Jump-Start our Business Start-Ups (“JOBS”) Act.24  Early 
academic analysis of the impact of the JOBS Act evidenced a belief that it was having a 
significant positive effect in the IPO market,25 but subsequent years’ performance have 
demonstrated that any gains were temporary and insufficient to arrest the overall decline 
of the number of public Operating Companies in the United States.26   
More recently, the Trump administration has announced its intent to support further 
regulatory streamlining to reduce the compliance burden on listed companies by asking 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to consider biannual financial reporting 
amongst other reform ideas.27  This is an obvious indication of the belief by the President 
that the problem of public company decline can be addressed by ad hoc securities 
regulatory reform. 
 
24 The JOBS Act: Public Law 112-105, House Bill Number H.R. 3606, Signed into law on April 5, 2012. 
25 Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew T. Gustafson, “The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: 
Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision” (2015) 116 Journal of Financial Economics 121. 
26 Supra note 13 at 6. 
27 Michael J. de la Merced and Matt Phillips, “Trump Asks S.E.C. to Study Quarterly Requirements for 
Public Firms” New York Times (17 August 2018) online:< https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/business 
/dealbook/trump-quarterly-earnings.html>. 
10 
 
The current United States administration is not alone in this belief.  In Europe, the first 
recommendation of the European IPO Taskforce was the creation of a more streamlined 
regulatory environment for small and medium size listed companies to lower the costs 
and complexity of ongoing compliance.28   
In Canada, the Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”), an umbrella organization 
for collaboration between the provincial and territorial securities regulators, recently 
undertook a year-long analysis and consultation process pursuant to CSA Consultation 
Paper 51-404 (“CP 51-404) which was specifically focused on reducing the regulatory 
burden for public Operating Companies.29  The CSA consultation process involved a 
request for public comment which resulted in responses being submitted from various 
constituencies within the public markets ecosystem that will be discussed later in this 
Dissertation.  At the end of the CSA consultation process, each of the provincial and 
territorial securities regulatory bodies were tasked by the CSA with initiating their own 
internal processes to consider whether, and how, to implement the regulatory 
streamlining proposals that were identified through the CSA initiative.30  
The Ontario Securities Commission (the “OSC”) represents the first securities 
commission in Canada to follow through on implementing a formal streamlining process, 
issuing OSC Staff Notice 11-784 (“OSC 11-784”) on January 14, 2019 announcing the 
creation of the OSC Burden Reduction Taskforce.31  In conjunction with OSC Notice 11-
784, the OSC published a document entitled “Burden Reduction Survey” and held a 
 
28 E.U. IPO Taskforce, supra note 18 at 10. 
29 CSA Consultation Paper 51-404, “Considerations for Reducing Regulatory Burden for Non-Investment 
Fund Reporting Issuers” (6 April 2017), online:< http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_ 
20170405_51-404_considerations-for-reducing-regulatory-burden.htm>.  
30 CSA Staff Notice 51-353 “Update on CSA Consultation Paper 51-404 Considerations for Reducing 
Regulatory Burden for Non-Investment Fund Reporting Issuers” (17 March 2018), online: 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca /en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20180327_51-353_fund-reporting-issuers.htm>.  
Hereinafter referred to as “CSA 51-353”. 
31 OSC Staff Notice 11-784 “Burden Reduction” (14 January 2019), online: <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca 
/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20190114_11-784_burden-reduction.htm>.   
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series of roundtable discussions between March and May 2019.  Recently, the OSC gave 
a detailed update on the history, current status and future priorities for its burden 
reduction initiative in a report entitled “Reducing Regulatory Burden in Ontario’s Capital 
Markets” (hereinafter referred to as the OSC Burden Reduction Report”).32  It is unclear 
as to what degree the OSC Burden Reduction Taskforce was created in response to the 
mandate handed to the OSC as a result of the CSA CP 51-404 as opposed to a change in 
focus directed by the new conservative provincial government in Ontario.  However, it 
appears that the latter factor was the more important driving force, but the OSC is 
nevertheless now clearly focused on a mandate of burden reduction. 
One of the key elements of this Dissertation is consideration of the specific details of the 
CSA and OSC burden reduction processes, assessing whether the existing regulatory 
reform initiatives appear to be on a path that is likely to be successful in stemming further 
public company decline in Canada.  As part of that analysis, the CSA CP 51-404 and 
OSC Notice 11-784 processes, priorities and outcomes thus far will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this Dissertation in Chapter 4, followed by analysis of the 
implications of the observations and conclusions in this Dissertation for those regulatory 
processes in Chapter 10. 
In summary, the research problem that is the focus of this Dissertation is properly 
summarized as follows: (i) a precipitous decline in the number of public Operating 
Companies has been validated across industrialized western democracies and is 
particularly acute in Canada; (ii) the decline is widely acknowledged as being both 
important and concerning, given that a robust market for public Operating Companies is 
an integral component of a healthy financial ecosystem; (iii) several countries, including 
Canada, have initiated regulatory reform initiatives designed to streamline ongoing 
compliance requirements on the assumption that regulatory overreach is an important 
contributing factor to public Operating Company decline; (iv) there has been significant 
 
32 Ontario Securities Commission, “Reducing Regulatory Burden in Ontario’s Capital markets”, OSC 
report (19 November 2019) online:< https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/20191119_reducing-
regulatory-burden-in-ontario-capital-markets.pdf>. 
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academic and business media speculation on the underlying causes of the decline in 
public Operating Companies based on anecdotal evidence, but the empirical research on 
the topic to date has been limited to analysis of listing and financial data; and (v) there is, 
thus far, no empirical evidence of the significance of factors relevant in the go public / 
stay private decision for senior business decision makers and public markets influencers 
that would make it possible to assess whether the type of regulatory reforms currently 
being pursued are likely to be successful in stemming the further decline of public 
Operating Companies. 
1.4- Research Study Objectives 
The principal objective of the survey-based empirical research study conducted on public 
company decline in Canada (referred to herein as the “PCD Study”) underpinning this 
Dissertation is to address the critical gap in the existing academic canon on the following 
two key questions:  
(i) Which, of the numerous categories of factors posited as potentially contributing to 
public Operating Company decline in Canada, are actually most important to Canadian 
senior business decision-makers and key public markets influencers in making the 
decision as to whether to take a company public or pursue private financing alternatives?  
(ii) What are the implications of the conclusions reached from analysis of the empirical 
data generated in study of the first question for ongoing Canadian securities regulatory 
reform initiatives focused on public company burden reduction? 
Understanding which of the various factors can be empirically validated as being the 
most influential in the decision-making process is critically important as a reference tool 
instructing future regulatory initiatives.  Certain factors can be directly addressed and 
remediated by regulatory streamlining or other regulatory initiatives.  Other factors are 
endemic to public companies by their nature, reflect the evolution of our economic 
system over time or are reflections of the adoption of new technologies.  These particular 
factors cannot be easily addressed by securities regulatory reform and intuitively require 
more broad-based and aggressive forms of governmental intervention in order to 
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overcome.   
The PCD Study, and the accompanying analysis in this Dissertation, seeks to provide an 
empirical foundation on which to assess the need, scope and priorities for future 
regulatory reform initiatives specifically designed to stimulate new listings for public 
Operating Companies.  In Canada, the PCD Study research project is particularly timely 
as the provincial and territorial securities regulators beyond Ontario are only now 
beginning to frame their individual responses to the CSA 51-504 initiative.  It is hoped 
that the Canadian securities regulators will consider the conclusions of the PCD Study in 
prioritizing and framing their final regulatory responses.  
 It is further hoped that the provincial and federal governments will realize the scope and 
significance of the public company decline phenomenon to the future of the Canadian 
capital markets, and begin to consider what roles they can and should play in broader 
policy initiatives to ensure the future viability of the Canadian public markets.  As is 
discussed later in this Dissertation at several points, the securities regulators simply do 
not have the tools in their toolbox to single-handedly stem the tide of public company 
decline in Canada.  Only federal and provincial governments can access the necessary 
reforms and policy initiatives that could reasonably be expected to sustainably stimulate 
IPO volume to the extent necessary to see a growth in the number of Operating 
Companies. 
Prior to execution of the PCD Study, it was anticipated that the study data would confirm 
the evolving consensus in the academic literature that the key contributing factors related 
to public company decline are multi-factorial and not dominated by a particular category 
of factors.  It was, however, completely unknown which particular factors would be 
proven to be most important in the analysis, and what the relative influence of the factors 
would be in terms of their importance in the decision-making process by corporate 
leadership to pursue private versus public alternatives.  In this area, the PCD Study 
results have proven to be illuminative. 
Ultimately, the PCD Study strongly supports the conclusion that the key elements 
contributing to public company decline in Canada are indeed multi-factorial.  In fact, the 
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PCD Study data evidences that there are a number of different categories of factors with 
similar degrees of importance to the overall phenomenon, such that no single factor, or 
even a single category of factors, can be distinguished from the others and designated as 
the primary culprit responsible for public company decline in Canada.  The more data 
that is considered from the PCD Study, the greater that the complexity associated with 
public company decline becomes apparent.  By extension, that knowledge also dictates 
that the solutions to arresting public company decline are complex and costly. 
1.5- An Important Assumption of the PCD Study 
How can one pursue a course of research to empirically determine the degree of 
relevance of the various categories of factors posited as contributing to operating public 
company decline?  First, one must consider that there is an important assumption 
underpinning the design and execution of the PCD Study; i.e., that the decision on 
whether to go or remain public is a conscious decision made by corporate leaders based 
on their perception of the relative advantages and disadvantages of going public versus 
the non-public financing options available to the company.    
This critical “conscious decision” assumption is not expressly articulated at length in any 
of the academic literature addressing public Operating Company decline.  Does this lack 
of analysis in the literature mean that the critical assumption is at risk of being exposed as 
inaccurate, thereby undermining the focus and methodology of the PCD Study research?  
In other words, has a fundamental systemic change occurred in the public markets 
ecosystem that has removed, or materially reduced, the opportunity for Operating 
Companies to pursue a public listing, such that the decline in IPO volume is not 
principally the result of conscious choice of senior company leadership, but rather a 
business imperative?  The simple answer to that complex question is “no”.  There is 
nothing in the literature or the PCD Study data that suggests that the decline in the 
number of public Operating Companies to date reflects anything other than an evolution 
over time in the conscious preference of corporate decision-makers towards private 
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financing alternatives.33   
The principal advantages of pursuing an IPO have been well articulated and understood 
for decades: lower ultimate cost of capital (i.e., higher trading multiples), speed of 
follow-on financings for public entities, liquidity for shareholders, increased ability to 
attract talent by using equity incentives and the prestige and credibility associated with 
public company status.  Throughout the industrialized western world, and in Canada in 
particular, it is apparent that there remains a significant demand amongst investment 
banks and public shareholders for new IPO inventory.  Public companies in North 
 
33 Of the 10 categories of factors posited in the literature as being potentially responsible for the decline in 
public Operating Companies discussed above, only one does not clearly engage a conscious decision by 
corporate leadership, namely the Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis.  The co-originator of the 
Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis (Dr. Jay Ritter) has clearly articulated that the decision to 
pursue strategic acquisitions of their companies instead of pursuing IPO alternatives remains a conscious 
decision by corporate leadership as a function of value optimization strategy.  As such, the opportunity to 
pursue IPOs is not impacted by the Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis. See Jay Ritter, supra note 
17. 
A second factor that does not clearly support the conscious decision assumption is the Systemic Portfolio 
Shift factor which is described as representing an “11th” category of potential contributing factors in note 
22, supra.  Notably, this particular factor is not identified anywhere in the literature on public company 
decline or by any participants in the PCD Study outside the investment banking community. Yet, it was 
brought up repeatedly in the qualitative analysis responses to Q17 and also during live presentations made 
to the investment banking community.  The quick answer (with more detail in note 22) is that Systemic 
Portfolio Shift has the potential to act as a constraint on IPO volume in Canada in the future, but has not 
been a limiting factor that has contributed in depressed IPO volume up to this point.  Therefore, it does not 
undermine the proposed methodology of the PCD Study research. The investment banker subgroup alone in 
the PCD Study noted that there has been a significant shift over the past decade in investment capital in 
Canada away from actively-managed mutual funds and into passively-managed ETF’s.  The investment 
bankers advised that ETF’s generally purchase stocks based on indexes and do not participate as part of the 
buying group in individual IPOs. Notably, mutual funds have historically been some of the largest buyers 
of IPOs in Canada. 
The implication of this shift of funds from actively-managed investment vehicles to passively-managed 
investment vehicles is that the pool of capital available to participate in Canadian IPOs by mutual funds is 
shrinking annually.  This systemic shift in capital within the investment fund market has the potential to 
impact the IPO market in the future if the trendline continues, and therefore is one more factor that  
highlights future risk of further degradation of the public capital markets in Canada. 
However, in reference to the validity of the “conscious decision” assumption underpinning the course of 
research in the PCD Study, the investment bankers clearly stated that the depressed IPO market in Canada 
over the past several years has meant that this shift in investment capital has not yet impacted their ability 
to fill their IPO allotments or their desire to pursue IPOs for strong IPO candidates in Canada.  As such, 
there is no question, as of yet, that the shift from actively-managed investment vehicles to passively-
managed investment vehicles in Canada has contributed to the phenomenon of public company decline that 
has occurred thus far.  As such, this factor also does not challenge the “conscious decision” assumption. 
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America and Europe are trading at some of the highest multiples of earnings in history.  
As such, none of the authorities writing in this area seriously challenge that the 
opportunity for companies to pursue public listings has fundamentally changed; 34 rather, 
it understood that it is the collective preference of the corporate decision-makers that has 
evolved to favour non-public alternatives.   
Any strong growth-stage private company requiring significant equity capital to fund 
further expansion that is currently considering an IPO in Canada will certainly have other 
forms of private financing available to it, and the ultimate decision to undertake the cost 
and distractions of an IPO will only occur if the corporate decision-makers determine that 
the net benefit to the company of going public outweighs the net benefit of pursuing 
private alternatives.  The decline in the number of the Operating Companies pursuing 
IPOs and remaining public over the long term must, therefore, necessarily represent a 
fundamental shift in perception by corporate decision-makers in Canada and other 
industrialized western democracies on the relative merits, costs and opportunities 
associated with being public versus pursuing available private options. 
1.6- Potential Study Application Outside of Canada 
With respect to potential applicability of the PCD Study outside of Canada, it is 
acknowledged that each country’s public market contains its own nuances and 
peculiarities and that the inferences drawn from a Canadian study cannot be universally 
applied without additional consideration.   
However, the fact that the decline in the number of Operating Companies has occurred 
throughout industrialized western countries at similar rates over similar periods of time is 
certainly suggestive of the fact that significant overlap exists in the major contributing 
factors.  A general consistency of proposed explanations for public company decline 
throughout the academic literature from different countries also supports the belief that a 
significant degree of commonality exists amongst the contributing factors, even if the 
 
34 Supra note 4 at 353. 
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relative weight of the contributing factors is not determined to be identical in each 
country.  As such, the findings and analysis developed through the PCD Study may well 
serve as a starting point for further empirical analysis of a similar stream in other 
industrialized western democracies, subject to testing for the impact of the unique 
elements of each country’s capital markets ecosystem on the relative weighting of the 
criteria examined in this study. 
1.7- Researching Where Others Have Not Yet Tread 
It has been mentioned previously that a complete void in empirical research currently 
exists with respect to any attempt to assess the relative importance of the principal factors 
contributing to public company decline in Canada, the United States and elsewhere.  This 
lack of empirical research output is clearly not a result of the fact that few people have 
identified the existence of public company decline or fail to recognize it as a topic worthy 
of analysis.  This fact is evidenced by the volume of academic literature discussed in 
Chapter 2 hereafter hypothesizing as to the possible causes of public company decline 
and decrying the lack of empirical data.  Why, then, has this void in empirical research 
continued to persist?  There are three explanations, all of which have likely played a role.   
First, there is no existing database or other empirical source that can be accessed, mined, 
or manipulated to generate the source data required to analyze this topic.  The existing 
data only allows academics to quantify the nature and extent of public company decline, 
not to clarify the relevance of categories of factors potentially contributing to the 
phenomenon. Existing data also allows academics to define trends related to certain of 
the potential contributing factors, such as determining the change in size of total pool of 
available private equity capital for investment in private companies at various points in 
time.  However, none of this existing data clarifies the extent to which the posited 
categories of contributing factors actually impact the ultimate decision-making process of 
the key decision-makers and influencers as to whether to pursue public or private 
alternatives for their business.  Therefore, any researcher seeking to empirically study this 
area must generate the foundational data through their own efforts.  This is a time-
consuming and often expensive process, resulting in fewer researchers willing to invest in 
the generation of new data from the source. 
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Second, securing the engagement of senior decision-makers and key public markets 
influencers on the topic of public company decline in sufficient numbers is extremely 
challenging.  The groups of target participants in the PCD Study all are extremely busy, 
balancing multiple demands on their time, working long hours, and having been 
successful in highly competitive environments.  These are not the groups in society who 
are easily convinced to devote additional time to research projects for which they receive 
no direct reward.  As such, most academics simply choose to focus their research efforts 
in areas where data collection is perceived to attract fewer hurdles than are apparent in 
the PCD Study.  Indeed, the Research Methodology chapter later in this Dissertation 
discloses the degree of effort that was directed towards enrollment of PCD Study 
participants. 
Third, this is an area of research that overlaps the academic fields of corporate law and 
business / finance. From the corporate law perspective in Canada, the use of survey 
methodology to generate empirical data is a foreign concept. From the business 
perspective, there is a dichotomy in academia between the relatively small group of 
academic researchers who are familiar and comfortable with the proper use, interpretation 
and limitations of survey data and the majority of academic researchers who are not.  
Most of the academics who have a deep knowledge of survey methodology in the 
business arena are from the marketing discipline.  Notably, this is not the particular 
discipline within business academia that has traditionally focused on the public company 
decline issue. 
Indeed, the primary academic focus on public company decline from business scholarship 
has come from the finance discipline.  Academics coming from a finance background are 
often historically suspicious of survey data that they frequently denigrate as constituting 
“soft” data.  The finance-focused academics prefer to base their research pursuits on 
“hard” forms of data that they recognize and can easily verify from independent sources.  
This does not include perceptions of individuals that are generated through survey data.   
Yet, nobody has yet identified a research methodology to generate the type of “hard” data 
that would be familiar to a finance academic in terms of assessing the relative import of 
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the factors posited as contributing to public company decline.  Consequently, for over a 
decade, the academic analysis on the topic of public company decline has failed to 
materially advance, with writers in this space continuing to lament the lack of empirical 
data.  
The genesis of the PCD Study was the observation that public company decline is 
certainly an issue of significant importance to the Canadian economy in need of some 
form of empirical analysis to better inform the ongoing regulatory reform initiatives.  All 
realistic empirical methodologies for studying this phenomenon were evaluated, resulting 
in the chosen study design utilizing survey methodology by process of elimination.   
Certainly, the limitations of the data generated from the PCD Study must be understood 
and acknowledged at the outset.  The qualitative and quantitative data that has been 
collected from the respondents is descriptive in nature, not designed to establish 
statistical causation. However, it is submitted that the data gathered in the PCD Study is 
rich in its breadth and depth, and valuable in offering a previously unavailable snapshot 
of the perceptions of the decision-makers and influencers on the key topics embedded in 
the phenomenon of public company decline.  The PCD Study data discloses which of the 
numerous categories of factors posited as contributing to public decline are perceived as 
most important by the specific individuals who are making (and influencing) the critical 
decision as to whether to take companies public in Canada.   
The PCD Study also generates the type of data that can be used to predict behavior based 
on the opinions expressed. The correlation between perception on a particular issue, as 
expressed by participants in surveys, and the ultimate outcome of future decisions 
relating to that same issue has been repeatedly verified and is widely accepted in business 
marketing academic circles.35  
While it is understood why nobody has undertaken this type of survey-based research 
 
35 Lara R. Glasman and Dolores Albarracin, “Forming Attitudes that Predict Future Behavior: A Meta-
Analysis of the Attitude Behavior Relation” (2006) 132(5) Psychology Bulletin 778.  This articles reviews 
more than 100 primary sources and 10 previous meta-analysis on the subject. 
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project to generate empirical data on public company decline thus far, it is submitted that 
there is significant value in doing so.  Although certainly difficult to obtain and subject to 
limitations with respect to its inability to prove causality, the specific insights that can be 
gleaned from PCD Study data justify the significant effort expended to generate that data.  
Particularly given the vacuum in empirical data that existed prior to the PCD Study, it 
provides industry participants, regulators and academics studying the topic multiple 
empirical reference points that previously did not exist. 
1.8- A Brief Aside on the Nature of Recent Bursts of Activity in 
the Canadian Public Markets 
As a final element of the introductory chapter of this Dissertation, it is worth questioning 
why Canada has been so slow to identify, and respond to, the critical issue of the decline 
of Operating Companies in its public markets.   
One obvious reason, as mentioned above, is that the Operating Company decline has 
been masked by an accompanying increase in the number of ETF’s and closed-end funds 
listed on the TSX.  This shift in investment capital into these new vehicles has given the 
illusion of a relatively robust capital market as a result of the significant corporate finance 
transactions and trading volume generated at the senior exchange level, providing some 
replacement revenue to the TSX and to the public markets ecosystem which would have 
otherwise starved on the lack of Operating Company IPOs. The total listing numbers of 
these non-operating entity stocks has also obscured the extent and speed of Operating 
Company decline in Canada at a headline level, as the TSX does not distinguish between 
operating and non-operating businesses in its summary listing numbers.   
Yet, a decline in the volume of new non-operating companies being listed must also be 
on the horizon as the saturation level for ETF’s and closed-end funds approaches.  The 
pool of Operating Companies that those non-operating entities invest in continues to 
shrink, and it is inevitable that the shrinking pool of Operating Companies will ultimately 
have a negative impact on the sustainability of the non-operating funds. 
Even more concerning at a macro level, though, for those who desire to see a healthy and 
sustainable public capital markets ecosystem in Canada is the nature of the IPO market in 
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Canada over the past few years.  The depressed overall nature of the Canadian IPO 
market generally has been discussed, but it is also important to note that a material 
portion of the IPO volume that has occurred in Canada in recent times, during short-lived 
and frenzied bursts of activity, is attributable to the blockchain and cannabis industries.   
With due respect to the participants and investors in those industries, these two industries 
are classic examples of what may be the single worst character trait of the public markets; 
namely, its perseveration on, and susceptibility to, irrationality surrounding whatever 
industry is currently being portrayed as representing the “next big thing”.  With respect to 
both blockchain and cannabis, the recent IPO and trading frenzies were demonstrably not 
based on any traditional metrics of long-term business valuation.  The inevitable results 
are public market bubbles, and the resulting boom and bust cycles.  
That the only signs of significant life in the IPO market in Canada in the past few years 
are attributable to blockchain and cannabis may be as disturbing as the overall decline in 
Operating Company volume generally.  If the Canadian public markets are relegated to 
representing a sphere of overly-optimistic exuberance for high-risk nascent industries 
such as blockchain and cannabis, the implications are dire.  If the only viable IPOs over a 
period to time arise in industries that are viewed as too inherently risky or overvalued 
such that they are shunned by traditional private equity, then the blockchain and cannabis 
booms may be considered further evidence of an underlying malaise in the public 
markets.   
Unless and until the public markets see a sustainable resurgence in Operating Company 
IPOs relating to businesses that are profitable and economically sustainable over the 
long-term, the phenomenon of ongoing public company decline will inevitably continue.  
These short periods of market irrationality and the gold-rush mentality that has 
accompanied both the blockchain and cannabis bubbles are certainly evidence of 
something, but not a broader return to health of the public markets.   
With due respect to the authors of the PWC quarterly report on IPOs in Canada 
referenced earlier, any analysis of the actual health of the Canadian public markets needs 
to look behind the headline statistics on total IPO volume and dollars raised, and 
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seriously assess the nature, profitability and long-term sustainability of the companies 
that are going public.  Otherwise, the IPO volume that is reported and celebrated as 
evidencing temporary signs of life in the capital market may in reality be further evidence 
of the relegation of Canadian public markets to the fringes of the economy where private 
capital sources are unwilling to participate at inflated values.  To resort to a popular 
metaphor, the “light” that blockchain and cannabis have represented to the Canadian 
capital markets over the past few years may, instead of being a ray of hope that the end of 
public company decline is in sight, actually be more evidence of an oncoming train.36 
  
 
36 Further analysis of this hypothesis is complex and beyond the scope of this Dissertation. 
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 Literature Review 
2.1- Introduction- Literature on Public Company Decline 
The first significant challenge in crafting this literature review chapter is determining 
how broadly to cast the net in terms of coverage of the subject area.  The general subject 
of IPOs is one of the most widely studied topics in the field of business law and also in 
finance throughout the academic world. Thousands of articles have been published on 
various IPO issues over the past few decades.  Clearly, the net cannot be cast so widely in 
this chapter so as to encompass all of the historical academic analysis of IPOs. 
To restrict the material included in this literature review to a manageable size, the focus is 
directed towards that body of academic literature that deals with the specific subject of 
contemporary public company decline in the industrialized west.  As such, the majority 
of the works discussed in this chapter are from 2006 (i.e., the time at which the current 
market trend in public company decline was first identified in the United States) and 
later.  The material covered also largely originates from the United States, Europe and 
Canada (i.e., the specific jurisdictions primarily impacted by the phenomenon). 
However, in order to place this topic within recognized frameworks of legal analysis, it is 
important to include in the analysis a brief overview of two streams of academic literature 
that significantly influenced modern theory with respect to public companies.  These 
influential works played a role in informing the contemporary regulatory regimes that are 
now being impugned as potentially contributing to public company demise.  As such, this 
literature review also includes selected articles on these two streams of literature that pre-
date the discovery of the public company decline phenomenon in the industrialized west 
in 2006, yet were still influential in informing contemporary theory and regulatory 
treatment of the public company. 
Also relating to the proper extent of coverage in this literature review, the topic of public 
company decline is a subject area in which it is sometimes difficult to draw a bright-line 
distinction between classic academic literature and the coverage of the topic in the 
business media.  Serious academics have published pieces on public company decline in 
the business media, and many business media articles extensively quote academics as 
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their primary authorities.  On occasion, the quotes from academics included in the 
business media articles supplement, extend or clarify the academics’ previous analysis 
from more traditional academic forums.   
Yet, public company decline is a subject area in which the opinions and perceptions of 
business experts outside of the traditional academic sphere can be of critical importance.  
Securities regulators, government ministers, investment bankers, venture capitalists, 
private equity financiers, securities lawyers and accountants all have opinions and 
perceptions formed by their ongoing engagement on the front lines of the public company 
ecosphere. These opinions and perceptions are often largely ignored or minimized by 
academics as being self-interested as a result of the obvious financial incentives of these 
participants to ensure the continuity of robust public markets in driving fee revenue for 
their businesses.  Nevertheless, the degree to which perspectives from outside of 
academia align or diverge from the academic literature should be considered.  
Consequently, a representative sample of opinions on public company decline in the 
business media from non-traditional academic voices is included in this literature review. 
The second critical question faced in framing this literature review is determining how 
best to present the relevant literature as a logical and coherent narrative.  A single method 
of categorizing the relevant literature without being confusingly circular and repetitive is 
elusive, so the narrative in this chapter is organized based on a combination of categories 
in terms of subject matter, sphere of origin and geography. 
The first section of this literature review covers the few foundational pieces that have had 
the greatest influence on the modern theory of the public company, introducing the 
notions of agency costs and the role of legal frameworks in creating the preconditions for 
robust capital markets.   
The second section highlights key academic pieces analyzing the decision to go public, 
including the motivations and timing of the business decision-makers.  In this section, we 
introduce two research studies that are discussed at greater length later in this 
Dissertation in the “Research Methodologies” and “Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD 
Study” chapters.  These two articles reflect the two previous instances in which an 
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attempt has been made to assess the motivations of key decision-makers in the going-
public process through the use of survey methodology, thereby providing significant 
instruction and comparisons for the research efforts in the PCD Study.    
The third section of this literature review covers the extensive body of literature 
addressing public company decline in the United States, broken down into four 
subsections: (i) business media articles; (ii) government and industry-sponsored 
literature; (iii) academic literature focusing specifically on the impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley37 on public company decline; and (iv) academic literature that goes beyond 
Sarbanes-Oxley in searching for explanations for the phenomenon of public company 
decline.   
The fourth section of this literature review covers European literature on public company 
decline broken into two sections: (i) business media; and (ii) government and industry-
sponsored literature.  Analysis on this topic is notably absent in the European academic 
sphere. 
The fifth section covers Canadian literature on public company decline, broken into three 
sections: (i) business media; (ii) government and industry-sponsored literature; and (iii) 
academic literature.   
The sixth section briefly covers other western democratic countries likely impacted by 
the phenomenon of public company decline.  
A final section considers the critical literature relating to an ongoing academic dispute as 
to the relevance of one of the particular factors posited as potentially contributing to 
public company decline: shareholder short-termism. 
 
37 United States. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763.   Referred to herein as “Sarbanes-Oxley” 
or “SOX”. 
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2.2- Theory of the Firm & the Impact of Regulation 
 American Business Media 
The phenomenon of public company decline in the U.S. capital markets has been widely 
covered in the American business media. There are dozens of articles that outline the 
extent of the decline and hypothesize as to its causes.  The Wall Street Journal alone has 
published more than 10 articles on the topic.38  Although the reported number of public 
companies listed at the peak of the U.S. market in 1997 varies depending on the source 
(and whether foreign listings in the U.S. are included or not), there is broad agreement 
that the number of domestic U.S. issuers listed today is approximately half of the number 
listed at the peak.  Notably, there are no recent business news articles suggesting that the 
phenomenon of public company decline is temporary or is expected to reverse at a future 
point.  Nor are there any business media articles that propose to have any definitive 
explanations for the decline.  Most business media articles conclude that the underlying 
causes are indeterminate and then proceed to outline a few of the potential causes from 
the factors that are outlined previously in this Dissertation.  The Wall Street Journal 
points out the irony that a well-known index, the “Wilshire 5,000”, has become a 
perpetual misnomer because there haven’t been 5,000 companies listed in the U.S. for 
more than a decade.39  The U.S. business media reports also demonstrate that this issue 
remains on the radar for the current administration, advising in August 2018 that 
President Trump has directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to 
evaluate the ramifications of reducing public company financial reporting to twice per 
year.40  
 
38 For example: Jason M. Thomas “Where Have all the Public Companies Gone?” (16 November 2017) 
WallStreet Journal, online:< https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone-
1510869125>. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Michael J. Merced, and Matt Phillips, “Trump Asks S.E.C. to Study Quarterly Requirements for Public 
Firms” New York Times (17 August 2018) online:< https://www .nytimes.com/ 2018/08/17/business/ 
dealbook/trump-quarterly-earnings.html>. 
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Where a fundamental disagreement arises in the business media is on the key issue of 
whether the phenomenon of public company decline is particularly worrisome for the 
economy and what it portends for the future of the U.S. capital markets.  Two articles 
will be discussed as examples, each supporting a different position on this critical issue, 
both of which were published in credible business media forums. 
The first article was co-written by four professors, two from Ivy League business schools 
(Dartmouth and Columbia) and two from Canadian business schools (Calgary and 
Victoria).41 In this article, the group of professors contend that the decline in the number 
of public companies is not particularly worrisome.  They build their argument on the fact 
that most capital-intensive industries have been transferred from the U.S. to Asia.  They 
also point out that the American economy is now based largely on technological 
innovation.  They further posit that the biggest contributing factor leading to public 
company decline is that “digital strategies and rapid technological obsolescence” 
combine to decrease the lifespans of U.S. public companies without creating any 
increased demands for IPOs.42  The most controversial portion of their analysis is the 
concluding paragraph: 
So, what can be done to increase the number of listed companies in the 
U.S. exchanges — and is that even a worthwhile objective? Although we 
often treat the stock market as a barometer of economic activity and a 
healthy IPO market as the hallmark of successful entrepreneurial pursuits, 
there is no evidence that the recent decline in number of listed firms has 
adversely affected the U.S. economy. The aggregate market capitalization 
of listed companies keeps increasing, unemployment remains manageable, 
and U.S. retains its leadership in technological progress. The only change 
is that more deals are done with private funds and more companies come 
to [the] IPO market having been initially financed by venture capitalists 
than ever before. Public investors do not miss out [on] the action either. 
Institutional investors now channel more and more of common investors’ 
savings towards digital companies, by taking stakes in private equity 
 
41 Vijay Govindarjan, et al, “Why We Shouldn’t Worry About the Declining Number of Public 
Companies” (27 August 2018) Harvard Business Review, online:< https://hbr.org/2018/08/why-we-
shouldnt-worry-about-the-declining-number-of-public-companies>. 
42 Ibid.  
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funds. In sum, the decline in the number of listing companies is a sign of 
successful adaptation of organizational structures by U.S. corporations, 
keeping up with their changing business strategies. It should be applauded, 
not considered a cause for concern.43 
This is a very bold statement and, if proved to be true, could be argued to undermine one 
of the fundamental premises of this Dissertation and the accompanying research project; 
i.e., that retaining a robust capital markets environment is of significant public concern 
and that public company decline matters.  
However, the view of Govindarjan et al is very much a minority position in academia at 
this point in time.  Govindarjan et al also fundamentally overstate the access to private 
deals available to the average retail investor through traditional mutual funds.  Although 
the recent increase in availability of alternative mutual funds willing to invest in private 
transactions has changed the investment landscape to a degree, investing in companies 
through a mutual fund does not provide the same opportunity to investors as investing in 
those same companies if they had gone public.  First, the best private equity deals are not 
currently available to the average retail investors through mutual funds to the degree 
suggested by this article.  The most attractive private equity investments continue to be 
controlled by the traditional private equity funds available only to high net worth 
investors.  Second, the layers of management fees and success-based participation fees 
charged for participation in private equity through mutual funds is significant, thereby 
reducing the ultimate return on investment to investors.  Third, investing in a private 
company through a mutual fund requires the investor to purchase the entire basket of 
private company investments owned by the mutual fund, depriving the investor of the 
opportunity to pick and choose their own ultimate investee companies. 
Further, the authors’ view of digitization and increased speed of obsolescence being the 
primary cause of public company decline is overly simplistic in describing the 
phenomenon.  The PCD Study outcomes, discussed in the ensuing chapters of this 
Dissertation, demonstrate that the factors proposed by Govindarjan et al as being the 
 
43 Ibid. 
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most significant contributing factors to the public company decline phenomenon are not 
supported by the empirical findings. 
A counterpoint against the position of Govindarjan et al is an article published in The 
Atlantic in November 2018 entitled “The Death of the IPO” written by Frank Partnoy.   
Partnoy is now a Berkeley full professor in business law who previously spent time as an 
investment banker with Morgan Stanley and CS First Boston.  After noting the decline of 
more than half of the number of companies listed in the U.S. since the 1997 peak, 
Partnoy develops the following argument in favor of the importance of the public 
company decline issue: 
Stock-exchange officials certainly are [concerned]. Last year, Thomas 
Farley, then the head of the NYSE Group, said the drop “may severely 
limit [companies’ opportunities] for economic growth, hiring, and wealth 
creation.” Earlier this year, in her introduction to a white paper, Nasdaq’s 
CEO, Adena Friedman, warned that if the trend continues, “job creation 
and economic growth could suffer, and income inequality could worsen as 
average investors become increasingly shut out of the most attractive 
offerings.” 
Of course, Farley and Friedman have a financial stake in the health of the 
exchanges. But there is a broader logic to their professed concerns. 
Traditionally, promising young companies turned to the public markets to 
raise capital in order to expand their operations; this gave individual 
investors a shot at owning a piece of those companies’ hoped-for success, 
either by buying their stocks directly or, more commonly, by holding them 
in a mutual fund or index fund. Today, more and more start-up companies 
secure funding from private investors, cutting most Americans out of the 
equation. 
Robert J. Jackson Jr., a commissioner of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission who previously worked at Bear Stearns underwriting IPOs, 
told me there can be real distributive consequences when the highest-
growth companies are private. If many of the economy’s greatest success 
stories aren’t included in the funds that ordinary Americans hold, only the 
wealthiest members of society will enjoy the gains, intensifying 
inequality. “It’s a good enough argument for me to care about wanting 
more companies to be public,” Jackson said. SEC Chair Jay Clayton 
agrees. In his first major speech, he warned: “The potential lasting effects 
of such an outcome to the economy and society are, in two words, not 
good.” 
The conclusions of Partnoy stand in direct opposition to the position of Govindarjan et al.  
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Only time will tell which position is more accurate, but the Partnoy analysis resonates 
specifically for the reasons stated in the quote of Robert J. Jackson, Jr. above.  The U.S. 
already has a significant wealth distribution problem, as evidenced by the fact that the 
U.S. demonstrates the greatest concentration of wealth in the hands of the top 10%, top 
5% and top 1% of its population amongst 28 member nations of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation Development (the “OECD”) analyzed in a recent white paper.44  
Moreover, the degree of wealth distribution inequality has increased in the U.S. during 
the period of public company decline.45  It follows logically that the U.S. should be 
seeking to mitigate any further long-term systemic changes in its public capital markets 
structure that increase wealth inequality by limiting the most attractive investment 
opportunities to its wealthiest investors.   As such, Partnoy’s argument (reflective of the 
majority position in the U.S. business media at the current time) is more convincing and 
will likely be borne out as being more accurate over the upcoming years.46 
 The Concept of Agency Cost and Its Implications 
The analysis of the modern theory of the firm relating to public companies starts with 
former Harvard economics professor Michael C. Jensen, who along with William H. 
Meckling, in 1976 published the seminal paper that brought the concept of agency costs 
in public companies into the general consciousness.47  Jensen and Meckling here 
articulate their theory that, in situations in which equity of a company is held by non-
management shareholders, there is an inherent divergence in interest between 
 
44 OECD, “Inequalities in household wealth across OECD countries: Evidence from the OECD Wealth 
Distribution Database” White Paper (20 June 2018) online: <https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments 
/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En> at 15.  The U.S. currently 
evidences the third highest level of wealth distribution amongst all 34 OECD countries, exceeded only by 
Mexico and Turkey.   
45 With reference to the GINI Index, the most commonly used measure of wealth inequality.  Federal 
Reserve Economic Data, “GINI Index for the United Stated, online: <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ 
SIPOVGINIUSA> accessed December 29, 2019. 
46 Statista, “U.S. household income distribution from 1990 to 2018” 
47 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure.” (1976) 3:4 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
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management and the non-management equity-holders.  Jensen views owner-managers 
(i.e., managers holding less than 100% of the equity of the firm) as rational self-interested 
economic actors seeking to maximize their personal outcomes in all situations, which 
causes the owner-managers to seek benefits from their companies that are misaligned 
with the pure maximization of shareholder value.  Jensen summarizes the core of his 
theory as follows: 
As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on 
the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate 
larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This 
also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more 
resources in monitoring his behavior. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner 
of obtaining additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional 
ownership falls.48 
Jensen formulates the cost to residual equity shareholders of the self-interested behaviour 
of managers in economic terms, and that cost has become widely known throughout 
academic literature as “agency cost”.49   
Jensen’s theory on the misalignment of interests between management and shareholders 
of companies quickly became widely accepted and has played a critical role in instructing 
public company regulatory theory over the past 40 years.  Ever since “Theory of the 
Firm” gained prominence, the general arc of public company regulation in North 
America has seen the adoption of a steady stream of initiatives designed to minimize 
agency costs associated with the management of public companies, thereby maximizing 
the value of equity acquired by non-management shareholders. 
More than a decade later, Jensen further prognosticates as to the long-term implications 
of his theory of agency conflict on public companies as the dominant form of capital 
market enterprise.50   Here, Jensen articulates his belief that public companies are 
 
48 Ibid at 317. 
49Ibid at 323. 
50 Michael C. Jensen, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation” (1989) 67 Harvard Business Review 61. 
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inefficient structures to resolve agency conflicts, and that this conflict resolution can be 
better achieved by direct negotiation amongst stakeholders in private companies.  
Ultimately, Jensen predicts that the inability to efficiently address agency costs will lead 
to the decline of public entities: 
New organizations are emerging in [the place of public entities]—
organizations that are corporate in form but have no public shareholders 
and are not listed or traded on organized exchanges. These organizations 
use public and private debt, rather than public equity, as their major source 
of capital. Their primary owners are not households but large institutions 
and entrepreneurs that designate agents to manage and monitor on their 
behalf and bind those agents with large equity interests and contracts 
governing the use and distribution of cash. 
Takeovers, corporate breakups, divisional spin-offs, leveraged buyouts, 
and going-private transactions are the most visible manifestations of a 
massive organizational change in the economy. These transactions have 
inspired criticism, even outrage, among many business leaders and 
government officials, who have called for regulatory and legislative 
restrictions. The backlash is understandable. Change is threatening; in this 
case, the threat is aimed at the senior executives of many of our largest 
companies. 51 
 
Jensen goes on to state his belief that this evolution away from the public company form 
reflects a positive development for the economy as a whole.52  This belief is predicated 
on Jensen’s opinion that private entities are better positioned structurally to resolve what 
he perceives as the fundamental weakness of public companies, namely the ongoing 
tension relating to control of corporate resources between management and shareholders, 
thereby leading to greater efficiency and productivity.53  Jensen concludes that public 
companies will ultimately retain an important role in the economy, but only with respect 
to companies that cannot self-fund growth with internally-generated cash-flow.54  
 
51 Ibid at 61. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid at 62. 
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Companies that can self-fund their growth targets from internal sources are, in Jensen’s 
opinion, better off pursuing private ownership structures.55 
Jensen’s analysis on the impact of the evolution of capital sources away from direct 
investment by entrepreneurs and towards an increasing concentration of investment 
capital, and accompanying power in the investment-making decision, in the hands of 
institutional investors evokes the earlier analysis of another Harvard academic, law 
professor Robert C. Clark, on the stages of the capitalism.56  In Clark’s categorization, 
the third and fourth stages of capitalism involve the transfer of capital and delegation of 
investment-making discretion to investment professionals (in the third stage) and, 
eventually, the underlying savings decision itself to collectivized interests of pension 
fund managers (in the fourth stage).  However, Clark does not continue to consider the 
likely impact of the evolution of capital on the position and role of the public company as 
an institution.  Jensen takes Clark’s observations on the continuing evolution of capital 
towards greater institutionalized control (and less direct investment by the ultimate 
individual beneficiaries of the capital) further, considering the likely impact of this 
evolution in capital deployment on the position of the public company in the future 
economy. 
Jensen’s prediction was met with significant academic skepticism at the time of its 
release in 1989, particularly as the number of public companies in the U.S. continued to 
rise through much of the 1990’s.  However, the subsequent decline in public companies 
in the U.S. beginning in 1997 has caused academia to reappraise Jensen’s 1989 article 
and has enhanced Jensen’s legacy as the oracle who first predicted the public company 
decline phenomenon.57 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Robert C. Clark, “The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises” 
(1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 961. 
57 See, for example: Kathleen M. Kahle and Rene M. Stulz, “Is the US Public Corporation in Trouble?” 
(2017) 31:3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 67. 
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Certainly, Jensen was ahead of his time in predicting public company decline and his 
theory of agency costs continues to retain its primacy as a descriptor of the relationship 
between firm managers and equity holders.  However, Jensen’s rationale in predicting 
public company decline back in 1989 is not necessarily explanatory of the phenomenon 
that has transpired in the U.S. over the past 20 years.  Jensen’s predictions on the 
inevitability of public company decline are founded on his belief that sources of capital 
become increasingly frustrated by their inability to effectively limit agency costs in the 
public company environment in the U.S. where the minority equity holders have no 
effective voice in governance.  As such, in Jensen’s theory, the equity investors 
inevitably and intentionally direct their investments away from the public sphere and into 
private transactions in which they can contractually impose the necessary agency-cost 
restraining mechanisms necessary to protect their equity interests.  Jensen believed that 
this affinity for the private markets would have the effect of siphoning off the funding 
sources of public entities and forcing firms towards private transactions. 
In fact, the phenomenon of public company decline that we have witnessed is somewhat 
different from what Jensen expected.  Ironically, some of the most important causes of 
public company decline may well be directly linked to the universal acceptance of 
Jensen’s observations on agency costs and the corresponding implications for securities 
regulatory reform over the past four decades.  In Jensen’s view, companies would be 
forced towards the private markets in order to access capital that had moved away from 
the public markets and was accessible only through private investment alternatives.   
Rather than a lack of capital willing to invest in IPOs and secondary offerings of public 
entities, the phenomenon of the public company decline that we have experienced 
appears to be driven by a shift in the preference of senior management away from the 
public markets and towards private financing opportunities.  Who are these business 
decision-makers that avoid the public markets?  The same owner-managers identified by 
Jensen as being the individuals who directly benefit from the lack of control mechanisms 
in the public market to maximize their share of the agency costs.  
In reality, we have witnessed four decades in which securities regulators and shareholder 
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rights interest groups have relentlessly rooted out and legislated every perceived 
opportunity for self-dealing managers in the public markets.  In fact, some of the most 
insightful academic analysis surrounding public company decline is focused on the 
question of whether the securities regulatory authorities have overshot the goal and 
reduced public company agency costs to such a level that managers no longer have the 
appetite for the hassles of being engaged in the public markets.58  The question now has 
to be asked as to whether some minimal level of agency costs must be preserved in the 
public market in order to protect the existence of the public company as a viable 
institution.  In fact, eminent legal academics have argued in an analogous area that the 
optimal level of private benefits that can be extracted from a public company is not 
necessarily zero, expressing their belief that value of private benefit extraction from a 
public company in some instances may be greater than the cost to the entity.59  This 
illustrates the irony that Jensen’s prediction on public company decline may have come 
to fruition, not for the reasons foreseen by Jensen in 1989, but at least partially as a result 
of the influence of Jensen’s earlier analysis relating to public company agency costs on 
the past four decades of securities regulatory reform. 
 The Theory of Investor Legal Protection as a Determinant of Robust 
Capital Markets 
Turning now to a second stream of literature written by three finance professors from 
Harvard (at the time of the publication of the relevant articles) along with the 
collaboration of one finance professor from the University of Chicago.  The group, 
comprised of Rafael LaPorta, Florenico Lopez-de-Silanes, Andei Shleifer and Robert 
Vishy (referred to herein as “LLSV” as they self-stylize themselves in their later 
 
58 Tingle, Bryce C., J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, “The IPO Market in Canada: What a 
Comparison with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem” (2013) 54 Canadian Business Law 
Journal 321 at 363. 
59 Ronald L. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders” (2003) 152 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 785 at 803-804 and 843.  Gilson and Gordon’s analysis focuses on the 
extraction of private benefits from public companies by controlling shareholders and not specifically on 
agency costs of management, but analogies of the Gilson and Gordon arguments to the potential benefit of 
maintaining minimal level of agency costs to encourage companies to access the public markets are clear. 
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writings), focuses on the nature and quality of legal protection of shareholder rights as a 
critical determining factor in creating robust public capital markets.  The three main 
LLSV papers are from 1997,60199861 and 1999,62 and all claim to build upon the 
foundation established by Jensen.  The 1997 LLSV paper begins with the following 
foundational question: “Why do some countries have so much bigger capital markets than 
others”.63  
After considering the legal frameworks of 49 different countries, the 1997 LLSV paper 
states the main LLSV hypothesis: 
[t]he results of this article confirm that the legal environment (as described 
by both legal rules and their enforcement) matters for the size and extent 
of a country's capital markets. Because a good legal environment protects 
the potential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises 
their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence 
expands the scope of capital markets. 
The 1998 LLSV paper builds on empirical data obtained from the earlier analysis of the 
49 countries previously considered, furthering the proposition that the nature of the legal 
rights inherently associated with a particular country’s legal system is of paramount 
importance in determining the nature and success of that country’s capital markets: 
The rights attached to securities become critical when managers of 
companies act in their own interest. These rights give investors the power 
to extract from managers the returns on their investment. Shareholders 
receive dividends because they can vote out the directors who do not pay 
them, and creditors are paid because they have the power to repossess 
collateral. Without these rights, investors would not be able to get paid, 
and therefore firms would find it harder to raise external finance. 
 
60 Rafael La Porta, Florenico López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and R. Vishny, “Legal Determinants of 
External Finance,” (1997) 52:3 Journal of Finance 1131. 
61 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Law and 
Finance.” (1998) 106:6 Journal of Political Economy 1113.  An earlier version of this paper was originally 
published in 1996 by the National Bureau of Economic Research as NBER Working Paper 5661. 
62 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1999. “The Quality of 
Government.” (1999) 15:1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 222. 
63 Supra note 60 at 1131.  
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But the view that securities are inherently characterized by some intrinsic 
rights is incomplete as well.  It ignores the obvious point that these rights 
depend on the legal rules of the jurisdictions where these securities are 
issued. […] Law and the quality of its enforcement are potentially 
important determinants of what rights security holders have and how well 
these rights are protected. Since the protection investors receive 
determines their readiness to finance firms, corporate finance may 
critically turn on these legal rules and their enforcement.64 
The analysis in the 1998 LLSV paper starts with the observation that the origin of most 
commercial laws internationally can either be traced to the sources of English common 
law or Roman civil law.  Within civil law, LLSV identifies three major civil code 
traditions that account for all civilian-based systems: French, German and 
Scandinavian.65  
Ultimately, based on their assessment of the legal regimes in the 49 countries studied, 
LLSV concludes that countries whose legal systems are based on the British common law 
system have both the greatest degree of protection of investor rights in public companies 
and the most robust capital markets.  On the other end of the spectrum, LLSV singles out 
countries utilizing the French civil code structure as having the weakest protection of 
investor rights, which they posit directly impacts the willingness of investors to invest as 
minority shareholders in public entities. In French civil code jurisdictions, LLSV point 
out that other “adaptive” legal mechanisms necessarily evolve to serve as surrogates for 
strong legal protection of investors.  A prime example is the increased concentration of 
ownership in public entities facilitating direct control by shareholders through voting 
mechanisms and thereby circumventing the shortcomings of the legal regimes in 
protecting minority shareholders.66  These adaptive mechanisms can exist inside or 
 
64 Supra note 61 at 1114. 
65Ibid at 1115. 
66 Ibid at 1116. 
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outside of the law.67  
In the LLSV analysis, German and Scandinavian-based legal systems are ranked 
somewhere in the middle between British common law and French civil code systems in 
terms of the degree of investor protections that they provide.68 
The 1998 LLSV paper states four conclusions: (i) there is a marked difference in laws 
around the world in terms of the bundle of rights that are given to investors; (ii) there is a 
marked difference in the quality of law enforcement between countries as well, and better 
enforcement is linked with better economic outcomes; (iii) countries with poor investor 
protections develop “substitute mechanisms” inside or outside of law to compensate; and 
(iv) countries with poorer investor protection have less robust capital markets.69 
In the 1999 LLSV paper, LLSV move on to the analysis of why they believe that the 
British common law tradition is a better protector of investors than the civil code 
traditions.   First, they consider an explanation based on differences in the judiciary, 
which they ultimately discount as being sufficiently explanatory.  They then move on to 
their hypothesis that the explanation is rooted in which particular institutions in society 
held the greatest influence in the formation of the law.  LLSV point out that, during the 
critical formative years of the 18th and 19th centuries, the British crown’s influence 
declines significantly compared to the relative influence of parliament in the development 
of the common law.  British parliament during this era is dominated by property owners, 
who evolve into the investor class in the capital markets as the 18th and 19th century 
progressed.  Therefore, the state in Great Britain (represented by the Crown) had 
relatively lesser influence on the development of the common law than the property 
owners.  As such, LLSV believe that the common law evolved to favour the interests of 
property owners and, ultimately, investors.  This serves as a defence by property owners / 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid at 1151. 
69 Ibid. 
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investors against “attempts by the sovereign to regulate and expropriate them”.70  
In contrast, the state had a greater degree of power in the civil code countries during this 
era and property owners did not have an equivalent voice in government as that held by 
the British property owners as a result of their influence through parliament.  As such, 
LLSV contend that the civil law developed “as an instrument used by the sovereign for 
state building and controlling economic life”.71 
LLSV further extend their analysis of what they categorize as their “legal approach” to 
economic analysis to the topic of corporate governance and the capital markets in their 
fourth collaboration in 2000.72  In the 2000 article, LLSV state that: 
[t]he most basic prediction of the legal approach is that investor protection 
encourages the development of financial markets. When investors are 
protected from expropriation, they pay more for securities, making it more 
attractive for entrepreneurs to issue these securities. This applies to both 
creditors and shareholders. Creditor rights encourage the development of 
lending, and the exact structure of these rights may alternatively favor 
bank lending or market lending. Shareholder rights encourage the 
development of equity markets, as measured by the valuation of firms, the 
number of listed firms (market breadth), and the rate at which firms go 
public. For both shareholders and creditors, protection includes not only 
the rights written into the laws and regulations but also the effectiveness of 
their enforcement. Consistent with these predictions, La Porta et al. (1997) 
show that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock 
markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of 
IPO activity than do the unprotective countries.73 
A critical conclusion of LLSV to be drawn from these four papers is that heightened 
investor protection does not equate with increased government intervention in the 
 
70 Supra note 62 at 224. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance.” (2000) 58:1 Journal of Financial Economics 3. 
73 Ibid at 13. 
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economy.  Heightened investor protection in the British common law tradition in fact is 
derived from the historical ability of the property owner / investor class to push back 
against the Crown and direct the development of the common law towards enhanced 
property and investor rights, protecting against the risk of expropriation by the state and 
by corporate insiders.  In contrast, in the civil law countries the state was historically able 
to push back against the property owner / investor class during the 18th and 19th century 
and “did not surrender its power of economic decisions to the courts”.74   
The civil code countries kept their direct influence in economic matters through 
legislation.  As a result, LLSV are generally cited as standing for the proposition that a 
lower degree of direct legislative intervention, consistent with the British common law 
tradition, is generally associated with a higher degree of protection of investor rights and, 
by extension, better economic outcomes and more robust capital markets.  Conversely, a 
higher degree of direct government intervention in the economy through increased 
financial legislation is associated with the civil code tradition which generally evidences 
lesser protections for investors and, by extension, poorer economic outcomes and smaller 
capital markets. 
Notwithstanding their general support of market mechanisms as representing a superior 
forum for improving investor protections than government legislation, LLSV conclude 
this article with a statement that makes it apparent that they are not supporting a fully 
laissez-faire approach to capital markets regulation.  After reiterating that they view 
strong legal protection of investors as the foundation of strong corporate governance, 
they state that: 
 [a]n important implication of this approach is that leaving financial 
markets alone is not a good way to encourage them. Financial markets 
need some protection of outside investors, whether by courts, government 
agencies, or market participants themselves. Improving such protection is 
a difficult task.  In part, the nature of investor protection, and more 
generally of regulation of financial markets, is deeply rooted in the legal 
structure of each country and in the origin of its laws. Marginal reform 
 
74 Ibid at 12. 
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may not successfully achieve the reformer's goals. In part, the existing 
corporate governance arrangements benefit both the politicians and the 
entrenched economic interests, including the families that manage the 
largest firms in most countries in the world. Corporate governance reform 
must circumvent the opposition by these interests.  Despite these 
difficulties, reform of investor protection is politically feasible in some 
circumstances, and can bring significant benefits. It can take the form of 
opting into more protective legal regimes or introducing more radical 
changes in the legal structure.75 
As with Jensen, the work of LLSV has been taken by some as supporting the arc of 
increasing securities regulation over the past twenty years based on the following 
rationale: (i) LLSV conclude that common law countries providing the highest level of 
shareholder protection in limiting agency costs are also the countries with the most robust 
capital markets; (ii) LLSV advise that leaving financial markets alone is not a good way 
to encourage them; (iii) securities regulators have therefore been willing to accept the 
LLSV analysis as support for the view that expanded securities regulation can lead to 
further reductions in agency costs in the public capital markets.  However, such an 
interpretation represents an imperfect interpretation of LLSV.  LLSV spend much more 
time making the point that the increased direct government regulation in the capital 
markets, evidenced by the experience of the civil code countries, has resulted in poorer 
economic outcomes.  LLSV may bear some blame for the confusion themselves, as the 
concluding paragraph in the 2000 LLSV paper may be taken out of context as 
contradicting the core themes they developed throughout the four papers. 
Possibly realizing the confusion created by their conclusion in the 2000 LLSV paper,  
LLS (minus “V” this time) revisited their 1997, 1998 and 1999 papers in 2008.76  The 
2008 paper advises that, although their earlier works “have taken some bumps”,77 their 
 
75 Ibid at 24. 
76 Rafael La Porta, Florenico Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins” (2008) 46:2 Journal of Economic Literature 285. 
77 Ibid at 317.  This is an apparent reference to various challenges to their work, in particular their 
methodology and their putative international rankings of countries according to legal foundations. 
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contribution to capital markets theory “appears to us to still be standing, perhaps even 
taller than a decade ago”.78  Notably, LLS do not reference the 2000 paper whatsoever in 
the 2008 paper.  One wonders whether this omission results from LLSV’s recognizing the 
confusion resulting from the 2008 paper with respect to government intervention in 
reducing agency cost.   One also wonders whether LLSV were beginning to understand 
that their claim from the 2000 paper that “shareholder rights encourage the development 
of equity markets, as measured by the valuation of firms, the number of listed firms 
(market breadth), and the rate at which firms go public” no longer matched the trendlines 
of the U.S. public capital markets.  Does swinging the pendulum too far in favour of 
investor protection in the public markets (i.e., creating a sufficiently large delta between 
investor rights in the public capital markets compared to what is available in the private 
capital markets) ultimately work against the arguments that LLSV carefully construct? 
As such, can too much investor protection contribute to the phenomenon of public 
company decline? 
At this date, LLSV have not published anything further addressing the phenomenon of 
public company decline that is now evident in the major common-law based legal 
systems.  How history will treat LLSV’s legal approach to analysis of capital markets is 
yet to be determined, but it is suggested that their legacy is not assured, particularly if 
regulatory overreach ultimately proves to be a significant contributing factor to public 
company decline.  Their failure to contemplate that too much investor protection in the 
capital markets context might serve as a public markets constraint may complicate their 
ultimate legacy.  Indeed, one wonders whether the breadth of the academic criticism 
already directed at LLSV serves to undermine their assertion about their work standing 
taller than when it was written.79 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 The criticisms of LLSV are wide-ranging, particularly in scholarship from civil law countries.  For a 
Canadian critique of LLSV, see Poonam Puri, “Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada” (2009) 
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43 
 
 Analysis of the IPO Decision-Making Process 
One of the core assumptions of the research project undertaken for this Dissertation is 
that firms go public as the result of the conscious choice of senior decision-makers.  As 
previously stated in this Dissertation, this assumption is generally taken as an obviosity in 
capital markets academia and has not been the subject of significant discussion.  
However, there are a few notable exceptions where the issue of the conscious decision to 
pursue an IPO versus other available alternatives has been analyzed doctrinally and 
empirically. 
The first empirical analysis of the topic appears to have been undertaken by R.D. Ransley 
of the London Business School in 1984, who completed a short survey of executives 
taking their companies public in the U.K. to determine their motivations.80  Ransley 
concludes that prospects for growth by acquisition are the primary motivating factor in 
British IPOs, followed in priority by securing funds for organic growth and repayment of 
debt.81 
An ambitious empirical analysis on Italian IPOs was completed in 1998 by Marco 
Pagano, Fabio Panetta and Luigi Zingales (referred to herein as “Pagano”).82  This team 
takes advantage of their access to a unique database containing financial statements and 
credit costs for a large number of public and private Italian companies going back several 
years.  This unique dataset allows Pagano to conduct analysis of the financial positions of 
firms that complete an IPO going back several years before the IPO.  In their article, 
Pagano outlines the various factors that have been posited in the academic literature as 
being costs of going public and benefits of going public, and apply statistical models to 
 
80 R.D. Ransley,  “A research project into the operation and development of the unlisted securities market 
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work unavailable. 
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ascertain which can be demonstrated as accurate through analysis of their dataset. 
Pagano concludes that the most important factor in predicting the likelihood of an IPO is 
the “market-to-book ratio at which firms in the same industry trade: a one standard 
deviation increase in the market-to-book ratio raises the odds of an IPO by 25%”.83   In 
other words, the more frothy the public market for a particular industry, the more likely 
that additional companies in the industry will choose to go public to take advantage of the 
attractive valuations.  Additionally, maturity of the firm is found to increase IPO 
probability (older firms are more likely to go public in the Italian context).  On the costs 
side, the fixed costs of going public are found to be a significant deterrent, especially for 
smaller companies.   
Although Pagano acknowledges the significant limitations in extrapolating general 
principles for international application from the Italian data due to the unusual nuances of 
the Italian IPO market, this article has been extensively cited in the past two decades and 
clearly remains influential in IPO analysis.  One wonders whether the continuing 
popularity of the Pagano study is indicative of how difficult it is to generate empirical 
evidence on the factors influencing the IPO decision.  It also may reflect the inherent bias 
of finance academics in favor of “hard” empirical evidence generated from financial 
datasets compared to the “soft” data gleaned from surveys of decision-makers. 
Two additional studies focus specifically on the timing element of the IPO decision, 
considering the impact of the particular market conditions.84  Both studies conclude that 
firms indicate strong preferences to time their IPOs in relatively hot markets, leading to 
clusters of IPO offerings offset by periods of diminished activity.  These conclusions are 
intuitive to market observers, and certainly support the underlying position that both the 
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occurrence and the timing of the IPO are conscious decisions made by the senior 
decision-makers in the firms.  Because the participants have flexibility, they will logically 
choose to complete the IPO during market periods that are most advantageous to the firm 
to secure the highest possible valuation and minimize IPO dilution. 
In 2003 James Brau, Bill Francis and Ninon Kohers undertook an American study that 
was similar to Pagano in its scope of coverage (i.e., evaluated data from nearly 10,000 
private companies), but focused on the specific issue of factors that affect the choice of 
company decision-makers to pursue an IPO versus selling out to another firm.85  The 
summary of the findings is as follows:  
Our results show that four factors— industry, market-timing, deal-
specific, and to a lesser degree demand for funds—play a role in the IPO 
versus takeover choice. Specifically, the concentration of the industry, the 
high-tech industry status of the private firm, the “hotness” of the IPO 
market relative to the private target takeover market, the current cost of 
debt, the percentage of insider ownership maintained in the firm, and the 
size of the firm are all positively related to the probability that a firm will 
conduct an IPO. In contrast, firms in high market-to-book industries, 
financial service firms, firms in high debt industries, and deals involving 
greater liquidity for selling insiders show a stronger likelihood for 
takeovers.86 
The most notable element of the Brau study is that it seems to contradict one of the main 
conclusions of Pagano on the motivation for going public.  Pagano concluded that high 
market-to-book valuations increased the likelihood of going public, while Brau states that 
firms in industries that have high market-to-book valuations are more likely to exhibit a 
preference for selling out to third parties rather than conducting their own IPOs.  
Although making multiple references to Pagano in terms of comparing their 
methodologies, Brau does not devote much analysis to explaining the difference in 
conclusions between the two studies.  Nevertheless, it is clear that Brau does not dispute 
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Pagano’s data or results, but rather is asking a fundamentally different question than 
Pagano that is not obvious at first glance.  Pagano’s research essentially asks the question 
“what factors increase the likelihood of an IPO for all companies in Italy”?  Brau’s 
research asks the question “what factors push a company towards an IPO versus a 
takeover”?  Pagano concludes that having a relatively high industry market-to-book ratio 
increases the probabilities that a company will pursue an IPO transaction compared to 
companies in low market-to-book industries.  However, having a high market-to-book 
ratio also increases the chance of a company selling out in a takeover to an even greater 
degree according to Brau.  As such, Brau’s conclusions do not necessarily contradict 
Pagano’s conclusions, although Brau’s methodology and scope of coverage are more 
illuminative and are clearly more relevant to the topic of public company decline. 
This portion of the literature review ends with consideration of two different research 
projects that have studied motivations for going public, one in the U.S. and the other in 
Europe.  The research project in the U.S. was undertaken once again by James Brau, this 
time in collaboration with Stanley Fawcett.87  This research project involves initiating 
and analyzing a survey of Chief Financial Officers (“CFO’s”) of U.S. companies, seeking 
to compare theory to practice on the following IPO-related topics: “motivation, timing, 
underwriter selection, underpricing, signaling and the decision to remain private”.88   
Brau \ Fawcett focused their survey on three different types of companies: (1) those that 
completed an IPO; (2) those that initiated and then withdrew an IPO; and (3) those that 
never contemplated an IPO.  With respect to the substantive portion of the analysis, the 
two elements of the Brau \ Fawcett research project that are particularly relevant to the 
topic of public company decline are IPO motivation and the decision to remain private.  
Brau/Fawcett conclude that the primary motivation for completing an IPO is the desire to 
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grow through acquisitions using company stock as a currency89.  The primary motivation 
to withdraw or not to pursue an IPO is the desire to retain control of the company, both 
with respect to decision-making authority and equity ownership.90 
A similar study was undertaken and published in 2009 by Franck Bancel and Usha 
Mitoo, this time focusing on the motivations of the CFO’s of European companies in 
going public.91  This work was later reprised as a chapter, along with a summary of the 
Brau \ Fawcett research, in the compendium of academic articles on IPO theory published 
as Handbook of Research on IPOs.92  Bancel \ Mitoo focus almost exclusively on reasons 
for going public and do not repeat Brau \ Fawcett’s survey question on the reasons for 
avoiding IPOs or pulling IPOs, other than a single open-ended text question on the 
perceived costs of the IPO.  However, Bancel \ Mitoo’s survey questions on the reasons 
for going public are significantly more comprehensive than what is asked by Brau \ 
Fawcett’s survey, which was achievable because Bancel \ Mitoo focus primarily on the 
IPO motivation question whereas Brau \ Fawcett also were seeking input from survey 
participants on multiple other issues relating to IPO theory.  Bancel \ Mitoo conclude 
that: 
the motivations for an IPO differ significantly across firms, countries, and 
legal systems. Large firms consider the enhanced external monitoring to 
be the most important benefit; small firms value the ability to raise capital 
for growth, and family-controlled firms view the IPO as a vehicle to 
strengthen their bargaining power with creditors without relinquishing 
control. The English system firms value the ability of the pre-IPO 
investors to exit and enhanced stock liquidity as the most important 
benefits of an IPO whereas the Italian firms identify the reduction in the 
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cost of financing as most valuable. The European and US CFOs have 
similar views on most benefits of an IPO but disagree strongly on the costs 
(both direct and indirect) of an IPO. 
Our evidence suggests that the decision to go public is a complex one that 
cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple 
benefits in going public. We find strong support for the IPO theories that 
focus on financial and strategic considerations, such as increased 
credibility and reputation, and financial flexibility for growth, moderate 
support for theories that emphasize exit strategy, balance of power, 
monitoring, or mergers and acquisitions as a major benefit, and less 
support for the asymmetric information and cost of capital theories.93 
As mentioned in the introduction to this literature review chapter, both the Brau \ Fawcett 
and the Bancel \ Mitoo research projects are discussed at length later in this Dissertation 
in the “Research Methodologies” and “Analysis of Results” chapters.  
2.3- American Literature on Public Company Decline 
 American Government & Industry-Sponsored Literature 
Dealing with this topic chronologically, the starting point of the analysis for government 
and industry-sponsored literature on the phenomenon of public company decline in the 
U.S. is a 2006 report authored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.94  This report is 
critical of what the Chamber of Commerce argues is an anti-business environment 
created as a result of SOX and other regulatory reforms adopted in response to the string 
of major corporate accounting scandals (Worldcom, Enron, etc.) at the start of the 
century.  The Chamber of Commerce report is particularly critical of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
stating that “just because something has the corporate governance label doesn’t mean that 
it really helps corporate governance—or that the costs imposed provide corresponding 
benefits. The best example is Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.”95  The Chamber of 
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Commerce concludes by warning that the dominant position of the U.S. capital markets is 
at risk and advises that “we must ensure that our system is one of high standards—legal, 
ethical, and regulatory—but not one of duplicative, unnecessary, or ineffective 
regulation. Unless we are very careful to nurture the competitiveness of our economy at 
all levels, we will find our nation poorer and less powerful as a result.”96  The Chamber 
of Commerce report is also markedly critical of what they classify as union activism to 
advance their own agendas, but instead is couched as shareholder rights initiatives. 
The second source to consider is the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation issued in 2006.97  This committee is popularly known as the “Paulson 
Committee”, as it was created with the backing of Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson 
Jr.  The Paulson Committee was comprised of a blue-ribbon panel of American business, 
financial, investor and corporate governance, legal, accounting and academic leaders to 
study ideas to enhance the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets.   
At the time of its creation, there was a growing consensus that the U.S. was losing its 
dominant position as the preferred locus for foreign IPOs, but the full extent of the 
trendline of public company decline for domestic listings in the U.S. was not yet 
understood.  The Paulson Committee ultimately identifies four areas in which it makes 
recommendations to approve U.S. capital market competitiveness:  (1) Regulatory 
Process: the Paulson Committee recommends that the SEC should focus its regulations as 
more of a “risk-based process, focusing on the costs and benefits of regulation” compared 
to its existing “regime of detailed prescriptive rules”;98 (2) Private and Public 
Enforcement System: the Committee recommends litigation reform with caps and safe 
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harbors;99 (3) Shareholder Rights: the Committee states its belief that the U.S. is falling 
behind other countries with respect to protection of shareholder rights, recommending 
shareholder approval of poison pills, majority voting requirements and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms for shareholder disputes;100 and (4) Sarbanes-Oxley: the 
Committee supports the retention of SOX in its current form, with minor tweaks in 
implementation to allow rational compliance on a multi-year basis to reduce costs of 
annual attestation. 
The third report to consider is a 2007 McKinsey & Company report commissioned jointly 
by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer.101  The 
McKinsey report is similar in mandate to the Paulson Committee report in that it is 
designed to assess the risks to the U.S. dominant position in international public equity 
markets, although the McKinsey report is focused specifically on protecting New York’s 
position as the preeminent global financial hub.  Notably, the McKinsey report is 
significantly more critical of the chilling effects of SOX implementation on the capital 
markets than the Paulson Committee report.  The McKinsey report concludes by stating 
that providing clearer guidance on SOX implementation and implementing immediate 
litigation reform to stem securities class-action suits are “critical national short-term 
priorities”.102 
The next item of relevance in time sequence is the report of the U.S. IPO Task Force in 
2011 entitled “Rebuilding the On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job 
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Market Back on the Road to Growth”.103  The title of the document demonstrates that the 
IPO Task Force draws an inextricable line between job growth and a robust IPO market, 
relying heavily on the work of Weild and Kim that is discussed later in this chapter.  The 
IPO Task Force report states that “[d]uring the past 15 years, the number of emerging 
growth companies entering the capital markets through IPOs has plummeted relative to 
historical norms. This trend has transcended economic cycles during that period and has 
hobbled U.S. job creation.”104  The report goes on to summarize its findings on factors 
contributing to public company decline: 
In summary, the IPO Task Force has concluded that the cumulative effect 
of a sequence of regulatory actions, rather than one single event, lies at the 
heart of the crisis. While mostly aimed at protecting investors from 
behaviors and risks presented by the largest companies, these regulations 
and related market practices have:  
1. driven up costs for emerging growth companies looking to go public, 
thus reducing the supply of such companies,  
2. constrained the amount of information available to investors about such 
companies, thus making emerging growth stocks more difficult to 
understand and invest in, and  
3. shifted the economics of the trading of public shares of stock away from 
long-term investing in emerging growth companies and toward high-
frequency trading of large-cap stocks, thus making the IPO process less 
attractive to, and more difficult for, emerging growth companies.105 
Ultimately, the IPO Task Force makes three key recommendations to stimulate IPO 
activity: (i) provide an exemption of five years to allow new public companies to get up 
to speed before full compliance is required on financial certification (i.e., establish an 
“on-ramp” for newly public companies); (ii) improve information flow on private and 
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public companies using updated methods of communication; and (iii) lower the capital 
gains rate for profits made on long-term holders of IPO shares. 
The first recommendation of the IPO Task Force with respect to the five year “on-ramp” 
was ultimately adopted as a core component of the U.S. JOBS Act in 2012.106  The JOBS 
Act was specifically introduced as a regulatory measure to stimulate the number of IPOs 
in the U.S. as a driver of job creation.  Other measures adopted in the JOBS Act are 
amendments lifting the ban on solicitations for exempt offerings, creation of crowd-
funding exemptions, an increase in exempt capital limits and an increase in the threshold 
of shareholders of record allowed before registration becomes mandatory.  The impact of 
the JOBS Act is assessed by academic commentators discussed hereafter. 
The next industry report of relevance is a white paper released in 2014 by Oliver Wyman 
Financial Services.107  This white paper contains novel ideas on measures to increase 
small and medium enterprise (“SME”) financing and growth.  These recommendations 
include the creation of an international electronic trading platform exclusively for SME’s 
with reduced regulation and lower compliance costs, along with the idea of a mutualized 
guarantee network amongst all SME’s traded on the electronic platform to enhance 
access to credit.  While interesting, there is no evidence that these particular 
recommendations ever made it beyond the proposal stage due to the inherent 
complexities associated with developing a trans-national SME trading platform. 
The final industry document discussed here is the most recent major report on public 
company decline issued by the U.S. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation in 
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2017.108  This follow-up to the Paulson Committee Report states that the U.S. public 
markets situation has further deteriorated in the intervening decade as the U.S. has 
continued to lose ground to foreign equity markets.  As for the prime culprit specifically 
responsible for this situation, the 2017 Report points the finger at “excessive regulation 
and litigation risk”.109  As a proposal to move forward, the U.S. Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation recommends the following: 
As a first step towards reinvigorating U.S. public equity markets, the 
Committee recommends that the SEC work with private U.S. companies 
to better understand why they are not going public and whether specific 
regulatory changes could incentivize them to do so. As a second step, the 
SEC should empower U.S. shareholders of public companies to adopt a 
mandatory system of individual arbitration to replace securities class 
actions that are costing public companies and investors billions of dollars 
each year.110 
The first recommendation specifically instructs the type of empirically-based research 
project that has been executed in this Dissertation.  It will be interesting to see whether 
the publication of this Dissertation receives any notice in the U.S., or whether American 
scholars believe that there are too many differences in the public markets ecosystem and 
regulatory structure between the U.S. and Canada to draw any inferences from this 
Dissertation that would be relevant to the U.S. situation.  Given the degree to which 
finance academics have cited the Italian study of Pagano et al over the years, there is 
some hope that there will be American scholars (and maybe regulators as well) who see 
value in considering the analysis and conclusions of this Dissertation.  
 American Public Company Literature Focused on Sarbarnes-Oxley 
One of the earliest and most influential critiques of SOX was published in 2002 by a 
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George Mason University law professor, the late Larry Ribstein.111  Ribstein notes that 
the SOX provisions allowing courts to establish personal liability on the basis of “ex post 
judgement that the executive certified controls proved to be inadequate” may actually 
increase agency costs by incentivizing management “to act more conservatively than the 
owners would prefer”.112  Ribstein further hypothesizes that SOX will increase the 
relative benefits of being private compared to being public, and could result in a reduced 
number of public companies available for investors.  Ribstein concludes by stating that 
“this effect would be ironic in light of the law’s intent to lure investors back into the 
market”.113 
Corporate lawyers Marc Morgenstern and Peter Nealis are the authors of a 2004 paper in 
which the increase in going-private transactions post-SOX adoption is noted, but the 
authors question the effectiveness of going-private transactions in ultimately avoiding 
SOX compliance.114  They point out that many of the going-private processes rely on 
institutional debt, and that institutional debt is increasingly demanding contractual rights 
forcing management to continue to report on the SOX certification standards, thereby 
making SOX avoidance a poor reason for pursuing a going-private transaction.  The same 
argument is made in greater depth by Georgia law professor Robert Bartlett in 2009, who 
determines that companies going private after SOX are even more likely to subject 
themselves to SEC reporting obligations through contractual provision than prior to the 
adoption of SOX.115    
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In 2007, Ellen Engel, Rachel Hayes and Xue Wang published a study indicating that the 
likelihood of smaller firms going private after the adoption of SOX has increased, and 
that the market reaction to smaller firms announcing their intention to go private is more 
positive than when larger firms announce their intention to go private.116 
One of the most interesting academic articles (in terms of its applicability to the core 
topics covered by this Dissertation) focusing on the impact of increased compliance costs 
associated with SOX in the U.S. public markets is a 2004 study published by Stanley 
Block.  Block’s study involves a survey of former public companies who went private in 
the U.S. between January 2001 and July 2003 (which overlays the 2002 adoption of 
Sarbanes-Oxley ).117  Block was able to secure survey responses from representatives of 
110 out of 236 companies who went private in the U.S. during this interval.  Based on his 
data, Block squarely blames the increased compliance costs associated with SOX as one 
of the main reasons why an increasing number of companies have gone private, 
particularly focusing on SOX’s disproportionate effect on smaller issuers.118  However, 
Block also identifies other factors cited by the management of the companies as 
motivations for their decisions to go private, including the pressures and time constraints 
for senior management, lack of analyst coverage and insufficient liquidity for their 
shares.119  Each of these factors is, as discussed later in this Dissertation, amongst the 
factors ultimately tested in the PCD Study.120  
In his 2010 work, Penn State finance professor Peter Iliev determines that SOX 
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compliance essentially doubles audit fees of firms that are forced to certify financial 
statements.121  He further concludes that the evidence indicates that some companies 
deliberately manage their market capitalizations to stay below the $75 million public float 
threshold for SOX compliance and that SOX has the effect of reducing the overall value 
of smaller public companies.122 
In his 2010 PhD thesis, Kim Jaehoon analyzes recent going-private transactions in the 
U.S. to determine whether the high compliance costs associated with SOX caused the 
going-private boom or a private equity fundraising boom.123  He concludes that the 
evidence is insufficient to establish a causal link between SOX and the increase in going-
private transactions across all categories of transactions.  However, there are certain sub-
categories of going-private transactions for which a causal link to SOX compliance costs 
can be established. 
Finally, in a 2014 article, two Harvard professors, law professor John Coates and 
accounting professor Suraj Srinivasan, undertook an extensive review of over 120 studies 
completed on SOX in the fields of accounting, law and finance.124  Coates / Srinivasan 
summarize the paradox of their conclusion as follows: 
[T]he law continues to be fiercely and relentlessly attacked in the US, 
particularly in political election battles and during legislative debates, 
reflected in part in provisions of the Dodd- Frank Act and the JOBS Act, 
which can be seen as a partial legislative rollback of the Act. On the other 
hand, survey evidence… suggests that informed observers, including 
corporate officers and investors, do not believe that the Act – as 
implemented, taking into account significant relaxations of its most 
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criticized provision (section 404(b) internal control attestation) – has been 
a significant problem, and may well have produced net benefits, and the 
law has been copied at least in part by other countries. What explains this 
puzzle of continued hostility amid acquiescence or even mild praise by 
those most directly affected by the Act? 125 
Notwithstanding that many of the affected parties reported a net benefit to SOX 
compliance, Coates / Srinivasan acknowledge that there is a general perception that SOX 
has increased “the risk of personal liability facing managers and directors and in the risk 
of reputational harms and opportunity costs created by litigation.”126 They conclude by 
conceding that, if this is true, then “difficult-to-explain and legitimate business risks may 
be foregone, firms may decline to go public or otherwise avoid the burdens of the 
law”.127 
 American Public Company Decline Literature Positing Other Causes 
The first body of literature that is noteworthy in the timeline of academic articles 
considering public company decline in the U.S. beyond analysis of the impacts of SOX is 
a series of three white papers published by accounting firm Grant Thornton, LLP.  These 
white papers are written by David Weild and Edward Kim, two former high-level 
investment bankers and, subsequently, senior officers of NASDAQ who now lead the 
Capital Markets Practice Group at Grant Thornton LLP.   
The categorization of the Weild / Kim series of white papers in terms of their proper fit 
within this literature review chapter is a challenge, resulting from uncertainty as to 
whether they should be included in this sub-section as academic literature or relegated to 
the earlier sub-section on government and industry-sponsored literature on public 
company decline.  Clearly, these white papers were written under a corporate mandate 
from Grant Thorton LLP, a commercial entity with a significant interest in ensuring the 
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maintenance of robust capital markets to support their public audit practice. Therefore, 
one might assume that the Weild / Kims series papers are commercially-influenced and 
should not be discussed alongside the academic materials which have the benefit of 
academic independence. 
However, the Weild / Kim analysis of public company decline in the U.S. represents the 
first analysis in any form of literature to identify the full extent of the phenomenon in the 
U.S.  They are also the first commenters to allege that the trend is caused by something 
more fundamental and complex than the increased compliance costs associated with SOX 
implementation.  The theories espoused by Weild / Kim have proven to be extremely 
influential throughout all the subsequent academic literature and are cited as key 
authorities in every academic article of note on public company decline.  There is little 
doubt that Weild / Kim are properly considered as constituting some of the foundational 
research on public company decline in the academic world.  As such, the decision was 
reached that analysis of the Weild / Kim stream of literature should occur in this core 
section of the literature review. 
The first paper by Weild / Kim entitled “Why are IPOs in the ICU” was released in 
2008.128  In this ground-breaking work, Weild / Kim advise that they consider the 
increase in compliance costs of SOX to be a lesser contributing factor to public company 
decline: “[W]hile Sarbanes-Oxley did increase the costs and time required to go public, it 
is a bit of a red herring in that it is only one factor, and probably not the major factor, in 
the demise of the IPO market.”129  Instead, Weild / Kim point to another regulatory 
reform initiative, also designed with the intention of helping retail investors, as the main 
culprit: 
Barreling down the track in 2001 was the death star of decimalization. 
While it’s difficult to argue in theory with the change from fractional to 
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decimal increments, in hindsight the markets would have been better 
served by a reduction of increments to just 10 cents, rather than the penny 
increments for which the SEC pushed. The resultant loss of 96 percent of 
the economics from the trading spread of most small cap stocks — from 
$0.25 per share to $0.01 per share — was too much of a shock for the 
system to bear. Trade execution had to be automated. Market makers no 
longer exchanged information over the phone scrambling to match buyers 
with sellers on the other side of a trade. Liquidity, supported by capital 
commitment, was quickly a thing of the past in the NASDAQ system. In 
the name of championing consumers, the damage was done. […] 
Generally speaking, economists and regulators have maintained that 
competition and reduced transaction costs are of great benefit to 
consumers. This is only true to a point. When it comes to investments, 
higher front-end or transaction costs and tax structures that penalize 
speculative (short-term) behavior can act as disincentives to speculative 
behavior and create incentives for investment (buy-and-hold) behavior that 
may be essential to avoiding boom-and-bust cycles and maintaining the 
infrastructure necessary to support a healthy investment culture. As 
markets become frictionless (i.e., when there is little cost to entering into a 
transaction), it becomes easier for massive numbers of investors to engage 
in speculative activity. […] 
Regulators may have unwittingly done a real disservice to mom and pop 
investors by enabling traders to hijack the markets for speculation.130 
To remedy the phenomenon of public market decline, Weild / Kim propose an alternative 
market structure that they suggest firms can opt into on a voluntary basis.  The key 
features of this alternative market are suggested to include: (i) investment open to all 
investors (distinguishing it from the Rule 144A exempt market); (ii) firms complying 
with the same SEC regulatory disclosure obligations as the primary market; (iii) a quote-
driven market  supported by market makers who commit capital to the market-making 
enterprise; (iv) investors having the ability to execute trades only through brokers, 
ensuring higher commission rates; and (v) tick sizes between $0.10 and $0.20 depending 
on share price.131   Based on their proposed solutions, it is clear that Weild / Kim blame 
decimalization for destroying the IPO ecosystem of brokerage support that provided 
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trading liquidity and analyst coverage of public companies.  Their solution is essentially 
an alternative system in which we return to the past through a voluntary alternative 
market structure that eliminates the speculators, high volume electronic trading systems 
and day-traders and advantages the investment bankers. 
Weild / Kim follow up their 2008 paper a year later with a sequel entitled “A Wake-Up 
Call for America”.132  In this paper, they reiterate all of their arguments from the earlier 
paper, but also go the extra step of quantifying what they claim is the loss in job creation 
resulting from the ongoing public company decline.  Clearly, they don’t feel that they 
have received sufficient academic and popular traction from their 2008 paper, so the 2009 
paper utilizes more emotional language to ensure that the depth of the crisis cannot be 
misunderstood by the readers.  In particular, Weild / Kim describe the phenomenon of 
public company decline as the “The Great Depression in Listings” and the rise of 
speculators, day-traders and high-volume electronic institutional trading as “Casino 
Capitalism”.  Critically, they also calculate that the total number of jobs lost in the U.S. 
as a result of public company decline at 22 million between 1997 and 2009.  It is this 
calculation that garners all of the subsequent headlines, and grabs the attention of both 
the capital markets industry and the regulators. 
It cannot be stated for certain that the Weild / Kim papers were the immediate impetus for 
the creation of the U.S. IPO Taskforce, but it is clear that the Taskforce is deeply 
impacted by the Weild / Kim articles. The headline statistic of 22 million jobs lost in the 
U.S. due to IPO decline is cited on the first page of  U.S. IPO Taskforce report.133  
Clearly, the 2009 paper by Weild / Kim brought the reality of public company decline 
into the public consciousness, leading to academics finally beginning to pick up the 
thread and undertake their own analysis in the area.  The 2008 and 2009 Weild / Kim 
papers are amongst the most influential pieces in all of the academic literature, and not a 
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single article has been subsequently written on the topic without acknowledging the 2008 
and 2009 contributions of Weild / Kim. 
Weild / Kim return again in 2012134 with their third white paper on public company 
decline, this time in direct response to the implementation of the U.S. JOBS Act.135  
Weild / Kim argue in the 2012 paper that the JOBS Act got two-thirds of the way to 
correcting the problem by providing “(1) a framework to lower costs for small companies 
accessing the public markets, and (2) a framework to improve company communication 
with investors in the public and private markets.”136   
However, they also point out that the JOBS Act completely fails to provide the third leg 
of the “stool required to revive the U.S. IPO market”.137  This time, instead of arguing for 
an alternative market where issuers can contract to enrich investment banks in exchange 
for providing liquidity and research coverage, Weild / Kim propose two new alternatives 
to solve the tick size dilemma. The first alternative allows issuers to set their own tick 
size in consultation with advisors “in order to arrive at an optimal increment for its shares 
that would address both the needs of the ecosystem and the liquidity in its shares”.138  
The second alternative is to allow the SEC to set algorithmic customization of tick size at 
50% of the average bid/ask spread over a specified period (they suggest 12 months).139  
Both of these alternatives proposed by Weild / Kim are interesting and likely to be more 
palatable to regulators than their earlier alternative market suggestion, which was an 
obvious non-starter from a public policy perspective. 
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It is apparent that Weild / Kim received a significant degree of traction at high levels of 
government on this argument. In 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bi-
partisan vote directing the SEC to initiate a pilot program testing the impact of increased 
tick sizes in the market.  Under this congressional directive, the SEC pushed the U.S. 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) to implement a two-year pilot 
program in the public markets.  FINRA implemented the program on October 3, 2016, 
increasing tick sizes from $0.01 to $0.05 for a sample of small capitalization stocks.140   
The SEC pilot program expired in October 2018 with little fanfare or business media 
notice. It has generally been regarded as a failed experiment by the SEC and other 
business media for failing to materially enhance liquidity.141   FINRA’s own official 
analysis of the pilot program reports that both liquidity and pricing did improve for the 
listed companies in the experimental group, but not by a high enough amount to offset the 
cost associated with the program.  Also, FINRA reports that the number of market 
makers did not increase for the experimental stocks.  The conclusion is obvious: this 
particular regulatory initiative, designed specifically to address one of the factors 
believed to contribute to public company decline, did not deliver the hoped-for gains.   
This experimental failure does not necessarily undermine the core analysis and 
conclusions of Weild / Kim, but it does call into question the degree to which tick sizes 
contribute to the overall phenomenon of public company decline.  In fairness to Weild / 
Kim, though, a two-year pilot of a limited number of companies may not be a sufficiently 
large data sample to disprove their theory, and the experiment clearly did not control for 
the countervailing effects of other contributing factors of public company decline that 
could well have served as a drag on the companies included in the experiment.  Perhaps 
most telling is the Barron’s article on the topic which reported that the SEC, FINRA and 
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the two congressmen who sponsored the initial vote that led to the SEC pilot study all 
declined to provide any comment on the pilot study’s demise, evidencing that few in 
government currently want to associate with the SEC pilot program at this point.142  As 
such, we are unlikely to see another regulatory attempt to legislate tick sizes in the U.S. 
any time soon, and the implications of this experiment will be discussed later in this 
Dissertation under the “Implications of PCD Study for Regulatory Reform Initiatives” 
chapter. 
The analysis now turns to the stream of U.S.-based academic literature published in the 
traditional peer-reviewed journals and on which there is no question of independence of 
the authors.  This portion of the analysis starts with a series of articles written by 
University of Florida finance professor Jay Ritter and his collaborators.  The analysis of 
the Ritter articles starts with an article entitled “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?” 
published in 2013.143  Preliminary versions of this article circulated on the internet for a 
year before publication and served as the foundation for a 2012 presentation made by Jay 
Ritter to the SEC Advisory Committee on SME’s.144  In both the 2012 presentation and 
the 2013 article, Ritter, Gao and Zhu (referred to herein as “Ritter”) state that 
conventional wisdom on the causes of IPO decline continues to be that increased 
compliance costs associated with Sarbanes-Oxley, along with the reductions of tick sizes, 
are primarily to blame.145  Ritter refers to the combination of these two factors as the 
“regulatory overreach hypothesis”.146  While not discounting the relevance of the 
regulatory overreach hypothesis completely, Ritter advance their own unique theory that 
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they believe are more important in explaining the regulatory decline phenomenon: 
We posit that the advantages of selling out to a larger organization, which 
can speed a product to market and realize economies of scope, have 
increased relative to the benefits of operating as an independent firm. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we document that small company IPOs 
have had declining profitability, consistently low returns for public market 
investors, and an increasing likelihood of being involved in 
acquisitions.147 
In a follow-up article in 2014, Ritter further expounds on the theory which is 
characterized as “the fundamental economic change hypothesis”: 
[G]etting big fast is more important than it used to be, at least in some 
industries such as the technology industry, and globalization and 
improvements in communication technology are behind the change. The 
implication is that being a small independent company and growing 
organically (that is, internally) is increasingly an inferior business strategy 
compared to an alternative strategy of getting big fast, which frequently 
can be accomplished most efficiently through mergers and acquisitions. 
This hypothesis implies that young firms are now more likely to make 
acquisitions or sell out in a trade sale than to go public. 148 
Under Ritter’s hypothesis, the fundamental economic change leading to public company 
decline is irreversible and there are unlikely to be any regulatory panaceas identified that 
can single-handedly reverse the trendline of decline in public companies.  However, 
Ritter believes that maintaining functioning (if not robust) equity markets is worthwhile 
and that public companies continue to play an important role in the U.S. economy.149  
Ritter does provide the following recommendations for limiting the further decline of 
U.S. public markets: (1) lowering the costs associated with IPOs by allowing auctions 
rather than book-building; (2) reforming the legal system to discourage poorly grounded 
class-action lawsuits; and (3) reforming the U.S. copyright system.  The limited scope of 
these proposed reforms demonstrates that Ritter is somewhat pessimistic about the ability 
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for large-scale regulatory intervention to be successful in arresting the continuing decline 
of the U.S. public company. 
The next article meriting discussion is an analysis of the impact of the JOBS Act by 
Michael Dambra, Laura Casares-Field and Matthew Gustafson (collectively referred to as 
“Dambra” herein).150  The Dambra article finds a statistically significant increase in IPO 
activity after the JOBS Act implementation compared to the baseline activity prior to the 
JOBS Act, but the positive impact is restricted primarily to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical-based industries. The uptick is also determined not to be of sufficient size 
to offset the rate of attrition of public companies.  As such, Dambra does not predict that 
the JOBS Act impact will be sufficient to offset ongoing public company decline,151 a 
fact which has been borne out by continued decline in the number of listed public 
companies over the four-year interval since the Dambra article was published. 
We now turn to a series of six related articles, most of which are written as collaborations 
by a group of finance professors whose common background is that they all were on 
faculty or completed their PhD’s at Ohio State University over the same time period in 
the early 2000’s.   This series of articles is referred to herein as the “Stulz” papers for 
convenience, as Rene Stulz is the most senior academic in the group and is the only 
author that is common to all five papers.   
The Stulz papers commence in 2013 with the publication of “The US Left Behind?  
Financial Globalization and the Rise of IPOs Outside the US”.152  In this article, the 
authors focus on the decline of the American public markets in comparison to global 
public markets, blaming financial globalization for the decline in U.S. dominance of 
public equity markets since 1997 and painting a rosy picture of the status of public 
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companies in the rest of the world.  Beyond globalization, the authors do not have any 
firm beliefs as to the causes of the decline in the U.S.  They do, however, advise that the 
regulatory changes in general, and SOX in particular, cannot explain U.S. public 
company decline.153 
In the next paper in the Stulz timeline, published in 2017, the authors continue to 
expound on the views previously stated in the 2013 paper.154  Once again, the authors 
point out that the popular bogey-man of SOX compliance costs does not properly explain 
the timeline of U.S. public company decline.  The authors discuss the theories of Weild / 
Kim and Ritter as well as alternative explanations of the decline, but do not posit any 
specific theories of their own or take any position as to what they believe are the principal 
contributing factors. 
Two more Stulz papers were published in 2017, once again reiterating the same themes: 
(i) the U.S. is getting left behind the rest of the world; (ii) the IPO market and public 
company health are far better everywhere outside of the U.S.; and (iii) nobody is sure as 
to the actual causes of public company decline, but the popular culprits of regulatory 
overreach associated with Sarbanes-Oxley and decimalization can be demonstrably 
proven to not be the major contributing factors.155  Here, the authors refer to “the US 
Listing Gap” to describe the difference in what the U.S. IPO activity should be compared 
to the rest of the world based on historical market share.  
The fifth Stulz paper was released in 2018, this time as a solo effort from Rene Stulz.156  
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This paper does provide some new insights beyond the themes that are repeatedly 
recycled in the first four Stulz papers, principally in analysis of the increasing relevance 
of research & development and the resulting increase in balance sheet intangible assets in 
the modern U.S. economy. On this point, Stulz points out the following: 
The fact that GAAP accounting is less instructive about the economic 
value of firms with more intangibles works especially against young firms. 
An established firm with high intangibles will have an easier time 
convincing markets of its economic value. As a result, the growth in the 
importance of intangibles makes it less likely that young firms will want to 
join the exchanges and more likely that they will seek private funding or 
be acquired.  […] 
The fact that young firms investing in intangibles tend to have GAAP 
losses even though they are creating economic value provides another 
reason why many firms may want to stay away from public markets. 157 
Later on, Stulz deepens his analysis to include consideration of the ramifications of the 
technology-based economy on the competitive positions of companies pursuing public 
offerings.  Stulz expresses the belief that the public markets are inherently less attractive 
for firms that invest in development of intangible assets given the competitive risk of 
public company disclosure obligations.158 
This fifth paper in the Stulz series offers more insights than the earlier four articles, 
which all get hung up on the issue of the unique American nature of public company 
decline with little else to add to the academic canon on the topic.  The two key points that 
Stulz makes in the last article with respect to the challenges of technology companies 
dealing with public company reporting and the potentially chilling effects of disclosure 
on their competitive position are both suggestions that merit further analysis.  As a 
counterpoint, however, the PCD Study results discussed later in this Dissertation do not 
support the public disclosure disadvantage as being in the class of most critical factors in 
public company decline. 
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The sixth Stulz paper is a further collaboration of the co-authors of the first four Stulz 
papers discussed above.159  In this last Stulz paper, the authors look back at Jensen’s 
1989 article, “The Eclipse of the Public Corporation”, which was discussed earlier in this 
literature review.  With respect to Jensen’s predictions in 1989 on public company 
decline, it is noted that only some of the important predictions have come to fruition.  
They reiterate their previously-stated belief that public markets in the U.S. remain well-
suited for companies with mostly tangible assets, but have been eclipsed by the private 
markets for companies with primarily intangible assets looking for growth funding.  The 
authors also note that this evolution is problematic in that individual investors are often 
prevented from gaining access to potentially high-growth investments in companies with 
intangible asset bases, along with a reduction in transparency as fewer firms go public. 
From a Canadian perspective, it is imperative to point that there is no consideration in the 
Stulz papers of the nature of public company decline outside of the United States.  In fact, 
public company decline is presented in these articles as a uniquely American 
phenomenon.    It is uncertain why the Stulz articles fail to pick up on the occurrence of 
this phenomenon in other western industrialized democracies, particularly since the key 
Canadian and European sources discussed later in this literature review pre-date the 
publication of all but the first paper in the Stulz series.160   
The analysis now turns to consideration of another group of articles that propose a 
different factor as being the principal contributing cause of U.S. public company decline: 
namely, the effect of the deregulation of private equity markets as a result of the National 
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”).161   NSMIA increased the 
ability of private companies to raise significant equity by adding an additional exemption 
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for sale of securities to qualified purchasers, and also increased the number of qualified 
investors who could participate in hedge funds.   
The first article to be considered in this stream was published by Duke corporate law 
professor Elizabeth de Fontenay in 2016.162  Fontenay’s theory is succinctly summarized 
in the following excerpt:  
From its inception, the federal securities law regime created and enforced 
a major divide between public and private capital raising. Firms that chose 
to "go public" took on substantial disclosure burdens, but in exchange 
were given the exclusive right to raise capital from the general public. 
Over time, however, the disclosure quid pro quo has been subverted: 
Public companies are still asked to disclose, yet capital is flooding into 
private companies with regulators' blessing.163 
De Fontenay goes on to state her opinion that private companies have essentially become 
free riders in the capital markets, taking advantage of the public company disclosure for 
pricing and other critical information, which effectively operates as a subsidy from the 
public companies to their private market competitors.164 
 
The same theory is advanced in a recent paper co-written by CalTech finance professor 
Michael Ewens and Northeastern finance professor Joan Farre-Mensas.165  This article 
specifically points the finger at NSMIA and demonstrates the significant increase in 
private equity placements completed in the immediate aftermath of its passage.  The 
thesis of both de Fontenay and Ewens / Farre-Mensas is that private companies will 
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generally choose private alternatives of financing if they are readily available in order to 
avoid the disclosure obligations and costs of being a public company, and that the series 
of regulatory reforms increasing the ability to raise capital through private sources is the 
single biggest contributing factor to U.S. public company decline since the 1996 passage 
of NMSIA.  Notably, this is the theory that maps most directly on the timeline with the 
actual beginning of the decline of the U.S. public markets starting in 1997. 
The final item to be considered in this section is a 2018 article co-authored by two 
fellows of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard, 
Marshall Lux and Jack Pead.166  Lux / Pead review the decline of the U.S. IPO market 
and the number of listed companies, and then turn to discussing the importance of 
retaining robust public markets in the U.S.   
On the issue of relevance of the decline, Lux / Pead come down firmly on the side of 
believing that public company decline does matter and that there is value in seeking to 
find ways to combat the decline.  They also conclude that the causes of the decline are 
multi-factorial and intertwined, concluding that five factors are the major drivers of 
public company decline:  “(1) analyst coverage trends, (2) buy-side trends, (3) a shift 
from active to passive investment strategies, (4) the growth in private capital and (5) 
increasingly burdensome regulation.”167  Lux / Pead are also the first writers to point the 
finger at a new culprit embedded within the analyst coverage trends, Elliott Spitzer: 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s crusade against research 
conflicts in the early 2000s led to the Global Analyst Research Settlements 
in April 2003 that banned any quid pro quo between research and 
investment banking—meaning the promise of future business for a 
recommendation. While this eliminated a conflict, it undermined the 
economics of equity research, forcing a restructuring and rethinking of 
many research units. The settlement set off a chain of consequences. 
Investment banks had generally subsidized small-cap coverage with 
 
166 Marshall Lux and Jack Pead, “Hunting High and Low: The Decline of the Small IPO and What to Do 
About It” (2018) Harvard Kennedy School, M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series No. 86, online:< 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/working.papers /86_final.pdf>. 
167 Ibid at 8. 
71 
 
profits from large-cap stocks. Now the economic model of most 
investment banks focused more tightly on large-cap companies. Smaller 
companies found themselves in the cold.168 
Lux / Pead conclude by providing their recommendations for combatting public company 
decline, including: (1) increasing the threshold of small company reporting to $250 
million; (2) extending the length of the IPO on-ramp in the JOBS Act from 5 years to 10 
years; (3) increasing the value of shareholdings required to table a shareholder proposal; 
(4) allowing mandatory shareholder mediation to replace securities class action litigation; 
and (5) simplifying the ongoing disclosure requirements. 
2.4- European Literature on Public Company Decline 
 European Business Media 
European business media have certainly picked up on the trend of declining public 
companies in the European capital markets, although not to the same degree as Canadian 
and American business media.  The first business writer to pick up the thread is Kate 
Burgess of the Financial Times, who writes a 2015 article documenting the decline in the 
number of IPOs being completed in both Europe and the U.S.  Her article focuses on 
European IPO decline, noting that the rate of companies going public has gone down by 
half over the past decade.169 
Another article written by Duncan Lamont has recently been published in the Financial 
News.170  Lamont confirms that public company decline has indeed taken hold in the U.K 
and other Western European countries: 
[O]ur analysis finds a similar collapse in the UK and parts of Western 
Europe. This trend has not been reflected in emerging markets, especially, 
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Asia, where they have grown in prominence. In developed markets 
however, there is clearly a declining appetite for IPOs and consistently 
higher numbers of companies delisting (mainly due to mergers and 
acquisitions) are to blame.171 
What is apparent from Lamont’s analysis is that the phenomenon of public company 
decline is evidenced throughout developed Western democratic countries, but not Eastern 
European countries.  That this trend does not exist in Eastern Europe is not surprising, as 
the decline intuitively appears to be a function of mature markets that have had a long 
period to reach the optimal number of public companies listed before the confluence of 
events that combine to create the decline began to take hold in the late 1990’s.   
With respect to Asian countries, developing countries elsewhere in the world, and the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe, it is logical to infer that these economies 
have sufficient latent demand for public companies that the impact of the factors 
contributing to Western democratic public decline can be more than offset by the growth 
required to reach maturity.  This does not suggest that the factors contributing to public 
company decline in Western industrialized democracies do not also exist in these other 
markets; rather, one can hypothesize that the effects of these factors may only become 
observable in terms of total companies listed once the developing economies finally 
achieve a state of stasis where the number of public companies reaches a “mature” level.  
Again, only time will tell whether this prognostication is accurate and further analysis of 
the difference in IPO trends between mature western democracies and other nations is 
beyond the scope of this Dissertation. 
 European Government and Industry-Sponsored Publications 
The first piece of literature to consider under this heading is the report of the European 
IPO Task Force.172  The European IPO Task Force consists of representatives of three 
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different industry associations: (1) European Issuers Association; (2) Invest Europe 
(formerly European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association); and (3) the 
Federation of European Securities Exchanges.   The rationale for the creation of the Task 
Force is summarized as follows: 
The European IPO markets need to work better for the real economy.  In 
the last ten years, capital raised through IPOs was only around half of 
what was raised in the 1990s. This decline comes at the worst possible 
time for European businesses, coinciding with declining availability on 
bank lending. Although Europe continues to build and grow businesses 
with the potential to be world class, the failure of the IPO market to 
facilitate their access to capital markets hampers their growth and lowers 
potential employment. According to OECD analysis, a properly 
functioning IPO market could deliver thousands of extra jobs in Europe. A 
survey, conducted in 2007, also finds out that 92% of job growth in a 
company occurs post-IPO. This is an opportunity we cannot afford to 
miss.173 
Pointing to recent regulatory changes in Europe, the Task Force claims that regulations 
have had the effect of: (1) creating intractable legislation for all sizes of companies; (2) 
increasing regulatory compliance costs; (3) eliminating incentives to invest in equity; and 
(4) shifting trading economics away from value investing toward high-volume program 
trading.174  
The Task Force report makes five recommendations for reversing public company 
decline, although only two of the recommendations reflect concrete action items.  The 
first recommendation mirrors the on-ramp provision of the JOBS Act.  The second 
tangible recommendation is granting tax incentives to investors who buy IPOs and hold 
them long term, reflecting a key recommendation of the Paulson Committee. 
The second piece of literature to consider is the NASDAQ report from 2016 advocating 
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for capital markets union throughout Europe.175  This report points out some unique 
elements of the European financial system, particularly its disproportionately high 
reliance on debt financing as a tool for financing growing ventures.  The NASDAQ 
report repeats the call for tax incentives for long-term investment in IPOs, along with the 
streamlining of the ongoing compliance for SME’s that are public to reduce reporting 
costs. 
 European Academic Analysis of Public Company Decline 
This is the shortest subsection of this literature review chapter, simply because there are 
no notable European-based academic analyses of public company decline published to 
date in the English language as of the date of this literature review.  This fact is in and of 
itself somewhat surprising, and the reasons why are unclear.  Possibly, the academics 
writing on the public markets in Europe are so focused on securing capital markets union 
and understanding the consequences of Brexit that this topic has not made it onto their 
radar to the same degree as their American counterparts.  Certainly, the statistics 
demonstrate that the European IPO decline is not yet as acute as the American version.  
However, European IPO decline nevertheless appears to be a real phenomenon, as 
evidenced by the European business media articles and the European IPO task-force.  It is 
certainly only a matter of time until European academics pick up the scent and begin to 
write on the unique elements of their own IPO decline.  As of this point, there has been 
no significant analysis undertaken on why the European experience in public company 
decline appears to lag the U.S. experience on a timeline basis. 
2.5- Canadian Literature on Public Company Decline 
 Canadian Business Media 
The phenomenon of public company decline has been widely reported on in the Canadian 
business media, with nearly every major newspaper and magazine having published at 
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least one article on the topic in the past two years.176  In each instance, the business 
media writers identify the extent of decline in the number of operating public companies 
listed in Canada, and point out that the headline numbers on IPO listings in Canada are 
obscured by the proliferation of closed-end funds and ETF’s.  Another common theme 
amongst the articles is the understanding that public company decline cannot be 
attributed to any single factor, and that there is a lack of agreement as to what the relative 
degree of contributions of the various potential factors actually are to the phenomenon.  
Consistently reported in all of the articles is that Canadian executives are wearied by the 
excessive time that they spend dealing with various stakeholders of the public entity, 
which they view as a distraction from focusing on growth of the core business.  In 
summary, the Financial Post article quotes Calgary law professor Bryce Tingle,  who 
states that the securities regulators should be “surveying public company executives on 
which rules they find most burdensome and then determine whether they can be 
fixed.”177  This admonition by Bryce Tingle has specifically informed this Dissertation 
and the formulation of the PCD Study. 
The most recent major article on the topic is a January 2020 analysis written by Sean 
Silcoff, technology reporter for The Globe and Mail.178  In this article, the ready 
availability of private financing alternatives for Canadian technology companies is 
posited as the main culprit of public company decline.  Silcoff concludes that the easy 
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availability of private equity is “enabling fast-growing companies to stay private much 
longer, raising as much as they could by going public, but without the hassle, cost, 
disclosure requirements and scrutiny”.179  However, multiple other contributing factors 
are also cited throughout this article as potentially having some role in public company 
decline.  
 Canadian Government and Industry-Sponsored Literature 
The analysis of Canadian government and industry-sponsored literature starts and ends 
with the Canadian Securities Administrators and the initiative launched in CSA 
Consultation Paper 51-404.  As these documents have been covered extensively 
elsewhere in this Dissertation in Chapter 4 “Analysis of the CSA and OSC Streamlining 
Initiatives”, there is no need to repeat that portion of the analysis in this literature review 
chapter.  
 Canadian Academic Analysis of Public Company Decline 
There exists only a single stream of academic literature in Canada that deals specifically 
with the subject of Canadian public company decline, namely originating with University 
of Calgary law professor Bryce Tingle (mentioned in the previous subsection) and two 
finance professors at the University of Calgary.  However, before turning to that stream 
of literature, there are a few other Canadian pieces that should be discussed briefly. 
Although they were written before the phenomenon of Canadian public company decline 
became apparent, these pieces anticipate the possibility that public company decline 
could happen and warn about becoming complacent in terms of regulatory overreach 
continually increasing the burden on capital public issuers. 
The first piece to consider is a research study written by Western University corporate 
law professor Chris Nicholls in 2006 entitled “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital 
Markets and the Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Response to Sarbanes-
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Oxley”.180  In this report commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities 
Legislation in Canada, Nicholls considers the unique elements of Canada’s public 
markets, including the small number of large issuers and the large number of small 
issuers that make up Canada’s public company base.  Nicholls highlights the tension that 
developed between various stakeholders in response to the U.S. adoption of SOX, with 
factions who believed whole-sale adoption of the SOX certification procedures was 
necessary to protect Canada’s reputation as a serious regulatory jurisdiction, in opposition 
to other factions who argued that the unique elements of Canada’s public capital markets 
dictated a more nuanced and bespoke legislative response.  Clearly, Nicholls comes down 
on the side of supporting a more nuanced regulatory response that he believes will be 
appropriate for the smaller enterprises that make up the majority of Canadian public 
listings.  Of particular note for the topic of this Dissertation, Nicholls draws a lesson from 
U.S. corporate history in which (then N.J. governor) Woodrow Wilson decimated the 
market for incorporations in New Jersey by bringing in new anti-trust legislation.  
Nicholls concludes by stating that 
 “[i]t would be impertinent and misleading to suggest that SOX might 
prove as disastrous for America’s capital markets as Wilson’s anti-trust 
legislation proved for New Jersey’s corporate tax coffers. Access to the 
enviably deep and liquid U.S. capital markets offers far too many 
advantages to corporations (and their investors) to be outweighed by a 
single legislative initiative, especially one as well-meaning as SOX. But 
features of Canada’s markets suggest that they may well be more fragile. 
Accordingly, Canada’s regulators do not have the luxury of crafting 
regulation secure in the knowledge that the lure of Canada’s markets will 
ensure that modest regulatory burdens will not dampen the interest of 
issuers and investors. Rather, Canadian securities regulation may need to 
be crafted with much greater concern for its perceived impact on investors 
and issuing corporations, and with much more sensitivity to the 
international competition for listings of small-cap firms. 181 
 
180 Christopher C. Nicholls, “Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the Illustrative Case of 
Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley” (15 June 2006) Research Study 
Commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, online:< 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ download?doi= 10.1.1.568.644&rep=rep1&type=pdf>. 
181 Ibid at 191. 
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Certainly, Nicholls recognizes the inherent fragility of the Canadian capital markets 
compared to its U.S. neighbours and the risk that regulatory overreach has the potential to 
irreparably damage the Canadian public markets ecosystem. 
Nicholls is followed in his analysis of the SOX implementation in Canada by Stephen 
Sibbold, a securities lawyer and former Chairman of the Alberta Securities Commission.  
Sibbold authored a 2009 article in which he points out that the dominant position of the 
U.S. in the IPO market has begun to erode since the adoption of SOX.182  Noting the 
erosion of the U.S.’s position in capital markets, Sibbold warns that, “rather than 
continue to emulate a regulatory regime which is apparently in competitive decline 
internationally, Canada should strive to forge for itself a distinct regulatory regime based 
on sound regulatory principles and practical, cost-effective, and enforceable rules.”183  
Sibbold concludes by stating his position that one such area in which Canadian regulation 
is trending in the wrong direction is in the Canadian Securities Administrators adoption 
of policies supporting greater board independence. 
Turning back now to the University of Calgary trio who have written on the specific topic 
of Canadian public company decline, the key article co-authored by Bryce Tingle, J. Ari 
Pandes and Michael J. Robinson (collectively referred to as “Tingle” herein) is published 
in 2013.184  This article compares the Canadian capital markets to the U.S. capital 
markets and reviews the key literature from American academics positing various causes 
of regulatory decline.  Tingle groups the various posited causes of public company 
decline from the American sources into four categories (regulatory over-reach, litigation 
climate, changes in market structure and fundamental economic change) and proceeds to 
then explain why none of these possible explanations seems to be properly descriptive of 
 
182 Stephen P. Sibbold, “Assessing Canada’s Regulator Response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: 
Lessons for Canadian Policy Makers” (2009) 46 Alberta Law Review 769. 
183 Ibid at 786. 
184 Bryce C. Tingle, J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, “The IPO Market in Canada: What a 
Comparison with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem” (2013) 54 Canadian Business Law 
Journal 321. 
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the Canadian experience.  
With respect to the unique nuances of the Canadian market, Tingle provides a number of 
statistics to demonstrate that the ready access to private equity capital that is often cited 
in the U.S. sources simply is not reflective of the Canadian reality.  Tingle argues that 
Canadian venture capital and private equity markets are nowhere near as robust as their 
American counterparts.  Notably, Tingle’s discussion of the differences in access to 
private financing between the U.S. and Canada seriously brings into question whether the 
belief expressed in the most recent U.S. articles (i.e., that easier access to private capital 
is a major cause of U.S. public company decline) published after Tingle’s article have 
any validity in explaining the Canadian version of public company decline.185 
After eliminating each of the four groups of potential cause as being descriptive of the 
Canadian public company decline phenomenon, Tingle concludes by advancing the 
following: 
[S]omething else must be keeping small businesses (and some big firms as 
well) out of the IPO market. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
provide our full explanation for the decline of public markets, we can 
recommend an examination of the traditional approach scholars take to 
corporate governance questions: look at the alignment of incentives. The 
decision to take a company public, finance it privately or allow it to be 
acquired falls squarely within the ambit of corporate governance. It isn't 
necessary to discover some particular feature of the IPO market that has 
changed so as to alter the economics of small public firms. It is sufficient 
to ask whether the public markets and the legal and regulatory apparatus 
surrounding them have evolved in a way that provides strong disincentives 
to managers to take their businesses public. 
It is this particular challenge in the Tingle article that formed the seeds of the PCD Study 
 
185 Other academics writing on the comparative accessibility and availability of venture capital and private 
equity in Canada have come to the same conclusion; namely, private financing is significantly more 
difficult to secure in the Canadian market than in the U.S.  See: Donald J. Cumming and Jeffrey MacIntosh, 
“Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the United States” (2003) 53 University of Toronto Law Journal 101; 
and Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan, “The IPO as an Exit Strategy for Venture Capitalists: Regional 
Lessons from Canada with International Comparisons”, book chapter in  Mario Levis and Silvio Vismarar, 
eds, Handbook of Research on IPOs (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Pub, 2016),  
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underpinning this Dissertation.  The Tingle article remains the last word on the subject 
academically in Canada, and it is appropriate that the academic discourse be jump-started 
to provide our provincial regulators with updated guidance and analysis as they each 
evaluate the appropriate regulatory response to CSA Consultation Paper 51-404. 
An updated article from Tingle on public company decline entitled “The Decline of 
Canadian Capital Markets” is forthcoming and will be published by the University of 
Calgary Institute of Public Policy.186  This article confirms that the phenomenon has not 
abated and remains very much a critical public issue to be addressed to ensure the 
continued health of Canadian capital markets. 
2.6- Other Western Democratic Countries Impacted by Public 
Company Decline 
As noted in the introductory chapter of this Dissertation, the phenomenon of public 
company decline has been reported as being endemic throughout western democratic 
industrialized countries.  If this statement is accurate, what other countries beyond the 
U.S., Canada and the countries in Western Europe should be experiencing a similar 
decline?  The obvious answers are New Zealand and Australia.   
A search for recognition of this phenomenon in New Zealand does not turn up any 
academic sources, but there is an insightful analysis arising in Australia.187  An article, 
posted on the Australian CPA website indicates that Australia is likely in the early phases 
of the decline, a recognition which has perhaps been delayed by the fact that Australia’s 
capital markets have benefitted significantly from their close physical proximity to Asia.  
Asian public markets are continuing to experience a boom in new listings and these 
Asian-linked listings may well obscure the imminence of an Australian public markets 
 
186 J. Ari Pandes and Bryce Tingle, “The Decline of Canadian Public Capital Markets”, upcoming in 
University of Calgary Institute of Public Policy Journal. 
187 Adrian Rollins, “The Disappearing Public Company: Why Firms Don’t Want to List” (1 November 
2017) Australian CPA Society Website, online:< https://www.intheblack.com /articles/2017/11/01/ 
disappearing-public-companies>. 
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decline mirroring what has happened in Canada.  Certainly, Australian finance professor 
Adam Steen of Charles Stuart University, quoted in the article, believes that the 
phenomenon is inevitable and in fact is already occurring.188  Once again, time will tell if 
the anticipated decline in Australia has yet reached an inflection point where it will 
become more obvious and receive more public recognition in the upcoming years. 
2.7- A Brief Consideration of the Relevance of the Ongoing 
Academic Debate on Shareholder Short-Termism to the 
Topic of Public Company Decline 
As a final element to consider in this Literature Review chapter, it is worth discussing 
briefly an ongoing debate within legal academia as to the ultimate relevance of the rise of 
shareholder short-termism on the issue of public company decline.  Short-termism 
generally refers to pressures from external forces placed on public companies to deliver 
results in the short-term, with the assumption made that focusing on short-term results 
may not necessarily be consistent with maximizing profitability of the company over the 
long-term.  Shareholder short-termism (i.e., the unwillingness to hold onto shares for 
longer periods of time) is one of several different elements of overall short-termism 
tested as potential contributing factors to public company decline in the PCD Study, 
along with analyst short-termism and the impact of short-sellers in the marketplace. 
There is no serious debate within legal academia as to whether increasing shareholder 
short-termism is a real phenomenon in the capital markets.  Since 1980, the average 
length that a public shareholder holds a share on the New York Stock Exchange has 
dropped from three years to under one year.189  With a shorter horizon for liquidity, 
shareholders demand tangible results more quickly so that their share value appreciates.  
However, there is a significant divergence of opinion as to whether increasing 
 
188 Ibid. 
189 Mark J. Roe, “Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact” European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper No. 426/2018, November 2018, online:< https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3171090>; also Mark J. Roe, “Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the 
Courtroom” (2013) 68 The Business Lawyer 977. 
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shareholder short-termism is an issue that actually prevents public companies from 
investing for the long-term at the expense of pursuing tactics that maximize short-term 
shareholder value.  As such, there is an ongoing academic dispute as to how much 
shareholder short-termism matters. 
One of the leading advocates of the position that shareholder short-termism does not 
necessarily prevent public companies from successfully pursuing long-term strategies by 
under-investing for the future is Mark J. Roe, the David Berg Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School.  Roe underpins his analysis largely on empirical evidence 
demonstrating that the largest and fastest-growing public companies in the U.S. continue 
to be technology companies that also have the highest level of investment in ongoing 
research and development. Therefore, Roe concludes that these enterprises are 
succeeding and clearly not focusing only on maximizing short term operating results.190  
Roe’s analysis builds on similar observations previously undertaken by others, 
particularly another Harvard Law School professor, Lucian Bebchuk.191  In each of these 
instances, the authors build the case that increasing shareholder short-termism does not 
necessarily negatively impact the ability of public companies to invest for the long-term.  
They also argue that shareholder short-termism may have benefits for improved corporate 
governance. 
However, none of these arguments claiming that shareholder short-termism is not as big 
of a problem for long-term corporate performance as has been widely claimed by 
contemporary business leaders is particularly relevant to the fundamental analysis 
undertaken by this Dissertation.  This Dissertation is agnostic towards the question of 
 
190 Ibid. 
191 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars A. Stole, “Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment 
in Long-Term Projects” (1993) 48:2 The Journal of Finance 1993; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, 
“How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results” (2010) 22 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
99;  Lucian A. Bebchuk, “The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value” (2013) 113 
Columbia Law Review 1637; and Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, “The Long-Term Effects 
of Hedge Fund Activism” (2015) 115 Columbia Law Review 1085. 
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whether shareholder short-termism is inherently a positive development or a negative 
development for corporate governance, and also as to whether shareholder short-termism 
innately limits the ability of contemporary public companies to maximize long-term 
value creation.  Rather, this Dissertation is focused on the potential impact of various 
factors that have recently developed in the capital markets that may impact the trajectory 
of the decline in the number of public Operating Companies.   
As argued in the introductory chapter and again later in this Dissertation, the 
phenomenon of public company decline is inevitably defined by the evolution of the 
conscious preference of senior business decision-makers away from the public markets 
and towards private financing alternatives.  As such, the critical question with respect to 
the intersection of the shareholder short-termism debate and this Dissertation is not 
whether the increasing trend towards short-termism actually prevents public companies 
from achieving their goal of long-term value maximization.  Rather, the critical question 
is whether the issue of increasing shareholder short-termism is perceived by senior 
business decision-makers as being an issue of concern and frustration to the extent that it 
may ultimately influence their decision as to whether to pursue an IPO or an alternative 
private financing. 
With respect to this particular calculation, the same group of legal academics referenced 
previously who argue most strenuously that short-termism is not as big of a problem as 
perceived by public companies in reality assist in making the underlying case as to the 
importance of shareholder short-termism as a matter of concern for public company 
decline.  To wit, Mark Roe begins an abstract for his seminal paper on short-termism 
with the following summary: 
Stock-market-driven short-termism is crippling the American economy, 
according to legal, judicial, and media analyses. Firms forgo the R&D 
they need, cut capital spending, and buy back their own stock so feverishly 
that they starve themselves of cash. The stock market is the primary cause: 
directors and executives cannot manage for the long-term when their 
shareholders furiously trade their company’s stock, they cannot make 
long-term investments when stockholders demand to see profits on this 
quarter’s financial statements, they cannot even strategize about the long-
term when shareholder activists demand immediate results, and they 
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cannot keep the cash to invest in their future when stock market pressure 
drains away that cash in stock buybacks. 
 
This doomsday version of the stock-market-driven short-termism 
argument entails economy-wide predictions that have not been well-
examined for their severity and accuracy.192 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is this perception itself, and the potential implications of 
that perception on the phenomenon of public company decline, that the PCD Study is 
concerned with.  Considering the preceding quote from Mark Roe, there is no question 
that the perception, on the part of senior business decision-makers, of short-termism as a 
negative factor is sufficiently widely held that it is imperative that it be included as a 
factor to be considered in the PCD Study.  
 
192 Supra note 189 
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 An Overview and Brief History of Public Company 
Regulation in Canada 
The rise of public companies as a major force in western industrialized nations since the 
beginning of the sixteenth century is inextricably linked to the growth and diversification 
of the overall economy during this unprecedented era of wealth creation.  In Chapter 1 of 
this Dissertation, a variety of reasons were articulated explaining why the maintenance of 
robust public capital markets remains a national economic priority Canada and elsewhere. 
 
For as long as publicly-held corporations have existed, governments have wrestled with 
the challenge of how best to regulate them: i.e., how can the interests of vulnerable public 
investors be adequately protected without stifling continued growth of the underlying 
markets themselves?  It is readily apparent to capital markets observers that the period of 
public company decline in Canada overlays an era of ever-increasing regulatory 
complexity and compliance cost.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that so many casual 
observers of the Canadian public markets assume that regulatory overreach is the 
principal cause of public company decline.  Clearly, an assumption that overregulation 
has hampered the Canadian capital markets in recent years is embedded in the recent 
mandate delivered by the current Ontario provincial government to the OSC to prioritize 
public company burden reduction.  To what degree can this assumption be validated 
empirically?  Addressing that question is at the core of this Dissertation.   
 
Before turning to an overview of contemporary Canadian securities regulatory reform 
initiatives in Chapter 4, and then continuing on to a detailed analysis of the empirical 
study underpinning this Dissertation beginning in Chapter 5, this chapter provides 
additional historical context on the evolution of both the public company form and public 
company regulation in Canada. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the historical 
development of the modern public company form starting in the U.K. and tracing its 
evolution through the U.S. and into Canada.  Next, the historical development of the 
regulatory regimes that have evolved to govern public companies in Canada are outlined.  
Thereafter, major changes in the regulation of public Operating Companies in Canada 
occurring specifically over the past 25 years are summarized, tracking the period 
86 
 
immediately preceding the beginning of the public company decline phenomenon in 
Canada up to the present day.  Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief consideration 
of the key elements of effective securities regulation generally, and regulatory reform 
specifically. 
3.1- Legal Origins of the Public Company Form in Canada 
Corporate theory and practice throughout Canadian history has developed primarily with 
reference to the dual precedents of U.S. and British experience, drawing significantly 
from each of these two key influences at various points in time.193  The direct ancestor of 
the modern public corporation, the joint stock company,194 originated in both England 
and the Netherlands during the sixteenth century.195   Joint stock companies, which were 
the first commercial entities offering limited liability to investors, were initially 
established by royal charter, and later also through special acts of Parliament, for special 
purposes strategically aligned with the interests of government.196  Initially, joint stock 
companies were primarily engaged in shipping, international trade and colonization 
activities.  The capital-intensive nature of these particular activities required that large 
amounts of risk capital be secured from a variety of individual high net worth investors in 
order to diversify the significant risk associated with these commercial ventures.  
 
193  Fenner Stewart, “A history of Canadian corporate law: A divergent path from the American model?”, 
in Harwell Wells, ed., Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2018) at 459. 
194 In his review of Laurence Gower’s classic 1954 text reviewing the development of English company 
law (L.C.B. Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (London, England: Stevens and Sons 
Limited, 1954)), eminent American securities law professor Louis Loss notes that Gower draws a 
distinction between various types of British-incorporated companies based on the specific source of their 
charter.  As such, Gower uses a more limited definition of the term “joint stock company”. See, Louis Loss, 
“Reviews- The Principles of Modern Company Law” (1955) 65 Yale Law Journal 1080 at 1084.  However, 
most modern corporate and securities texts use the term “joint stock company” to refer collectively to all 
British corporations created under royal charter, act of Parliament or early general incorporation statute, 
and this broader definition is adopted in this Dissertation. 
195 B. Mark Smith, A History of the Global Stock Market: From Ancient Rome to Silicon Valley 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) at 17. 
196 Inger Dubeck, “Legal History of Joint-Stock Companies” (1993) 37 Scandinavian Legal Studies 
Journal 11 at 13. 
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While the joint stock company form provided the legal vehicle necessary for securing 
investment from disparate investors, it also uncovered a fundamental tension between the 
priorities of individual investors supplying capital and the promoters of sixteenth century 
commercial enterprises. 197  The promoters of the commercial enterprises required surety 
of stable investment capital for a specified duration to finance the ventures, while the 
individuals supplying the capital desired liquidity that would allow them to convert their 
investments back to cash at the time of their choosing.198  The demand for a mechanism 
providing investor liquidity without negatively impacting the company’s capital base was 
solved by the creation of stock exchanges in London and Amsterdam, whereby the 
interests of the individual investors could be traded freely and converted to cash without 
requiring repayment of capital from the company itself.   
The Dutch East India Company, in particular, represented the first joint stock company 
with a permanent charter, whose shares were tradeable through the facilities of a stock 
exchange. 199  A robust trading market developed in Amsterdam in the early years of the 
seventeenth century, which also allowed investors to secure credit against their 
investments and trade on margin.200   The Dutch experience in corporate finance with 
publicly-traded joint stock companies was quickly adopted in England, particularly with 
the ascension of the House of Orange to the English throne in 1688.201 
Several notable joint stock companies, including such famous enterprises as the British 
East India Company, grew rapidly to become massive widely-held and publicly-traded 
corporate entities with significant international political and economic influence on the 
 
197 Oscar Gelderblom and Jost Jonker, “Completing a Financial Revolution: The Finance of Dutch East 
India Trade and the Rise of the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1595-1612” (2004) 64:3 The Journal of 
Economic History 641 at 642. 
198 Ibid.  
199 Supra note 195 at 17-18. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
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world stage during the eighteenth century.  Among the specific characteristics of the joint 
stock company that allowed it to flourish were the “means of concentrating substantial 
capital […] supported by a permanent core of transferable equity shares” that served to 
provide the entity with “sufficient financial flexibility to be able to exploit the economies 
deriving from an increased scope of trading activities”.202 Ultimately, these joint stock 
companies were able to achieve economies of scale previously unseen by concentrating 
capital in a single entity.203 By providing liquidity through the stock markets, the joint 
stock companies with permanent capital avoided the costly and disruptive cycle  of 
liquidation, distribution and re-formation that had previously reflected the normal course 
of business in trading enterprises.204 
As discussed in more detail hereafter in the ensuing section covering the history of 
securities regulation, however, the evolution of the joint stock company did not occur 
without attracting notable criticism from certain constituencies205 and facing major 
setbacks that disrupted the emergence of the public company form.  In particular, the 
South Sea Bubble of 1720 and the contemporaneous passage by the British Parliament of 
the Bubble Act of 1720 (the “Bubble Act”)206 effectively served to prevent new joint 
 
202 Johnathan Barron Baskin and Paul J. Miranti, Jr., A History of Corporate Finance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 57. 
203 Ibid at 61. 
204 Ibid at 60. 
205 Indeed, by the time of the publication of the The Wealth of Nations in 1776,  Adam Smith had already 
identified two major challenges with the early forms of publicly-traded joint stock companies: (i) the fact 
that joint stock companies were generally granted some form of monopoly powers from the crown or 
parliament in conjunction with their charter, which Smith viewed as problematic in that the monopolies 
artificially increased the prices of goods for consumers; and (ii) the problems associated with self-interested 
company managers whose interests were not aligned with shareholders, which in modern times are defined 
as the “agency costs” as discussed in the Literature Review chapter of this Dissertation.  See: Adam Smith, 
The Wealth of Nations (London: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1776).  Also: Henry Hansmann & Mariana 
Pargendler, “The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption” 
(2014) 123 Yale Law Journal 948 at 950. 
206 An Act for better securing certain Powers and Privileges, intended to be granted by His Majesty by 
Two Charters, for Assurance of Ships and Merchandize at Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and 
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stock companies with transferable shares from being formed in the United Kingdom (the 
“U.K.”), except through royal charter or act of Parliament, for a century until its eventual 
repeal.207    
Notwithstanding the legal prohibitions of the Bubble Act, by the latter portion of the 
eighteenth century it was increasingly recognized by business and governmental interests 
that the joint stock company form was a useful tool in developing areas of the domestic 
economy beyond the traditional roots of international trade, shipping and colonization.  In 
particular, a number of physical infrastructure projects in bridges, canals and railroads, 
which all also required large infusions of investment capital, secured joint stock company 
charters.208  Also, the British government issued a number of joint stock charters during 
the eighteenth century for banks and insurance companies.209  However, beyond these 
specific commercial applications of the joint stock company form favored by the 
contemporary British governments, securing corporate charters for other business 
enterprises remained difficult, expensive and rare throughout the balance of the 
eighteenth century.210   
The inability to secure joint stock company charters was particularly acute for businesses 
operating in the industrial sector.211  The industrial revolution in the U.K. (starting in 
approximately 1760) created a significant demand for access to joint stock companies or 
 
for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned. 6 Geo. I, c. 18 
[Bubble Act] 
207 Ron Harris, “Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions and the Repeal of the Bubble Act 
in 1825” (1997) 50:4 The Economic History Review 675. 
208 Hansmann, supra note 205 at 958. 
209 Alceste Santuari, “The Joint Stock Company in Nineteenth Century England and France: King v. Dodd 
and the Code de Commerce” (1993) 14 Journal of Legal History 39 at 40. 
210 Philip I. Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups” (1986) 11 Journal of Corporate Law 573 
at 581. 
211 Ibid. 
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facsimiles thereof. 212  The invention of new means of capital-intensive large-scale 
production during the industrial revolution required that businesses secure investment 
capital from large groups of individual investors to finance the construction and 
equipping of factories.213   
Unable to secure formal charters to form joint stock companies, industrial revolution-era 
capitalists in the U.K. developed their own pragmatic alternatives.  Predominantly, 
British industrial companies originating in the second half of the eighteenth century 
adopted the alternative form of unincorporated companies (a.k.a. “joint stock 
associations”), which were officially treated as partnerships under the law, but operated 
as pseudo-corporations in practice.214  This proliferation of unincorporated companies 
during the second half of the eighteenth century created a variety of challenges in 
commercial law during the industrial revolution, as it proved impractical for creditors to 
secure and enforce individual legal judgments against the hundreds, or even thousands, of 
individual investors who had invested in an unincorporated company.215   As such, it 
eventually became clear that the widespread adoption of the joint stock association form 
throughout the U.K. was effectively subverting the Bubble Act’s key purpose of 
preventing the unfettered proliferation of corporate entities raising large amounts of 
capital from public investors and the inevitable speculation resulting therefrom.216  Even 
more problematic, the explosion of grey-market joint stock associations operating in the 
U.K. resulted in a significant portion of the British economy operating in a highly 
 
212  Supra note 209 at 40. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Supra note 209 at 39. Also, supra note 210 at 581 and 587.  The British joint stock associations 
operated under deeds of settlement with the stock held by trustees.  They also contained contractual 
provisions limiting liability of the beneficial stockholders to the organization and between each other.  As 
such, the joint stock associations reflected many of the key elements of contemporary joint stock 
companies, but without the formal charters and official limited liability. 
215 Supra note 209 at 40. 
216 Supra note 207 at 688. 
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uncertain legal environment.217  Ultimately, the British government implicitly 
acknowledged that the commercial reality of the proliferation of joint stock associations 
through the U.K. had effectively emasculated the Bubble Act while increasing legal 
uncertainty in the economy, leading to its repeal in 1825.218 
The development of the corporate form in the American colonies followed the British 
precedent closely up until U.S. independence in 1776.  After independence, the ability to 
grant corporate charters devolved from the British crown to the governments of the 
thirteen new states.  The American states in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
were less reluctant than the British government to grant corporate charters for 
infrastructure projects.219  The joint stock association form that had become so 
ubiquitous in the U.K. during this period also existed in the U.S. to a degree, but these 
associations were much less prevalent in the U.S. due to the easier access to corporate 
charters.220  
Still, the new U.S. states evidenced a degree of aversion to granting widespread corporate 
charters to support manufacturing enterprises for the first 30 years after independence. 221 
However, by the first decade of the nineteenth century, American demand for 
domestically-manufactured goods increased rapidly as relations between the U.S. and 
U.K. deteriorated.222  This political impetus eliminated American legislative reluctance 
to issuing corporate charters for manufacturing purposes, resulting in a significant 
 
217  Supra note 209 at 40-41.  The Sanuari article cites key British legal cases, often contradictory in 
approach, in the first decade of the nineteenth century that cast considerable doubt on the willingness of the 
courts to enforce key restrictions of the Bubble Act in that particular environment, thereby further 
increasing the legal uncertainty surrounding the joint stock associations.  Also, supra note 210 at 582. 
218 Supra note 192. 
219 Supra note 210 at 588-589. 
220 Ibid at 587. 
221 Ibid. 
222 With the increase in tension between the U.S. and the U.K. ultimately leading to the War of 1812. 
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increase in the number of corporate charters issued throughout the northern states.223  
Ultimately, the trend towards increased use of the joint stock company form in the U.S. 
culminated with the adoption by New York of the first statute allowing for general 
incorporation without the necessity of a special charter issued by the government in 
1811.224 A number of other northeastern American states followed the lead of New York 
with similar general incorporation statutes within the next decade.225 
As previously discussed, the repeal of the Bubble Act in the U.K. in 1825 was an implicit 
acknowledgment by Parliament of the legal superiority of the joint stock company form 
over the unincorporated company alternatives (principally the joint stock association) 
which had become prevalent in the British economy over the century while the Bubble 
Act remained in effect.226   In the years following the Bubble Act repeal, an increasing 
number of corporate charters were granted by Parliament for domestic business 
ventures.227  Eventually, in 1844 the U.K. ultimately followed the earlier American 
precedent with the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act.228  This legislation finally 
allowed for the establishment in the U.K. of joint stock companies without Crown charter 
or special act of Parliament, although it notably did not extend limited liability to all 
shareholders.  The Limited Liability Act, 1855229 and an updated version of the Joint 
 
223 Supra note 210 at 590.  Also, for an earlier view of the historical development of the U.S. corporate 
form during this period, see: Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, “Origins of the American Business 
Corporation” (1945) 5:1 The Journal of Economic History 1. 
224  Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, §7, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111.  Also, supra note 193 at 456. 
225 Supra note 210 at 592. 
226 Supra note 207.  Also, supra note 209 at 43. 
227 Supra note 209 at 47. 
228 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Victoria, c.110). 
229 Limited Liability Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Victoria, c.133). 
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Stock Companies Act passed in 1856 ultimately extended limited liability to all joint 
stock companies and further liberalized the ability to incorporate.230   
In colonial-era Canada, general incorporation statutes were initially adopted in 1849, but 
were limited to companies engaged in bridges and road construction.231  Just prior to the 
enactment of the British North American Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867),232 Canada 
took a step back from the contemporary trends towards general incorporation in the U.K. 
and the U.S. by reverting to a form of incorporation through letters patent under seal of 
the Governor in Council, thereby reflecting the earlier British process of incorporation 
through royal prerogative.233  This antiquated method of incorporation remained in place 
in Canada for over a hundred years, until the first modern provincial incorporation statute 
providing unrestricted rights of general incorporation was adopted by Ontario in 1970, 
followed soon after by the majority of other Canadian provinces.234  The modern 
Canadian corporate statutes are largely based on the American model statute precedents, 
with certain elements of British influence also reflected.235  
In summary, the origin of the public company form in Canada is traced directly through 
the strong precedence of the British and American experience.  As discussed above, the 
direct ancestor of the modern public company form in Canada is the British joint stock 
company form that originated through royal charter or act of Parliament.  Prior to the 
evolution of alternative structures of significant private investment capital, the public 
company form was the primary source of large-scale investment capital.  By allowing for 
 
230 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Victoria, c.47).  
231 Supra note 193 at 455. 
232 Constitution Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Victoria, c.3). 
233 Supra note 193 457. 
234 Ibid at 458. 
235 Ibid at 465-469.  The notable exception remains Nova Scotia, which is modelled more directly on 
British precedents. 
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capital to be pooled in a separate legal structure with its own independent legal status, 
perpetual existence and limited liability, the joint stock companies in the U.K., U.S. and 
Canada were able to engage in enterprises that were far beyond the scope of individuals 
and partnerships.  
It is apparent from the preceding summary that the direct descendant of the joint stock 
company form is the modern public company; specifically, companies which have broad 
shareholder bases and have relied on the advantages of the corporate legal structure to 
raise large amounts of capital from disparate groups of investors.  Notably, the modern 
concept of a private company eventually developed as derivative of the joint stock 
company form that was not originally envisioned by the governments during the period 
of modernization of corporate statutes in the U.K. and U.S in the mid-nineteenth 
century.236  In fact, it was only in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the 
modern private company form came into broader commercial use, and not until 1907 that 
the private company form was legally recognized as distinct in Britain.237  The private 
company distinction was first adopted in Canada by the province of Ontario in 1912, with 
other jurisdictions soon following suit.238 
 
236 Ron Harris, “The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862-1907” (2013) 33:2 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 339 at 340. 
237 The first legal recognition of a private company form occurred in Germany in 1892.  Although the 
Companies Act in the U.K. between 1844 and 1862 did not distinguish between incorporation types based 
on number of shareholders, it is clear that the legislators were not actively considering the potential for use 
of the corporate form for small business purposes.  The Companies Act, 1862 required that the 
memorandum of association creating a corporation be signed by seven or more persons. See Frank Evans, 
“Evolution of the English Joint-Stock Limited Trading Company” (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 461 at 
469.  However, lawyers realized the benefit of limited liability for small business and began recommending 
its use.  For example, Francis Beaufort Palmer published a famous pamphlet on the topic in 1881: Francis 
Beaufort Palmer, Private Companies, Their Formation and Advantages, Or, How to Convert Your Business 
Into a Private Company, and the Benefit of So (London, England: Stevens and Sons, 1881).   
In the U.K, the landmark House of Lords case in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1896] UKHL1, [1897] 
AC 22 confirming the distinctiveness of the legal form in closely-held corporations and endorsing the 
legitimacy of this practice, even in cases where only one shareholder of the mandatory minimum of seven 
had any real economic interest in the corporation, provided a strong impetus for small businesses to 
incorporate to take advantage of the availability to secure limited liability. Ibid at 340-342.   
238 J. Peter Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960) at 
11. 
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Private equity funds, meanwhile, did not come into existence in a form recognizable by 
modern standards until the early 1900’s, and did not gain significant scale in the economy 
until after the creation of the Small Business Investment Company Program by the U.S. 
Congress in 1958.239  As such, accessing large-scale capital throughout the latter portion 
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century required, by necessity, 
that companies secure investment from a number of different individual investors.  This 
period coincides with the period of rapid growth and entrenchment of the public capital 
markets as a major factor in economic development throughout the western industrialized 
world.240  The public company form, therefore, had a decades-long head-start over the 
private equity financing alternatives, and the public company became a significant 
institution in the Canadian economy long before private equity became a realistic funding 
alternative at any scale. 
3.2- Brief History of Securities Regulation Impacting Canada 
From the earliest days of the joint stock company’s existence, stock market bubbles and 
major occurrences of fraud or other malfeasance against independent investor interests by 
promoters and managers, followed by the inevitably-resulting public outcry, have largely 
motivated and defined the process and scope of public company securities regulation.241   
The inherently risky nature of the joint stock company commercial efforts, rampant 
speculation and the lack of effective regulation relating to promotional activities and 
 
239  Harry Cendrowski, et al, Private Equity: History Governance and Operations (Hoboken, N.J: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008) at 29-30;  Derek Loosvelt, “A Brief History of Private Equity”  (10 March 2009) The 
Vault (blog), online:< https://www.vault.com/blogs/in-the-black-vaults-finance-careers-blog/a-brief-
history-of-private-equity>; and Investment U, “The History of Private Equity”, White Paper, Investment U 
(accessed January 13, 2020) online:< https://investmentu.com/private-equity-history/>. 
240 Mary O’Sullivan, “The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885-1930: Historical Facts and 
Theoretical Fashions” (2007) 8:3 The Journal of Enterprise and Society 489 at 492. 
241  For an interesting and insightful discussion on how stock market bubbles have historically been 
causative of a decline in securities enforcement, thereby inevitably leading to a string of frauds that create 
the impetus for further regulation (and an inevitable repeating of the cycle), see:  Erik F. Gerding, “The 
Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation” (2006) 38 Connecticut Law 
Review 393. 
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continuous disclosure led to several notorious failures of joint stock companies during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.242  The first significant bubble in joint stock 
companies occurred in the early eighteenth century in England, with the creation of 
numerous companies raising funds for speculative ventures abroad in an overheated 
investment climate.243  Most prominent amongst the bubble companies was the South 
Sea Company, a joint stock company granted monopoly rights over British trade in South 
America.244 Shortly in advance of a massive price run-up on South Sea Company shares 
in 1720, speculation was rampant about the role that the company would play in British 
government debt reorganization.245 The South Sea Company was heavily promoted by 
insiders, stockjobbers and stockbrokers, many of whom sold their interests at significant 
profits at the peak of the company’s trading value in the summer of 1720 (i.e., £1050 per 
share).246  Many buyers of the South Sea Company stock during the frenzy purchased on 
margin.247  By the end of 1721, the price of the shares of the South Sea Company 
retreated back to £128, leaving public investors who had borrowed to buy shares in 
desperate financial situations and casting a pall over the entire British economy.248   
The Bubble Act was enacted by the British parliament prior to the collapse of the South 
Sea Company shares, principally at the instigation of the directors of the South Sea 
Company who sought to preserve their advantaged position in attracting new investment 
 
242 Supra note 195 at 14.  Also, Phil Mirowski, “The Rise (and Retreat) of a Market: English Joint Stock 
Shares in the Eighteenth Century” (1981) 41:3 Journal of Economic History 559. 
243 Benedict Sheehy, “The Trouble with Stockjobbers: the South Sea Bubble, the Press and the Legislative 
Regulation of the Markets” (2008) 7 Newcastle Law Review 117 at 123. 
244 Ibid at 125. 
245 Mark R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada (3rd ed.)  (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 81. 
246 Christopher Nicholls, Securities Law (2nd Ed.) (Toronto: Irwin law, 2018) at 130. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Supra note 243 at 127. 
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capital through the stock market.249  The Bubble Act essentially prevented the creation of 
new companies that could compete on the British stock market and also mandated that 
the raising of capital by existing companies must be undertaken directly by the company, 
effectively banning intermediaries acting as stockbrokers or stockjobbers.250  Although 
the impetus for the Bubble Act adoption had nothing to do with the South Sea Company 
share collapse, the subsequent collapse of the South Sea Company share price created 
such a panic amongst the general investing population at the time that the British 
government began to enforce the Bubble Act provisions strictly to prevent a repeat of the 
stock market bubble.251   
The Bubble Act was immediately controversial, and academics continue to debate the 
degree of damage that it inflicted on the British economy prior to its eventual repeal a 
century later in 1825.252  The Bubble Act, reflecting (in the opinion of several corporate 
historians) modern history’s first attempt at securities regulation,253 therefore presages 
the arc of securities regulation in the past three hundred years in the U.K., U.S. and 
Canada as a sphere of regulation occasionally engaging dubious legislative motives, 
interest group lobbying, unintended consequences and overly-broad politically-motivated 
reactions to market bubbles and executive chicanery.  As discussed in the previous 
section, British industry during the Industrial Revolution developed the mechanism of the 
unincorporated joint stock association to effectively structure around the prohibitions of 
the Bubble Act, but at the cost of creating a significant level of legal uncertainty on the 
regulation of companies during this interval. 
 
249 Supra note 246 at 131. 
250 Supra note 243 at 129. 
251 Ibid at 132. 
252 Supra note 243 at 130.  Also, Ron Harris, “The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business 
Organization” (1994) 54:3 The Journal of Economic History 610 at 624. 
253 Supra note 206. 
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The repeal of the Bubble Act represented a pragmatic acknowledgement by the 
government of the U.K. that the joint stock company form reflected a necessary legal 
construct in the British economy.254  Having been unable, or at least unwilling, to stem 
the proliferation of the joint stock associations during the period that the Bubble Act was 
in force, the British government turned its focus instead on developing legislation that 
prevented the worst excesses and abuses associated with joint stock companies in order to 
protect public investors, while simultaneously seeking to ensure that compliance with the 
regulations is not so overly burdensome that it serves as a barrier to economic growth.  
After the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, a number of subsequent reforms were 
introduced in a series of British statutes over a two-decade interval, commencing with the 
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844255 and ending with The Companies Act, 1867.256  The 
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 required that promoters file, as a condition of 
incorporation, a return including a copy of any prospectus or advertisement that they 
intended to use to market their shares.257  Several acts between 1844 and 1867 gradually 
abrogated the disclosure requirements originally established in the Joint Stock Companies 
Act, 1844 until The Companies Act, 1867 once again created new disclosure obligations 
by requiring the identification of all parties to company contracts in any prospectus 
raising new funds and establishing civil liability for failure to comply.258 
 
254 Supra note 246 at 132.  There is little evidence that the contemporary British government determined 
that joint stock companies were a positive development at the time, but rather that they were superior to a 
continued expansion of the use of unincorporated joint stock associations. See supra note 207 at 692-693. 
255 Supra note 228 
256 30 & 31 Victoria, c.131.  Supra note 246 at 134. 
257 Supra note 238 at 4.  Williamson notably is not amongst those who consider the Bubble Act to be 
modern history’s first attempt at securities legislation, instead pointing to the passage of Joint Stock 
Companies Act, 1844 as marking the beginning of modern securities regulation.  Of course, the difference 
of academic opinion as to when “securities regulation” began is a bit opaque because the term “securities 
regulation” was not coined until 1951.  Supra note 246 at 1. 
258 Ibid at 4-5. 
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In 1890, Parliament once again turned its focus back towards securities regulation issues 
by legislatively overturning the outcome of a politically unpopular House of Lords 
decision,259 thereby establishing personal liability of directors for misrepresentations in 
prospectuses unless the directors held an actual and reasonable belief in the truth of the 
impugned statements.260  Following the release of a government report on reforms 
necessary for regulating joint stock companies in 1895,261 a new Companies Act, 1900 
was passed by the U.K Parliament, increasing the breadth and depth of prospectus 
disclosure requirements.262  Further evolutionary changes occurred in English securities 
regulation over the next three decades, leading up to the 1929 consolidation of the 
Companies Act, which served as an influential precedent for the ongoing development of 
contemporary Canadian securities laws.263 
In the U.S., the historical development of securities legislation is generally traced back to 
the adoption in Kansas of the first “blue sky” legislation in 1911.264  Similar statutes 
were passed by states throughout the U.S. over the next two decades.265  Blue sky 
regulations in the U.S. were premised on having governmental agencies approve the 
merit of a particular share offering, a fundamentally different regulation model from the 
focus on mandated disclosure requirements that were stipulated by the U.K. securities 
legislation of the era.266 
 
259 Derry v. Peek (1889) LR 14 A.C. 337 (UKHL). Supra note 245 at 82. 
260 Directors Liability Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict, c.64.  Supra note 246 at 135. 
261 Referring to the “Davey Committee Report”, a report of the U.K. Board of Trade issued in 1895.   
Supra note 246 at 135. 
262 Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Victoria, c.38.  Supra note 246 at 136. 
263 Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo V, c.23. Supra note 246 at 137. 
264 Supra note 246 at 138.   
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid.  Also, Gillen, supra note 245 at 83. 
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The entry of the American federal government into the securities regulation arena, with 
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the subsequent Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, was precipitated by the stock market crash of 1929 and a variety of 
contemporaneous stock market scandals.267  Notably, the U.S. federal government model 
of regulation was based on the mandated disclosure precedent of the U.K., and not the 
merit-review model associated with the blue sky laws adopted by the U.S. states.268 
Turning now to Canada, securities regulation in this country has historically developed 
within the purview of the provincial governments under their constitutional authority to 
legislate in the areas of property and civil rights.269  Any uncertainty as to the extent of 
the Canadian federal government ability to legislate on securities matters under the 
general branch of the federal trade and commerce powers was eliminated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in a 2011 decision, which confirmed that jurisdiction over the core 
components of securities regulation lie within areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
authority.270  This ruling thwarted an attempt by the federal government to create a 
national securities regulator and determined that any attempt to establish a national 
securities regulator would have to be secured through co-operation between the provinces 
and the federal government. 
In the field of company regulation, Ontario was the first province in Canada to follow the 
1890 English precedent of the Directors Liability Act, adopting its own version 1891.271  
Ontario continued trailblazing in Canadian company regulation with the adoption in 1897 
of the first Canadian statute requiring mandatory disclosure to shareholders and, again in 
 
267  Securities Act of 1933, Pub.L. 73-22; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Pub.L.73-291.  See discussion 
by Nicholls, supra note 246 at 140.  Also, Gillen, supra note 245 at 84. 
268 Supra note 246 at 140.  Also, supra note 245 at 84.   
269 Supra note 245 at 77. 
270 Reference Re. Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66. 
271 Directors Liability Act, 1891, S.O. 1891, c.34. Supra note 245 at 84. 
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1907, by mandating the contents of a prospectus and granting rights of rescission for oral 
representations based again on the English model.272   
It was Manitoba, however, that took the lead in 1912 to become the first province in 
Canada to adopt an American-style blue sky law based on merit review,273 followed soon 
after by three other provinces.274  Manitoba was again the first province to introduce a 
fraud prevention act in 1926, followed by Ontario in 1928.275  These fraud prevention 
statutes focused principally on licensing of brokers and securities fraud investigations.276   
The Ontario Securities Commission, the first dedicated provincial securities regulatory 
body in Canada, traces its origins back to the 1928 fraud prevention statute.277,278  This 
statute introduced mandatory registration of brokers and also required registration for 
trading.279  The first chair of the Ontario Security Frauds Prevention Board, the 
governmental body responsible for enforcing the act, was appointed in 1931.280  In 1932, 
 
272 Gillen, supra note 245 at 84. 
273 The interesting background that prompted Manitoba to become the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt 
blue sky securities laws is recounted in: Christopher Armstrong, Blue Skies and Boiler Rooms: Buying and 
Selling Securities in Canada, 1870-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 7. 
274 Supra note 245 at 85.  Also, supra note 246 at 139. 
275  Supra note 245 at 85. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ontario Securities Commission Website, “About the OSC” (accessed January 15, 2020) online:< 
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About_about_index.htm>. 
278 The origin of the OSC is surprisingly obscure.  Although the OSC claims its origin from the date 
above, a number of academics consider its effective origin as dating to 1945. See: Mary Condon, Making 
Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities Regulation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998) at 17. 
279 David Johnston and Kathleen Doyle Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation (Toronto: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2006) at 22. 
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the Ontario fraud prevention statute was renamed as the Securities Act, and the board was 
soon thereafter renamed as the Ontario Securities Commission in 1933.281   
The Ontario Securities Act underwent a major overhaul in 1945 and again in 1947, 
mandating prospectus contents, delivery and rescission rights.282  Other Canadian 
provinces adopted similar statutes over the course of the next decade.283  One of the key 
impetuses for the reforms in 1945 and 1947 was the unlicensed marketing of speculative 
mining stocks by Canadian-based brokers into the U.S. without proper registration or 
disclosure.284 
A series of public markets scandals in the 1960’s led to another round of major securities 
reforms based on the Kimber Report and the Kelly Report, both issued in 1965.285  The 
most famous of these scandals (which was the specific focus of the Kelly Report) was 
related to a TSX-listed reporting issuer named Windfall Oils and Mines Limited, which 
perpetuated inaccurate rumors that it owned mining claims of significant value.286  These 
reforms included establishing the OSC as an independent administrative body and the 
adoption of the Ontario Securities Act (1966), “the first modern Canadian securities 
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282 Supra note 245 at 86.  Also, Condon, supra note 278 at 22-24 
283 Supra note 245 at 86. 
284 This issue, which was dubbed the “Canadian Problem” by U.S. regulators and attracted significant 
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statute”.287   The changes to securities regulation instituted under the 1966 version of the 
Ontario Securities Act were sufficiently impactful that a 1966 supplement to 
Williamson’s 1960 edition of Securities Regulations in Canada, covering only the 
content and impact of the changes from the 1966 amendments, is 100 pages longer than 
the original work.288  In 1978, Ontario adopted a “closed system” of securities regulation 
that extended to the resale of securities previously acquired in exempt distributions.289  
Finally, in 1995 the OSC was the first provincial securities commission given the ability 
to make its own rules relating to securities regulation, thereby increasing its ability to 
respond to market challenges rapidly and avoid the tedious process of getting onto the 
provincial government’s agenda to secure amendments to the Securities Act.290  Since 
that time, most of the critical elements of securities law and policy have migrated beyond 
the riverbanks of the provincial securities act themselves and have been promulgated 
through rules, policy statements and, when collaborating with other provinces, in national 
or multilateral instruments and national policies. 
Each of the major developments in securities law in Ontario discussed above were 
eventually replicated in similar forms by most other Canadian provinces.291  Supporting 
harmonization between the provinces has been the work of the Canadian Securities 
Administrators, the council of the thirteen different provincial and territorial securities 
regulators established in 1937 that works to coordinate securities regulatory initiatives, 
analyze new policy initiatives, and minimize the regulatory inconsistencies between the 
jurisdictions.292  Over the course of its history, the CSA’s effectiveness in harmonizing 
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securities regulation nationally has waxed and waned, depending on the legislative 
priorities of the specific provincial governments in power at the particular time and the 
predilections of the governments, along with individuals in senior roles within the 
regulators, to work towards consistency between jurisdictions versus going it alone on 
securities matters of local priority. 
Of significant note, Canada remains the only country in the OECD without a national 
securities regulator.  This fact has been noted on occasion by the OECD, which has stated 
its belief that the inconsistency arising from having 13 securities regulators in a country 
with a relatively small population is problematic and inefficient.293  Significant effort has 
been directed towards establishing a consensus-based national securities regulator known 
as the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory Authority (“CCMRA”), with seven out of 
thirteen jurisdictions having thus far agreed to join the initiative.294   However, four 
provinces and two territories, including the key provinces of Alberta and Quebec, 
continue to be hold-outs; while one or more of these jurisdictions will likely join the 
CCMRA initiative in due course, it appears that Alberta and Quebec continue to prefer 
retention of their local securities commissions to protect local interests. The continuing 
hold-out of Alberta and Quebec are particularly noteworthy, as these provinces represent 
the second and third largest provincial capital markets in Canada.295  As such, the 
CCMRA has repeatedly delayed its formal launch and the prospects for securing an 
effective national securities regulator in Canada remain highly uncertain at this point in 
time. 
 
293 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2016 (Paris, OECD Publishing 2016) at 107. 
294 Department of Finance Canada, Press Release “Nova Scotia Agrees to Join the Cooperative Capital 
Markets Regulatory System” (April 10, 2019) online:< http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/news-
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295 Ontario is by far the largest capital market in Canada measured by market capitalization of listed 
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3.3- The Recent Arc of Securities Regulation in Canada 
This Dissertation has previously discussed that the zenith of public companies, in terms 
of the number of Operating Company listings, was in 2007 in Canada and in 1998 in the 
United States.  It is apparent from the Literature Review in the previous chapter that no 
one seriously suggests that any single event in Canadian securities regulation is solely 
responsible for the phenomenon of public company decline.  However, it is helpful, as 
further context in understanding the form and content of the PCD Study later in this 
Dissertation, to understand the major arc of securities regulation in Canada going back 25 
years.  This covers the period of public company decline, plus the era immediately before 
the public company decline phenomenon became apparent. To the extent that increasing 
securities regulation is a contributing factor to public company decline, at least some of 
the regulatory changes contributing to the phenomenon must presumably be traced back 
in time prior to the peak of public company listings. 
One of the most important developments in Canadian securities law in the past century 
has been the devolution of rule-making power from the provincial governments to the 
provincial securities commissions.  Prior to 1995, securities regulation in Canada was 
largely contained within the provincial securities acts and required the intervention of the 
provincial governments in order to make significant changes. Securing amendments to 
the provincial securities acts represented a laborious process, as the securities regulators 
had to compete with other bodies to secure priority on the government’s legislative 
agenda.  As a result, provincial securities commissions frequently passed policies that 
endeavored to clarify and add depth to the formal securities act provisions, which the 
securities commissions deemed critical to the proper functioning of the capital markets.  
However, a 1993 court decision in Ontario cast doubt on the enforceability of the policy 
statements published by the securities commissions, as these policy statements were 
viewed by the court as attempts to effectively impose legislation in the capital markets 
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outside of the authority of the securities commissions.296  Ultimately, the Ontario 
government granted specific rule-making authority to the Ontario Securities Commission 
in 1995, with other provinces soon following suit.  While the devolution of rule-making 
authority to the securities commissions in 1995 certainly reduced the significant 
bottleneck previously associated with the process of pushing changes to formal securities 
regulation through the provincial legislatures, it also significantly increased the autonomy 
of the securities commissions and enabled the securities commissions to pursue 
significant securities regulatory reform on their own authority through the use of their 
new rule-making power. 
Until the June 2018 election of the Doug Ford-led conservative government in Ontario, 
which triggered the current impetus for the regulatory streamlining and public company 
burden reduction initiative discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 of this Dissertation, the 
general arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past two decades, and in Ontario in 
particular, has between towards ever-increasing public company regulation and the 
adoption of new and more complex continuous disclosure obligations.  A simple word-
count comparison of the consolidated Ontario securities legislation published in 1996 and 
2020 evidences that the total length of the securities regulations has increased by more 
than 300% during that interval.  However, as a counterpoint in defense of provincial 
securities commissions, former OSC Vice-Chair and current Osgoode Hall Law School 
Dean, Mary Condon, points out that the landscape of securities regulation in Canada 
continues to become increasingly complex as technology and market evolution bring new 
challenges to securities regulators that were hitherto unknown.297 
Summarizing all of the detailed, and often technical, changes to securities regulation in 
Canada over the past two decades period is beyond the scope of this Dissertation.  The 
 
296 Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario (Securities Commission) (1993), 14 OR (3d) 280 (Gen Div).  
Affirmed on appeal, Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario (Securities Commission) 77 O.A.C. 155 (Ont.CA). 
See discussion in Nicholls, supra note 246 at 98. 
297 Condon, supra note 278 at 225. 
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focus here instead will be on briefly reviewing the most impactful securities regulation 
changes in terms of their influence on, and cost to, Canadian public Operating 
Companies. 
As discussed in the previous section of this Dissertation, the primary impetuses for eras 
of significant securities regulatory reform throughout British, American and Canadian 
history have often been major stock market meltdowns and clusters of notorious public 
company scandals.  The recent arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past two 
decades reflects a continuation of this cause-and-effect relationship between public 
outcry over notorious corporate misdeeds or stock market collapses and the passage of  
new securities regulation. 
Although the development of Canadian public companies was heavily influenced by both 
the U.K. and U.S. precedents, the impact of events in the U.S. has represented the greater 
influence on Canadian securities regulation in the past 20 years.  The increased influence 
of the U.S. events on Canada is inevitable due to geographic proximity between the 
countries, and the increased integration of the American and Canadian economies under a 
succession of free trade agreements.  The U.S. domestic market currently accounts for 
approximately 76% of all Canadian exports,298 and many of the larger Canadian public 
Operating Companies are also inter-listed on U.S stock exchanges.299 As such, major 
capital markets events originating in the U.S. resulting in new trajectories in American 
securities regulation inevitably have a significant impact in Canada.   
The infamous American corporate scandals in the early 2000’s, particularly Enron 
(2001), Worldcom (2002), Tyco (2002) and Adelphia Communications (2002), and the 
 
298 World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank, “Canada Trade” (accessed 30 December 2019) online:< 
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American regulatory responses thereto (particularly Sarbanes-Oxley 300), reverberated 
throughout the Canadian capital markets and eventually resulted in the adoption of a 
significantly-modified Canadian version of Sarbanes-Oxley, encompassed in a variety of 
legislative and securities regulatory initiatives.301   Although the Canadian responses to 
Sarbanes-Oxley are certainly much less onerous in terms of compliance cost than the 
American version, MI 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim 
Filings particularly represents a material increase in both the time and cost associated 
with financial statement certification and internal evaluation of the effectiveness of 
financial controls for Canadian public companies compared to the pre-existing rules. 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis originating in the U.S. in 2008, which quickly expanded 
into a global financial crisis, was likewise strongly felt in Canada.  However, the more 
cautious Canadian banking system was less traumatized than its American counterpart, 
and there was not the same degree of impetus to extend the most notorious elements of 
the Dodd-Frank Act302 to Canada.  Still, specific elements of the Dodd-Frank Act did 
find their way into Canadian securities legislation in the form of new rules for derivative 
trading under National Instrument 93-101 Derivatives- Business Conduct, and in Ontario 
specifically with respect to the adoption of whistleblowing bounties under OSC Policy 
15-601 Whistleblower Program.303 
 
300 An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. Pub.L. 107-204 (a.k.a. “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002”).   
301 The Canadian response to Sarbanes-Oxley, often referred to as C-SOX, is embedded legislatively in 
Ontario’s Keeping the Promise for Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002, R.S.O. Ch. 22- Bill 198, 
as well as regulatorily in Multilateral Instrument (“MI”) 52-108- Auditor Oversight, MI 52-109- 
Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Filings and MI 52-110- Audit Committees.  All 
of these multilateral instruments are available online at the OSC website under “Securities Law & 
Instruments”. 
302 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, (2010) Pub.L. 111-203. 
303 For a discussion on the OSC process leading to the adoption of OSC Policy 15-601, see: L. Daniel 
Wilson, “As Canadian as Apple Pie: A Critique of the OSC’s Adoption of Whistleblowing Bounties Under 
Policy 15-601” (2019) 62:1 Canadian Business Law Journal 63. 
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Although the major American scandals of the early 2000’s certainly reverberated into 
Canada, the U.S. has not had the market cornered on public company scandals during this 
interval.  Rather, some of the most impactful changes to securities regulation in Canada 
over the past two decades are attributable to homegrown Canadian scandals.  In 
particular, the notorious Canadian public company scandals of Bre-X (1997), Livent 
(1998), YBM Magnex (1999), Nortel (2004) and Sino-Forest Products (2011) all created 
a hue and cry from certain constituencies within Canada for new regulation to prevent 
repeats of these public company collapses. 
Directly attributable to the Bre-X fraud, NI 43-101- Standards of Disclosure for Mineral 
Projects was adopted by securities regulators across Canada in 2001, standardizing 
reporting on mineral reserves by mining issuers and mandating outside verification by 
qualified geologists.  A similar regime for oil & gas issuers was adopted across Canada in 
2003, with the implementation of NI 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas 
Activities. 
One of the early regulatory initiatives adopted after securities commissions secured rule-
making power was NI 33-106- Year 2000 Preparation Reporting adopted in 1998.  This 
regulatory instrument required reporting issuers to assess their vulnerability to potential 
Y2K computer issues and advise in their formal disclosure documents as to the 
preparations that the company was undertaking to mitigate the risk.304  Although this 
issue was time-limited and the associated regulatory instruments were withdrawn after 
the turn of the millennium, NI 33-106 offered a glimpse into the future arc of securities 
regulation in Canada as it evidenced how the securities commissions would utilize their 
 
304 The “Y2K issue” arose from the fact that programmers early in the development of computing systems 
had adopted a convention of using a two-digit field for the year code.  This convention had become 
widespread throughout computing systems, leading to significant uncertainty as to what would happen on 
New Year’s day 2000 when the “99” year code rolled over to “00”.  The issue received a huge amount of 
media and governmental scrutiny, with some prognosticators predicting huge security and economic 
implications.  Ultimately, the Y2K concerns proved to be much ado about nothing, but nevertheless served 
as a temporary financial boon for information technology consulting companies and vendors of apocalypse-
related prepping supplies. 
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new rule-making authority to respond to topical issues associated with perceived 
reporting risks. 
Another major regulatory initiative that arrived in the early 2000’s and was influenced by 
the embarrassment caused by Bre-X, Livent and YBM Magnex is NI 51-102 Continuous 
Disclosure Obligations.  This instrument, adopted in 2004, harmonized continuous 
disclosure obligations for public companies across Canada, but also introduced a number 
of more stringent disclosure requirements.  Included in NI 51-102 was a shortening of 
annual financial statement filing deadlines (Part 4, section 4.2), significant expansion of 
the MD&A content requirements (Part 5, section 5.3, section 5.4 and Companion Policy 
51-102- Part 5), expansion of Annual Information Form content requirements 
(Companion Policy 51-102- Part 6), expansion of required executive compensation 
disclosure (which had already been materially expanded only a few years earlier), 
expansion of the disclosure requirements for Information Circulars, and the introduction 
of the requirement to file a Business Acquisition Report ( “BAR”) for all significant 
acquisitions by a public company (NI 51-102 Part 6 and Companion Policy 51-102- Part 
6).305  The net effect of NI 51-102 was a material increase in the time and cost associated 
with public company compliance for all TSX-listed companies in Canada. The new BAR 
requirements were particularly unpopular with a number of public company executives, 
as they included a requirement to file audited financial statements for acquired companies 
and, thereby, made it difficult to acquire private companies that did not have the requisite 
audited statements.  Prior to NI 51-102, public companies only had to file financial 
statements for material acquisitions in conjunction with prospectus offerings. 
Another new continuous disclosure requirement implemented for the first time under NI 
51-102 was the requirement for public companies to begin to file all material contracts on 
 
305 The definition of a significant acquisition for TSX-listed companies in NI 51-102 includes acquisitions 
that meet any of the following thresholds: (i) the acquisition constitutes at least 20 percent of the 
consolidated assets of the reporting issuer on its balance sheet; (ii) the consideration paid for the acquisition 
constitutes at least 20 percent of the consolidated assets of the reporting issuer; or (iii) the reporting issuer’s 
proportionate share of consolidated income from the acquired business constitutes at least 20 percent of the 
consolidated income of the reporting issuer. 
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an ongoing basis.306  Previously, material contracts only had to be filed publicly by 
companies in conjunction with a prospectus offering.  This amendment was again 
unpopular with certain public company executives who viewed it as a privacy intrusion 
for their businesses and required them to put information in the public domain that they 
desired to keep private for competitive purposes.   
Ultimately, NI 51-102, along with its companion policy and associated forms, has been 
amended on multiple occasions over the 15 years since its initial adoption.  In most 
instances, the amendments have added new filing requirements, thereby further 
increasing the cost and complexity of continuous disclosure obligations. 
Also adopted by the major provincial securities commission in 2004 was MI 58-101 
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.  This regulatory instrument initiated the 
obligation on public companies to publicly report, as part of their continuous disclosure, 
on a number of corporate governance items, including board attendance, qualifications 
and board independence.  Over the course of time, a number of amendments to MI 58-
101 were implemented that mandated further changes in Board committee composition 
and operation.  For example, securities regulation during the past two decades has 
changed from allowing block voting on entire Board slates to mandating individual 
voting for each individual Board member. 
Recently, further changes were adopted to MI 58-101 that require reporting issuers to 
report on a number of elements of their diversity policies and practices.  This new 
requirement in MI 58-101 is but one example of a recent trend by securities regulators to 
use their rule-making power to move proactively towards advancing positions on social 
issues.  Professor Chris Nicholls, of Western University Faculty of Law, notes this trend 
in his text on Canadian securities law: 
In recent years, Canadian securities commissions have occasionally fixed 
their sights on a number of issues that, historically, might have been 
regarded as matters of corporate law rather than securities regulation, or in 
 
306 NI 51-102- Continuous Disclosure Obligations, Part 9, section 12.2. 
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some cases issues of broader social policy not necessarily linked, at least 
directly, to the goals of investor protection or enhancing confidence in 
capital markets.  The regulators’ foray into such matters reflects a 
recognition that certain matters that could, theoretically be addressed 
through amendments to corporate or other laws may, in fact, simply 
languish if not diligently pursued by securities regulators, the one 
investor-protection body that boasts not only substantial financial and 
human resources but also significant leverage over business corporations- 
regardless of their particular jurisdiction of incorporation.  Such public 
policy initiatives, then, may be considered not as necessary adjuncts of 
traditional securities regulation per se, but as significant by-products of the 
establishment of substantial agencies with a mandate to regulate issuers 
and markets with a view to protection of the public interest.307 
However, the securities regulatory authorities are not alone in Canada in terms of 
targeting new public company regulations in areas historically viewed as coming within 
the purview of social policy.  The federal government in Canada has recently enacted 
changes to its version of corporate legislation that, as of January 1, 2020, requires all 
publicly traded companies that are federally incorporated to file mandatory diversity 
disclosure.  These particular amendments were part of a number of new statutory 
requirements relating to corporate governance procedures for federally incorporated 
companies enacted through the mechanism of federal corporate legislation.308 
A related development in securities regulation that is perceived by certain constituencies 
(particularly companies operating in the oil & gas sphere) as crossing into the realm of 
social policy regulation is the recent promulgation by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators of CSA Staff Notice 51-358- Reporting of Climate Change-related Risk 
(“CSA 51-358”) in August 2019.  Although 51-358 expressly disavows that it is seeking 
to impose any new legal obligations on reporting issuers, this notice does provide clear 
guidance indicating that the risk disclosure of reporting issuers will be considered 
 
307 Supra note 246 at 144. 
308 Bill C-25, “An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the 
Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act and the Competition Act” 2nd Sess, 42nd Parl (assented to May 1, 
2018), with the relevant sections on mandatory diversity disclosure coming into effect January 1, 2020. 
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inadequate unless the disclosure incorporates CSA 51-358’s extensive guidelines for 
reporting on climate change-related risk.   
Another significant change that has occurred in Canadian securities law is the increase in 
legal liability associated with being a public company, particularly as a result of 
amendments to Canadian securities laws establishing secondary market liability and 
facilitating securities class actions against public companies.  Historically, Canadian 
public companies that were not inter-listed in the U.S. faced a much lower overall 
litigation risk than their U.S. counterparts.  Securities-based class actions have been 
available in Canada since 1992, but Canada did not at that time have statutory civil 
liability for secondary market continuous disclosure violations.309  Without a statutory 
civil liability for misrepresentations in the secondary market, statutory remedies were 
only available to purchasers who acquired treasury shares directly from the issuers.  
Investors purchasing shares on the open market in Canada, as such, only had recourse to 
common law actions, usually for negligent misrepresentation.310  The common law tort 
of negligent misrepresentation requires proof of detrimental reliance at the individual 
plaintiff level, which made it extremely difficult to establish reliance in a securities class 
action.311  Between 1992 and 2005, only a single securities class action case in Canada 
proceeded to final judgment.312   
 
309 A.C. Pritchard and Janis P. Sarra, “Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empirical 
Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Canada” (2010) 47:4 Alberta Law Review 881 at 882. 
310 Robb C. Heintzman, Michael D. Schafler and Soloman Lam, “Securities Market Liability in Canada: 
Securities Class Actions” Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, Thom Reuters Practical Law Blog (1 March 2012) 
online:< https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-519-0831?transitionType=Default&contextData= 
(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1>. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Supra note 309. 
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However, in 2005 Ontario became the first jurisdiction in Canada to entrench secondary 
market liability for securities violations in its securities legislation,313 followed quickly 
by the other key provinces.314  From 2006 to 2017, 74 securities class action cases were 
filed in Canada against 47 different public companies.315  In many of these cases, 
individual directors and officers have been named as defendants alongside their 
corporations. 316 Of these 74 cases, none have yet proceeded to final judgment, but 
approximately 40% of the claims have been settled with an average settlement value of 
$12.2 million.317  While certainly not yet approaching American levels of class action 
activity, the prospect of secondary market liability clearly is a development that 
materially increases both corporate and personal legal liability for Canadian public 
companies compared to the situation existing before 2005.   
Another major regulatory change impacting Canadian public companies was the adoption 
of MI 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions, a 
regulatory initiative which was initially adopted by Ontario and Quebec in 2008.  This 
particular instrument significantly increased the processes, timing and costs associated 
with the approval of non-arms’ length transactions for public companies in Canada.  
Although it replaced similar regulations previously in place in Quebec and Ontario, MI 
61-101 further tightened the procedures associated with securing minority approval and 
extended the requirements of obtaining independent fairness opinions on specific 
 
313 Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5.  The secondary market liability sections are contained in 
Part XXIII.1, sections 138.1 to 138.14.  Notably, the secondary market liability provisions in Ontario 
include liability caps for each liable party.  For directors and officers, the cap is the greater of $25,000 and 
50% of the compensation received by the individual from the issuer.  For issuers, the cap is 5% of the 
issuers’ market capitalization or $1 million. 
314 Supra note 309. 
315 Osgoode Securities Class Action Database (accessed January 14, 2020) online:< https://securities. 
osgoode.yorku.ca/third-page-2/>. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid.  Average is calculated from the Osgoode Securities Class Action Database. 
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transactions.  Also, MI 61-101 was adopted beyond Quebec and Ontario in a number of 
other key jurisdictions. 
A further area of Canadian corporate governance closely related to the topic of increasing 
securities regulation is the rising prominence of the roles of the proxy advisory services 
in Canada over the past two decades, principally Institutional Shareholder Services 
(“ISS”) and Glass Lewis.  Proxy advisory services, which provide institutional clients 
with voting recommendations for their portfolio public companies with respect to annual 
meetings, special meetings and corporate transactions, have gained increasing influence 
and play an ever-larger role in the Canadian corporate governance landscape. 
Beginning in 2012, both ISS and Glass Lewis began publishing annual proxy guidelines 
for public issuers at the end of the calendar year, advising which specific elements of 
corporate governance would be focused on by the proxy advisors in the upcoming annual 
meeting season. In particular, these annual reports outline specific requirements the proxy 
advisors have determined will be pre-conditions to them issuing positive voting 
recommendations for the upcoming meetings.   Each year, new and more restrictive 
corporate governance requirements are foisted on the Canadian public companies through 
the annual guidelines of the proxy advisors.  
In this regard, an argument can be advanced that ISS and Glass Lewis have stepped into a 
quasi-regulatory function in the Canadian capital markets.  Although compliance with the 
proxy guidelines is not mandated by any securities law, any Canadian public company 
disregards the mandates of the proxy advisory firms at their peril, risking a significant 
percentage of their shares being withheld from voting or voted against management 
proxy recommendations for failure to comply with the recommendations. 
Executives of Canadian public companies have long been at odds with the proxy advisory 
firms, viewing them as meddlesome and unaccountable, and arguing that the proxy 
advisory firms are inherently subject to significant conflicts of interest and have no 
accountability or visible process for determining what new corporate governance 
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standards they will require in a particular year.318  However, unlike the U.S., where 
legislation has recently been proposed to regulate proxy advisory firms,319 Canadian 
securities regulators assessed the situation and decided not to formally regulate the proxy 
advisory firms.  Instead, a national policy was adopted by Canadian securities regulators 
which provides discretionary guidance.320  Paradoxically, the decision of the Canadian 
securities regulators not to regulate the proxy advisory firms effectively serves to 
increase the ability of the proxy advisory firms to continue to act in a quasi-regulatory 
role with respect to Canadian public companies and thereby increase the public company 
compliance burden.321  Moreover, like the Canadian securities regulators, the proxy 
advisory firms have extended their area of focus to topics that would traditionally be 
understood as relating to social policy rather than corporate regulation.322 
As mentioned at the start of this subsection, a more detailed discussion of all of the 
changes in securities regulation in Canada over the past two decades that have increased 
the costs and complexity of becoming a public company, or continuing to operate as a 
public company, is beyond the scope of this Dissertation.  The items discussed above 
provide a representative sample of several of the most important regulatory changes that 
 
318 David Milstead, “Canadian firms object to influence of proxy advisors” The Globe and Mail (26 
November 2018) online:< https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-firms-object-to-
influence-of-proxy-advisers/>. 
319 New York Stock Exchange, “New Bipartisan Bill Advances Reform of Proxy Advisory Firms”, 
online:< https://www.nyse.com/article/bipartisan-bill-advances-reform-of-proxy-advisory-firms>. 
320 National Policy 25-201 Guidance for Proxy Advisory Firms, April 30, 2015, available on OSC website, 
online: <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20150430_25-201-proxy-advisory.htm>. 
321   For example, the gender diversity requirements stipulated by both ISS and Glass Lewis in their most 
recent proxy voting guidelines are significantly more onerous than the requirements under National 
Instrument 58-101.  See ISS, Canada Proxy Voting Guidelines for TSX-Listed Companies, Benchmark 
Policy Recommendations, online:< https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/Canada-
TSX-Voting-Guidelines.pdf> at 14; Also, Glass Lewis, 2020 Proxy Paper- Guidelines: An Overview of the 
Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice, online: https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
Guidelines_Canada.pdf> at 18. 
322 Ibid. 
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are of particular relevance to the design and analysis of the PCD Study, but are not 
intended to be exhaustive. 
3.4- The Key Elements of Effective Securities Regulatory Reform 
Having now briefly reviewed the historical development and the recent arc of securities 
regulation in Canada, and before turning to an analysis and critique of the ongoing 
regulatory streamlining / public company burden reduction initiatives in Canada, it is 
helpful to consider one final, yet critical, question:  What should proper securities 
regulation and regulatory reform processes look like? 
At the core of all securities regulation is the dynamic tension between ensuring that 
adequate securities regulation exists to sufficiently protect investor interests without over-
regulating to the extent that capital markets growth is stifled: 
Capital markets could exist without government regulation, but 
unregulated markets are frequently hampered by exploitive practices that 
can hurt some investors and shake the confidence of other investors, 
making them reluctant to participate.  Thoughtful and balanced regulation 
can address both problems, protecting investors and shielding them from 
misconduct while lowering the cost of capital for businesses and 
governments by helping to restore confidence in securities markets.  But 
all regulation comes at a cost.  Over-regulation can be at least as harmful 
as under-regulation.  Finding the optimal level of regulation, in any field, 
is the perennial and often elusive, goal of wise policy makers.323 
Similar sentiments are expressed in a securities text co-written by former Canadian 
Governor General David Johnston, who summarizes the three assumptions on which 
Canadian securities regulation is founded: 
First, regulation should not impose excessive cost or intervention (note 
that the reality is different from the theory).  Second, investors and issuers 
cannot escape some level of risk- ranging from minimal to severe.  Not all 
investors understand this point.  Third, experience demonstrates a proven 
correlation between risk and return. […] Thus, regulation cannot, and 
should not, eliminate risk.324 
 
323 Supra note 246 at 3. 
324 Supra note 279 at 2. 
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Johnston and co-author Kathleen Rockwell continue on to note that securities regulators 
have often missed the mark by focusing excessively on the protection of “naïve, 
unsophisticated” investors and failing to sufficiently consider the competing interests of 
“all other actors in the securities market”.325 
The securities reform process that has evolved across Canada since the provincial 
securities commissions were initially granted rule-making authority, beginning with 
Ontario in 1995, is defined by the provisions of the applicable provincial securities 
legislation.  The provincial securities acts each mandate a public consultation process in 
which the proposed new rules, or amendments to rules, are published with a minimum 
period (usually 90 days) during which the public is invited to provide written comments.  
The Ontario Securities Act specifically requires the following: 
Publication of proposed rules 
143.2 (1) The Commission shall publish in its Bulletin notice of every rule 
that it proposes to make under section 143.   
 
Notice 
(2) The notice must include the following: 
1. The proposed rule. 
2. A statement of the substance and purpose of the proposed rule. 
3. A summary of the proposed rule. 
4. A reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed or a 
statement that the Commission is seeking legislative amendments to 
provide the requisite rule-making authority. 
5. A discussion of all alternatives to the proposed rule that were 
considered by the Commission and the reasons for not proposing the 
adoption of the alternatives considered. 
6. A reference to any significant unpublished study, report or other written 
materials on which the Commission relies in proposing the rule. 
7. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the anticipated costs and 
benefits of the proposed rule. 
8. A reference to every regulation or provision in a regulation to be 
amended or revoked under subsection 143(3). 326 
 
325 Ibid at 3. 
326 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5. 
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The regulatory reform process that the securities commissions have adopted over the past 
two decades usually follows the provisions of their enabling legislation strictly.  On 
matters deemed to be of significant importance, the securities commissions will 
occasionally schedule round-table discussions in which subject matter experts, along with 
members of the public who have participated in the process by voluntarily submitting 
comments, are invited to participate in discussions.   
Notably, however, the securities commissions rarely rely on any unpublished studies or 
reports in their analysis.  Only on rare occasions have the regulators commissioned 
external experts to undertake empirical research on specific topics.  Moreover, the 
securities commissions have not historically undertaken any internal original empirical 
research to serve as additional data points in order to support, verify or contradict, based 
on empirical evidence, the opinions expressed by commission staff and the members of 
the public who provide comments on any particular regulatory reform initiative.   
With approximately 500 staff in place at the OSC alone, the decision not to routinely 
support original empirical research as a part of the regulatory process cannot be explained 
as being the result of a lack of financial resources.  In fact, the bounties paid by the OSC 
earlier this year to Canadian whistleblowers represents a budgetary number sufficient to 
support more than 50 man-years worth of empirical research effort.327  The inescapable 
conclusion, therefore, is that the securities commissions in Canada have not frequently 
used empirical research to support their regulatory reform initiatives because they do not 
value empirical research as a significant contributor to maximizing regulatory reform 
outcomes.  Is this an appropriate perception? 
In answer to this question, consider the position of two leading U.S. legal academics in 
corporate law on the topic of what constitutes effective securities law reform: Roberta 
Romano and Robert C. Clark.  Roberta Romano pointedly addresses the issue of what 
 
327 OSC, “OSC Awards $7.5 Million to Three Whistleblowers” Press Release (27 February 2019) online:< 
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20190227_osc-awards-to-three-whistleblowers.htm>.  The 
estimates of 50 man-years equates to a generous allocation of $150,000 per man-year for a senior empirical 
researcher. 
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constitutes effective securities reform in a 2005 article in which she famously refers to 
the history of crisis-response securities regulation in the U.S. as “quack corporate 
governance”.328  In this piece, Romano discusses how periods of securities reform often 
result from shifts in the public mood against companies as a result of corporate scandals 
and/or significant stock market declines causing financial distress, sometimes coupled 
with changes in government.  Romano further articulates how these particular moments 
in time open up “policy windows for policy entrepreneurs to link their proposed solution 
to a problem”.329  Romano concludes that “legislating in the immediate aftermath of a 
public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking” in the securities 
regulation arena.330  Throughout her analysis, Romano discusses the importance of 
regulators properly understanding the empirical data underpinning the particular issue 
and proposed reforms, and advocates for any crisis-linked regulatory reform proposals to 
have built-in sunset clauses that lead to a natural termination of the reform initiative at 
such time as the crisis has passed, thereby eliminating the problematic requirement of 
being forced to proactively rescind the legislation.331  Romano continues with the same 
themes a decade later, advising that regulation in the financial area “tends to be enacted 
in a crisis setting”332 and reaffirming her core belief that securities legislation enacted 
during periods of crisis should routinely include sunset clauses to ensure that they are re-
assessed for efficacy and unintended consequences once empirical data are available as to 
the impacts of the legislation, and cooler heads have ultimately prevailed once the crisis 
has passed.333 
 
328 Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance” (2005) 
114 Yale Law Journal 1521. 
329 Ibid at 1524. 
330 Ibid at 1602. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Roberta Romano, “Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation” 
(2014) 43 Hofstra Law Review 25 at 25. 
333 Ibid at 92. 
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Robert Clark similarly undertakes an analysis of the implications and unintended 
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, ultimately arriving at three criteria that he states should 
be applied as preconditions to regulatory reform in securities matters: (i) serious 
empirical analysis; (ii) periodic reassessment of reforms considering the empirical 
evidence; and (iii) commitment to affirm or alter the regulations in light of the empirical 
evidence.334  Clearly, Robert Clark believes that consideration of empirical evidence 
(compared to anecdotal evidence or the perceptions of the regulators) represents the 
single most critical element of  ensuring effective regulatory reform in the securities 
arena.  The importance of considering potential securities regulation with specific 
reference to empirical evidence is discussed by several other legal scholars in the U.S. as 
well.335 
In consequence, therefore, there is an influential body of academic opinion holding to the 
position that consideration of empirical data at the outset, along with built-in sunset 
provisions ensuring continued evaluation as new empirical data are available, should be 
the consistent foundation of effective regulatory reform initiatives.  Yet, the securities 
regulation reform processes in both the U.S. and Canada do not yet enshrine any formal 
role for the gathering or consideration of empirical data.  In Canada, the legislated 
process for securities reform does not mandate any role for fundamental empirical 
analysis of reform proposals, nor have the securities commissions thus far elected to 
prioritize the application of empirical analysis within the discretionary elements of their 
securities reform processes.  
Ultimately, the omission of any form of empirical analysis in the course of executing 
securities reform initiatives by Canadian securities regulators, which is viewed by the 
author of this Dissertation as a significant process deficiency, has served as a primary 
 
334 Robert C. Clark, “Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality 
Tale for Policymakers” (2005) 22 Georgia State University Law Review 251 at 311. 
335 For example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II” 
(2011) 95 Minnesota Law Review 1779, 
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impetus for undertaking the major empirical research project underpinning this 
Dissertation. 
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 Analysis of the CSA and OSC Regulatory 
Streamlining Initiatives 
4.1- Ongoing CSA Burden Reduction Process 
In this chapter, the details of the recent CP 51-404 burden reduction initiative will be 
discussed in more detail, followed by a review of the ongoing OSC 11-784 burden 
reduction initiative.  As the OSC 11-784 initiative represents the first formal attempt by a 
provincial securities regulator to take up the mantle passed onto the securities 
commissions by the CSA after the conclusion of the CP 51-404 process, it is of clear 
relevance to the subject of public company decline.  The recent release of the OSC 
Burden Reduction Report provides an excellent window into the OSC’s thought process 
and future plans on the OSC burden reduction initiative at this point in time.   
The underlying question to consider is the following: how effective is the OSC 11-784 
process likely to be in following up the CSA burden reduction initiative based on the 
process and developments that have occurred thus far?  Unfortunately, it appears that the 
OSC has already deviated significantly from the most important elements of the CP 51-
404 burden reduction initiative, evidencing an unpromising start to the provincial 
implementation phase of the CP 51-404 initiative.   
The CP 51-404 and OSC 11-784 initiatives are classic examples evidencing how the 
machinery of securities regulatory reform typically moves in Canada.  The regulatory 
reform processes are generally initiated by a notice published either by the CSA (on a 
multi-jurisdictional initiative) or directly by a provincial securities commission (on a 
single-provincial initiative) advising the capital markets of a particular issue identified 
with respect to existing securities regulation that is believed to be in need of reform.  The 
published notices set forth the initial thoughts of the regulatory body as to the nature of 
the reform that the CSA or securities commission is contemplating, and then request 
comments from interested parties on the specific topic.  The open solicitation for written 
comments is, as discussed in the previous chapter, mandated in the securities acts of the 
various provinces.  It also remains as the primary methodology chosen by the CSA and 
commissions to obtain input on the proposed reform package, notwithstanding that other 
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alternatives for engagement and analysis of potential regulatory reforms, such as directly 
conducting empirical research,  are not precluded by the enabling statutes.  On broader 
reform initiatives, roundtable discussions are also held by the regulators in which 
representative voices of the groups who submitted written comments, or are considered 
by the regulators as subject matter experts, are invited to discuss the issue in an open 
forum. 
CP 51-404 opens with the following summary of its mandate and intent: 
The purpose of this CSA Consultation Paper (the Consultation Paper) is to 
identify and consider areas of securities legislation applicable to non-
investment fund reporting issuers that could benefit from a reduction of 
undue regulatory burden, without compromising investor protection or the 
efficiency of the capital market. Part 2 of this Consultation Paper is 
focused on considering options to reduce the regulatory burden associated 
with both capital raising in the public markets (i.e., prospectus related 
requirements) and the ongoing costs of remaining a reporting issuer (i.e., 
continuous disclosure requirements).336 
 
This summary positions the CP 51-404 initiative squarely within the realm of 
burden reduction for Operating Companies in the Canadian public markets.  The 
mandate is further clarified on the next page of CP 51-404 where the five specific 
categories to support reporting issuer burden reduction are outlined: 
We set out below some potential regulatory options which may reduce 
regulatory burden for reporting issuers: 
 
2.1 Extending the application of streamlined rules to smaller reporting 
issuers 
 
2.2 Reducing the regulatory burdens associated with the prospectus rules 
and offering process 
(a) Reducing the audited financial statement requirements in an 
initial public offering (IPO) prospectus 
(b) Streamlining other prospectus requirements 
(c) Streamlining public offerings for reporting issuers 
(d) Other potential areas 
 
2.3 Reducing ongoing disclosure requirements 
 
336 Supra note 29 at 2. 
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(a) Removing or modifying the criteria to file a business 
acquisition report (BAR) 
(b) Reducing disclosure requirements in annual and interim filings 
(c) Permitting semi-annual reporting 
 
2.4 Eliminating overlap in regulatory requirements 
 
2.5 Enhancing electronic delivery of documents337 
CP 51-404 then goes on to propose 33 specific consultation questions providing greater 
detail on the nature of the reforms that are being considered by the CSA within the five 
categories of reforms outlined above.  Excerpts of the 33 consultation questions are 
appended to this Dissertation at Appendix 2.  Embedded within the 33 CP51-404 
consultation questions are a number of thought-provoking questions and comments 
relating to specific public Operating Company proposals to reduce the regulatory burden 
associated with being public.  These proposals get right to the core of seeking to strike a 
more favorable balance, from the perspective of Operating Companies, between reducing 
the time, costs and complexity of IPOs and continuous disclosure and the overreaching 
securities commission mandate of maintaining the integrity of the capital markets and 
protecting public investors. 
Amongst the most significant of the list of reforms proposed for consideration in CP 51-
404 are the following: 
• Modifying the two existing categories of reporting issuers that determine 
eligibility for lesser continuous reporting standards from the current TSX / 
venture issuer dichotomy to a new size-based based distinction; 
• Extending certain of the existing lesser continuous reporting standards to all 
reporting issuers; 
• Extending the ability to use two years of historical audited financial statements as 
the foundation for an IPO to all reporting issuers; 
• Eliminating the requirement for auditors to review interim financial statements in 
a prospectus; 
 
337 Ibid at 3.  The lack of punctuation is in the original document. 
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• Streamlining short form prospectuses and expanding the list of reporting issuers 
who have access to them; 
• Considering alternative prospectus models; 
• Codifying the existing securities commission internal approval process for 
exemptive relief for At-the-Market (“ATM”) offerings into a regulatory policy to 
limit the need for exemptive relief; 
• Liberalization of pre-marketing and marketing rules for offerings; 
• Modifying the Business Acquisition Report (“BAR”) requirements; 
• Streamlining quarterly filing requirements, including looking at consolidating 
management’s discussion & analysis (“MD&A”), the annual information forms 
(“AIF”) and financial statements into a single reporting document; 
• Consideration of moving from quarterly to semi-annual reporting; and 
• Expanding the ability of issuers to use electronic document delivery under 
National Policy 11-201 and also expanding “notice and access” scope under 
National Instruments 54-101 and 51-102. 
After extension of the initial consultation period from July 7, 2017 to July 28, 2017,  a 
total of 57 written submissions were received on CP 51-404, of which 14 (i.e., 25%) were 
filed by representatives of Operating Companies. The remaining 75% of the written 
submissions were filed by various groups of public markets influencers; namely, stock 
exchanges, law firms, accounting & audit firms, investment dealers, advocacy groups, 
professional bodies, industry organizations and individual investors.  Having reviewed 
each of the 57 written submissions, it is apparent that the majority of the submissions 
made comments at a very general level or commented only on certain proposed 
regulatory changes of particular interest to them. 
Eight months after closing of the consultation period, the CSA released CSA Staff Notice 
51-353 (“CSA 51-353”).338  The summary of the process of consultation in CSA 51-353 
states that the individual securities commissions also directly consulted various advisory 
 
338 Supra note 30. 
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committees, industry groups and “other commenters”.339  Appendix A to CSA 51-353 
summarizes the responses received from the 57 written submissions on the 33 specific 
consultation questions, breaking the responses on each area into three categories: 
supportive, supportive in certain circumstances and not supportive.  The total number of 
responses that expressed opinions on the particular reform proposal are tallied and 
allocated to those three categories.  However, there is no distinguishing between the 
source of the comments, or any evidence that the CSA tracked which categories of the 
specific commenters fit within each group on each particular question. 
Evident from the demographic make-up of the commenters and the summary analysis of 
comments in CSA 51-353 (which is reflective of similar regulatory initiatives in Canada 
in recent years) is that, while the ultimate public/private determination is made by 
corporate decision-makers, input on prospective regulatory responses is heavily weighted 
in favour of various subgroups who collectively make up the universe of public markets 
influencers in Canada (which is a broader group of influencers than the four categories 
targeted for participation in the PCD Study).  In similar securities reform consultations 
across Canada, the same list of industry and shareholder associations frequently shows up 
with comments offering predictable input on the proposed amendments based on their 
pre-existing biases and mandate to voice the concerns of their various constituencies. 
Ultimately, from the initial list of 33 different proposals for reform outlined in CP 51-
404, the CSA collectively decided to pursue reform in six different areas:340 
1. considering alternative prospectus models with more concise and 
focused disclosure; 
 
2. initiating a process to modify and streamline the rules for ATM 
offerings; 
 
3.  eliminating discrepancy in interpretation of Item 32 of Form 41-
101F1 Information Required in a Prospectus (i.e., what 
 
339 Ibid at 2. 
340 Ibid. 
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information is required in historical financial statements) between 
various securities provincial commissions; 
 
4. modifying the requirements of filing a BAR; 
 
5. initiating a general continuous disclosure streamlining process to 
limit duplication in filings; and 
 
6. initiating a process to further facilitate the delivery of electronic 
documents to shareholders by reporting issuers. 
Individually, each of these six regulatory reform initiatives are positive steps.  However,  
this list of six initiatives does not come close to constituting a comprehensive reform 
package that will meaningfully reduce the overall regulatory burden for Canadian public 
Operating Companies.  As such, it is disappointing that many of the initial 33 proposals 
that offered the prospect of more significant reductions in regulatory burden were 
dropped at such an early stage of the reform process with the CSA. 
It should be noted that Item #3 in the list of six reform proposals above was not even 
included in original CSA 51-404 proposals.  While certainly uncontroversial (i.e., it is 
difficult to imagine circumstances in which anyone would object to consistency in 
interpretation of provisions across provincial jurisdictions), this proposal represents an 
obviosity and not a meaningful burden reduction reform.  Other inclusions on the list 
such as Item #5 and Item #6 are also certainly worthwhile.  However, these reform 
proposals are also non-controversial and it is self-evident that they should form part of 
the CSA’s ongoing analysis, and certainly did not require a formal consultation process in 
order to identify. 
Item #4 above, relating to proposed changes to the BAR requirements,341 has been 
followed up on by the CSA with a subsequent CSA Notice and Request for Comment.342  
 
341 The adoption of the current BAR requirements and the challenges that these requirements present for 
public companies are discussed earlier in Chapter 3 of this Dissertation. 
342 Canada Securities Administrators, CSA Notice and Request for Comment, “Proposed Amendments to 
National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations and Changes to Certain Policies Related to 
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The proposals include increasing the significance test triggering a BAR filing for non-
venture issuers from 20% to 30% of the market value of the issuer as well as requiring 
that two of the three significance tests be met before a BAR filing is required.  While 
certainly representing a positive step forward, it is again disappointing that the first 
concrete reform proposal to come out of the CSA 51-404 process relates to an issue that, 
as disclosed later in this Dissertation, ranks near the bottom of the list of factors assessed 
in the PCD Study as likely contributing to public company decline in Canada.343 
Contemporaneous with the announcement of the comment period for the proposed 
modifications to the BAR filing requirements, the CSA issued another notice and request 
for comment specifically relating to reducing regulatory burden for investment fund 
issuers.344  Once again, the proposals reflected in this notice represent positive 
streamlining changes for investment fund issuers.  However, there is nothing whatsoever 
in these proposals to streamline the regulatory processes of Operating Companies in 
Canada that are the focus of this Dissertation.  While investment fund issuers in Canada 
may also be critically in need of burden reduction, it is disappointing that the interests of 
public Operating Companies, which are so critical to the Canadian capital markets, have 
been deferred once again in the regulatory reform process.  
On the whole, therefore, the outcome of the CSA 51-353 process must be considered to 
be highly disappointing for advocates of meaningful capital markets reform for Operating 
Company reporting issuers in Canada.  CSA 51-404 originally included a number of bold 
and significant reform proposals for consideration that offered the prospect of meaningful 
burden reduction for reporting issuers in Canada.   However, none of the boldest 
proposals from the original list of 33 reform ideas, offering the prospect for significant 
 
the Business Acquisition Report Requirements” (5 September 2019) online:<. https://www.osc.gov.on.ca 
/en/SecuritiesLaw_rule_20190905_51-102_rfc-business-acquisition-report-requirements.htm>. 
343 See the specific discussion later in this Dissertation in section 7.15.5.1. 
344 CSA Notice and Request for Comment.  “Reducing Regulatory Burden for Investment Fund Issuers – 
Phase 2, Stage 1” (12 September 2019) online:< https://albertasecurities.com/securities-law-and-policy//-
/media/ASC-Documents-part-1/Regulatory-Instruments/2019/09/5480656-_-81-102-_-CSA-Notice-and-
Request-for-Comment-Project-RID.ashx>. 
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burden reduction in CSA 51-404, made it to the final list of initiatives for further 
consideration and development in CSA 51-353. 
Why?  One can only speculate, but it is clear that any impetus for broad reform was once 
again overwhelmed by the nature of the customary regulatory reform process and the 
dissident voices arguing against meaningful burden reduction for reporting issuers under 
the guise of protection of public shareholders.   
As mentioned above, there is a standard cast of characters who can be counted on to 
regularly submit written responses on any material securities reform initiatives in Canada.  
Most of these participants are associations and interest groups, each of which has an 
embedded bias on regulatory topics, either for or against burden reduction, arising from 
the interests of their particular constituencies.  The fact that the CSA summary analysis of 
the CSA 51-404 responses simply tallied the voices expressed for or against the 
proposals, and failed to openly distinguish between the nature of the commenters on each 
topic, is worrisome.  In the regulatory reform process, one cannot simply assume that all 
voices should be weighted equally.  Without access to the internal deliberations of the 
CSA between the time of the publication of CSA 51-404 and the publication of CSA 51-
353, it is impossible to hypothesize as to what particular impediments and objections led 
the CSA to abandon the most promising and boldest of the reform packages from CSA 
51-404. The explanation and construction of CSA 51-353 makes one question whether 
the fact that a particular proposal faced any significant opposition during the consultation 
was sufficient to result in it being abandoned.  It appears that only those reform proposals 
on which a strong consensus was evident from the commenters were included in the final 
six recommendations. 
If so, this is an unfortunate outcome. There will always be dissenting voices to any 
meaningful proposals for securities regulatory reform on burden reduction and regulatory 
streamlining.  The voices of the shareholder rights associations have historically opposed 
most attempts to reduce the costs and complexity of continuous disclosure, particularly if 
they feel that it will deprive them of any existing information.   
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Yet, with due respect, the shareholder rights groups also do not necessarily appreciate 
sufficient context on the broader topic of public company decline to understand that the 
Canadian capital markets are on the precipice of sliding towards irrelevancy at an 
alarming rate. These shareholder rights groups continue fighting the battle to push ever-
increasing disclosure onto the reporting issuers, often failing to realize that, in doing so, 
they may be complicit contributors to overall public markets decline. 
In discharging their prime mandate to protect the integrity of the capital markets, it is 
submitted that the evidence presented in this Dissertation as to the extent of the public 
company decline phenomenon and the underlying complexity of subject matter 
demonstrates that the Canadian securities regulators need to exhibit strong and visionary 
leadership that is willing to adopt meaningful reform packages.  In so doing, it is 
apparent, from review of the comments submitted to the CSA during the recent 
consultation processes, that regulatory initiatives with sufficient teeth to offer the 
prospect of meaningfully influencing public company decline will inevitably be 
unpopular amongst certain constituencies, particularly the shareholder rights lobby.   
However, the argument is advanced throughout this Dissertation that the extent of 
Canadian capital markets decline at this point in time is past the stage where regulatory 
reform by consensus is a feasible option. 
The breadth and depth of the 33 initiatives proposed in CP 51-404 represent a positive 
first step towards a meaningful package of regulatory reform that would collectively 
operate to materially reduce the burden on Canadian public companies.  The final six 
initiatives that ultimately were advanced in CSA 51-353 do not offer the same hope.  If 
the typical securities regulatory reform process of initial proposals followed by public 
consultation leads us inevitably to such watered-down initiatives as is reflected in CSA 
51-353, then it is incumbent on governmental authorities at a higher level to intervene in 
the burden reduction initiatives in order to provide leadership that offers an increased 
prospect of meaningful burden reduction. 
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4.2- Ongoing OSC Burden Reduction Process 
The final paragraph of CSA 51-353 advises that the CSA is passing the mantle of burden 
reduction on to the provincial securities regulators to pursue their own processes on the 
six initiatives discussed above.  Now, a year-and-a-half after the release of CSA 51-353, 
only the OSC has announced a formal process to follow up on the CSA burden reduction 
initiative.  The OSC response is encompassed in OSC 11-784 Burden Reduction, 
published on January 14, 2019, which also announced the creation of a Burden Reduction 
Taskforce.345 
Notably, OSC 11-784 refers in its mandate to both CSA CP 51-404 and to another CSA 
initiative focused specifically on investment funds, CSA Staff Notice 81-329 Reducing 
Regulatory Burden for Investment Fund Issuers.346  OSC 11-784 announces an initial 
consultation process in which interested parties are invited to submit comments on a wide 
variety of areas relating to overall burden reduction.  The following statement is made, 
evidently anticipating objections from the investors’ rights lobby: 
Strong investor protections are the underpinnings of fair and efficient 
capital markets. Reducing unnecessary regulatory burden for issuers, 
registrants and other market participants will benefit investors, because 
investors ultimately bear the costs of unnecessary or outdated 
regulations.347 
The OSC issued a survey form for the consultation element of OSC 11-784 that included 
the following substantive questions: 
Do you have any general comments on the topic of regulatory burden 
reduction related to securities regulation?  
 
Are there operational or procedural changes that would make market 
participants' day-to-day interaction with the OSC easier or less costly? 
   
 
345 Supra note 31. 
346 CSA Staff Notice 81-329 Reducing Regulatory Burden for Investment Fund Issuers (24 May 2018) 
online:< https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20180524_81-329_investment-fund-
issuers.htm>. 
347 Ibid at 2. 
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Are there ways in which we can provide greater certainty regarding 
regulatory requirements or outcomes to market participants?   
 
Are there forms and filings that issuers, registrants or other market 
participants are required to submit that should be streamlined or required 
less frequently?   
 
Are there particular filings with the OSC that are unnecessary or unduly 
burdensome? 
 
Is there information that the OSC provides to market participants that 
could be provided more efficiently? 
 
Are there requirements under the OSC rules that are inconsistent with the 
rules of other jurisdictions and that could be harmonized?  
 
Are there specific requirements that no longer serve a valid purpose?  
  
Are there ways to enhance and improve how investors experience 
disclosure provided: (i) before they invest; (ii) as part of ongoing public 
disclosure; and (iii) by registrants?348 
In addition to the written consultation, the OSC held three roundtable panels 
between March and May, 2019, transcripts of which were posted to the OSC 
website.  The participants in the roundtables were selected from the pool of 
individuals and groups who had provided written submissions and requested the 
opportunity to be heard in the roundtable. 
Ultimately, the OSC received 69 written responses on OSC 11-784 during the 
consultation period.349  A review of all of these written responses demonstrates that 
only four responses of the 69 submissions were from Operating Company issuers 
who were concerned with general issues of public company burden reduction.  All 
other reporting issuers who filed comments were concerned almost exclusively 
with issues specific to investment fund registrants.  The remainder of the comments 
 
348 Ibid  
349 All responses letters received in response to public consultation requests by the OSC are reproduced 
and available on the OSC website.  The 69 responses on the OSC 11-784 consultation are available at the 
following; online:< https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/59169.htm>. 
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came from public markets influencers, such as law firms, exchanges, and the 
standard list of industry associations and the investor rights associations.  The 
transcripts of the roundtable discussions also evidence that the participants during 
the discussions were primarily focused on the issues of streamlining the 
requirements for investment funds, and not at all on burden reduction for public 
Operating Companies generally.   
The OSC recently published its follow-up summary report on the entire 
consultation process thus far in a document entitled OSC Burden Reduction 
Report.350  This report is an extensive document that provides a clear picture into 
the process, current status and future plans of the OSC on the topic of burden 
reduction.  The OSC Burden Reduction Report states that the OSC received a total 
of 199 suggestions on how to do things better, which it grouped into 38 underlying 
concerns relating to rules, processes and interactions between the OSC and public 
markets constituents.351  Ultimately, the OSC came up with 107 decisions and 
recommendations to streamline processes and reduce the ultimate regulatory 
burden.  However, of the 107 decisions and recommendations, only 14 applied to 
all markets participants and another 13 applied to public Operating Companies.  
The other 80 items relate only to investment funds, registrants, derivative 
participants and markets, trading and clearing topics (i.e., trading mechanics).352  
 
350 Supra note 32. 
351 Ibid at 7. 
352 Ibid at 8. 
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The break-down is summarized visually by the OSC as follows:353
 
On each of the 107 decisions and recommendations, the OSC provides a description 
of the proposed change, status update, timetable and a summary of the perceived 
benefits of the item.  The OSC summaries of the 14 decisions and recommendations 
applicable to all public markets participants and the 13 decisions and 
recommendations applicable to Operating Companies are included in Appendix 1 
of this Dissertation. 
Ultimately, the OSC states that “the initiatives outlined in our decisions and 
recommendations will make it easier for businesses to operate in our capital 
markets by helping to minimize regulatory delays, reduce the cost of capital and 
free up resources to focus on growth”.354  More specifically, the OSC outlines the 
following items as expected tangible benefits of the regulatory reform process: 
■ Enhanced service levels 
■ New tools and use of technology to assist with navigating the 
regulatory process 
■ More transparency around our processes 
■ Clearer communication from staff 
■ More manageable timelines for certain filings 
 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid at 9. 
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■ Greater clarity and flexibility on what is required to fulfill 
regulatory requirements 
■ Less duplication of requirements and form filings 
■ Improved coordination between the OSC and our regulatory 
partners 
■ Rules and guidance that are easier to read and understand 
■ Information that will be easier to find and better organized on our 
website 
■ Improved coordination of reviews 
■ A more tailored regulatory approach that takes into account the 
size and type of businesses. 355 
There is no question that the OSC burden reduction process is a positive initiative, 
and is one that should be emulated by every other provincial securities regulator in 
Canada.  Every small step towards burden reduction and regulatory streamlining is 
a step forward.   However, the critical question in analyzing the effectiveness of the 
process thus far is whether the plans outlined in the OSC Burden Reduction Report 
go far enough to offer any meaningful prospect of stemming the tide of public 
company decline in the future.  The answer to this question is discussed later in 
Chapter 10 of this Dissertation. 
Clearly, what is most concerning about the OSC consultation process is the lack of 
participation by representatives of Canadian Operating Companies.  Certainly, the 
opportunity for this group to participate was clear, as evidenced by the broad nature 
of the particular questions that the OSC framed in its survey questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire included many topics of concern for operating company issuers.  It is 
unclear why so few Operating Companies executives chose to voice their opinions 
on this important consultation from the OSC, but it is unfortunately clear from the 
record that the OSC is forced to operate with a paucity of valuable input from the 
Operating Company constituency in its deliberations as to the next steps that should 
be taken on the burden reduction initiative.   
 
355 Ibid. 
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Certainly, there is a risk that the lack of meaningful input during the consultation 
period from public Operating Companies impacted the focus of the OSC in 
selecting the reform proposals that are ultimately being pursued, as outlined in the 
OSC Burden Reduction Report.  Only 25% of the decisions and recommendations 
of the OSC deal in any meaningful way with the issues that are faced by Canadian 
public Operating Companies. The other 75% of the decisions and recommendations 
relate specifically to issues faced by financial markets participants.  As such, much 
greater focus and attention in the OSC Burden Reduction Report is given to 
financial industry participants and market registrants.  This prioritization of the 
issues of the financial markets participants is unsurprising because of the much 
greater level of participation by representatives of these industries in the 
consultation process.   
In no way should any element of this Dissertation be interpreted as arguing that the 
concerns of the investment bankers and brokers in the Canadian public markets are 
not important, or that the reforms proposed to support streamlining in those sectors 
are undeserved.  It is widely understood that those critical members of the public 
company ecosphere are also going through difficult financial times in Canada and 
many smaller firms are struggling to survive.  It is also clear that the overall health 
of the public markets in Canada depends on having a robust infrastructure of 
investment banks, market makers and other financial markets participants available 
to service the needs of public Operating Companies.  
However, it is also clear that the consultation methodologies implemented by the 
CSA, and subsequently by the OSC, have been largely ineffective in securing 
sufficient levels of participation from representatives of Operating Companies.  In 
fact, the participation of Operating Companies in the OSC burden reduction process 
is so limited that it is doubtful the OSC can claim to have completed any type of 
consultation leading to a fulsome understanding of the burden reduction issues that 
are unique to Operating Companies. 
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This unfortunate result brings into sharp focus the severe limitations of the 
traditional model of securing industry input for securities regulatory reform in 
Canada.  For whatever reason or combination of reasons, the consultation process 
that was implemented on OSC 11-784 has fundamentally failed in its goal of 
bringing a strong representation of voices from a cross-section of public Operating 
Companies across multiple industry sectors on the critical topic of burden 
reduction.   
As mentioned in the earlier discussion on the various CSA burden reduction 
initiatives, it is clear that the voices of the investment fund industry have been the 
loudest thus far in the consultation process.  One can infer that the clarity of the 
message received from the investment fund industry has pushed the prioritization 
for burden reduction relating to investment funds to the top of the legislative 
agenda,  reflected by the most recent CSA initiative kicking off Phase 2 of the 
reform agenda directed specifically at investment fund issuers.  The voices of the 
public Operating Companies in Canada have been comparatively muted during the 
consultation processes run by the CSA and OSC.  The danger associated with this 
relative silence from the Operating Companies is that the burden reduction 
initiatives for Operating Companies will continue to be subordinated to the 
concerns expressed by the more vocal proponents of reform from the investment 
fund community. 
Why are the investment fund issuers so vocal compared to the Operating 
Companies in the consultation process?   It is likely because the investment fund 
industry views their very survival as being at stake; for the Operating Company 
senior decision-makers, there are many private options that can be pursued as 
alternatives to the public markets.  Public company decline is not a matter of life 
and death for Canadian companies at this stage; they perceive that they can always 
choose private financing alternatives if the public market is not attractive. 
Unless the consultation processes of the securities regulators are fundamentally 
altered, there is every indication that the number of Operating Companies listed in 
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Canada will continue to decline unabated.  Hopefully, the securities regulators 
understand that the lack of a coordinated response from leaders of Canadian 
Operating Companies in response to the requests for comment from the CSA and 
OSC should not be interpreted to mean that Operating Company burden reduction 
is unimportant.   
The failure of Operating Company business executives to respond in the same 
numbers as their investment fund counterparts should, rather, be considered as 
being reflective of the fact that, as discussed in detail later in this Dissertation, 
Operating Companies in Canada currently have robust financing alternatives in the 
private financing markets.  The lack of a hue and cry from Operating Companies 
demanding immediate regulatory reform does not in any way diminish the reality 
of the phenomenon of public company decline or its importance to the underlying 
Canadian economy.  The lack of participation in the securities reform consultation 
process by representatives of this group does not change the fact that stemming the 
decline of public Operating Companies in Canada should be a top priority for 
Canadian securities regulators for the reasons outlined in Chapter 1 of this 
Dissertation.  However, the lack of Operating Company participation in these recent 
processes does demonstrate that the securities regulators should look at 
fundamentally altering their consultation processes to include other sources of data 
if they aspire to secure more meaningful input from this critical group.  These 
additional data sources could include empirical studies.  However, it could also 
simply include dedicating the resources necessary at the CSA or provincial 
securities commissions to individually contact the senior business decision-makers 
of each public Operating Company in Canada and request their opinions on critical 
reform initiatives.  In the present environment, simply publishing an open invitation 
to participate in a consultation process is not adequate to secure the participation of 
this business cohort of Canadian businesspersons. 
Despite the deficiencies in its consultation processes, the OSC must be commended 
for the significant effort that it has undertaken on burden reduction throughout the 
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public markets.  Each improvement that comes from the process is a small step 
forward.    
As for the other provinces outside of Ontario, one wonders why they have moved 
so slowly in responding to the mandate for regulatory burden reduction.  Clearly, it 
is not a priority item for the provincial securities commissions outside of Ontario 
at this time. Possibly, the individual regulators realized that the watered-down 
recommendations resulting from CSA 51-353 were so uninspiring in scope that 
pushing the initiative internally at this point in time offers little value in meaningful 
burden reduction.  Possibly, the release of the recent OSC Burden Reduction Report 
will spur them into some form of further action. 
Regardless, it is also hoped that the warnings sounded in this Dissertation on the 
extent of public company decline in Canada will provide some additional impetus 
for the Canadian securities commissions to revisit the 33 reforms proposed for 
consideration in CP 51-404, possibly revisiting the boldest of the recommendations 
for significant regulatory reform contained therein in order to do what they can to 
stem the tide of further public company decline. 
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 Research Methodologies 
5.1- Introduction to Research Methodologies 
Applying empirical research methodologies to studies covering topics within the 
traditional boundaries of legal academia is a practice that has become commonplace in 
the United States.  Many law schools in the United States teach methodology courses 
focused on empirical studies within the law.356  
In Canada, however, the application of empirical studies to legal topics has not yet 
entered the academic mainstream.  Based on a search of Canadian law school course 
offerings, it appears that no courses in empirical methodologies have yet made it into 
Canadian law school curriculums.  Empirical studies applied to legal topics in Canada 
thus far have primarily originated through collaborations with academics working in 
other disciplines such as sociology, health, economics and finance.   
It is apparent from recent trendlines that the application of empirical research 
methodologies to legal topics by legally trained academics will continue to increase in 
frequency and stature in Canada.  As it remains a nascent discipline within law at this 
juncture, however, it is recognized that the methods employed in the PCD Study may be 
unfamiliar to a portion of the audience coming from a traditional legal background.  
Considering that present reality, this Research Methodologies chapter will go through the 
research methodology associated with the PCD Study in greater detail and spend more 
time discussing the underlying assumptions and key research choices made in the process 
than might otherwise be seen in a typical empirically-based Dissertation. 
Having started with the observation that public company decline in Canada was a subject 
matter desperately in need of study to remedy the existing void in empirical data, the first 
step in the process of defining the PCD Study was assessing all realistic avenues of 
 
356 For example, in creating a reading list for a self-study course on empirical methods in the law, the 
author secured course outlines for empirical methods-focused courses currently being taught in law schools 
in Stanford, UCLA and Duke. 
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inquiry for empirically studying the phenomenon.  Through the process of elimination, it 
was determined that a survey of key Operating Company senior decision-makers and 
public company influencers in Canada was the most practical and promising tool to 
generate meaningful empirical data.  This led to the execution of an extensive process of 
preparation involving a significant amount of directed-study and self-study research into 
contemporary best practices in empirical studies in law, survey research methodologies 
and the implications and specific challenges of conducting empirical research involving 
human subjects in the context of a PhD Dissertation through a Canadian law school. 
5.2- Ethics Approval Process and Outcome 
As the PCD Study was executed under the auspices of Western University, Faculty of 
Law and involved research on human subjects, an application for approval to the Western 
Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (“NMREB”) was required.  The NMREB 
application process is extensive, and required the drafting and filing of approximately 20 
different documents including an 8500 word Survey Protocol and Research Plan that 
detailed all of the relevant elements, plans, procedures and policies that would be adopted 
and observed during the course of the PCD Study initiative.  Copies of the draft survey 
instruments, interview scripts, verbal recruitment scripts, email solicitations and proposed 
advertisements were also submitted for review.  
One of the main documents vetted in the NMREB process was the form of the Letter of 
Information that is required to be reviewed and acknowledged by every study participant, 
with confirmation of acknowledgement retained as a record of informed consent by the 
study administrators. Copies of all of the paper formats of the survey instruments were 
also individually submitted for approval. 
Ultimately the NMREB process is principally focused on: (i) ensuring the protection of 
the privacy and dignity of the potential participants in a research study before during and 
after the study; (ii) confirming that appropriate steps are made to safeguard all data 
collected, particularly any data that can be used to identify individuals; (iii) guaranteeing 
that the recruitment process is free of undue coercion; (iv) ensuring that full and informed 
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consent is obtained from every study participant; and (v) ensuring that best-practices in 
human research are followed at all stages of the research process. 
The initial Western NMREB application was filed, along with all supporting documents, 
on November 20, 2018.  Minor comments were received from the NMREB personnel on 
the initial application and a revised application was submitted on December 5, 2018.  
Final NMREB approval for the PCD Study was received on December 7, 2018.   
One of the biggest issues in the review of NMREB applications generally is consideration 
of the vulnerability of the specific populations being studied.  Any specific vulnerabilities 
require a corresponding plan for enhanced protections in the study protocol.  However, in 
the PCD Study underpinning this Dissertation, the various subgroups being targeted for 
inclusion are amongst the least vulnerable groups that one can identify in Canada.  The 
target participants in the PCD Study are highly educated and generally highly 
compensated.  They can also be assumed to have developed immunity to recruitment 
pressures, as they face competing requests for their valuable time on a daily basis.  As 
such, the biggest concern in designing the protective elements of the PCD Study were 
less about protecting the target participants from undue pressures in recruitment  due to 
any vulnerabilities (although best practices in that area were followed throughout) and 
more focused on protecting the identity and personal information of everyone who 
enrolled in the PCD Study.   
On this topic, many of the respondents evidenced little concern on retaining anonymity, 
going so far as to include their names and phone numbers in the text responses and 
inviting calls back to discuss their comments further.357  Individuals who requested 
specific contact were generally followed-up with phone calls, inviting them to share 
further on the topic.  The information from these follow-up calls was collected for 
 
357 Regardless of whether a particular individual made it clear that they were unconcerned with 
maintenance of privacy, procedures were followed throughout the PCD Study process to ensure that all 
privacy conditions of the NMREB approval were followed for all PCD Study participants, and no 
individualized data was consequently stored in any form that could allow for identification of any of the 
PCD Study participants. 
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additional context, but did not form part of the formal PCD Study data.   A small number 
of respondents did express concern about potential attribution of their responses as the 
questions sought personal opinions. Several participants were keen to ensure that it was 
clear that they were providing their opinions only in their personal capacities and not in 
their capacities as formal representatives of their specific organizations.  
Collectively demographic data that allows for personal identification of the respondents 
also creates a host of data security issues that continue long after the completion of a 
research project such as the PCD Study.  As such, the decision was ultimately made that 
no information would be collected in the PCD Study that would allow for individuals to 
be personally identified.  Only generalized demographic data was collected and utilized 
to define and assess the responses of the multitude of demographic subgroups tracked 
throughout the analysis of the PCD Study data.  Careful process was followed to ensure 
that no individualized responses were reported alongside compiled demographic data that 
might collectively establish a profile where readers are able to make educated guesses at 
the identities of the respondents.  Ultimately, the data protection processes of the 
respondents were outlined in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan filed with the 
NMREB, providing a high degree of anonymity to the PCD Study participants.   
In terms of human research and NMREB ethics concerns, the PCD Study is relatively 
straightforward and does not engage the usual complexities that can become problematic.  
No waivers or variations of the NMREB policies were required.  The single area in which 
the Survey Protocol & Research Plan engaged a topic that is considered ethically 
sensitive was in reference to the use of snowball sampling in the recruitment process.  
Snowball sampling involves using individuals, other than those who are investigators in 
the research study to assist in the recruitment process, generally asking that people who 
have participated in the study pass along the invitation to other individuals that they know 
would fit within the target participant group.  Those individuals are then asked to invite 
other individuals to participate and so on.  Snowball sampling can be an effective tool in 
securing enrolment for target groups that are hard to reach directly.  However, snowball 
sampling also inherently raised NMREB ethical concerns because the recruitment effort 
is delegated outside the direct control of the investigators who are trained in survey 
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methodology and understand both the specifics of the NMREB approval conditions for 
the study and best-practice ethical boundaries in survey recruitment generally. 
It was disclosed in the NMREB application and in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan 
that it was intended to use passive snowball sampling in the PCD Study.  Passive 
snowball sampling is where a request is extended to persons outside of the investigator 
group to pass along the invitation to participate in the research study to others.  
Investigators are not allowed to follow up with individuals and ask them whether they 
have in fact passed along the invitation or, if so, to whom.  In active snowball sampling, 
investigators follow up with individuals to determine whether requests to participate have 
been forwarded.  Passive snowball sampling is allowed by the NMREB recruitment 
guidelines of Western University, while active snowball sampling is prohibited. 
As a result, passive snowball sampling combined with anonymous survey responses 
prevents the researcher from knowing which of the responses received are attributable to 
the passive snowball sampling efforts as opposed to direct solicitations of the respondents 
by the study investigators.  Moreover, passive snowball sampling does not allow the 
investigator to ask for contact information of others who meet the study criteria and 
thereby solicit those individuals directly.  Passive snowball sampling forces the 
investigators to rely on others to follow through on recruitment efforts without any ability 
to verify if that is indeed occurring or to what degree.  The only practical method of 
determining what effect passive snowball sampling is having in the overall recruitment 
effort is to discontinue all direct solicitation efforts over an extended period of time and 
assess the results, such that an inference can be drawn that most of the new responses 
being completed are attributable to the snowball sampling and not direct recruitment.   
In the PCD Study, the aggressive timeframes for survey enrollment did not allow for a 
significant gap in the active recruitment efforts, so it cannot be known with certainty 
what portion of the total responses received came from the passive snowball sampling 
efforts.  However, based on observation of the correlation between the timing of direct 
solicitation efforts and the timing of the responses received, it is believed that more than 
90% of the responses received in the PCD Study were as a result of direct solicitation by 
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the Co-Investigator.  More details on the recruitment process, and the lessons learned 
therefrom, are included later in this chapter.   
5.3- Format and Delivery of the PCD Study 
The PCD Study ultimately utilized four different survey methods at various stages in the 
research process: (i) in-person interviews; (ii) phone interviews; (iii) paper surveys; and 
(iv) online surveys.  The use of live interviews was limited to the survey validation phase 
discussed hereafter and also for participants in the main survey who indicated via email 
response or phone call that they preferred to have a live conversation with the Co-
Investigator.  In those situations, the Co-Investigator would go through the relevant paper 
version of the survey with the specific respondent and would then enter the paper version 
as an online response.  In total, less than 15 paper surveys were completed (all of which 
were thereafter inputted online), with the remainder of the responses occurring through 
the online portal.  As such, more than 95% of the responses in the PCD Study were 
originally secured online. 
The online data collection portion of the PCD Study exclusively utilized the Qualtrics 
survey platform. Qualtrics has entered into a university-wide license with Western 
University, making Qualtrics the obvious choice for the PCD Study from a cost 
perspective.  However, assessment of the Qualtrics survey platform also confirmed that 
the Qualtrics software offers all of the desired functionality for efficient administration of 
the PCD Study along with robust technical support.  Qualtrics was also used for basic 
review and analysis of the data collected in the PCD Study.  For the more complex 
statistical analysis, the Qualtrics responses were exported into CSV files and analyzed 
using Excel and a specialized open-source statistical software program called “R”. 
Due to the full anonymity provided to the respondents in the PCD Study, the issue of how 
to prevent “ballot-box stuffing” was considered at length to ensure the integrity of the 
data collection process.  The decision was ultimately made to utilize a Qualtrics feature 
that embeds cookies in respondents’ browsers and prevents anyone using that same 
computer terminal from completing the survey a second time.  Although this protection 
can be defeated by an intentional deletion of the embedded cookies by the user, the risk 
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of ballot-box stuffing in the PCD Study was considered very low.  No compensation was 
offered for participation in the PCD Study, so no apparent motivation for any respondents 
to complete more than one survey can be identified.  As such, the use of this particular 
Qualtrics feature was considered sufficient as an anti-ballot-stuffing measure. 
For online responses, eligibility to participate in the survey was verified through self-
reporting and self-certification at the beginning of the online responses using a variety of 
screening questions.  In the PCD Study, it was determined that self-certification was the 
only practical method for eligibility verification in order to assure anonymity and avoid 
collecting personal data.  While relying on self-certification opens up the possibility that 
respondents can improperly report their eligibility in order to participate, the chance of 
this occurring was determined to be low in the PCD Study.  The solicitation process, 
discussed in more detail hereafter, was targeted only to those individuals who were likely 
to meet the eligibility criteria from the start.  Also, there is no obvious incentive for 
respondents to misrepresent their eligibility in order to participate in the survey.  
Participation in the PCD Study takes effort and time without any tangible reward being 
offered to respondents.  Based on all of these factors, self-certification of eligibility was 
considered an appropriate methodology for the low level of risk in the PCD Study. 
Finally, the core of the PCD Study included several matrix questions listing a number of 
potential factors that the respondents were asked to rank or otherwise evaluate according 
to specific criteria.  On matrix questions, the issue of question order bias must be 
considered in the design and implementation of the survey.  In a list of items, it is 
recognized that respondents’ perceptions may be influenced by where the items are 
placed sequentially in the lists, thereby introducing question order bias that can result in 
sample error.  Utilization of an online survey tool such as Qualtrics offers a simple 
solution to this issue, enabling the appearance order of the items in lists to be randomized 
for each individual respondent.  This randomization functionality was used in the PCD 
Study to ensure that question order bias was eliminated in the responses which were 
originally collected through the Qualtrics system. 
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5.4- Nature of the Empirical Effort 
The rationale for resorting to an empirical study based on survey research to illuminate 
the relative importance of contributing factors to public company decline was discussed 
at some length in the introductory chapter of this Dissertation.  Empirical research has 
repeatedly demonstrated the significant linkage between preferences expressed in surveys 
and decision-making outcomes.358  The correlation between attitudes and future decision-
making is strongest when the attitudes are based on direct experience,359 which is clearly 
reflective of the participants in the PCD Study. These authorities validate the underlying 
proposition that the PCD Study outcomes illuminating the perceptions of Canadian senior 
business decision-makers and public markets influencers on the key topics relevant to 
public company decline provide valuable insight as to the actual IPO / private decision-
making process and likely outcomes.  While formal causality of public company decline 
cannot be determined using the survey methodology, the PCD Study data provides the 
best information yet collected to formulate hypotheses on a number of critical issues 
intuitively and conceptually linked to the public company decline phenomenon in 
Canada. 
One of the principal goals of the PCD Study is to determine a rank-ordering of the 
importance of various factors posited as contributing to public company decline in 
Canada.  The PCD Study accomplishes this by determining a rank-order of the factors in 
terms of their perceived importance to senior business decision-makers and public 
markets influencers when faced with a hypothetical go public / stay private decision. 
Another principal research goal in the PCD Study is analyzing the biases and 
predispositions of senior decision-makers and influencers towards IPOs, the capital 
markets and private financing alternatives generally.  Key questions in the PCD Study 
were designed specifically to determine whether survey participants exhibited a positive 
or negative bias to public or private financing alternatives, with the results discussed 
 
358 Supra note 35. 
359 Ibid at 812. 
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hereafter demonstrating that significant biases against the public markets persist amongst 
several key subgroups included in the PCD Study. 
The PCD Study was designed and executed as a cross-sectional survey, meaning that it 
gathered information from a sample group taken from a larger population at a particular 
point in time.   
There were two separate components in the PCD Study, namely the Preliminary Survey 
and the Main Survey.  The Preliminary Survey was utilized in order to test and validate 
the form and content of the final survey instrument for the subsequent Main Survey.  The 
Preliminary Survey phase took place between December 14, 2018 and January 14, 2019.  
The format adopted for the Preliminary Survey was live interviews conducted either in-
person or over-the-phone.  The average interview length in the Preliminary Survey was 
approximately one hour.  A total of 14 different individuals were interviewed during the 
Preliminary Survey phase representing a cross-section of the target subgroups for the 
Main Survey: three public company senior decision-makers, three TSX-eligible private 
company senior decision makers, three securities lawyers, two public accountants / 
auditors, one investment banker and two private equity investors.  As such, the 
Preliminary Survey participants represented a cross section of all target subgroups that 
were also solicited in the Main Survey. 
In each Preliminary Study interview, a short initial discussion was held in which the 
nature of the public decline phenomenon and the purpose of the PCD Study were 
discussed.  The participants were then given approximately 20 minutes to go through the 
survey, either online or with a paper version, without any interaction with the interviewer.  
The participants were requested to make personal notes as they progressed through the 
survey instruments indicating any items in the PCD Study that they felt were confusing, 
unclear, inaccurate, leading, misleading or irrelevant.   
The amount of time that each participant took to complete the Preliminary Survey was 
logged.  After the participants completed the survey, the interviewer went back over the 
survey instrument with the participants on a question-by-question basis, asking whether 
the participants had any comments on the particular questions.  Afterwards, the 
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participants were asked if they could identify any potential additional downsides 
associated with being a public company or other possible contributing factors to public 
company decline that had not been mentioned in the survey instrument.  Finally, the 
participants were asked if they had any final suggestions on the survey execution plan, 
the design of the survey or any other related topic.   
The notes from the 14 interviews in the Preliminary Survey phase were then incorporated 
and used to create the final survey instrument for the Main Survey. During the course of 
the Preliminary Survey process, several revisions were made to the questions and 
instructions in order to improve the clarity of those items based on feedback received 
from the Preliminary Survey participants.    
After completion of the Preliminary Survey, the Main Survey enrollment phase was 
begun immediately. The Main Survey was completed over a five-month period, 
commencing on January 15, 2019 and ending on June 15, 2019. 
5.5- Determining the Target Participants in the PCD Study 
 Which Senior Business Decision-Makers? 
Having developed the argument earlier that the decision to pursue public or private 
alternatives is fundamentally a conscious decision by senior business decision-makers, 
and that the decline in the number of public Operating Companies must thereby be 
inferred to be a result of a shift in perception over time of the relative merits of public 
versus private financing options, one of the first critical questions that had to be defined 
early in the PCD Study planning process was which individuals should be studied?  In 
order for the study outcome to have empirical validity and interest to market participants, 
the individuals surveyed for the primary research undertaking need to come from 
amongst that elite group of senior business leaders who have the actual authority to 
unilaterally determine, or at least strongly influence, the public/private decision.   
How should the class of senior business decision-makers be defined?  Since no similar 
empirical research project has been undertaken on the decline in public Operating 
Companies prior to the PCD Study, there is little illumination in the literature providing 
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guidance on the appropriate selection of study participants.  The Brau / Fawcett and 
Mittoo Bancel studies completed in the U.S. and Europe on IPO motivations and timing, 
previously discussed in the Literature Review chapter of this Dissertation, both rely 
solely on opinion of CFO’s.360   Although the opinions of CFO’s certainly can be 
anticipated to be well-informed in most instances, it was determined that relying solely 
on CFO opinions was insufficient to secure the breadth and depth of perspectives being 
sought in the PCD Study. 
Ultimately, three different groups of senior business decision-makers were included in 
the PCD Study solicitation. While many internal and external voices may be consulted by 
company leadership in advance of an IPO, the ultimate public/private decision in each 
company generally rests with a small number of decision-makers who reside at the very 
top of the corporate hierarchy: Executive Chairpersons, Presidents/CEOs, CFOs and 
COOs (collectively, “C-suite” executives).  Ultimately, the IPO process is so time-
consuming and distracting for C-suite management that it is all but impossible for a 
company to go public without the C-suite management being supportive of the ultimate 
goal. 
The second group of decision-makers included are significant shareholders.  In certain 
instances, significant non-management shareholders (i.e., those shareholders with 
sufficient shareholdings to force their liquidity agenda on C-suite management) also are 
key decision-makers in the IPO / private financing determination.  Most often, this occurs 
when a specific shareholder has secured registration rights during an earlier private round 
of financing.  Ultimately, it was decided that the category of non-management 
shareholders eligible to participate in the PCD Study would be limited to those 
shareholders holding at least 20% of the voting shares in a particular company 
The third group of decision-makers included in the PCD Study were non-executive 
directors.  Non-executive directors may also play a role in the decision-making process, 
 
360 Supra notes 87 and 91. 
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although their influence is likely to be significantly less on this particular topic than that 
of executive directors.  Non-executive directors will rarely be the impetus for an IPO on 
their own without the full support of the C-suite executives.  However, it was determined 
that their opinions may have sufficient weight in the ultimate go public / stay private 
decision that they should be included in the PCD Study. 
The definition of the class of senior business decision-makers in Canada eligible for 
participation in the PCD Study certainly excludes many individuals who may have a 
significant voice in the company on the go public / stay private decision.  However, it 
was determined that the PCD Study data would be more informative if the definition of 
senior business decision-maker erred on the side of being too restrictive rather than too 
inclusive.  In other words, it is preferable to exclude participation by some individuals 
who may have some valuable insight on the topic than to include individuals who may 
not be influential in the IPO analysis and decision-making process.  By using the 
restrictive definition adopted for PCD Study eligibility, we can be assured that each of 
the responses from a senior business decision-maker represents an individual whose 
opinions are informed by personal experience and is in a position to significantly 
influence the outcome of the decision-making process. 
From amongst the three categories of individuals fitting with the PCD Study definition of 
senior business decision-makers, it is obvious that the most influential group are the C-
suite executives.  As such, the recruitment effort for senior business decision-makers was 
focused primarily on C-suite executives.  The minimum target for C-suite executive 
representation within the senior business decision-maker demographic was initially set at 
70% of the respondents in that group.   
Analysis of the PCD Study data ultimately shows that approximately 85% of senior 
business decision-maker respondents are C-suite executives, thereby exceeding the 
minimum target.  Approximately 9% of the senior business decision-maker respondents 
in the PCD Study are non-executive directors.  The remaining 6% of PCD Study senior 
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business decision-maker respondents represent large-block shareholders who are neither 
directors nor C-suite executives.361   
Does the mix of respondents in the PCD Study from the senior business decision maker 
group in the PCD Study represent an appropriate allocation amongst the various 
constituents of senior business decision-makers with reference to their relative 
importance in the IPO / stay private decision?  There are no authorities in the literature 
specifically addressing this particular point, as no published research has been historically 
focused on empirically determining the comparative influence of senior executives, 
independent directors and large shareholders on the go public / stay private decision.   
The two studies cited in the Literature Review discussion at Chapter 2 of this 
Dissertation, which are the only two previous instances where survey methodology has 
been used to assess IPO motivations, both solicited the opinions only of CFO’s.362  Brau 
/ Fawcett acknowledge the limitation of restricting their analysis to the opinions of 
CFO’s, but express their belief that “the CFO is in the best position to understand the IPO 
process”.363  They also point to previous American empirical studies in which only CFO 
opinions were solicited on particular corporate finance topics, concluding that reference 
to CFO opinions alone on corporate finance topics is in line with accepted practice.364  
However, these other studies cited by Brau / Fawcett address specific topics related to 
 
361 63.4% of the C-suite executives who participated in the PCD Study also served on the Board of 
Directors of their companies. 
362 Supra notes 87 and 91.  Of the two studies, only Brau / Fawcett address this methodological issue.  
Mittoo / Bancel simply disclose that they are following the methodology of Brau / Fawcett. 
363 Ibid at 405.  The studies cited as authority by Brau / Fawcett for soliciting the opinions only of CFO’s 
are the following: (i) J.M. Pinegar and L. Wilbricht, “What managers think of capital structure theory” 
(1989) 18:4 Financial Management 82; (ii) E.A. Trahan and L.J. Gitman, “Bridging the theory-practice gap 
in corporate finance: A survey of chief financial officers” (1995) 35 Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 73; and (iii) J.R. Graham and C.R. Harvey “The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence 
from the field” (2001) 30 Journal of Financial Economics 187. 
364 Ibid . 
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corporate finance other than IPOs and do not provide any compelling rationale for 
limiting empirical study of IPOs opinions to only CFO’s. 
In framing the PCD Study, the conclusion was reached that the solicitation of senior 
business decision-makers should go beyond CFO’s to include other C-suite executives, 
independent directors and large shareholders for two main reasons.  First, Canada is a 
much smaller economy than the U.S. and there are far fewer firms to solicit, making it 
infeasible to secure a statistically-significant cohort of responses from the CFO category 
alone.  Second, while CFO’s may be the individuals within a company best positioned to 
understand the IPO process as contended by Brau / Fawcett, there is nothing in the 
literature to suggest that they are the most influential in the critical stay private /go public 
decision-making process.  As the PCD Study is focused on securing the input of 
individuals who have the greatest influence on the IPO decision-making process, 
solicitation of a broader group of senior business decision-makers not limited to CFO’s is 
clearly mandated.  
Does the PCD Study evidence an ideal breakdown of senior business decision-makers 
that appropriately reflects the relative influence of each type of respondent on the 
decision-making process? That question is impossible to answer because, as previously 
stated, there is no empirical evidence determining what the relative influence of each type 
of respondent is on the stay private / go public decision.  The appropriate standard should 
be, therefore, reasonableness based on expert opinion.   
Ultimately, the targets established for the PCD Study were based on the combined 
perceptions of the Co-Investigator and several other IPO experts consulted on this 
particular issue.  These opinions on the relative influence of various senior business 
decision-decision makers on the IPO process are based on direct experience of the Co-
Investigator and the other IPO experts engaging in numerous Canadian IPOs over the 
course of their careers.  The consensus expressed by this expert group is that the final 
breakdown of senior business decision-maker respondents who participated in the PCD 
Study is a reasonable reflection of the relative influence of different types of senior 
decision-makers on the stay private / go public decision-making process.   
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 Decision-Makers of Which Canadian Companies? 
Another preliminary question that had to be addressed with respect to the corporate 
decision-makers component of the PCD Study is which types of companies should be 
targeted?  Should the focus be on senior business decision-makers who have direct 
management experience with existing public companies, or should the focus be on senior 
business decision-makers currently managing growth-stage private companies that are 
realistic prospects for future IPOs?   In order to maximize both the credibility and impact 
of the PCD Study, it was determined that strong representation should be solicited from 
senior business decision-makers of both public and private companies. 
If the decline in Canadian public Operating Companies is an evolution in the preferences 
of corporate leadership, then it is imperative to determine the factors that are important to 
decision-makers from both existing public companies and from prospective public 
companies.  The senior business decision-makers in existing public companies possess a 
wealth of information on the actual advantages and disadvantages of being a public 
company as a result of their personal experience, whereas the beliefs and perceptions of 
the decision-makers in prospective future public companies is instructive as to whether 
there is a gap between the perception and reality of the relative benefits and costs of 
pursuing an IPO versus private alternatives.  
As will be discussed at various places later in this Dissertation, the differences in 
perception between senior decision-makers of public and private companies offer fertile 
ground to better understand the nature of public company decline generally.  Also, since 
pursuing an IPO is a conscious decision, the current perception of decision-makers in 
private IPO-eligible companies may be viewed as predictive for the near-term future of 
the IPO market in Canada. 
5.6- Considering the Junior Canadian Stock Exchanges 
A further critical question that had to be addressed in defining the scope of the PCD 
Study was determining which particular stock exchanges would be eligible in the 
research project.  Amongst the classes of senior business decision-makers discussed 
above with experience in public company management, should junior-market TSXV and 
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Canadian Stock Exchange ("CSE") decision-makers be included amongst the target 
participants? Or should enrollment be limited to decision-makers of TSX-level 
companies? There is no obvious right or wrong answer to this particular question from an 
academic perspective. The decision was made, after significant reflection, to limit 
enrollment of those subgroups to those with TSX-level experience.  The rationale for 
doing so is largely based on pragmatic considerations.  
The statistics on decline in the number of public Operating Companies in the introduction 
to this Dissertation were drawn only from the TSX, but the TSXV junior market has also 
experienced a 36.5% percentage decline in the number of Operating Company listings 
during the same interval.365    
A portion of these TSXV listings have moved over to the alternative CSE exchange in the 
interval, which has seen a significant increase in the number of total listings during the 
period in which the decline in the TSX and TSXV is reported.  However, very few of 
these CSE listings are of a size and stage of development that they would have been 
eligible for the TSX with the notable exception of companies from the cannabis and 
blockchain industries.  Certainly, the cannabis boom in 2018 generated a temporary boom 
in CSE listings, trading volume and markets valuations.  In 2019, however, the cannabis 
bubble ended and the volume of new listings on the CSE slowed to a trickle, most of 
which are small mining exploration projects. 
Ultimately, there were two key reasons behind the decision to exclude TSXV and CSE 
companies from the PCD Study and focus exclusively on TSX-listed companies and TSX 
eligible private companies.  The first reason is for the purposes of retaining comparability 
of the study results and the applicability of conclusions drawn therefrom for capital 
markets outside of Canada.  The TSXV and CSE listing requirements, along with the 
average asset base of the listed companies on the TSXV and CSE, are significantly lower 
than any comparable markets in the United States or Europe.  The challenges, 
 
365 Source: TMX Market Intelligence Group report on annual listings on TSX and TSX 2008-2019. 
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opportunities and hurdles associated with being a micro-cap public company listed on the 
TSXV or CSE are often unique to companies of that particular size and stage of 
development. For example, the average company listed on the TSXV has only a single 
analyst covering it (often affiliated with the firm who completed the IPO) and a 
significant percentage of the institutional investors in Canada will not buy TSXV stocks.   
The single TSX IPO completed in Canada in the first three quarters of 2019 overwhelms 
all the TSXV and CSE IPOs completed in terms of the amount of money raised by an 
order of magnitude.  
To the degree that the public company decline phenomenon observed on the senior public 
markets in Canada has commonality with the U.S. and European experiences, those 
commonalities will have to be evaluated companies of comparable size and in similar 
industries across the geographic regions.  If the TSXV and CSE companies were to be 
included in this research project, the nuances of those exchanges and the smaller size of 
the public companies listed thereon may fundamentally alter the underlying narrative, 
sentiment analysis and rank-order outcomes of the PCD Study.  This would obscure the 
nature of commonality and differences between Canadian public company decline and 
the same phenomenon in other western industrialized countries. 
A second reason for exclusion of the CSE specifically is the numerous complications, 
complexities and future uncertainties associated with the specific cannabis and 
blockchain industries that have been so heavily weighted in the CSE listings over the past 
few years.  The CSE has recently come through a historic boom cycle in both cannabis 
and blockchain fueled by retail investor exuberance.  Clearly, that bubble has now passed 
as evidenced by the lack of new listings in either cannabis or blockchain on the CSE and 
the decline in those industry-specific indexes since their peaks in the past couple of 
years.366   If the senior decision-makers of CSE companies were added into the analysis, 
 
366 Robin Levinson-King, “Why Canada’s cannabis bubble burst” BBC News (29 October 2019) online:< 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50664578>.  Also, Karen Owram, “The pot stock bubble has 
burst. Here’s why” BNN Bloomberg News (16 November 2019) online:< https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ 
the-pot-stock-bubble-has-burst-here-s-why-1.1348989>. 
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the proclivities and recent experience of the cannabis and blockchain industries, both 
positive and negative, would again fundamentally alter the research outcomes and 
obscure key findings on the broader nature of public company decline in Canada. 
In order to ensure that the issue of broad-based public company decline remains in sharp 
focus, along with the desire to maximize the potential impact of the proposed research 
project outside of Canada, the decision to focus the PCD Study on senior decision-makers 
associated with TSX-listed and TSX-eligible companies was determined to be the most 
prudent course of action.   Analyzing the unique challenges associated with the decline of 
small-scale public companies on the TSXV and CSE, and the temporary blips in IPO 
volume associated with industry-specific bubbles in cannabis and blockchain, are 
interesting phenomena in Canada and certainly worthy of further study.  However, 
pragmatic considerations dictate that those are matters best left for a different day in a 
different research study. 
 Rationale for Including Public Markets Influencers 
There is one final important consideration to discuss with reference to the target 
participants of the PCD Study.  Namely, the following question had to be answered in the 
PCD Study design: should the PCD Study be limited to senior business decision-makers, 
or are there other classes of individuals who are influencers within the public markets 
ecosphere whose opinions should be also be included?   
In answer to this question, it is noted that this Dissertation is submitted in conjunction 
with the pursuit of a PhD in the Faculty of Law.   The underlying subject matter of public 
company decline in Canada is inherently interdisciplinary in nature and the lines of 
distinction frequently blur between business and law.  It is the hope of the author that the 
PCD Study observations and recommendations will be considered in both the faculties of 
business and law.  However, the analysis portion of this Dissertation engages, as a core 
theme, the regulatory implications of the PCD Study.  In particular the fundamental 
question of whether regulatory reform can realistically be expected to reverse, or at least 
stem, the decline in public Operating Companies in Canada is considered.  The hope is 
that the research output will ultimately have some influence on existing and future 
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regulatory reform initiatives, in part by the assessment of which specific factors 
established as being most influential in the public/private decision-making process can be 
addressed through regulatory reform.  Clearly, not all factors lend themselves to 
regulatory solutions; some factors are simply endemic to the public markets ecosphere at 
this point in time. 
In the previous chapter of this Dissertation summarizing the recent CSA and OSC 
initiatives into public company burden reduction (see Chapter 4), it was discussed that the 
voices of public markets influencers are disproportionately heard during the consultation 
process compared to those of senior business decision-makers.  For the purposes of 
instructing future regulatory reform in Canada, therefore, there is value in determining 
whether the perception of the key subgroups who participate in the traditional regulatory 
reform process are consistent with the perceptions of the business decision makers.  If 
significant differences exist between public markets influencers and decision-makers, 
what are the underlying issues? 
Moreover, senior decision-makers rarely reach a final determination on an issue as 
important as whether to ultimately pursue an IPO for the company without taking counsel 
from external advisors (securities / corporate lawyers, investment bankers and auditors / 
accountants).  Since these groups all have strong familiarity with the public markets, their 
counsel is often considered carefully before a decision on the direction the corporation 
will pursue is finalized.  Also, since these groups of key public markets influencers 
advise a number of clients simultaneously, their perceptions reflect wide cross-sections of 
public market experience unlike senior business decision-makers who may serve in only 
a few different organizations for much of their career.  As such, there is obvious value in 
having the participation of securities / corporate lawyers, investment bankers and auditors 
/ accountants in the PCD Study. 
Beyond these three groups of influencers, there is obvious value is including one 
additional subgroup into the PCD Study research project, namely private equity investors 
in Canada.  Private equity investors are the one group of public markets influencers 
whose overriding self-interest is often perceived to be in opposition to the public markets, 
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specifically given that the public markets and private equity investors have historically 
competed for the same deals.  For that reason, there is value in understanding what the 
perception of public company decline is amongst private equity financiers with the 
narratives that they use to convince senior business decision makers to avoid the public 
markets.  Moreover, IPOs remain a potential exit option for private equity financiers, 
although an IPO exit for a private equity-backed Operating Company generally occurs at 
a more mature stage of company development than would otherwise be the case.  
Regardless, adding the perspective of the private equity participants to the analysis for 
further comparison is certainly accretive to the PCD Study analysis. 
There is one final group of public markets influencers whose opinions would have added 
value to the PCD Study data, namely securities regulators working for the provincial 
securities commissions and for the TSX.  This group of public markets influencers is 
aware of the existence of the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada and it 
would be interesting to see how the perceptions of the securities regulators on the key 
topic compares to the perceptions of the senior business decision-makers and public 
markets influencers.   Indeed, securities regulators were initially defined in the PCD 
Study as the fifth target group of public markets influencers that would be solicited. 
For pragmatic reasons, however, securities regulators were ultimately removed from the 
PCD Study as participants.  The elimination of securities regulators as a subgroup for 
participation in the PCD Study results from the decision of OSC representatives not to 
participate.  Although there were initial indications that the OSC would support the 
participation of its senior employees in the PCD Study, this turned out not to be the case 
at the end of the day.  The rationale for the OSC declining to participate was not 
articulated beyond a vague attribution to concerns expressed by the legal division.   
Notably, the TSX senior administration expressed a willingness to participate and were 
supportive of the PCD Study, indicating their belief that the study could provide valuable 
information for the TMX Market Intelligence Group.  Other securities commissions in 
Canada were not solicited, as it was determined that there was little ultimate value in 
including securities regulators as a subgroup for analysis from outside of Ontario unless 
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the OSC was onboard with participation given the obvious importance of the OSC to 
securities regulation in Canada.   Any empirical effort with respect to the opinions of 
securities commission personnel that does not include the participation of the OSC is 
open to obvious criticism that the lack of participation by the largest and most important 
securities regulatory body in the country is insufficient. 
Although disappointing, the inability to secure the participation of the OSC was not 
deemed to be of fundamental concern to the validity of the underlying PCD Study.  In the 
IPO process, the securities commissions are certainly consulted at various stages with 
respect to regulatory compliance matters, but they rarely interface directly with the senior 
decision-makers of the prospective IPO targets and are not part of the group of voices 
that actively supports the IPO alternative in the decision-making process.  The TSX, on 
the other hand, does play an active role in marketing itself to potential IPO candidate 
companies and it would have been accretive to have their perspective reflected in the 
PCD Study.  However, without the participation of the OSC and the other securities 
commissions, the TSX simply does not constitute a sufficiently large subgroup such that 
their participation would give rise to observations at the required level of statistical 
significance. 
In summary, the final specific groups targeted for enrollment in the PCD Study included: 
(i) senior business decision-makers of TSX-listed Canadian-based and Canadian-
controlled companies; (ii) senior business decision makers of TSX-eligible private 
Canadian-based and Canadian-controlled companies; (iii) securities / corporate lawyers; 
(iv) auditors / accountants with public company practices; (v) investment bankers; and 
(vi) private equity investors.   The first two subgroups are collectively referred to herein 
for the purpose of convenience as Group I, senior business decision-makers, and the latter 
four groups are collectively referred as Group II, public markets influencers. 367 
 
367 In the analysis portion of this Dissertation, reference may be made simply to “lawyers” or “auditors” 
for the sake of brevity.  However, the lawyers are all individuals who identify as securities law and/or 
corporate transaction specialists, and the auditors are individuals working at public accounting firms that 
have a significant exposure to audit and assurance services for public and private companies. 
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5.7- Review of Survey Enrollment Efforts and Outcomes 
It was clearly understood from the initial concept phase of the PCD Study that securing 
sufficient survey enrollment to arrive at statistically significant observations at a macro 
level and, even more so, at a subgroup comparison level, would be a material challenge.  
Canada has a relatively small population compared to the United States or Europe, and 
the criteria for survey participation eligibility are sufficiently stringent that the total 
population size is relatively small.   
Although there are no easily accessible sources that allow for a scientifically-determined 
estimate of the population sizes of the six different participant groups, a total population 
estimate of 20,000 individuals was used for enrollment target planning purposes in the 
PCD Study. This estimate is of the total population size of Group I- Senior Business 
Decision-Makers and Group II- Public Markets Influencers in Canada that qualify for 
eligibility in the study.  The estimate of 20,000 is believed to be significantly higher than 
the actual population number, but it was deemed most prudent and statistically 
conservative to use a high-end population estimate in the absence of any data that would 
allow a more accurate determination of actual population.  By using a high-end 
population estimate, the most conservative methodology is being applied from a 
statistical validation perspective.368   
Based on the population estimate of 20,000 individuals, our initial enrollment target was 
set at 377 respondents in order to meet the target confidence level of 95% with a 5% 
margin of error, which is the commonly accepted standard for survey data analysis in 
 
368 The target enrollment for the PCD Study is defined by the population size estimate, the acceptable 
margin of error and the desired confidence level for the overall survey.  With reference to the PCD Study, if 
a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error are defined as the targets, then the total sample size needs 
to be 375 respondents if the total population is 15,000 individuals.  However, if the total population size is 
25,000 individuals, then the total sample size in the PCD Study only increases to 379 individuals to reach 
the same confidence level and margin of error for the PCD Study.  Even if the population size is 50,000, the 
total sample size indicated at the same levels only increases to 382 individuals.  As such, at the scale of the 
population we are dealing with, there is no real return on spending the significant resources it would require 
to reach a more accurate estimate of population size. 
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social science research.369  However, the Study Protocol & Research Plan also clearly 
stated that the budgeted period of survey enrollment would run for four months, after 
which time the PCD Study could be ended provided that the minimum enrollment targets 
had been achieved.  The minimum targets for the PCD Study were established as 267 
total responses, which is the level at which a 90% confidence level with a 5% margin of 
error is achieved.  Although less common than the 95% confidence level in social science 
research, the 90% overall confidence level on survey data is still widely accepted within 
the social sciences as statistically valid in complex and more lengthy surveys (which the 
PCD Study certainly represents).370 
It was understood at the outset that the recruitment goals in the PCD Study, both at the 
target level and at the minimum level, were highly ambitious. By their nature and 
business stature, it is very difficult to gain access to large numbers of Canadian C-suite 
executives and convince them to take the time from their busy schedules necessary to 
complete a detailed survey questionnaire, regardless of their ultimate belief in the 
underlying importance of the subject matter.  The group of senior business decision-
makers targeted in the PCD Study is comprised of extremely busy people in Canada with 
significant competing demands on their time. The situation is similar for the four 
categories of Group II- Public markets influencers that were targeted for participation, all 
of whom have significant demands on their time.371 
 
369 Alan Bryman, et al, Business Research Methods, Canadian Edition (Toronto, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 508; W. Lawrence Neuman and Karen Robson, Basics of Social Research: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 2nd Canadian Edition (Toronto, Ontario: Pearson Canada, 2012) 
at 247-248;  James K. Skipper, Jr., Anthony L. Guenther and Gilbert Nass, “The Sacredness of 0.05: A 
Note concerning the Use of Statistical Levels of Significance in Social Science” (1967) 2(1) The American 
Sociologist 16. 
370 B.J. Winer, Statistical Principles in Experimental Design (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1962). 
371 It is noted that the targeted study participants in the PCD Study are not the only groups in Canada who 
are extremely busy.  Certainly, disadvantaged groups, such as single parents and new immigrants working 
multiple low-paying jobs simultaneously to support their families, are often at least as “busy” as senior 
business decision-makers.  Nor is anything in the discussion herein intended to imply that the time of the 
targeted study participants in the PCD study is inherently more valuable than that of any other identifiable 
demographic groups in society.  However, it is submitted that the fact that the opinions of the targeted PCD 
Study participants are frequently solicited in a variety of other forums, along with the reality that the PCD 
Study targets generally have executive assistants who view their role as weeding out distractions (including 
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The knowledge of the nature of the challenge faced in securing sufficient enrollment 
dictated that a significant degree of thought and planning be directed into the survey 
recruitment methodology for the PCD Study.  First, previous efforts to enroll similar 
groups of respondents in Canada and abroad were evaluated for precedent value.    
In Canada, KPMG previously sponsored a quarterly survey of C-suite executives on 
topical issues that was widely reported in the business media.  This survey was 
undertaken by The Gandalf Group, a professional market research firm. The C-suite 
executives solicited by the Gandalf Group were exclusively interviewed by phone, 
requiring an extensive time commitment by a number of different researchers. The last 
version of this survey was conducted in the fourth quarter of 2017, resulting in the 
participation of 159 C-suite executives.372  However, this initiative has been abandoned 
in the past couple of years due to the significant costs associated with collecting the data.  
Instead, KPMG now conducts their own internal C-suite survey on topical business 
issues. Only 75 Canadian C-suite executives were solicited in the most recent version of 
the KPMG Survey.373  Of the 75 solicited, it is unclear from the report how many 
responded.  The survey methodologies are also not disclosed, leading one to surmise that 
the survey is conducted almost exclusively from a captive list of KPMG clients with 
whom existing relationships exist.  Without the research budget necessary to retain the 
services of a professional market research firm like the Gandalf Group, it was determined 
that there is no contemporary precedent in Canada which provides any valuable 
methodological insight into how to approach the target participants for the PCD Study. 
Looking abroad, it was previously discussed in the literature review chapter of this 
Dissertation that there are two precedents of academic research studies that were 
 
requests for survey participation) on behalf of their bosses, makes the target group of PCD Study 
participants particularly challenging to enroll.  
372 The Gandalf Group, “C-Suite Survey, Executive Summary”, (12 December 2017), online:< 
https://gandalfgroup.ca/downloads/2017/CSuite%20Q4%202017%20Exec%20Summary%20tc2.pdf>. 
373 KPMG, “2019 Canadian CEO Outlook: Agile or Irrelevant” (accessed August 7, 2019) available on 
KPMG website, online:< https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ca/pdf/2019/05/2019-canadian-ceo-
outlook.pdf>. 
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conducted at the C-suite level.374  Brau and Fawcett recruited their target participants 
(i.e., CFO’s of U.S. companies that completed or attempted and withdrew an IPO and 
private firms from a Dun and Bradstreet database) using only regular mail solicitation.  
Brau and Fawcett included a paper copy of the survey along with a pre-paid return 
envelope and the promise of placing all respondent participant names in a draw for 
$1,000.  Brau and Fawcett repeated this paper mailing procedure over three different 
mailing solicitations undertaken over a six-month timeframe.375   Bancel and Mittoo 
replicated the methodology of Brau and Fawcett, with the target respondents all being 
located in the European Union and the three mailings occurring over an eight-month 
timeframe.  Assessing this method for its potential application to the PCD Study, it was 
clear that the collection of the data by the standard mail method over three different 
mailings would make it impractical to complete the data collection effort during the 
budgeted timeframe.  More importantly, the cost of mailing an extensive survey three 
different times, each time with a prepaid return envelope, to thousands of potential PCD 
Study participants in Canada necessitates a budget that is orders of magnitude higher than 
the available budget for the data collection element in the PCD Study.376 
With the classic hard-copy mailing methodology clearly unattainable for adoption in the 
PCD Study on an economic basis, other more cost-effective forms of targeting survey 
enrollment for the PCD Study were identified and evaluated.  Ultimately, it was 
determined that an online version of the PCD Study administered through the Qualtrics 
online platform would be the most efficient means of distributing and collecting the PCD 
Study data.  With respect to solicitation efforts to secure sufficient enrollment from the 
target groups of participants, it was determined that a combination of recruitment 
methods would be applied, in parallel tracks, to maximize the opportunity for reaching 
 
374 See Brau and Fawcett, supra note 87.  Also, see Bancel and Mittoo, supra note 91. 
375 Ibid, Brau and Fawcett at 402. 
376 The budget needed to replicate the Brau / Fawcett and Bancel / Mittoo methodology for the PCD Study 
is roughly $55,000 on mailing costs alone at current postage rates of $3.50 Cd. each direction per oversized 
envelope. 
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the enrollment goals within the four- month budgeted timeframe.  Three separate 
recruitment strategies were originally identified in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan 
submitted for the PCD Study. 
The first strategy utilized was the direct approach method, in which target participants 
were identified from across Canada who were believed to meet the necessary criteria for 
the PCD Study.  As the senior decision-makers of both the TSX-listed and private 
companies were perceived as representing the biggest recruitment challenge in the PCD 
Study, the early recruitment efforts were focused on these Group I participants.   
The initial challenge to overcome in this first portion of the recruitment plan, which was 
not insignificant, was compiling a list of the contact information of the C-suite 
executives, directors and major shareholders of the TSX-listed and private companies.  A 
review of approximately100 different websites demonstrated that the contact information 
of the C-suite executives is rarely included on the websites.  Only general reception 
phone numbers are normally provided for phone inquiries to C-suite executives and 
general company contact addresses are listed for email inquiries.  A test of inquiries sent 
to a number of different company general inquiry mailboxes explaining the nature of the 
PCD Study and asking for the information to be forwarded to the relevant C-suite 
executives generated no responses.  As soon as an inquiry was identified by the corporate 
gatekeeper as originating from a non-customer of the business, it was ignored.  Clearly, 
this avenue of inquiry was a non-starter and was quickly abandoned.  
Ultimately, it was determined that successfully reaching individual C-suite executives 
based on the contact details available on the company website required calling the 
general reception number and asking the attendant to forward the call to the executive 
assistant for a particular C-suite executive.  The executive assistants will invariably be 
trained not to pass along the email or phone contact information for the C-suite executive, 
so the explanation on the PCD Study and the nature of the request for participation must 
be communicated to the executive assistant in the hope that the executive assistant will 
relay this request onto the C-suite executive.  Again, a test with approximately a dozen 
different attempts to secure enrollment of the C-suite executive by communicating 
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through the official channels did not generate any successful responses.  In hindsight, this 
is not surprising at all because of the fact that executive assistants of C-suite executives 
invariably have no personal interest in the phenomenon of public company decline.  They 
are paid to insulate their bosses from such distractions, and most of the executive 
assistants see the PCD Study invitation as just one more distraction for their executive. 
While the topic of public company decline may be inherently interesting to their bosses, 
the message filtered through the executive assistants rarely results in any successful 
participant recruitment. 
Operating on the belief / hope that a number of significant C-suite executives still read 
their own email, the focus for Group I shifted to direct recruitment by accessing direct 
email addresses for the target respondents.  A list of the specific companies that should be 
targeted was compiled from various sources.   
For the TSX-listed public companies, identification was simple as a list of all TSX 
issuers is available on the TMX website.  Starting from the 799 Operating Companies 
listed on the TSX during the recruitment phase, a list of 658 Canadian-based companies 
was created that became the target group for the PCD Study. The remaining 141 TSX-
listed companies not solicited were those TSX-listed companies that have head offices 
outside of Canada.  The NMREB approvals did not allow for direct solicitation of 
individuals located outside of Canada in the PCD Study. 
With respect to TSX-eligible private companies, the creation of the target list required 
more effort.  A variety of sources were consulted, including Lexis / Nexis Public Suite, 
Globe & Mail Top 300 Private Companies and the Financial Post 500 Report.  A variety 
of industry award publications were also consulted, including Canada’s Top SME 
Employers and Canada’s Fastest Growing Companies.  
Ultimately, the target lists of TSX-listed and TSX-eligible companies were provided to a 
marketing solutions company, DataCaptive, who are in the business of compiling 
business-to-business data of various types, including C-suite level contact information, 
for commercial sale.  The list of companies was then compared by DataCaptive against 
their list of C-suite contact information and a database of the overlapping records was 
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created.  DataCaptive also provided additional contact data for private Canadian 
companies not otherwise on the private company list originally provided to them based 
on company revenue criteria.  Ultimately, this database of C-suite contact information 
was purchased from DataCaptive and served as the foundation of the solicitation efforts 
for the Group I participants discussed hereafter.  This data was certified by the vendor, 
DataCaptive, as containing the contacts of Canadian executives collected from a number 
of public sources, including trade show attendance, and 100% of these were opt-in 
confirmed for receipt of communication and cross-checked against the do-not-call 
registries.  Approval for utilization of these two databases in the PCD Study was sought 
from the NMREB prior to initiation of the solicitations. 
The second strategy planned for use in the PCD Study enrollment was the use of passive 
snowball sampling discussed previously.  This recruitment strategy focused on securing 
the support of survey participants who expressed a clear interest in the subject matter of 
public company decline, and were known to have previously-existing relationships and 
direct accessibility to a number of target survey participants. The individuals who were 
requested to pass along invitations to the PCD Study were given clear instructions on the 
specifics of the NMREB rules for passive snowball sampling and the limitations in what 
they were allowed to communicate in the solicitation process.  To preserve commonality 
of approach and ensure compliance with the NMREB rules, these individuals were asked 
to simply pass along the email invitation to the PCD Study to potential participants with a 
brief cover note to their contacts highlighting their interest in the topic.   
The passive snowball sampling strategy was beta-tested in the law firm context in 
February 2019 and it was found to generate a limited return in terms of the actual number 
of survey responses completed.  Due to the anonymous nature of the responses, it is 
unknown what percentage of the responses ultimately resulted from passive snowball 
sampling.  However, analysis of the response dates and geographic locations of the 
respondents demonstrates that less than 15% of the total responses secured in the PCD 
Study are attributable to passive snowball sampling. 
Ultimately, the plan to pursue further passive snowball sampling as a priority was 
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abandoned due to its limited success during the beta testing phase.  It is believed that a 
number of the individuals in the law firms who were requested to pass along the survey 
invitations did, in fact, pass along the requests.  However, the final response uptake was 
low because of the lack of direct connection to the investigators in the study.  Rather, it 
became apparent that a successful recruitment strategy required a more direct connection 
between the respondents and the study investigators that only arises through direct 
communication.   For the purposes of PCD Study, therefore, the limitations imposed by 
the NMREB significantly impacted the effectiveness of snowball sampling as a viable 
strategy. 
The third recruitment methodology initially identified in the Survey Protocol & Research 
Plan was the use of industry conferences and trade shows to solicit target respondents.  
This approach was beta-tested during the annual Prospectors & Developers Association 
of Canada conference in Toronto in March 2019.  Ultimately, this method was also 
abandoned after the beta-test, as it was found that return on investment was too low to 
justify the time and expense associated with conference attendance.  With respect to 
Group II participants who are readily accessible at the trade shows, other avenues of 
contact were available for PCD Study recruitment which are discussed in more detail 
hereafter.  With respect to the C-suite executives, it was found that their time is in such 
high demand during the trade shows that it is very difficult to individually get their 
attention in the trade show format.  After presentations, the lineup of people waiting to 
talk to each C-suite executive was several people deep, making it only practical to talk to 
3 or 4 C-suite executives in a full day.  Although conversations with C-suite executives 
were generally successful in securing survey participation, the number of recruitments 
per day were simply too small to continue that investment.  
A fourth recruitment strategy not originally included in the Survey Protocol & Research 
Plan was added to the list of potential recruitment tools and tested at a beta level.  This 
new methodology involved the use of a targeted social media campaign executed through 
the LinkedIn platform.  This particular strategy was added based on the recommendation 
of a social media marketing expert and involved the creation of a short animation that 
summarized the content of the PCD Study Invitation in animated form.  Ultimately, 
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although this strategy generated a number of “click-throughs” to the first page of the 
survey, it resulted in very few additional completed surveys and was abandoned as being 
economically inefficient. 
In summary, having tried each of the three recruitment strategies originally outlined in 
the Survey Protocol & Research Plan and a fourth recruitment strategy identified mid-
stream, it was determined that the direct recruitment strategy, in which the PCD Study 
investigator directly contacts the target participants via phone and email, was the most 
effective strategy in terms of return on investment (i.e., the number of completed 
responses secured per hour of time spent on the recruitment process).  Once this 
conclusion was reached, the recruitment efforts for the remainder of the PCD Study were 
focused primarily on the direct solicitation strategy with a small component of passive 
snowball sampling, used on an opportunistic basis, where available. 
5.8- Summary of Group I Recruitment Process 
After going through the identification process described above, a final list of 
approximately 1,100 usable emails for C-suite executive of TSX public companies and a 
list of approximately 2,100 usable emails for C-suite executives of Canadian private 
companies was established as the master lists for solicitation of the Group I participants.  
Notably, the C-suite records typically did not include direct phone number information 
for the C-suite executives, but rather included only main company phone numbers. 
The two master lists of C-suite executives from TSX public companies were uploaded to 
the Mail Chimp website, an electronic management platform for electronic marketing and 
solicitations.  Utilization of the Mail Chimp system for email distribution allows for real-
time monitoring of the status of email solicitation campaigns and analysis of results.  
Mail Chimp also allows for any recipient to immediately click “unsubscribe” if they view 
the email solicitation as an unwanted intrusion.  The email addresses for any individuals 
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who unsubscribed were immediately removed from the list.377   
Each person on the target database list received an email inviting them to participate in 
the PCD Study and briefly describing the PCD Study based on the form of email 
solicitation script approved by the NMREB.  Each email included an html link that could 
be clicked by the recipient and would take the prospective respondent to the introductory 
page of the online version of the PCD Study.   
The first email solicitation from Mail Chimp was distributed on March 6, 2019.  Three 
additional email distributions were sent using the Mail Chimp distribution platform on 
March 21, April 2 and April 16, 2019, respectively.  Ultimately, these four solicitations 
resulted in a total of 228 participants responding who were senior business decision-
makers of TSX-listed or private companies (i.e., Group I participants).378 
The total number of 228 responses received from all Group I participants compared to the 
total number or 3200 original solicitations sent out to potential Group I recruits equates to 
a response rate of 7.1%.  In and of itself, this was a surprisingly stellar response rate for 
an internet-based survey without any contact to the recipients to validate that the 
solicitation was not an elaborate phishing attempt.  However, the actual effective 
response rate is likely even higher as the original email invitation outlines the minimum 
qualifications required for survey participation, and there were certainly numerous emails 
on the list from the Data Captive-supplied group of private company names who did not 
meet the minimum requirements to be eligible for the survey.   The number of Group I 
private company respondents was 125 individuals out of the original 2100 solicitations, 
 
377 A total of 20 individuals, from the 3,200 email solicitations originally sent to C-suite executives, 
representing 0.6%, selected the option to unsubscribe from the mailing list. 
378 For the purpose of determining response rates, only those individuals who completed the third question 
in the PCD Study (confirming which of the two main groups of respondents they were part of) were 
counted as having responded to the survey.  As such, 228 is the number of individuals who selected “Group 
I: Senior Business Decision-Maker” in their Question 3 response.  This methodology under-reports the 
number of total respondents in the PCD Study as a result of the attrition discussed later in this chapter, but 
is the most conservative reporting option.  Although it is known there was an overall attrition of 25 
respondents prior to the completion of Question 3 in the Qualtrics platform, it is unknown what percentage 
of the attritions were senior business decision-makers. 
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representing a response rate of 6.0%.379  The number of Group I TSX-listed respondents 
was 103 individuals out of the original 1100 solicitations, representing a response rate of 
9.4%. 
In addition to participating in the study, dozens of replies were received by email from 
the individuals receiving the invitations.  Most of these email communications expressed 
support for the importance of the research being completed on public decline and 
indicated that they were pleased that empirical academic research was finally being 
undertaken in this area.  A number of other responses were received by individuals who 
indicated that their companies did not meet the minimum criteria set out in the survey 
based on residence, control or maturity of the business, but stating that they would have 
participated in the PCD Study if they had met the eligibility conditions.  A single 
negative response was received from a disgruntled recipient who was upset at being 
disturbed with a solicitation on his work email. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that there is a high degree of suspicion towards 
any unsolicited email in the current online environment. Many business organizations 
prohibit any emails being opened from unverified sources and standard institutional IT 
security training protocols advise against opening emails from unknown senders.  Often 
internal IT firewalls will transfer any emails from sources that have not been 
independently verified and place them in clutter folders, requiring the recipients to 
specifically release those responses to their inboxes before the pictures and other email 
functionality of the email are visible.  Again, it is unknown what percentage of the emails 
sent out via the Mail Chimp campaign reached the targeted inboxes of the recipients as 
 
379 The “effective” response rate for the private company respondents is certainly higher than the reported 
response rate of 6.0% given, given that the reported rate of 6.0% does not account for emails sent to 
individuals who were ineligible to participate according to the criteria established for the PCD Study.  
Apparent from the eligibility responses of the senior business decision makers of private companies in the 
PCD Study along with the direct email replies received from the Mail Chimp recruitment program, a 
number of the email solicitations sent to senior business decision-makers of private companies were 
received by individuals working in companies that did not meet the minimum eligibility criteria in terms of 
size or stage of development in order to be TSX-eligible. It is uncertain what percentage of the email 
solicitation recipients from private companies were ineligible to participate. 
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opposed to being trapped in filters. 
On the whole the Mail Chimp email solicitation campaign completed on the Group I 
senior business decision-makers has to be considered as a significant success considering 
all of the limitations associated with the online email solicitation methodology and the 
inherently challenging nature of securing the attention of the targeted Group I 
respondents. 
How the response rates compare to other survey-based studies undertaken elsewhere will 
be discussed later in this Dissertation. 
5.9- Summary of the Group II Recruitment Process 
The following section provides the details of the recruitment process for the various 
targeted subgroups.  A table summarizing this information is included later in this chapter 
in Section 5.11.1.  The solicitation of the Group II respondents occurred in two different 
phases.  The first phase involved live presentations made to the securities law groups at 
two of Canada’s pre-eminent businesses law firms, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP and 
McCarthy Tétrault LLP.  In both situations, the law firms provided a live platform for the 
Co-Investigator to present the PCD Study across a number of different offices through 
simulcast.  The presentation to McCarthy Tétrault occurred in Toronto (with a simulcast 
to the Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa, Calgary and Vancouver offices) on February 12, 
2019.  The presentation to Blake, Cassels & Graydon took place in Calgary (with a 
simulcast to Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal) on February 22, 2019.   The total 
number of lawyers participating in these presentations was approximately 75.  These two 
law firm presentations resulted in approximately 30 responses to the PCD Study being 
completed by securities lawyers and corporate lawyers. 
Other than those live presentations, an intensive email and phone solicitation campaign 
was initiated to secure enrollment from the four subgroups of Group II participants.  With 
respect to each subgroup, the recruitment process was initiated by compiling databases of 
both email addresses and phone numbers of securities lawyers, accountants / auditors, 
investment bankers and private equity investors across Canada.  
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The major difference in accessibility to contact information between the Group I and 
Group II participants is that many of the websites for Group II participants include both 
direct phone numbers to specific individuals and direct emails for all levels of their 
members.  As such, whereas it was extremely difficult to by-pass the executive assistants 
and communicate directly with the Group I senior business decision-makers via phone, it 
was relatively straightforward to directly contact the Group II public markets influencers. 
The databases for the Group II public markets influencers were compiled by the Co-
Investigator directly from firm websites.  Each of the four different categories of public 
markets influencers had their own nuances in terms of accessibility that necessitated 
adjustment of the recruitment strategy to respond to the specific information available. 
With respect to the subgroup of securities / corporate lawyers, the initial two 
presentations to the two major corporate law firms mentioned above resulted in 29 
responses with a strong representation across British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario.  It 
was clear in the presentations that this issue resonated strongly with securities lawyers, in 
particular, and that it would be possible to recruit a large cohort of lawyers to participate.  
However, it was determined that the target number of total responses for the securities / 
corporate lawyers subgroup should not exceed 50 in order to ensure that the opinions of 
this particular demographic were not overrepresented in the PCD Study data as a whole.  
As such, it was decided that the recruitment target for the securities / corporate lawyer 
database would be focused primarily in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, which remained underrepresented after the initial law firm presentations.  
The lawyers targeted for the email/phone solicitation phase, therefore, were lawyers from 
those specific provinces who met the following conditions: (i) they worked in firms 
identified as the most recommended for securities law expertise in the Lexpert rankings; 
(ii) they were identified in their profiles as specializing in securities law; and (iii) they 
had a direct phone number and a direct email listed online for contacting the individual. 
A total of 72 additional lawyers were contacted during this recruitment phase, resulting in 
an additional 20 PCD Study responses being completed through the Qualtrics platform.  
At that point, the total number of responses from lawyers stood at 49 and further 
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recruitment efforts were discontinued for this particular subgroup.  Certainly, further 
recruitment would have been successful in securing higher participation from the 
lawyers. 
With respect to the subgroup of accountants / auditors, there were greater hurdles to 
recruitment.  Specifically, none of the “big four” accounting firms publish individual 
names, practice profiles, addresses or email contacts of their accounting professionals.  
Yet, the big four accounting firms account for a significant percentage of the overall audit 
work completed for public companies in Canada.   
In order to deal with this recruitment hurdle, senior practice group leaders were identified 
from the public audit and assurance divisions and contacted at each of the big four 
accounting firms.  In each case, a description of the PCD Study was relayed to the 
practice group leader and a request was made for the practice group leaders to forward 
the PCD Study invitation internally amongst the individuals with significant experience 
in the public audit and assurance groups.  Once again, the lack of direct contact 
information for specific individuals published on the big four websites necessitated the 
use of passive snowball sampling for solicitation within the big four accounting firms, 
and once again this practice proved wholly ineffective as only five responses were 
received as a result of this particular solicitation effort.  Clearly, the inability to contact 
the potential participants directly resulted in a very limited uptake in survey participation. 
After hitting this roadblock and having exhausted the obvious recruitment opportunities 
within the big four accounting firms, the recruitment strategy for accountants / auditors 
was shifted in focus beyond the big four.  In support of this effort, a database was 
compiled of all of the accounting firms in Canada beyond the big four who were listed in 
the top 20 accounting firms in terms of revenue and also published individual contact 
information and practice profiles for their accounting professionals.380  Fortunately, 13 
 
380 The database of the top 20 firms in Canada was compiled from a variety of different online sources and 
firms appearing consistently across the lists were included in the database. One of the published lists used 
was: Statistica, “Leading accounting firms in Canada”, accessed April 15, 2019, online:< Statshttps:// 
www.statista.com/statistics/478822/leading-canadian-accounting-firms-by-revenue> 
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out of the 16 accounting firms, other than the big four, who were listed in the top 20 
accounting firms in Canada publish individual practice profiles and contact data.  In the 
case of the auditors / accountants, the database compiled included all professionals from 
the 13 accounting firms whose practice profiles listed an expertise in audit and assurance 
(public or private), had at least five years of industry experience and included individual 
contact information.  This resulted in the identification of 108 targeted individuals for 
recruitment, and ultimately led to 34 additional responses in the PCD Study being 
completed. 
Turning to investment bankers, a similar issue was encountered here as with the auditor / 
accountant group.  Namely, the bank-owned investment banking firms do not publish any 
personal contact information for their investment banking divisions and only publicly 
disclose the names of their department heads.  Once again, the recruitment effort within 
the bank-owned investment banking firms had to rely on direct presentations to groups 
and passive snowball sampling, which evidenced limited success in securing a significant 
number of PCD Study responses.  
It was again found that the majority of investment banking firms in Canada other than the 
bank-owned firms do indeed provide personal contact details for both phone numbers and 
emails for all of their principals and employees.  In this case, a list of investment banks in 
Canada was assembled from a variety of sources (including Bloomberg league tables, 
Reuters M&A advisory tables and a number of other lists).  A recruitment database was 
created containing individuals from the investment banking firms with a least 5 years of 
industry experience, whose firms listed both a direct phone number and an email contact.  
The investment banking database identified a total of 138 targets for PCD Study 
recruitment, resulting in 45 completed PCD responses. 
Near the end of the enrollment process, an opportunity arose to make live presentations to 
groups of senior investment bankers from CIBC World Markets and Scotia Capital.  
These presentations were made in Toronto on June 12, 2019, resulting in three additional 
PCD responses being completed online.  Although these in-person presentations did not 
result in a large number of completed PCD Study responses, the information gleaned 
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from the investment bankers in the discussions was highly illuminating on the specific 
topic of the potential impact on the flow of investment capital into ETF’s. 
Finally, turning to the subgroup of private equity investors, it was initially anticipated 
that this would be the most difficult of all of the categories of public markets influencers 
to enroll.  However, that turned out not to be the case, as the private equity investors 
demonstrated a higher degree of interest in the public company decline topic than 
expected. 
Once again, a database was compiled of all of the significant private equity firms based in 
Canada from a variety of different sources.  From this original list, an analysis was 
completed of which firms published the individual phone numbers and emails of their 
personnel.  A target recruitment database was then recruited which included the names of 
all of the personnel at these firms who operated in the investment portfolio divisions of 
the private equity firms, had been in the business for at least five years, and had published 
direct emails and phone numbers available.  This effort resulted in a target recruitment 
database of 198 private equity investors, from which 59 completed PCD Study responses 
were ultimately received. 
In summary, the recruitment process for the PCD Study was an iterative process, with a 
significant degree of trial and error resulting in refinement of each element of the 
recruitment methodology.  Of the four different methodologies that were originally 
conceived and attempted during the recruitment process, only the direct recruitment 
strategy can be classified as having been an unqualified success.  Overall, more than 80% 
of the total responses in the PCD Study occurred as a result of direct recruitment efforts.    
In the Group I recruitment phase in which individual phone numbers were not available, 
a response rate between 6.0% (for private company C-suite executives) and 9.4% (for 
TSX-listed C-suite executives) for the email solicitations was observed.  However the 
response rates for the Group II participants in the email solicitations were materially 
higher: (i) for securities / corporation lawyers, 20 completed responses out of 72 email 
solicitations for a 27.8% response rate; (ii) for accountants / auditors, 36 completed 
responses out of 108 email solicitations for a 33.3% response rate; (iii) for investment 
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bankers, 45 completed responses out of 138 email solicitations for a 32.6% response rate; 
and (iv) for private equity investors, 59 completed responses out of 198 email 
solicitations for a 29.8% response rate.  
Reflecting further on the recruitment process, it is clear that the key to the significantly 
higher response rates for the Group II participants compared to the Group I participants 
was the ability of the Co-Investigator to access individual phone numbers for most of the 
Group II participants who were ultimately solicited.  This conclusion can be inferred 
from the fact that, other than the follow-up phone call, the format of the email solicitation 
was identical for the Group I participants and Group II participants. 
For each Group II target participant solicited, a personal phone call was made to the 
target recipient within 15 minutes of the delivery of the initial email invitation by the Co-
Investigator.  The phone was answered by the target recipient in only approximately 20% 
of the instances.  In the other 80% of instances where the call went to voicemail, a 
detailed message was left for each individual.  The voicemail message introduced the Co-
Investigator, advised the target recipients that the Co-Investigator was following up on an 
email invitation that had recently been sent to the target recipient, then continued on to 
quickly summarize the nature of the PCD Study and personally invited the target 
recipient to participate in the PCD Study.  The voicemail message concluded with the 
Co-Investigator leaving his phone number and inviting the recipient to either email or call 
the Co-Investigator back with any questions or concerns on the survey. 
This additional step in recruitment methodology for Group II target recipients is simple in 
theory, but necessitated more than 500 phone calls to the Group II email recipients alone.  
With the Co-Investigator able to make approximately 5 phone calls per hour, the phone 
call follow-up step required the investment of approximately 100 additional hours of 
effort to support the recruitment effort.  However, it is clear from the results that the 
simple act of following up each email solicitation for the Group II respondents in the 
PCD Study with a phone call on a timely basis was sufficient to materially reduce the 
concern of the email recipients that the solicitation was a sophisticated phishing attempt 
and thereby increase their likelihood of participation.  Many of the phone call recipients 
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indicated verbally that they had dismissed the original email solicitation as a potential 
phishing attempt, but were willing to complete the survey once this fear was eliminated 
as a result of the phone-call follow-up. 
This approach also made it apparent that it is unnecessary that the target recipients 
actually speak to the researchers on the phone in order for the phone call strategy to be 
successful.  Many emails and phone calls were received from target participants who 
indicated that they had received the voicemail message and that they were intending to 
complete (or had already completed) the PCD Study.  This level of feedback was 
unexpected, but provided clear evidence of the value of being able to access a direct 
phone number for the target recipient and making the investment in leaving voicemail 
messages to confirm the veracity of the email in ultimately improving the response ratio. 
In summary, one of the key take-aways from the direct recruitment efforts in the PCD 
Study was confirmation that the biggest challenge in executing an electronic-based 
recruitment strategy through email is the inherent distrust that exists for any unverified 
solicitations from unknown sources.  Without any external verification in the form of an 
accompanying phone call, many of the emails sent to Group I participations targets were 
certainly deleted without even being opened simply as standard security procedure. 
Considering the volume of spam that arrives in email inboxes daily, and the number of 
competing requests that senior business decision makers face for their valuable time, the 
responses rates from the Group I respondents were surprisingly strong.  However, with 
access to the personal phone numbers of the Group II respondents, the extra step of 
making a follow-up phone call (even if the target participant does not answer) more than 
tripled the response rate between the Group I and Group II respondents.  This particular 
observation from the PCD Study should be noted for future electronic-based email 
surveys. 
5.10- Probability Sampling and Bias 
A paramount goal for survey recruitment planning and execution is to ensure that 
systemic error (bias) is eliminated to the greatest degree practical.  Although true 
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probability sampling is impossible to achieve in survey design for populations such as 
those targeted in the PCD Study, the objective nevertheless continues to be that the 
selection methodologies applied ensure that the group of respondents solicited comes as 
close as possible to true probability sampling.    
True probability sampling occurs where a surveying methodology is adopted in which 
everyone within a target population has an equal chance of being solicited to participate 
in the survey, and the ultimate determination of who is actually solicited to participate is 
done on a random basis. The textbook example of true probability sampling historically 
was where every 10th name listed in a phone book for a city is selected to be solicited.  
However, true probability sampling is very rare in practice, even in the modern 
environment. Indeed, even the classic phone book example no longer constitutes true 
probability sampling as a significant percentage of the populations no longer have 
landline phones and therefore are not listed in telephone directories.  As such, using the 
phonebook as a basis for determining survey enrollment now can be viewed as 
introducing clear systemic error because landlines (from which the phone book listings 
are derived) are disproportionately used by seniors and rarely used by millennials.  The 
phonebook as a data source no longer even approximates the characteristics of broader 
population.  Moreover, the few data sources that do allow for true probability sampling in 
the modern environment in the broader populations (like Government of Canada census) 
are generally inaccessible to researchers due to privacy concerns.   
As stated, the nature of the target participants in the PCD Study makes it impossible to 
implement true probability sampling mechanisms.  There is no single database accessible 
to researchers containing the names of all the eligible participants in any one of the six 
main categories of target participants.  Not even the Government of Canada with all of its 
statistical resources possesses a comprehensive database of the senior decision-makers in 
TSX-eligible private companies. The direct and repeated recruitment efforts required to 
secure sufficient survey enrollment consequently dictates that non-probability 
mechanisms must be applied.   
The goal in the recruitment process for the PCD Study therefore, is to adopt appropriate 
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policies and procedures to ensure that the actual recruitment methodology utilized comes 
as close as is reasonably practical to statistical sampling.  Statistical sampling is a type of 
probability sampling that ensures proper representation of strata or cohorts reflected in 
the population in order to minimize systemic error (bias).  As such, the target is to 
achieve the best approximation of probability sampling that can be achieved through a 
recruitment process by the Co-Investigator, executed in a reasonable timeframe and with 
reference to the financial resources available, without actually using true probability 
sampling.  
Since it is impossible to recruit a true probability sample in the PCD Study, it is also not 
possible to calculate the true margin of error for the study.  However, as the PCD Study 
attempts to approximate a probability sample, statistical inference methods (such as 
confidence levels, statistical significance, P-values, etc.) that assume a probability sample 
will be used in the analysis of the PCD Study, while recognizing that attempts to 
extrapolate the results to the greater population will be limited by the lack of a true 
probability sample. 
It is submitted that the version of the PCD Study executed adequately approximates true 
probability sampling methodology in the specific context of the factors surrounding the 
survey and with regard to the time and budgetary constraints.  To support this assertion, 
the recruitment strategy with respect to each of the six categories of target participants 
will be quickly discussed. 
With respect to Group I target recipients from private companies, the list of initial target 
companies was compiled from a number of independent industry sources.  With respect 
to the Group I target recipients of TSX-listed companies, the initial list of target 
companies was a comprehensive list of all current Canadian-based Operating Companies 
currently listed on the TSX.   In both of these circumstances, the lists were cross-
referenced against the entire DataCaptive list of C-suite contact data and all individuals in 
the C-suite contact list who met the target eligibility criteria were selected as target 
participants and were ultimately solicited for participation.  As such, if there is any 
identifiable recruitment bias with respect to the Group I target respondents, it arises from 
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the processes that DataCaptive utilizes to collect their C-suite contact data.  Confirming 
specifically what those processes are is beyond our scope of direct knowledge, but it is 
known that DataCaptive’s data gathering processes are extensive and combine machine 
learning, extensive analysis of company website data, predictive analysis and human 
intelligence.381  If an individual respondent at the C-suite level in Canada is not on the 
DataCaptive list, it is likely because they have been intentional in keeping their contact 
information private.  That group of individuals is likely unreachable through any 
mechanism or database available to the PCD Study effort.  In the case of incomplete 
population lists, sampling frame error is unavoidable.  Yet, it is submitted that the Group 
I target recipients in the PCD Study were objectively selected, broadly solicited and there 
is no apparent recruitment bias evident in the methodology.  If there is bias to be found 
from within the Group I respondents, it is more likely to be non-response bias than 
recruitment bias, a risk factor which is identified and discussed later in this Research 
Methodology chapter. 
With respect to the potential for bias in the Group II target participants, it is undeniable 
that the PCD Study does indeed evidence selection bias with respect to one particular 
subgroup, namely the securities/corporate lawyer class.  The significant number of PCD 
Study respondents generated as a result of the live presentations to Blake, Cassels & 
Graydon and McCarthy Tétrault in February 2019 certainly leads to the result that 
securities lawyers from these two firms are overrepresented in the PCD Study data.  
Moreover, it also results in the participants from other large corporate law firms based in 
Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta not having been given the same opportunity to 
participate in the PCD Study. 
While this high degree of concentration from two law firms is methodologically 
problematic in that it represents selection error from a statistics procedure perspective, it 
is submitted that this issue in PCD Study methodology should not be interpreted as 
 
381 See Data Captive website for a more in-depth discussion of their data collection and validation 
procedures: online:<www.datacaptive.com>. 
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materially diminishing the value of the PCD Study data from the legal subgroup.  Both 
McCarthy Tétrault and Blake, Cassels & Graydon are consistently ranked at the top of 
both the Lexpert practice area rankings for corporate finance and securities law in Canada 
based on industry recommendations and the published “league tables” by Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters with transaction volume in corporate finance activity.  As such, these 
two particular law firms are clearly amongst the most knowledgeable and most respected 
in the area of corporate finance and securities law, and also work on the greatest number 
of relevant transactions.   
There is no particular indication that the securities / corporate lawyers in two particular 
firms evidence any type of firm-related bias on the issues tested in the PCD Study, but to 
the degree that any firm-related perceptions do exist in the relevant subject areas they are 
certainly well-informed perceptions.  Law firms do not generally exhibit any degree of 
ideological hegemony, and the opinions of individual lawyers within the firms are formed 
by their specific experiences.  Ultimately, the overrepresentation of these two law firms 
in the PCD Data represents one of those items that must be noted for the sake of fully 
disclosing potential sources of selection error, but is more problematic from a 
methodological purity perspective than from a pragmatic perspective in terms of the 
likely impact on the quality of the PCD Data. 
With respect to the other Group II respondents, a second item to note in potential 
selection error is the undeniable underrepresentation in the PCD Study data from the big 
four accounting firms and from the bank-owned investment banking firms.  There is no 
question that both of those groups of target participants have lower representation in the 
PCD Study data than would be warranted by their overall importance and market share 
within their particular industries.  However, as discussed previously in this Dissertation, 
the underrepresentation of these participants in the PCD Study is a direct result of the 
unwillingness of the big four accounting firms and the bank-owned investment banking 
firms to publish individual contact data for their key employees, thereby making direct 
contact with these individuals extremely difficult.   
It is submitted that all reasonable avenues of contact were exhausted in the course of the 
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PCD Study recruitment effort to increase the participation of these particular target 
participants (including keeping the recruitment period open for 3 additional weeks and 
flying across the country to make in-person presentations to bank-owned investment 
banks), but the limitations associated with the NMREB guidelines on survey recruitment 
generally, and passive snowball sampling specifically, limited the impact of these efforts.  
Once again, this potential issue on selection bias is more problematic conceptually than 
pragmatically, as the target participant groups who were accessible and participated in the 
PCD Study certainly brought a high degree of experience in the capital markets to their 
analysis. 
5.11- Assessment of Non-Response Bias in the PCD Study 
In addition to sample design error discussed in the previous section, including sampling 
frame and selection error, any proper research methodology analysis must assess the 
potential impact of non-response bias. 
 Assessment of Overall Response Rate in the PCD Study 
The first level of analysis on the non-response bias topic is consideration of the overall 
response rates and the individual category response rates compared to other academic 
studies. The individual category responses rates in the PCD Study have been discussed 
above, but are summarized here again.382 
Table 1- Summary of Response Rate by Demographic Subgroup 
 
Category of Respondents 
Individuals 
Solicitated 
Responses 
Attained 
Response  
Rate 
Group I- TSX-Listed Company senior decision-makers 1100 103 9.4% 
Group I- Private Company senior decision-makers 2100 125 6.0% 
Group II- Securities / corporate lawyers 147 49 33.3% 
Group II- Auditors / accountants 120 39 32.5% 
Group II- Investment Bankers 145 48 33.1% 
Group II- Private equity investors 203 59 29.1% 
 
382 The numbers for the total solicitations and responses in the following table include both the live 
solicitations made in person as well as the email / phone solicitations.  The numbers reported previously 
represented only the email / phone solicitations.  This accounts for the small variations between the 
response rates previously discussed and the numbers reported in the following table.  The total solicitation 
numbers do not account for any passive snowball sampling efforts, as the number of solicitations relayed 
through this methodology are indeterminate and outside the ability of the researchers to assess. 
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Category of Respondents 
Individuals 
Solicitated 
Responses 
Attained 
Response  
Rate 
Total- All Respondents  
(includes both direct solicitations in person and online 
solicitations through email) 
3,815 423 11.1% 
Overall, the minimum overall response rate for the PCD Study is reported at 11.1%.  This 
statistic is referred to as the “minimum” because of the fact that the email invitation to the 
initial 2,100 invitees in the Group I- Private Company category defined several minimum 
eligibility criteria for participation in the survey.  It is unknown what percentage of that 
solicitation list actually meets all of the qualification criteria outlined in the invitation, so 
it is unclear what percentage of the targeted respondents who received the initial email 
declined from participating solely on the basis that they failed to meet the eligibility 
criteria.  As such, while we can infer that the actual response rate of eligible respondents 
was higher than 6.0% for this particular category, it is impossible to determine how much 
higher.   Once again, the decision has been taken to report the most conservative position 
statistically.   
How, then, does the PCD Study overall response rate of 11.1% compare with other 
surveys completed in similar academic studies?  It has already been discussed that this is 
believed to be the first empirical study of its kind completed specifically on the topic of 
public company decline in the world, so there is nothing in the literature that is directly 
comparable.  However, it is also discussed in Chapter 2- Literature Review that Brau / 
Fawcett and Bancel / Mitoo have completed survey-based studies in the United States 
and Europe, respectively, focused on the motivation of companies for completing 
IPOs.383  Both of those studies solicited respondents using the more time-consuming and 
expensive methods of mailing hard-copies of their surveys with pre-paid self-addressed 
return envelopes, repeating the mailing three times.  The Brau / Fawcett study also hand-
addressed each envelope (no labels) for personalization and offered the prospect of 
 
383 Brau and Fawcett, supra note 87.  Bancel and Mittoo, supra note 91. 
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financial rewards based on respondents being eligible to participate in a draw for a cash 
prize.384   
Ultimately, Brau and Fawcett report an overall response rate of 18.8%.385  Brau and 
Fawcett note that their response rate compares very favorably to what they describe as the 
leading precedent for surveys of senior executives set by Graham and Harvey, who 
reported a response rate of just under 9%.386  The Graham and Harvey study is notable in 
that they are also targeting senior officers of companies.  Graham and Harvey disclose 
their methodology as involving the sending of both a mail and a fax version of their 
survey to the target participants.  Graham and Harvey then discuss that they followed up 
with each target recipient by having a team of 10 MBA students make individual phone 
calls to each targeted participant.  In their analysis, Graham and Harvey cite a number of 
other academic surveys of senior officers to support their assertion that their response rate 
of approximately 9% is indicative of other outcomes.387 
As a further point of comparison, Mittoo and Bancel report an overall response rate of 
4.3%, which they describe as “reasonable considering the length of time, the nature of the 
data gathered and the number of countries involved” and draw comparisons to other 
survey-based studies of senior executives with responses rates in the 5% range.388  
An additional issue to be considered in comparing the PCD Study response rate to these 
other three studies is the relevance of the use of email solicitations in the PCD Study.  
None of the other three studies utilized the email solicitation methodology, likely because 
the public sources from which the investigators constructed their databases included 
 
384 Supra note 87 at 402.  
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid, citing John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field” (2001) 60 Journal of Financial Economics 187. 
387 Graham and Harvey, ibid at 191. 
388 Supra note 91 at 847. 
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physical mailing addresses but did not include direct email addresses for the senior 
executives being targeted for solicitation.  On this topic, a 2002 meta-analysis of surveys 
undertaken using both email and regular mail solicitations reported that the large majority 
of surveys encountered a significantly lower response rate through email than through 
regular mail.389   
With this discussion as background, how does the PCD Study response rate compare to 
these three particular studies of senior executives?  The overall response rate of 11.1% 
from the PCD Study is higher than the reported response rates of both Mittoo/Bancel and 
Graham/Harvey, but lower than Brau and Fawcett.  This higher response rate in the PCD 
Study was achieved notwithstanding that the PCD Study used email solicitation as a 
primary recruitment tool, where Mittoo/Bancel and Graham/Harvey used the higher cost 
regular mail delivery option which often leads to higher response rates.390   
Comparing the PCD Study specifically to Brau and Fawcett, it is notable that the Brau 
and Fawcett study was financially supported by five different external funding sources 
disclosed in the acknowledgements.  Although the total budget of Brau and Fawcett is not 
disclosed, it is clear that their recruitment budget was orders of magnitude higher than the 
PCD Study.  Brau and Fawcett also offered a $1,000 cash prize drawn amongst those 
individuals who participated in the study.  Based on these factors, it is submitted that the 
PCD Study response rate compares favorably to Brau and Fawcett. 
Beyond these three particular studies, Cycyota and Harrison have published a meta-
analysis on response rates for surveys of executives generally.391  Their analysis of the 
literature reports response rates for surveys of executives ranging from 3.5% to 18.1% 
where there is follow-up by the investigators, but no financial incentive for participation. 
 
389 Ronald D. Fricker, Jr. and Matthias Schonlau, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Internet Research 
Surveys: Evidence from the Literature” (2002) 14:4 Field Methods 347. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Cynthia S. Cycyota and David A. Harrison, “Enhancing Survey Response Rates at the Executive Level: 
Are Employee-or Consumer- Level Techniques Effectives?” (2002) 28(2) Journal of Management 151. 
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At the 11.1% level of overall response rate, therefore, the PCD Study compares favorably 
to the previously-undertaken survey-based academic studies seeking the input of senior-
level business executives.  
 Analysis of Non-Response Bias Based on Demographic 
Participation in the PCD Study 
The next level of analysis for potential non-response bias is to consider how well the 
demographic make-up of the PCD Study participants reflects the overall demographic 
make-up of the entire target population.  This analysis will be undertaken in three 
components: (i) geographic representation; (ii) industry representation; and (iii) late vs. 
early response analysis.  
Beginning with the geographic representation, the are several different metrics that can 
be used to assess how well the PCD Study respondents reflect the overall Canadian 
economy.  However, since the ultimate focus of the PCD Study is in the area of public 
company decline at the senior stock exchange level, the most logical foundation is to look 
at the geographic distribution of the existing TSX Operating Companies.  The current 
breakdown of TSX Operating Companies by the jurisdiction of the corporate head offices 
compared to the percentage representation of each province in the PCD is as follows:392 
  
 
392 TMX Market Intelligence Group Report, supra note 6. The four Atlantic Provinces are shown together 
because of their comparatively small economies. 
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Table 2- Percentage of TSX Operating Company Head Offices by Province 
 
Province 
Percentage of TSX 
Operating Company Head 
Offices 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
in the PCD Study 
British Columbia 21.5% 12.2% 
Alberta 20.6% 25.6% 
Saskatchewan 0.6% 0.9% 
Manitoba 1.7% 2.1% 
Ontario 40.3% 48.2% 
Quebec 13.2% 4.9% 
Atlantic Provinces 2.0% 5.8% 
On the whole, the data demonstrates that the geographic representation of the respondents 
in the PCD Study is a realistic reflection of the percentage of Canadian public companies 
based in each province with two obvious exceptions.  British Columbia and Quebec are 
both under-represented in the PCD Study compared to their degree of importance in the 
public company ecosphere.  However, these particular outcomes were anticipated and are 
representative of similar issues seen in other Canadian survey-based research projects.  
British Columbians have been observed to have lower participation rates generally than 
other provinces in Canada in survey-based research.393  In Quebec, participation rates 
decline significantly when the survey is not available in French, which is consistent with 
the understanding that non-response rates increase significantly when the survey is not 
carried out in the first language of the target recipients.394   This language limitation in 
the PCD Study was unavoidable, as the Co-Investigator responsible for recruitment 
 
393 Market Research and Intelligence Association, “Canadian Attitudes to Survey Research”, Fall 2004, 
online:< https://mria-arim.ca/sites/default/uploads/files/MRIASurveyFinal.pdf>. 
394 German Reyes, “Understanding Non-Response Rates; Insights from 600,000 Opinion Surveys” (2016) 
PubDocs, World Bank Publications, online:< http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/708511466183857404 
/paper-reyes.pdf>. 
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efforts has no French language capacity and financial resources were not available to 
secure sufficient bilingual supports to solicit, collate and interpret the PCD Study results 
in French. 
Other than the underrepresentation by British Columbia and Quebec, the geographic 
distribution of the PCD Study is quite consistent in reflecting the proportion of TSX-
listed Operating Companies emanating from each province.  The underrepresentation 
from British Columbia and Quebec results in a small overrepresentation from each of the 
other provinces or regions.  On the whole, therefore, there is some potential for non-
response bias on a geographic basis due to the underrepresentation in British Columbia 
and Quebec, but these particular limitations are systemic in English-language Canadian 
research surveys generally. 
Turning now to industry representation, a similar methodology will be used in the 
analysis.  Although a variety of calculations could be applied to determine what the target 
industry breakdown should be, this analysis will utilize the current break-down of 
Operating Companies on the TSX by industry as the target for comparison.  The 
following show the comparison of the industry breakdown by the three major industry  
segments tracked throughout the PCD Study compared to the percentage reflected by 
Group I senior decision-makers who participated as PCD Study respondents. 
Table 3- Industry Comparison of PCD Respondents to Current TSX Operating Companies 
 
General Industry Category 
 
Percentage of TSX 
Companies  
Percentage of 
Respondents 
in the PCD Study 
Oil & Gas / Pipelines / 
Energy Services 
19.2% 22.6% 
Mining 25.2% 20.3% 
Non-Resource Based 55.6% 57.1% 
The table evidences that the mining sector is slightly underrepresented in the PCD Study 
compared to its actual weighting in the overall TSX Operating Company list.  Again, this 
outcome is not unexpected because of the high concentration of mining companies based 
in British Columbia where, as discussed above, the overall response rate is known to be 
generally lower than the rest of Canada.  On the whole, it is submitted that the industry 
breakdown of the PCD Study respondents correlates sufficiently to the overall weighting 
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of the industry breakdown of the current list of TSX Operating Companies such that 
geographic non-response bias is not a material concern. 
Last in this portion of the analysis is an evaluation of the PCD Study data according to 
early and late responses, using the late-response analysis as an analog for simulating non-
response bias.  This test is frequently applied in similar studies to test for non-response 
bias, including both the Brau / Fawcett and Bancel / Mittoo studies discussed 
previously.395  In the PCD Study, completing this portion of the analysis is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that the Group II public markets influencers were recruited either 
through two different methodologies that principally determine the early and late 
responders (i.e., for lawyers) or were recruited through an intensive effort over a short 
period of time (i.e., for accountants, investment bankers and private equity investors), 
thereby eliminating these cohorts from the early / late response analysis.  This leaves only 
the Group I respondents for the early / late analysis. 
One of the methodologies generally accepted as valid in testing survey results for non-
response bias is comparing the first 30 responses received (i.e., the early responders) to 
the last 30 responses received (i.e., the late responders).396  Analysis of the 30 early 
responders and the 30 late responders amongst the Group I cohort were run using Fisher’s 
F-test in the software program “R”, testing for evidence of variability in the make-up of 
respondents by demographic representation as well as variability in the nature of the 
responses.   
In terms of demographic representation, there was no statistically significant difference 
found between the early and late responders with respect to geographical distribution or 
years of public company experience.  A weakly significant difference was found with 
respect to years of total career experience. 
 
395 Brau and Fawcett, supra note 87 and Bancel and Mittoo, supra note 91. 
396 Jimmy Lindner, Tim Murphy & Gary Briers, “Handling Nonresponse in Social Science Research” 
(2001) Journal of Agriculture Education 42. 
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In terms of variability of responses between early and late responders, four key questions 
from the PCD Study were selected as best representing the overall attitude of the 
participants and disclosing any embedded bias in favour or against the public markets 
generally: question 16-7, question 16-8, question 18-1 and question 18-2. The specifics of 
these questions are discussed later in this chapter.  Applying Fisher’s F test, no 
statistically significant difference was found between the early responders and the late 
responders on any of these four key questions.   
As such, the early vs. late responder analysis suggests that the PCD Study data does not 
materially suffer from non-response bias in terms of demographic make-up or responses 
on key questions.  
5.12- Demographic Overview of the PCD Study Respondents 
In the PCD Study recruitment, no minimum amount of career experience was specified as 
a gating condition in survey eligibility criteria.  However, the Group I respondents are 
required to be in positions at the C-Suite levels of their TSX-listed or TSX-eligible 
companies, or else serve as directors or major shareholders, in order to qualify for the 
PCD Study.  In the Canadian context, that level of seniority in a business organization 
generally implies that the individual has a significant degree of overall career experience.   
A Group II respondent can have less overall experience than a Group I respondent, 
because the Group II respondents do not have to reach a similar level of seniority in their 
organizations in order to qualify for the PCD Study.  However, as previously discussed, 
the databases compiled for solicitation of the Group II participants were limited to 
individuals with a minimum of 5 years of business experience in their respective 
professions.  
Looking to the PCD Study data, we observe that 100% of the Group I respondents have 
at least 10 years of experience in their business careers.  Further, over 61% of Group I 
respondents have at least 25 years of career experience, evidencing that the Group I 
cohort brings a high level of business experience to the PCD Study.  With respect to 
Group II participants, 89% of respondents have at least 10 years of career experience, 
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while 48% have 25 years of experience or more.  While less experienced than Group I, 
Group II respondents still bring a high level of personal career experience to the PCD 
Study as a whole. 
With respect to industry representation, a summary of the respondent mix according to 
the three big industry groupings was outlined in the previous analysis on response bias.  
Within the non-resource industry category, a significant number of industries are 
represented.  None of these industries is individually large enough to be statistically 
significant for analysis in the PCD Study as a stand-alone cohort, and therefore all the 
smaller industry segments have been grouped together in the PCD Study analysis.  
However, the individual industries are tracked, and the following table summarizes the 
breakdown of the various industries according to their specific classification. 
Figure 1- Summary of PCD Study Respondents by Specific Industry 
 
Figure 1 evidences the significant breadth of the PCD Study respondent group from an 
industry-based perspective.  The chart in the previous section on survey recruitment bias 
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demonstrated the significant breadth of the PCD Study on a geographic basis, noting that 
all areas of the country were represented in the survey and that only British Columbia and 
Quebec were underrepresented in terms of their overall contributions to the public capital 
markets as a whole. 
It is clearly understood that specific industries in Canada have a strong linkage to 
geographic regions.  For example, consumer goods manufacturing is concentrated in 
Ontario and Quebec, oil & gas production is concentrated in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
and mining is focused in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and the three territories.  As 
additional information that will be useful in tracking the linkage between geography and 
industry throughout the remainder of the analysis on the PCD Study, the following chart 
reflects the breakdown of the three major industry categories tracked in the PCD Study 
across the geographic regions of the country. 
Figure 2- Major Industry Groups by Geographic Region 
 
In addition to its breadth, geographically and by industry, the PCD Study respondent 
group represents a strong cross-section of company sizes as determined by total annual 
revenue and by employee count.   
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Ensuring that the PCD Study has a decent contingent of various-sized companies is 
particularly important on the topic of public company decline in Canada because of the 
strong belief expressed throughout the literature that SME companies are suffering 
disproportionately in the public markets for a variety of reasons.  As such, it is 
anticipated that the SME companies will evidence an even higher degree of overall 
aversion to the public markets than the larger companies.  In order for this belief to be 
demonstrated in the PCD Study data, it is important to have sufficient sample sizes of 
responses from Group I decision-makers of both SME companies and larger non-SME 
companies to make the observations related to company size statistically significant. 
The following charts summarize the breakdown of the Group I senior business decision-
maker respondents according to the two elements tracked in determining company size. 
Figure 3- PCD Study Respondents by Company Size (Revenue) 
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Figure 4- PCD Study Respondents by Company Size (Employee Count) 
 
It was anticipated that the attention of the larger company C-suite executives would be 
harder to get than the smaller company C-suite executives simply because the large-
company executives have more demands on their time due to their higher profiles.  
However, this expectation was ultimately proven wrong, and the final demographic mix 
includes a strong cross-section of company sizes at all stages of development.  If 
anything, it appears as if the larger company executives were inherently more interested 
in the public company decline phenomenon than their counterparts at smaller companies. 
5.13- PCD Study Format and Content Summary 
The PCD Study data are primarily quantitative in nature, applying a variety of 5-Point 
Likert Scales.  There are a total of 24 different questions in the online version of the PCD 
Study,397 although the application of skip logic results in a maximum of 20 questions 
 
397 There are fewer questions in each paper version of the PCD Study because of the fact that the paper 
versions are targeted to specific subgroups and remove the irrelevant questions for that subgroup (i.e., the 
questions that are skipped over by that subgroup in the online version as a result of the skip logic function).  
However, the same substantive questions are answered by all respondents with the exception of Question 
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being required to complete the survey for DG5- Private company respondents and fewer 
questions being required for all other subgroups.  22 out of the 24 questions solicit 
quantitative data.  The other two questions (namely question 17 and question 24) solicit 
qualitative data. 
The quantitative PCD Study questions can be categorized into three separate categories.  
The first category is the survey eligibility validation questions, which are utilized as 
screens to determine that each respondent properly fits within one of the following six 
subgroups of target participants: (i) senior decision-maker (C-suite executive, director or 
major shareholder) of an existing TSX-listed public company; (ii) senior decision-maker 
of a TSX-eligible private company; (iii) corporate or securities lawyer; (iv) public auditor 
or accountant; (v) investment banker; or (vi) private equity investor. 
The second category of PCD Study questions are the questions designed to convey 
demographic information about the individual respondent.  It is this data that allows us to 
categorize the respondents into a variety of demographic subgroups that are tracked 
throughout the PCD Study analysis. 
The third category of PCD Study questions are the substantive content questions.  These 
are the questions where the respondents give their opinions on a variety of different 
topics relevant to the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada.  It is these 
substantive questions that ultimately are the focus of the PCD Study analysis.   
The first two subgroups of respondents above constitute the Group I participants, namely 
senior business decision-makers.  In addition to fitting within that particular criteria, 
participants must also verify that their companies qualify as an Operating Company, 
which is defined in Question 6 of the PCD Study as follows: 
  
 
10 and Question 12, which are only answered by senior decision-makers of public and private companies, 
respectively. 
198 
 
 
Figure 5- Definition of “Operating Company” in Q6 of PCD Study 
"Operating Company"- An operating company is a business that directly produces a 
product or delivers a service to customers, or else owns a subsidiary that directly 
produces a product or delivers a service to customers.   
Note:  Mutual Funds, ETF's and REITS are not considered operating companies. 
The latter four subgroups in the above list constitute the Group II participants, namely 
public markets influencers.  If participants cannot certify that they meet all of the 
requirements of one of those six subgroups, they are thanked for their willingness to 
participate in the survey and the survey is terminated at that point. 
In addition to attesting that they properly fit within one of the above-listed six subgroups, 
respondents must also confirm that they are currently Canadian residents and that they 
work in Canada for Canadian-based and Canadian-controlled businesses.  This limitation 
was somewhat controversial amongst a number of respondents who desired to participate 
in the PCD Study, but did not meet the strict residency requirements.  However, the 
limitation was required to be implemented in order to preserve the comparability of the 
data for Canadian businesses and to eliminate any complexity in cross-border ethics 
approval requirements for solicitation of individuals located outside of Canada.   
Most of the quantitative questions in the PCD Study are formatted as 5-Point Likert-Scale 
questions.  Question 10 and Question 12 result in the collection of nominal data, each of 
which is specific to senior decision-makers of either TSX-listed or private companies.  
Question 19 is also nominal, allowing respondents to define the premium required in a 
hypothetical fact pattern to achieve equality in attractiveness between an IPO option and 
a private financing option.  
The two qualitative questions in the PCD Study are the following open-ended text 
responses questions: Q17- a text-based question asking the respondent’s perception as to 
the primary factors contributing to public company decline; and Q24- a concluding text-
based question inviting the respondents to share any final thoughts that they have on any 
topic related to the PCD Study.   
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The following figure is provided as a visual representation of the skip logic processes 
applied in the PCD Study. 
Figure 6- PCD Study Online Layout Summary 
 
The next figure reproduces the minimum financial requirements set forth in Question 11 
of the PCD Study, which is used to confirm that a private company is of sufficient 
maturity to be TSX-eligible. 
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Figure 7- Minimum Requirements in PCD Study for Private Companies 
You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private operating 
company.    
  
We would like to confirm one final eligibility criteria for participation in this survey, namely the 
size and stage of development of your company.  We are looking for Senior Decision-Makers 
of private companies that are of a sufficient size and stage of development that they would be 
eligible to pursue a TSX listing if they chose to.    
  
 Does your private operating company meet all the criteria in at least one of the 
following categories? 
  
Category A- Profitable Companies      
Minimum of $10,000,000 in annual revenue;    
Minimum of $2,000,000 in pre-tax cash flow; and    
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $10,000,000.   
 
Category B- Technology Companies and R&D Companies Not Yet Profitable    
Company owns proprietary technology that is close to being ready for commercialization or is 
already at the commercialization stage; 
Company has at least two years of development history in developing its technology;  
Company has spent a minimum of $5,000,000 in developing its technology to date; and  
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.    
 
Category C- Resource Companies Not Yet Profitable   
Company owns a resource property which is already in production or else has an independent 
technical report confirming commerciality;   
Company has spent at least $5,000,0000 on the acquisition and development of the property; 
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.    
 
My private operating company meets all of the criteria of at least one category listed 
above.   
o Yes   
o No   
o I Choose Not to Answer   
Anyone familiar with the minimum listing requirement of the TSX will recognize that the 
minimum financial conditions set out in Question 11 of the PCD Study, as per the above 
excerpt, are significantly higher than the actual minimum listing requirements in the TSX 
Company Manual.  However, it is also understood that it is impractical for a company to 
go public on the TSX if it barely meets the formal minimum listing requirements.   
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Indeed, the argument certainly can be made that even more stringent standards should 
have been applied for participation of private company senior-decision makers as the 
financial tests outlined above are still far too small to consider pursuing an IPO on the 
TSX in this market.  However, it is submitted that the enhanced minimum financial 
requirements adopted by the PCD Study to define TSX-eligible private companies are 
appropriate for determining which companies are, at least, of a sufficient size that they 
can realistically begin to consider whether an IPO alternative is something that should be 
on their long-term horizon.  Although those companies might not yet be at a size where 
the IPO alternative is realistically imminent, they are at least at a size where an IPO is an 
option that can be considered for the future as the company continues to grow. 
Each of the substantive content questions in the PCD Study is analyzed later in this 
Dissertation in Chapter 7- Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study.   
5.14-  Online Survey Participant Attrition Analysis  
In any online survey, there will inevitably be an element of attrition where participants 
drop out of the survey somewhere between the initial action of clicking through to the 
survey website and completion of the survey.  The longer and more complex the survey 
instrument is, the greater the percentage of respondents who will drop out prior to 
completion.  Survey orthodoxy indicates that the ideal survey length is a median of ten 
minutes, with a maximum survey length of 20 minutes indicated before significant 
attrition occurs amongst the respondents.398 
In considering the design and content of the PCD Study in particular, significant 
consideration was given to the fact that a common thread amongst all of the subgroups 
targeted for participation is that all are comprised of extremely busy individuals who face 
a number of competing demands for their time and attention daily.  It was clearly 
understood that simply capturing their interest, to the extent that they opened the survey, 
 
398 Melanie Revilla and Carlos Ochoa, “Ideal and Maximum Length for a Web Survey” (2017) 59:5 
International Journal of Market Research 557. 
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was a major challenge and would require significant effort.  If the PCD Study was too 
ambitious in its scope, it was recognized that the entire research effort would be at risk if 
it generated excessive participant attrition. 
Yet, having gone to the significant effort to enroll the respondents in the PCD Study, the 
clear desire was to secure as much relevant data from each respondent as possible.  If the 
PCD Study drop-out rate significantly exceeded the comparable drop-out rates for online 
surveys generally, the PCD Study would be open to criticism that it over-reached in 
trying to gather too much data.  If this outcome were seen to exist in the PCD Study 
output, it could further be argued that the quality of the data collection near the end of the 
survey instrument is impugned.  If the respondents are frustrated by the survey length, 
they may no longer be thinking as carefully about their answers and the data may be 
unreliable. 
As previously discussed, the time required to compete the PCD Study was tested during 
the Preliminary Survey phase.  This beta trial established that the average completion 
time was in the range of 12-17 minutes with a median completion time of 15 minutes.  
This places the PCD Study on the longer side of what is generally used in online surveys.  
Ultimately, does the output data demonstrate that the PCD Study struck an appropriate 
balance in length and complexity, or does the attrition rate indicate that the PCD Study 
over-reached in length and complexity? 
To undertake that analysis, we must understand that attrition in the PCD Study occurs 
from different sources.  Formal attrition results from the survey programming (where 
participants are prevented from continuing in the survey as a result of the survey design 
and their responses). Informal attrition occurs when participants stop completing the 
survey on their own volition at some point before completion due to any reason other 
than eligibility. Within the respondents who dropped out as a result of formal attrition, it 
is useful to distinguish between participants who were excluded from completing the 
survey because they failed to meet a required condition for survey participation (such as 
private company size or Canadian residency) and those who were excluded from 
completion because they chose not to answer a question. 
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The PCD Study is composed of two different types of questions, mandatory response and 
voluntary response.  Mandatory response questions must be answered in a specific 
manner in order for the respondent to continue in the survey.  Voluntary response 
questions are not required to be answered in any particular manner in order for the 
respondents to continue further in the survey.  Participants even have the ability to skip 
voluntary response questions and continue in the survey if they so choose. 
Of the mandatory questions in the PCD Study, the first screen is unique.  This first screen 
combines the formal Letter of Invitation and the Consent to Participate forms that are 
mandated for inclusion in the online survey version as a condition of research ethics 
approval by the Western University NMREB.  The compulsory ethics disclosure on this 
first screen is quite lengthy, running to nearly 1000 words.  At the end of this first screen, 
the following statement is given to participants:  
Figure 8- Screen-shot from PCD Study survey online- Consent to Participate 
 
If the participant selects “Yes” in response, they are able to continue to the main body of 
the PCD Study.  If the participant answers “No” on the first screen, they skip straight to 
the survey completion screen, which displays the following message: 
Figure 9- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Terminal Message 
 
Once this survey completion screen is displayed in the PCD Study, the survey is designed 
such that there is no ability for the respondent to go back and change their answer to 
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“Yes” on the first screen.  Those specific participants are also prevented from starting the 
survey again due to the anti-ballot stuffing security measures that were selected in the 
PCD Study settings.  To further ensure that informed consent is freely given and properly 
documented, PCD Study settings have also been selected such that there is no ability to 
bypass the first screen without selecting “Yes” or “No”.  This ensures and documents the 
informed consent of all participants. 
All other mandatory questions in the PCD Study relate specifically to demographic 
questions which are necessary to establish whether the particular participant falls within 
the class of eligible respondents who are targeted in the survey.  The question on 
Canadian residency is also designated as mandatory, as the NMREB research ethics 
approval was limited to solicitation of individuals living in Canada.  In each mandatory 
question, the participants are unable to bypass the question and continue without 
selecting an answer.  If the initial response of a participant on a mandatory question is 
one which fails to confirm that the participant is eligible to continue in the survey, the 
participant is given the following warning message: 
Figure 10- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Ineligibility Message 
 
If the participant makes an entry error which leads them to this termination warning 
screen unintentionally, they can correct the input error and continue with the survey by 
selecting “Back”.  However, if the respondent selects “Next” after seeing this particular 
message, they are forwarded to the survey completion screen and are thereafter blocked 
from further participation in the survey. 
Under Western NMREB survey ethics regulations, providing an answer to each 
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individual question must be voluntary.  To recognize this NMREB requirement, every 
mandatory response question in the PCD Study provides participants the option of “I 
Choose Not to Answer”.  If the participant selects this option on a mandatory response 
question, they receive the following message:  
Figure 11- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Mandatory Response Warning 
 
Once again, if the respondent selects “Next” after seeing this particular message, they are 
forwarded to the survey completion screen and are blocked from further participation in 
the survey. 
To respect the free will of the respondents, the PCD Study was carefully constructed such 
that only those questions which were mission critical in verifying survey eligibility were 
constructed as mandatory questions.    
All other questions, including demographic questions soliciting valuable information, but 
not information which is essential to validation of the eligibility of respondents, were 
designed as voluntary questions.  If a participant selects the “I Choose Not to Answer” 
option on a voluntary question, they are moved onto the next question without any 
comment.  Alternatively, if a participant simply skips a question by selecting the “Next” 
option without having selected any answer, they receive the following notification 
advising that questions on the screen were left unanswered: 
206 
 
Figure 12- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Missed answer warning 
 
If the participant selects the “Continue Without Answering” option, they move onto the 
next question.  The above warning does not force a response, but rather ensures that any 
failures by participants to answer voluntary questions are intentional rather than 
accidental.   
The following table provides a detailed summary of the PCD Study attrition throughout 
the survey instrument up to the completion of the critical matrix question (Question 20), 
past which point the PCD Study is considered to be substantially completed.  The coding 
under the “Attrition Type” column is summarized as follows: (i) FV is “Formal 
Voluntary Attrition”, referring those participants who were terminated by the survey rules 
as a result of selecting “I Choose Not to Answer” to a mandatory response question or 
else declining to acknowledge; (ii) FI is “Formal Involuntary Attrition”, referring to those 
respondents whose were terminated by operation of the survey rules as a result of their 
failing to match the survey conditions; and (iii) IV is “Informal Voluntary Attrition”, 
referring to those respondents who simply failed to advance to the next question for 
unknown reasons (i.e., quit the survey on their own volition).  The attrition number is the 
total number of respondents who did not continue onto the following question, and the 
remainder number is the total number of respondents who continued on past that 
question. 
Table 4- PCD Study Survey Attrition Analysis  
Q# Survey Question Summary 
Attrition 
(Remainder) 
Attrition 
Type Attrition Analysis Summary 
 Total number of initial 
respondents who show as 
“registered” responses in the 
Qualtrics software database for 
the PCD Study 
 
449  n/a 
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Q# Survey Question Summary 
Attrition 
(Remainder) 
Attrition 
Type Attrition Analysis Summary 
Q1 Letter of Invitation and Consent 
Form- Unless consent accepted 
by participant, survey terminated. 
15 
(434) 
FV= 4 
IV=11 
Slightly less than 1% attrition 
on this question from 4 
respondents who declined 
online consent form.  
Rationales for declining 
consent unknown. 
 
Q3 Respondents requested to self-
identify as falling within the 2 
main groups targeted for the 
survey: Group I (Senior Business 
Decision-Makers) or Group II 
(Public Markets Influencers).  
Unless participants identify as 
falling within Group I or Group 
II, survey is terminated 
 
8 
(426) 
FI= 7 
FV=1 
Slightly under 2% attrition 
from 7 respondents who 
selected “None of the above” 
and 1 respondent who selected 
“I choose not to answer”. 
 
Q4 Group I: Respondents requested 
to self-identify as falling within 
the 3 groups of Senior Business 
Decision-Makers:  C-Suite 
Executive, Corporation Director 
and/or Major Shareholder.  If not 
fitting in any of the three groups, 
survey terminated. 
 
1 
(425) 
FI=1 Single respondent who failed to 
match any group.  Likely a 
senior executive who did not 
meet the criteria for C-Suite 
Executive. 
Q5 Group I: Canadian residency 
question for Group I.  Unless 
participant confirms they are 
Canadian resident and working 
for a Canadian-based company, 
survey terminated 
11 
(414) 
FI=8 
FV=1 
IV=2 
Although recruitment targeted 
solely at Canadian companies 
and residents based on 
available data, a small number 
of respondents were non-
Canadian and therefore 
ineligible. 
 
Q6 Group I: Respondents requested 
to confirm that their companies 
are “operating companies” within 
definition provided  
16 
(398) 
FI=15 
FV=1 
Although recruitment targeted 
at companies believed to 
operating companies, some 
respondents were from REITS 
or other businesses not included 
in definition. 
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Q# Survey Question Summary 
Attrition 
(Remainder) 
Attrition 
Type Attrition Analysis Summary 
Q9 Group I:  Respondents requested 
to confirm that companies are 
TSX-listed or TSX-eligible 
private companies 
6 
(392) 
FI=6 
IV=2 
Attrition here is likely due to 
respondents from companies 
listed on TSXV or CSX 
exchanges. 
 
Q11 Group I: Private company 
respondents asked to confirm that 
their companies meet minimum 
size threshold in revenue and pre-
tax cashflow to be TSX-eligible 
19 
(373) 
FI=19 Although these eligibility 
criteria were included in 
solicitation, these respondents 
only picked up on the eligibility 
requirements at this stage. 
 
Q16 First substantive question of the 
survey, asking opinion on a 
variety of statements 
15 
(358) 
IV=15 A dozen additional participants 
exited prior to making it to the 
substantive element of the 
survey.   8 individuals who 
exited were Group II and 7 
were Group I.  Group I attrition 
was likely validation fatigue at 
this stage; Group II attrition 
was tire-kickers who had not 
invested much time in the 
survey to this stage 
 
Q18 Introduction of hypothetical 11 
(344) 
IV=11 Additional attrition after 
completion of unprompted text 
question at Q17. 
 
Q19 Valuation premium question 3 
(341) 
IV=3 Additional attrition between 
Q18 and Q19. 
 
Q20 Core question on public company 
disadvantages with 31 sub-
elements 
6 
(333) 
IV=8 Final attrition before major 
matrix question, likely put off 
by the size of the matrix table. 
Based on the above analysis, 333 of the 449 individuals who originally opened the PCD 
Study continued to the stage of substantial survey completion (i.e., beyond the major 
matrix question at Q20).  This survey completion ratio represents 74.2% of all those who 
initially opened the PCD Study.  On its own, the overall PCD Study completion rate is 
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slightly below the average online survey completion rate of 78% and 87% that are 
reported by various online survey firms.399   
However, the 74.2% number is not an accurate reflection of the effective PCD Study 
completion rates for the purpose of comparison to these other precedents.  Unlike most 
online surveys, the PCD Study contained a rigid eligibility criteria that eliminated the 
vast majority of the population from participation.  Unless the participants certified their 
eligibility in the validation portion of the survey, they were disqualified as being 
ineligible.  The analysis in the above table on PCD Study survey attrition evidences that, 
of the 116 initial respondents who failed to substantially complete the survey after 
initially opening it, just under half of the drop-outs (i.e., 54 participants) were attributable 
to formal involuntary reasons (i.e., the participants confirmed that they did not meet the 
eligibility criteria and were excluded from continuing on to survey completion by the 
operation of the online PCD Study rules).  If you exclude the formal involuntary attrition, 
then 333 of the 395 participants (representing 84.3%) who opened the first screen of the 
PCD Study) continued to the stage of substantial completion.  The effective completion 
rate is likely even higher, as it is anticipated that several of the initial participants who 
dropped out without providing a reason in fact dropped out and exited the survey once 
they realized that they were ineligible without taking the additional time to fill in the 
answer advising that they were ineligible.  Regardless, as the completion rate in the PCD 
Study is in line with the range for online surveys reported by the professional survey 
companies elsewhere, there is no indication that the respondents were overly frustrated 
with the length and complexity of the survey such that the data collected can be 
impugned for that reason. 
As a final note on the PCD Study recruitment effort, what should be reported as the final 
survey participation number?  Did the PCD Study meet its target threshold of 377 valid 
 
399 M. Liu & Wronski, L., “Examining Completion Rates in Web Surveys via Over 25,000 Real-World 
Surveys” (2017) 36:1 Social Science Computer Review 116–124.  Also, Fluid Surveys, “Response Rate 
Statistics for Online Surveys- What Numbers Should You be Aiming For?” (18 October 2014), online:< 
http://fluidsurveys.com/university/response-rate-statistics-online-surveys-aiming/> 
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respondents to support a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error overall? The 
answer depends on the particular question in the PCD Study.  Although survey response 
totals are sometimes reported using all respondents who entered the survey instrument, 
the PCD Study adopts a more conservative reporting methodology.  The decision was 
made not to include reference to prospective participants who entered the survey, but 
were ineligible to continue according to the survey enrollment requirements. 
Unfortunately, those particular individuals missed the explanation of the eligibility 
criteria that was included in the emailed survey invitation.  The PCD Study numbers also 
exclude eligible participants who voluntarily dropped out of the PCD Study during the 
eligibility validation phase before providing responses to the substantive content 
questions.  
As such, only those respondents who were eligible to participate and continued through 
to the first substantive response question at Q16-1 are included in the PCD Study 
calculations.  This results in a survey of 360 respondents, which is sufficient (again using 
a high-end population estimate of 20,000 and assuming a probability sample) to support a 
94.4% confidence level at a 5% margin of error.  Alternatively, it can support a 95% 
confidence level at 5.12% margin of error.  Either way, the recruitment effort came a 
hair’s breadth of meeting the initial target of 377 valid responses to support a 95% 
confidence level at a 5% margin of error for the PCD Study analysis.  Regardless, the 
recruitment effort is still considered successful, as it significantly exceeds the minimum 
condition stated in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan approved by the dissertation 
advisory committee.   
Beyond simple numbers, reference to the PCD Study demographic data also demonstrates 
that the recruitment effort secured a respondent pool that demonstrates a strong breadth 
and depth in terms of geographical reach, industry representation and a surprising level of 
experience in the field of private and public company markets, thereby adding weight to 
the opinion of this group of respondents.  It is the breadth of demographic diversity that 
protects the PCD Study survey against answer bias, which was analyzed previously in 
this chapter. 
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5.15- Collation and Analysis of PCD Study Data 
The PCD Study collected an immense amount of data.  Extracting meaning from the 
dataset first requires that the data elements be broken down into appropriate constituent 
groupings for analysis.  Although this analytical process is conceptually simple, there are 
a seemingly infinite number of ways to group and present the PCD Study data.  
Determining which groupings are most appropriate for the presentation of the PCD Study 
data requires the synthesis of a significant amount of contextual knowledge on the 
specific qualities and nature of the individual respondent subgroups, geographical 
tendencies and industry nuances.  When first beginning the data analysis process, a 
variety of different options for compartmentalization and presentation strategy were 
considered. 
Ultimately, it was determined that the optimal framework for analysis of the type of data 
gathered in the PCD Study is a matrix structure in which the individual question topics 
are assessed by both demographic and subject matter groupings. 
With respect to demographic analysis, the conclusion was reached that the most logical 
process is to define a limited number of demographic groups for consistent analysis 
throughout this Dissertation.  By defining and maintaining a consistent format for 
demographic analysis, the demographic group characteristics, trends and correlations can 
be coherently tracked across the multiple elements of the PCD Study.   
In determining how to properly define each demographic group for analysis, the principal 
goal was to identify logically-defined groupings that might be expected to have similar 
views on the particular topics raised in the PCD Study based on their demographic make-
up.  Moreover, although the groups are defined based on commonality of background and 
a belief that the unique demographic characteristic of the group may lead to different 
perspectives on the topics under consideration, pragmatism also plays a role in 
determining boundaries between the groups and amongst the subgroups.  In order for the 
observations of particular group nuances to have statistical significance, the social 
sciences “rule of thumb” of n=30 for the minimum target size for subgroup comparison 
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was adopted.400  However, certain logical demographic subgroups in the PCD based on 
geography (i.e., Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces) did not meet the minimum target 
subgroup size of n=30, the implications of which are discussed below. 
Ultimately, 25 demographic categories were defined and utilized throughout the analysis. 
The first 8 categories were defined in advance during the PCD Study design phase.  The 
last 17 categories were determined during the data analysis phase based on assessment of 
the enrollment results.  The 25 demographic groups include the following: 
Table 5- Definition of Demographic Groups in PCD Study 
Main Group  
Group 
Identifier 
Demographic 
Subgroup Title401 Demographic Group Details N402 
All 
Respondents 
DG1 All Respondents All respondents in survey 358 
Group I / II 
DG2 Group I Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers 168 
DG3 Group II Group II- Public Markets Influencers 190 
Group I- 
Core 
Components 
DG4 TSX-Listed Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers 
of TSX Listed Companies 
97 
DG5 Private Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers 
of Private Companies 
71 
Group II- 
Core 
Components 
DG6 Lawyers Group II- Corporate / Securities Lawyers 44 
DG7 Auditors Group II- Professional accountants / 
auditors 
39 
DG8 Investment 
Bankers 
Group II- Investment bankers 48 
DG9 Private Equity Group II- Private equity investors 59 
 
400 Chuck Chakrapani, “Statistical Reasoning vs. Magical Thinking- Shamanism as Statistical Knowledge: 
Is a Sample Size of 30 All You Need?” April 2011, Vue Magazine (Marketing Research and Intelligence 
Association) 16; also, Sitanshu Sekhar Kar and Archana Ramalingam, “Is 30 the Magic Number? Issues in 
Sample Size Estimattion” (2013) 4:1 National Journal of Community Medicine 175. 
401 Throughout this Dissertation, the 25 demographic groups will be referred to according to the group 
identifier number combined with the demographic subgroup title for ease of reference and consistency of 
terminology.   For example, reference to the subgroups of respondents in the PCD Study who are Senior 
Business Decision-Makers of SME companies (have less than 500 employees and less than $50 million 
($Cdn.) in annual revenue will simply be "DG10- SME"). 
402 “N” is the total number of respondents that fit within each of the specified groups or subgroups.  The 
value of N may differ for each question in the PCD Study, generally becoming slightly smaller through 
respondent attrition in the latter survey questions.  The N numbers in the table above are for Question 16-1, 
which is the first substantive question in the PCD Study.  N for each subgroup with respect to each 
individual question has been recorded and the appropriate N value is used in determining inferential 
statistics in the analysis contained in this Dissertation. 
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Main Group  
Group 
Identifier 
Demographic 
Subgroup Title401 Demographic Group Details N402 
Group I by 
Company 
Size 
DG10 SME  Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers 
of SME Companies using Stats Canada 
definition- Less than 500 employees and 
less than $50 million in annual revenue 
65 
DG11 Non-SME  Senior Business Decision-Makers of Non-
SME Companies using Stats Canada 
definition- Either more than 500 employees 
or more than $50 million in annual revenue 
96 
Group I by 
Industry 
DG12 Oil & Gas Senior Business Decision-Makers of oil & 
gas companies 
38 
DG13 Mining Senior Business Decision-Makers of 
mining companies 
34 
DG14 Non-Resource  Senior Business Decision-Makers of non- 
resource based companies 
96 
Geographical- 
Province of 
Residence 
DG15 British Columbia Respondent (Group I or II) resident in 
British Columbia 
40 
DG16 Prairies Respondent (Group I or II) resident in 
Alberta, Manitoba or Saskatchewan 
95 
DG17 Ontario Respondent (Group I or II) resident in 
Ontario 
157 
DG18 Quebec Respondent (Group I or II) resident in 
Quebec 
16 
DG19 Atlantic Provinces Respondent (Group I or II) resident in New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, PEI or 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
19 
Years of  
Career 
Experience 
DG20 Early-Career Respondent (Group I or II) with 15 years 
or less total career experience 
56 
DG21 Mid-Career Respondent (Group I or II) with 16-25 
years total career experience 
111 
DG22 Late-Career Respondent (Group I or II)  with more than 
25 years total career experience 
160 
Years of 
Public 
Company 
Experience 
DG23 Limited Pubco 
Experience 
Respondent (Group I or II) with 5 years of 
less experience working for, or advising, 
public companies 
103 
DG24 Moderate Pubco 
Experience 
Respondent (Group I or II) with between 6 
and 15 years experience working for, or 
advising, public companies 
81 
DG25 Extensive Pubco 
Experience 
Respondent (Group I or II) with more than 
15 years of experience working for, or 
advising, public companies 
143 
From this point forward in this Dissertation, the particular demographic subgroups will 
be referenced according to their specific subgroup number (i.e., DGx) and the descriptive 
summary to avoid any confusion as to which subgroup is being discussed. 
Selection of the subgroups requires the application of knowledge of the nature of the IPO 
decision-making process, and geographic and industrial context on the nuances of the 
Canadian markets.    
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With reference to company size, the demographic information collected in the PCD 
Study offers a number of alternatives for defining subgroups.  In developing the survey, 
consideration was given to breaking the size-defined category into 3 respondent groups 
defined as small, medium and large.  However, having limited the PCD Study eligibility 
to Senior Decision Makers from either TSX-listed or TSX-eligible companies, the dataset 
collected turned out to be skewed towards representatives from larger enterprises.  As 
discussed, securing responses from senior decision makers of private companies was the 
most challenging part of the recruitment process, and the total number of SME's 
responses reflected in the survey is significantly less than the number of large-company 
(ie, non-SME) responses. 
Also, the academic analysis related to company size and its relevance to public company 
decline is largely focused on the dichotomy of SME / non-SME.  As such, the decision 
was made to define only two demographic subgroups by company size for the analysis 
phase, SME's and non-SME's.  The definition of what constitutes an SME varies from 
country to country and even industry to industry, so the definition selected for the PCD 
Study analysis is taken from the internal categorization adopted by Statistics Canada for 
its own internal ongoing economic research.403  Companies are classified as being SME's 
if they have fewer than 500 employees and less than $50 million (Cdn.) in annual 
revenue. 
With respect to industry, the decision-making process was largely determined by 
pragmatic considerations.  As demonstrated in Figure 1 earlier, the only two industries 
with sufficient size to support significant inferences in the PCD Study with respect to 
statistical analysis are the mining and oil & gas industries.  This outcome is not 
unexpected. The Canadian economy generally, and the Canadian capital markets 
specifically, have for decades been heavily weighted in favor of these two extractive 
sector industries.  Both of these extractive sector industries have faced significant 
 
403 Statistics Canada, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Data Warehouse, Statistics Canada website, 
(Accessed July 21, 2019), online:< http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&Id 
=51554>. 
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headwinds in the past five years, and therefore it is anticipated that there will be 
meaningful observations on the nature of the responses within these two groups.  Outside 
of these two groups, no single other industry has a sufficient number of respondents to 
support meaningful analysis in terms of determining statistically significant outcomes.  
The computers, technology and software industries constitute the third largest group of 
respondents at 20. However, unlike the United States, where tech-focused IPOs have 
formed a significant percentage of the recent IPO market,404 the Canadian IPO market 
has not benefitted from a resurgence in tech-focused IPOs.  As such, there is no 
compelling rationale to break down the responses from the Senior Decision Makers of 
non-resource companies into any smaller demographic subgroups for analysis of the PDC 
Survey. 
With respect to the geographic analysis, there were only three provinces in the PCD 
Study with a sufficient number of respondents to exceed the target subgroup minimum of 
30 responses: British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario.  Initial consideration was given to 
simply breaking down the PCD Study into two geographic subgroups defined as Western 
and Eastern Canada, but that was determined as sub-optimal for analysis because of the 
distinct nature of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces culturally and economically.  
Combining Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces with Ontario in the analysis phase also 
might negatively affect the identification of trends within the Ontario data, and would 
certainly obscure the unique nuances of any observations from Quebec and the Atlantic 
Provinces by virtue of the large number of Ontario respondents in the PCD Study. 
There was admittedly a temptation to combine Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces as a 
single subgroup for the PCD Study analysis in order to secure a sufficient-sized cohort 
for statistical significance, but the conclusion was reached that the underlying nature of 
the respondents from these two regions made this combination inappropriate.  Quebec 
and the Atlantic Provinces are certainly two of the most distinctive regions in Canada. 
 
404 Alyson Clabaugh and Rob Peters, "The Unicorn IPO Report Summary", Harvard Law School Forum 
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (20 March 2019), online:< https://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2019/03/20/the-unicorn-ipo-report/>. 
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While located in close geographic proximity to each other, the cultural differences 
between Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces are significant.  As such, it was concluded 
that Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces should each remain as their own subgroup for 
geographic analysis purpose, with the recognition that the limited sample sizes of these 
two subgroups would limit the ability to make statistically significant observations. 
With respect to Western Canada, there was concern about losing the distinctiveness of the 
British Columbia responses given the economic and cultural nuances of the west coast.  
The conclusion was reached that the most appropriate subgroup definition in the west 
would be to consider British Columbia as a stand-alone province and then combine the 
responses from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba into a "Prairie" group.  Although 
Manitoba might be expected to evidence a different industry make-up than Alberta and 
Saskatchewan because of its lack of oil & gas companies, it is reasonable to anticipate 
that Manitoba respondents will exhibit significant similarity in responses to the other two 
provinces on non-oil & gas companies given the nature of its industry.  
With respect to grouping of the two experience-based demographic categories, the issue 
is simply where the appropriate boundaries are for the subgroup delineation.  The fact 
that these groupings include both Group I and Group II respondents gives us a larger 
number of datapoints to start with, so the categories can be broken down into more 
subgroups without approaching the lower size limits of subgroup targets.  With respect to 
both total career experience and specific public company experience, it was determined 
that it would be most useful to define different subgroups based on limited, moderate and 
significant experience. 
Overall, the respondents on the PCD Study tend to be more experienced than the general 
population as a result of the fact that: (a) more senior Group II participants were 
specifically targeted in the enrollment process to secure more informed data on the topic 
of public company decline; and (b) by the time that individuals qualify for the criteria of 
Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers, they will obviously have a higher level of 
experience than the general population.  There is no overriding principle that dictates the  
specific boundaries for the experience-defined subgroups, but the definitions of the 
217 
 
subgroups utilized are reasonable in the circumstances and the different groups exhibit 
outcomes that one would expect based on increasing levels of experience and knowledge. 
5.16- Considering the Nature of the Data Collected 
Several different forms of empirical data were collected in the PCD Study.  Assessing the 
underlying nature of this data is important in that the categorization of the data provides 
instruction on how to properly describe the various data elements statistically and also 
defines what statistical tests are appropriately applied in analysis. 
First, the PCD Study has two questions that collect a significant volume of qualitative 
data in the form of text responses: namely, Question 17 and Question 24, both of which 
have been previously discussed in the Research Methodology chapter.  Analysis of the 
text-based qualitative data involves coding the data into subject matter groupings and 
hierarchies and conducting frequency analysis, which is undertaken in Chapter 6- 
Analysis of Qualitative Data in the PCD Study.  Word cluster charts are also used to 
summarize the qualitative data. 
Second, the PCD Study collects several different forms of quantitative data.  Detailed 
analysis of the quantitative data collected in the PCD Study is undertaken in Chapter 7- 
Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study and in Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD 
Study. 
Quickly reviewing the forms of quantitative data collected in the PCD Study, we begin 
with nominal-level data.  Nominal-level data are the form of quantitative data in which 
the information collected can be classified by categories and counted, but there is no 
inherent order to the categories from which further statistical meaning can be derived.405  
The nominal-level data collected in the PCD Study is demographically-based.  These 
questions in the PCD Study allow us to categorize the respondents into either Group I-
Senior Business Decision-Maker or Group II- Public Markets Influencer categories, and 
 
405 Carl McDaniel, Roger Gates and Submranian Sivaramakrishnan, Marketing Research Essentials, 
Canadian Edition (Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley & Sons, 2009) at 220-223. 
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then further divide those groups into the sub-categories of Group I (TSX-Listed, Private 
Company) and Group II (Corporate Lawyers, Auditors, Investment Bankers and Private 
Equity Investors).  The question on province of residence also collects nominal-level 
data. 
Second, ratio-level data are the category of quantitative data in which the differences 
between values is a constant size and a meaningful “0” point is present.  Much of the 
obvious ratio-level data collected in the PCD Study is also demographically based.  The 
clear ratio-level data relates to the level of experience of the survey respondents in their 
industry generally, working with their current employer and also their experience 
working with or advising public and private companies.  However, the PCD Study also 
collects ratio-level data that is not demographically based, specifically in the hypothetical 
question in reference to the pre-money valuation premium that would be required to 
make the IPO and private equity equally attractive.  
Finally, the PCD Study collects a large amount of data that would traditionally be viewed 
as ordinal-level data or interval-level data in the form of responses to a variety of 5-point 
Likert Scale questions.  The following three different 5-point Likert Scales were used in 
the PCD Study generating ordinal-level data: 
Table 6, Forms of Likert Scales Used in the PCD Study 
Likert Scale A 
(Question 16) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Likert Scale B 
(Question 18) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
1 
Unlikely 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Likely 
4 
Extremely 
Likely 
5 
Likert Scale C 
(Question 20 & 
Question 21) 
Not at All 
Important 
1 2 
Moderately 
Important 
3 4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
Ordinal-level data are sequenced data in which the categories form a logical ascending 
and/or descending ranking.  However, ordinal-level data do not innately provide a logical 
foundation on which to determine that the differences between the various data points in 
the responses are consistent.  Interval-level data, by comparison, is data in which the 
distances between data points is consistent and equal.  The distinction between ordinal-
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level data and interval-level data has consequences for the statistical tests that can be 
appropriately applied in analysis of each type of data. 
There are two distinct statistical ideologies which have been at odds for decades as to the 
proper interpretation and use of Likert Scale data.  The debate focuses on whether the 
data generated through Likert Scales is interval or ordinal data in nature, and also as to 
the statistical analysis implications thereof.  The two sides of this debate essentially pit 
the statistical purists versus the statistical pragmatists.  Statistical purists dogmatically 
refuse to consider Likert Scale data as constituting interval-level data.406 The 
pragmatists, however, argue that Likert Scale outputs have consistently been shown to 
evidence characteristics sufficiently similar to interval-level data that it is appropriate to 
use statistical tests in Likert Scale data analysis that have historically been reserved for 
interval-level data.407  The biggest practical implication of this debate for the PCD Study 
analysis is as to whether reference to the “mean” is permissible and, thereafter, which 
statistical tests are appropriate to use on the Likert Scale-derived data.   
As this Dissertation is being completed in the field of business law (and not in statistics), 
it is beyond our scope to take a definitive position on this decades-old statistical feud.  
However, the pragmatic statistical approach clearly is much more useful in the analysis 
phase and will be adopted to a degree.408  This Dissertation will take a “middle of the 
 
406 See, for example: Tom M. Liddell and John K. Kruschke, “Analyzing Ordinal Data with Metric 
Models: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?” (17 December 2017) SSRN Online Journal; online:<https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2692323> or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2692323; Susan Jamieson, supra note 155; 
and Susan Jamieson, “Likert Scales and How to Abuse Them” (2005) 39 Journal of Medical Education 971 
407 See, for example: Godfrey Pell, “Use and Misuse of Likert Scales” (2005) 39 Journal of Medical 
Education 970; James Carifio & Rocca Perla, “Resolving the 50-Year Debate Around Using and Misusing 
Likert Scales” (2008) Journal of Medical Education 42; James Carifio and Rocca Perla, “Ten Common 
Misunderstandings, Misconceptions, Persistent Myths and Urban Legends About Likert Scales and Likert 
Response Formats and Their Antidotes” (2007), 3:3 Journal of the Social Sciences 106; and Nicola Petty, 
“Oh Ordinal Data, What do We Do With You?” (8 July 2013) Creative Maths: A World of Mathematicians 
(blog); online:< https://creativemaths.net/blog/ordinal>. 
408 Following the advice of McDaniel, Gates and Sivaramakrishnan in Marketing Research Essentials, 
supra note 405 at 154: “The best procedure would seem to be to treat ordinal measurements as though they 
were interval measurements, but to be constantly alert to the possibility of gross inequality of intervals.” 
220 
 
road” approach on the use of the Likert Scale data derived in the PCD Study, accepting 
that the Likert Scale output evidences interval-type characteristics and that there is value 
in reference to the mean as the most illuminating measure of central tendency in the PCD 
Study data.  In fact, this is the only measure of central tendency that can be reported in 
the PCD Study dataset that has illuminative value to any practical degree.   
However, in order to avoid offending the statistical purists any more than necessary, the 
statistical tests applied in the ensuing analysis chapters within the body of this 
Dissertation (beyond the calculation of the central tendency) are restricted to tests that are 
widely accepted within statistical science as being appropriately applied to ordinal data.  
While possibly less illuminating than the tests that might be applied if one were to accept 
that the Likert Scale responses were fully interval in nature, this approach is more 
statistically conservative.  This approach will also be less controversial if the elements of 
the analysis from the PCD Study are extracted and used, as hoped, for follow-on 
academic publications beyond this Dissertation.  As the author of this Dissertation is 
legally trained and does not come from a formal statistics background, and in 
consideration of the fact that the statistical tests available for ordinal data are sufficiently 
powerful to demonstrate significant differences amongst the respondent subgroups, this 
conservative course was considered the most prudent alternative for the analysis in the 
body of this Dissertation. 
However, it is also recognized that when reviewing and digesting the volume of source 
data derived from the PCD Study, and statistical analysis thereof contained in this 
Dissertation, it is a significant challenge to extract the big picture for those readers who 
have not been intimately involved in the data gathering and statistical analysis 
undertaking.  To access more of the statistical analysis relating to the PCD Study in a 
summary form that is more easily digested, it is helpful to apply other statistical 
interpretation methods that are designed specifically for application on interval-level 
data.  In particular, the use of multivariate analysis of covariance (“MANCOVA”) 
calculations is helpful in quickly determining whether a particular demographic 
characteristic tracked in the PCD Study can be used to predict variability in specific 
Likert Scale response questions after removing the effect of other confounding variables.  
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As such, application of MANCOVA allows one to quickly assess whether specific 
demographically-defined subgroups evidence statistically significant differences of 
opinion on a particular topic independent of the effect of other demographic 
characteristics.  As the application of MANCOVA on Likert Scale questions is 
controversial for those statisticians who tend not to view the Likert Scale data as interval-
level, the MANCOVA calculations and the bulk of the accompanying analysis have been 
segregated in appendices of the Dissertation at Appendix 7. 
5.17- Visual Presentation of the PCD Study Data 
Presentation of both qualitative and quantitative elements data can occur in any number 
of ways.  In considering the best alternatives for effectively communicating the results of 
the PCD Study data, consideration was given to the fact that the primary audience of this 
Dissertation will be from the disciplines of law and business.  The legal audience, in 
particular, may have limited exposure to empirical data analysis.  As such, visual 
presentations of the PCD Study data in the form of figures and charts were used as the 
preferred methodology of summarizing the data wherever practical. 
The use of the visual presentation format for the PCD Study data brought up one major 
limitation of the Dissertation format that had to be addressed.  Namely, the Dissertation 
formatting requirements stipulate that grey-scale colour schemes be exclusively used.  
This restriction limits the amount of content that can be summarized visually in a single 
figure or chart, and forces the use of more figures charts that are smaller in size and 
convey less content than would have been practical if the full colour scale had been 
available. 
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 Analysis of Qualitative Data in PCD Study 
6.1- Introduction to Analysis of PCD Study 
This Chapter 6 marks the start of the formal analysis portion of the Dissertation, where 
the PCD Study data will be summarized and discussed at length.  The analysis of the 
PCD Study is ordered primarily according to the specific major question headings, laid 
out in the PCD Study survey.409  Where questions are matrix questions with multiple 
sub-questions embedded therein, the analysis of the sub-questions is broken down 
topically for the purpose of expediency and ease of analysis. 
Relevant observations from the PCD Study are noted throughout the analysis in both 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  However, the key findings are also repeated in summary form 
later in Chapter 9-Summary of Key Findings and Observations of PCD Study. 
6.2- Question 17- Why do you think fewer senior business 
decision-makers are choosing to take their companies 
public?  
The qualitative data collected in the PCD Study in Question 17 (“Q17) and Question 24 
(“24”) are open-ended text questions with responses that can be arranged by categories 
into themes in order to summarize and describe the outcomes.   
The question posed to respondents in Q17 is simple and goes straight to the core of the 
phenomenon of public company decline in Canada.   
Q17 was framed as a voluntary response question, and participants were allowed to 
bypass this question and continue on to complete the remainder of the survey.  Notably, 
the question was also intentionally presented without any reference to whether a single 
factor or multiple factors were desired in the text response answer.   The decision on 
 
409 For additional reference, the various paper versions of the PCD Study are included in Appendix 1 to 
this Dissertation. 
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whether to answer Q17, and how much to write in the answer box, was left completely to 
the discretion of the individual respondent without any additional guidelines.   
Q17 was positioned in the survey order prior to the disclosure of the downside factors 
associated with being a public company in Q20.  This was done in order to ensure that the 
factors presented by the respondents in Q17 were generated spontaneously and reflected 
the personal opinions held by the participants, without reference to the hypotheses 
generated by others in the business and academic literature. 
Throughout the other analysis sections in this Dissertation, it is reiterated on numerous 
occasions that the quantitative elements of the PCD Study are not designed to prove 
statistical causation with respect to the phenomenon of public company decline in 
Canada.  What is being tested in the quantitative elements of the PCD Study is the degree 
of importance that the various factors, posited in the business and academic literature as 
potentially contributing to public company decline, play in the decision-making process 
leading to an ultimate determination of whether to take a company public or pursue 
private financing alternatives.   
Here in Q17, however, the qualitative open-ended question clearly is asking for the 
respondents' opinion on the causes of the decline in IPO volume in Canada, which is 
directly linked to the phenomenon of public company decline.  While Q17 does not in 
any way statistically prove what the underlying causes of public company decline in 
Canada are, it does reflect a compendium of the opinions on causation of a broad cross-
section of key senior business decision-makers and public markets influencers across 
Canada on the topic.   
While it is understood that a compendium of opinions of a group of people regarding 
causality of a particular phenomenon does not constitute scientific proof of actual 
causality, there is no denying that the opinions reflected in Q17 do represent the beliefs of 
a highly informed cohort on private and public capital topics.  This is also the first time 
that this specific and critical question has been asked of a broad group of industry experts 
in an empirical research study.  Unless and until a research methodology can be 
determined to provide scientific proof of causality on the phenomenon of public company 
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decline, it is submitted that the opinions and perceptions of the specific classes of 
individuals who comprise the participants in the PCD Study certainly are more certainly 
accretive to understanding the nature of the phenomenon than the complete void of 
relevant data that existed before the PCD Study. 
In total, 330 respondents in the PCD Study provided some form of answer to Q17.  The 
responses to Q17 ranged in length from a few words to several hundred words.  Some 
responses proposed a single explanation for public company decline; others proposed 
several alternative or complementary explanations.  Clearly, the longer answers were 
from those respondents who feel more strongly about the topic and/or were less time-
pressed in completing the survey.  Ultimately, the combined responses created a 
significant amount of data to sift through in order to identify trends and themes. 
The first step in the analysis process was reviewing the responses in Q17 in detail in 
order to become familiar with the data and develop focus on the critical areas.  Next, a 
tentative master framework was created for organization and presentation of the data.  In 
this step, referred to as "coding" or "indexing", an iterative process was used in which a 
tentative master framework was created based on an initial review of the data. The master 
framework was then refined over several iterations as the data was indexed in detail. 
Ultimately, the master coding framework was finalized once the framework was 
determined to be sufficiently robust to accurately reflect all of the relevant responses. On 
a second pass through the data indexing process, any consequential amendments 
necessary to update the initial coding of responses were inputted to update the coding 
consistent with the final master framework template. 
The final coding master list utilized in the PCD Study analysis is as follows: 
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Figure 13, Q17- Text Coding Master List 
 
Text Answer Coding – Question 17 
Version 2- Multiple Answers Within Class Coded to “9” 
 
10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges 
 11. Complex / excessive regulation 
 12. Recent changes in securities regulations 
 13. Inefficiencies / duplications in securities 
regulations 
 14. Financial statement certification 
requirements 
 15. Change in accounting requirements 
 16. General regulatory/reporting overload 
 19.  Multiples from 10-16 
 
20. Public Company Costs 
 21. Continuous disclosure costs 
 22. IPO costs 
 29. Multiples from 20-22 
 
30. Private Capital Availability 
31. Private equity availability 
32. Cheap debt availability 
39. Multiples from 30-32 
 
40. Liquidity & Valuation Concerns 
41. Lack of SME analyst coverage 
42. Orphan stock / liquidity concerns 
43. Low valuation of SME’s in public 
markets 
44. Relatively higher valuation in private 
markets 
49. Multiples from 40-44 
 
50. Access to Capital 
 51. Cyclical nature of public markets 
 52. Availability of capital in public markets 
when needed at fair price 
 59. Multiples from 50-52 
 
60. Short Termism in Public Markets- Generally 
61. Quarterly target perseveration / 
Managing to analyst expectations 
62. Inability to manage for the long-term as 
a public company 
63. Private capital more patient than public 
capital 
69. Multiples from 60-62 
 
70. Short Termism in Public Markets- 
Shareholder Specific 
71. Short-sellers 
72. Day traders 
73. Program trading 
79. Multiples from 70-73 
 
80. Public Market Volatility 
 
90. Legal Risk in Public Markets 
 91. Securities class actions 
 99. Multiples from 90-91 
 
100. Management Time / Effort  
 101. General issues dealing with daily 
distractions of public company 
 102. Dealing with uninformed shareholders 
 103. Dealing with proxy advisors 
 104. Lack of time to focus on core business. 
 105. Time / effort of IPO process 
 109. Multiples from 100-105 
 
110. Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage  
 
120.  Social Agenda Weaponization (Social) 
 
130.  General Shareholder Activism (Economic) 
 
140. Reputational risks / scrutiny from public 
 
150. Management control loss 
 
160. Resale restrictions 
 
170. Resource-sector specific challenges 
 
180. Tax disincentives in public markets 
 
190.  Decline of market infrastructure to support 
public markets (small brokers) 
 
200.  Systemic Market Change 1- Technology 
change impact on public market 
 
210. Systemic Market Change 2- Shift of 
investment funds towards ETF/CEF’s 
 
220. Systemic Market Change 3- Increase in 
number of mega-companies offering quick exits 
at pre-IPO stage via acquisition 
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Readers may note that the breakdown of the data into categorical topics does not 
perfectly match the 10 categories of factors which were set out in Chapter 1 as the list of 
factors gleaned from the literature to explain public company decline.  This is because the 
decision was made to be more specific and granular in this instance, analyzing the PCD 
Study data, than in summarizing the literature, and not to limit the analysis to those 10 
specific categories.  However, all of the 22 different categories used in coding the PCD 
Study data are encompassed within the list of 10 categories of factors described in 
Chapter 1.  For example, both Category 10-Regulation and Reporting Challenges and 
Category 20- Public Company Costs are embedded within the regulatory overreach 
category from Chapter 1. 
In the PCD Study, coding of the data was relatively straightforward.  The process 
confirms that the universe of potential explanations for public company decline in 
Canada is, indeed, finite.  The list of 22 different topical categories in the master 
framework is able to satisfactorily encompass all the explanations posited by the 
respondent group in Q17 as potential factors impacting public company decline.410  As 
such, the master framework does not require the inclusion of the generic category of 
"other" as a catch-all for outlier answers not fitting within the defined categories.  
What, then, does the Q17 data tell us with respect to the beliefs of the Canadian business 
community as to the causes of public company decline?  In advance of the PCD Study, it 
was assumed that the twin issues of increasing regulatory compliance complexity and 
increasing public company costs would be the two most prominent factors observed in 
the Q17 responses, based on the notoriety of these two issues in the business media.  
Indeed, these issues did factor prominently into the survey responses.   
With respect to DG1- All Respondents, 47.0% of respondents made reference to 
Category 10- Regulatory and Reporting Challenges at some point in their answer to Q17. 
 
410 There were only two answers submitted by the respondents that do not fit within the 22 categories 
above, and the decision was made not to add an additional factor to reflect those responses.  Both of those 
responses referred to general government policies making Canadian companies less competitive 
internationally.  It was determined that this issue is outside the general scope of the PCD Study 
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Also, 42.4% of respondents referenced Category 20- Public Company Costs.  The 
percentage of respondents who cited either Category 10 or Category 20 in their answers 
is above the two-thirds threshold at 68.7%.  Clearly, this outcome demonstrates that the 
opinion of the significant number of academics outlined earlier in this Dissertation, who 
seek to downplay the role of increasing regulatory complexity and increasing costs as 
factors contributing to public company decline, is at odds with the perceptions of the 
senior decision-makers and public markets influencers reflected in the PCD Study.   
Simply stated, the PCD Study text response demonstrates that the twin factors of 
increasing regulatory complexity and increasing public company costs are perceived by 
those who serve in positions of significant influence within the Canadian business 
community as being important contributors to the public company decline phenomenon.  
Whether or not the academic community accepts those perceptions as properly founded, 
one fact is indisputable: the perceptions of the senior business decision-makers and public 
market influencers are critical in that these are the specific people who directly influence 
the ultimate decision of whether to pursue an IPO or keep a company private at the key 
inflection points of business development.  
A summary of the Q17 responses is as follows.  Responses coded to the general category 
heading (example, 10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges) are those that referred to the 
category at a general level.  Responses coded to the individual sub-topics within the 
category heading are those that referred to the specific sub-topic.  Categories ending in 
"9" were used as the repository for those responses that referred to multiple subgroups. 
Table 7, Q17- Summary of Responses by Category 
   DG1   
  All Respondents % 
10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges 21 6.4% 
11. Complex / excessive regulation 24 7.3% 
12. Recent changes in securities regulations 14 4.2% 
13. Inefficiencies / duplications in securities regulations 11 3.3% 
14. Financial statement certification requirements 1 0.3% 
15. Change in accounting requirements 4 1.2% 
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   DG1   
  All Respondents % 
16. General regulatory/reporting overload 64 19.4% 
19.  Multiples from 10-16 16 4.8% 
Total 10-19 155 47.0% 
  
      
20. Public Company Costs 78 23.6% 
21. Continuous disclosure costs 44 13.3% 
22. IPO costs 12 3.6% 
29. Multiples from 20-22 6 1.8% 
Total 20-29 140 42.4% 
      
30. Private Capital Availability 69 20.9% 
31. Private equity availability 74 22.4% 
32. Cheap debt availability 3 0.9% 
39. Multiples from 30-32 6 1.8% 
Total 30-39 152 46.1% 
      
40. Liquidity & Valuation Concerns 6 1.8% 
41. Lack of SME analyst coverage 5 1.5% 
42. Orphan stock / liquidity concerns 20 6.1% 
43. Low valuation of SME’s in public markets 12 3.6% 
44. Relatively higher valuation in private markets 33 10.0% 
49. Multiples from 40-44 2 0.6% 
Total 40-49 78 23.6% 
      
50. Access to Capital 5 1.5% 
51. Cyclical nature of public markets 3 0.9% 
52. Availability of capital in public markets when needed at fair price 12 3.6% 
59. Multiples from 50-52 1 0.3% 
Total 50-59 21 6.4% 
      
60. Short Termism in Public Markets- Generally 21 6.4% 
61. Quarterly target perseveration / Managing to analyst expectations 15 4.5% 
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   DG1   
  All Respondents % 
62. Inability to manage for the long-term as a public company 19 5.8% 
63. Private capital more patient than public capital 6 1.8% 
69. Multiples from 60-62 9 2.7% 
Total 60-69 70 21.2% 
      
70. Short Termism in Public Markets- Shareholder Specific 2 0.6% 
71. Short-sellers 6 1.8% 
72. Day traders 1 0.3% 
73. Program trading 1 0.3% 
79. Multiples from 70-73 0 0.0% 
Total 70-79 10 3.0% 
      
80. Public Market Volatility 14 4.2% 
      
90. Legal Risk in Public Markets 18 5.5% 
91. Securities class actions 4 1.2% 
99. Multiples from 90-91 0 0.0% 
Total 90-99 22 6.7% 
      
100. Management Time / Effort  7 2.1% 
101. General issues dealing with daily distractions of public company 21 6.4% 
102. Dealing with uninformed shareholders 8 2.4% 
103. Dealing with proxy advisors 4 1.2% 
104. Lack of time to focus on core business. 4 1.2% 
105. Time / effort of IPO process 10 3.0% 
109. Multiples from 100-105 6 1.8% 
Total 100-109 60 18.2% 
      
110. Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage  23 7.0% 
      
120.  Social Agenda Weaponization (Social) 2 0.6% 
      
130.  General Shareholder Activism (Economic) 11 3.3% 
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   DG1   
  All Respondents % 
      
140. Reputational risks / scrutiny from public 18 5.5% 
      
150. Management control loss 16 4.8% 
      
160. Resale restrictions 1 0.3% 
      
170. Resource-sector specific challenges 26 7.9% 
      
180. Tax disincentives in public markets 11 3.3% 
      
190.  Decline of market infrastructure to support public markets  
(small brokers) 11 3.3% 
      
200.  Systemic Market Change 1- Technology change impact on public 
market 7 2.1% 
      
210. Systemic Market Change 2- Shift of investment funds towards 
ETF/CEF’s 27 8.2% 
      
220. Systemic Market Change 3- Increase in number of mega-
companies offering quick exits at pre-IPO stage via acquisition 19 5.8% 
It is worth noting that, while 68.7% of all Q17 responses made some reference to 
regulatory challenges or public company costs, those two factors collectively were the 
first item cited in the response only in 33.0% of the total responses in the PCD Study.  In 
the other 67.0% of responses, the first item cited by more than two-thirds of the 
respondents had nothing to do with either regulatory challenges or public company costs. 
Notwithstanding the clear importance of regulatory challenges and public company cost 
issues as highlighted in this table, it is submitted that the headline observation from Q17 
of the PCD Study should be the unexpected prominence of a number of other key factors 
that the senior business decision-makers and public markets influencers believe are 
important contributing factors to public company decline.   
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The PCD Study data also make it clear that, in the opinion of the PCD Study participants, 
the public company decline phenomenon is not fully, or even principally, explained by 
the twin factors of regulatory cost and complexity.  Rather, it is clear from the response 
that the phenomenon of public company decline is multifactorial and highly complicated.  
While the prominence of those two particular factors was anticipated, the prominence of 
a number of other factors in the Q17 responses represented a significant surprise.   
Chief amongst the other categories of factors that were unexpectedly prominent is 
Category 30- Private Capital Availability.  The increased access to private equity capital 
and cheap debt financing was cited by 46.1% of respondents, essentially placing it in a tie 
with the regulatory challenges category as the most-cited factor.  In fact, each of 
Category 10 and Category 30 were the first factor cited in approximately one-quarter of 
the total text responses in the PCD Study (i.e., 24.5% of responses).  
This is particularly surprising given that increased access to alternative capital is not one 
of the factors that has been given much attention in the Canadian business and academic 
commentary on public company decline.  As discussed earlier in Chapter 2- Literature 
Review, the increased access to private capital is a factor that has recently been receiving 
attention in the U.S. academic literature, but that thread has not yet been picked up in 
Canada.411 
The prominence of this factor in the Q17 text responses is also notable because the 
increased availability of private financing intuitively operates independent of anything 
that has changed in terms of the public markets themselves in the past twenty years.  An 
increase in access to private capital does not infer that the experience of being a public 
company in Canada has itself changed over the period of public company decline, but it 
does indicate that the alternatives to going public have been increasingly accessible over 
that period.  Also, anyone observing the capital markets over the past number of years is 
aware that the multiples paid by private equity investors have increased as a result of the 
 
411 The leading advocates of the theory that increased availability of private equity is a principal cause of 
public decline in the U.S. are De Fontenay, Ewens and Farre-Mensas, supra notes 162 and 165. 
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increased competition for good deals, thus reducing the anticipated valuation differential 
between private and public transactions.   
Notably, reference to the private capital factor in Q17 was widely reflected across all the 
demographic subgroups represented in the survey.  Not surprisingly, it appeared most 
frequently in responses from DG5- Lawyers and DG9 Private Equity.  However, it was 
included as a factor in at least 20% of the responses of each of the 25 demographic 
subgroups tracked in the PCD Study, with the sole exception of DG13- Mining.412  The 
breadth of support for this factor from across multiple demographic subgroups has to 
increase the seriousness with which this factor is viewed as a major contributor to public 
company decline.   
While the increased availability of private capital does not directly impact the public 
markets experience, the PCD Study data demonstrates that there is a strong perception 
that private financing alternatives are both more readily accessible and comparatively 
more attractive than in the past.  Therefore, although the impact of increased availability 
of private capital is indirect on the public markets, it still may be one of the most 
important factors contributing to public company decline. The perceptions and 
implications of increased access to private capital are discussed in more detail later in this 
Dissertation in the quantitative analysis section.  Certainly, this is a factor in need of 
further empirical analysis to determine the extent to which the perceptions expressed in 
the PCD Study can be empirically validated. 
Next up for consideration are three different groups of factors that were included in the 
range of +/- twenty percent of the total responses: Category 40- Liquidity and Valuation 
Concerns (23.6%); Category 60- General Short-Termism in the Public Markets (21.2%); 
and Category 100- Management Time / Effort (18.2%).  The prominence of the first and 
 
412 Mining's lack of connection to increased availability of private equity in Canada is noted and discussed 
at some length later in this Dissertation.  The high-risk nature and long-horizon to positive cash-flow 
associated with exploration and development in mining makes it one of the Canadian industries least 
compatible with the traditional private equity funding model. 
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third categories in this group were anticipated based on the literature;413 the prominence 
of general short-termism as a major factor was, however, a significant surprise due to the 
limited ink given to this factor in the literature. 
Concerns regarding liquidity and valuation are not unique to the Canadian market, but 
their relative importance is generally perceived as being higher in Canada due to the 
smaller size of the Canadian economy, lower trading volumes on Canadian stock 
exchanges and the number of smaller companies listed on Canadian exchanges compared 
to the U.S.   The management time and effort associated with managing the public 
elements of a public company are often considered as an unwelcome distraction from 
focusing on growing the core business, a factor which has featured prominently in the 
business media analysis of public company decline.  As such, the only surprise in the 
Q17 responses on both of these factors is that they did not appear even more often. 
It is submitted that the unexpected prominence of market short-termism highlights that 
this group of concerns is becoming a bigger issue every year in the public markets even 
though it receives little attention in the academic and business literature.  Indeed, one of 
the items included in this particular category, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst 
targets, surprisingly ranks as the most important factor in the Q20 Likert Scale analysis of 
downside factors associated with the public markets.414   
The common theme of text responses relating to the factors within this category is that it 
is becoming increasingly difficult in Canada to manage public companies with a view to 
long-term value maximization, due to a number of different competing obligations 
pushing management towards placating short-term expectations.  This includes the 
specific issues of short-sellers, day-traders and program trading from Category 70- 
 
413 Including Tingle, supra note 4, and, particularly, in the financial media analysis in articles such as 
Burgess supra note 11. 
414 Although the fact that it was brought up by less than 5% of the respondents in Q17 indicates that it is 
not a factor which is at the forefront of everyone's mind on the topic without prompting, but is viewed as 
being materially important when provided as one of the available options. 
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Shareholder Short-Termism, in addition to the general short-termism issues falling under 
Category 60.  
The challenges associated with short-termism are complex, and a full analysis of the 
complexities, trendlines, causes and potential solutions to short-termism could alone 
support another Dissertation.  Short-termism is also inextricably linked to the increasing 
role of technology in business and our daily lives, for it is the advancing technology that 
places public information in our grasp instantaneously and feeds our belief that we are 
entitled to expect immediate returns.  For the sake of brevity in this analysis, however, it 
is sufficient to identify short-termism as a nascent issue of concern that is gaining in 
importance in the perception of key business decision-makers in terms of its impact on 
public company decline. 
Below these major categories discussed above are a number of other less publicized 
factors in the other categories listed in the table.  In the aggregate, each of these specific 
factors were not brought up by a large percentage of overall respondents in the PCD 
Study, but were still referenced by a sufficient number of different individuals that the 
factor cannot be dismissed as lacking importance as a potential contributing factor to 
public company decline.  In fact, 19 out of the 22 categories were brought up by at least 
10 different respondents on an unprompted basis and 12 out of the 22 categories were 
referenced by at least 20 different respondents in the PCD Study.   Once again, analysis 
of the PCD Study data points towards a complex and multifactorial phenomenon that will 
not be reversed or rectified by addressing a single contributing factor. 
Beyond the coding matrix analysis, a second methodology that is frequently applied to 
assess overall sentiment in qualitative research is the use of word clouds.  Word clouds 
visually show the frequency with which specific words are used in open-text responses, 
thereby providing a quick visual summary of overall sentiment of the respondent group.  
Word clouds also can reveal patterns in the responses that can guide us in deciding which 
topics merit more in-depth analysis.  With reference to the PCD Study, word clouds are 
particularly useful in comparing the difference in the sentiments and areas of focus 
between the different major demographic subgroups. 
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The following word clouds disclose words that appear at least 10 times in the responses 
of each demographic subgroup.  The larger that a word is represented in word cloud, the 
more times that it is used.   Certain ubiquitous terms that do not differentiate sentiment 
are excluded. Synonyms and alternate versions of words are combined. 415 
The following two word clouds reflect the text responses of the two subgroups of senior 
business decision-makers: 
Figure 14, Q17, Word Cloud, DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company 
   
What is observed in the figure above is that the DG4-TSX subgroup demonstrated a 
broader focus in terms of the content they discussed.  Both the DG4- TSX and DG5- 
 
415 Words excluded in word clouds: "public"; "private"; "company"; "companies"; "businesses"; 
"business"; "market"; "markets"; "corporation"; "corporate"; and "corporations" 
Words merged in word clouds, represented by the first word in each group: "costs, cost, costs"; 
"advantages, advantage, advantageous"; "actually, actual"; "conflicted, conflicts"; "concern, concerned"; 
"comply, compliance"; "complexity, complex, complexities"; "change, changed, changing, changes"; 
"challenges, challenge, challenging"; "additional, addition, added, additionally"; "compete, competition, 
competitive, competitors"; "controls, control"; "decision-maker, decision-making, decision, decisions"; 
"equities, equity"; "managers, manage, managing, managed, management"; "reasons, reason"; "regulations, 
regulation, regulated"; "accessible, access, accessing"; "availability, available"; "disclosures, disclosure"; 
"financing, financial"; "relates, relate, relation, relative, relevant, related"; "government, governance, 
governments, governing"; "increases, increased, increase, increasingly, increasing"; "investing, invest, 
invested"; "investments, investment"; "listed, listing, lists, listings" "strategy, strategic, strategies"; 
"shareholders, shareholder". 
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Private Company subgroups evidence a similar primary concern about the costs 
associated with being public, as well the impact of increased access to private capital to 
fund growth phases that historically would have required that a company pursue an IPO 
in order to secure. Both subgroups also express concern about the impact of increasing 
regulation on the public markets.  Clearly, the concept of quarterly reporting features 
more prominently in the responses of DG5- Private Company, whereas the continuous 
evolution of governance requirements features more prominently in the responses of 
DG4-TSX. 
The next four word clouds reflect the text responses of the four subgroups of public 
markets influencers: 
Figure 15 Q17, Word Clouds, Group II- Public Markets Influencers 
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From the word clouds above, we see that all of the subgroups of public markets 
influencers perceive increased access to alternative sources of private capital as a major 
factor to be considered.  Public company costs are most important to the DG7- Auditor 
subgroup, while liquidity has a greater prominence amongst DG8- Investment Bankers.  
Concerns about the requirements of disclosure are reflected only in the word cloud of 
DG-9 Private Equity investors. 
6.3- Question 24- Final Open Text Response Analysis 
Q24 is a simple catch-all open text question at the very end of the survey that provides a 
final opportunity for the respondents to convey any last information they wish to add 
after completion of the survey.  The text of Q24 is as follows: 
 
Q24: Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey.  It is 
greatly appreciated!  
 
From your knowledge and experiences, do you have any final thoughts 
that you would like to share with us on the topic of public company 
decline in Canada, the content or format of this survey or anything else 
that you would like to convey? 
It is apparent that the purpose of Q24 was broadly defined.  It was hoped that Q24 would 
solicit both positive and negative feedback on the survey, as well as suggestions on how 
the research efforts could be improved in further studies.  It was also hoped that the 
question would give respondents an opportunity to underline any specific insights that 
they had on the broader topic of public company decline, particularly on issues that they 
had been reminded of by the lists of potential factors outlined by the matrix questions in 
Q20 and Q21. 
A total of 134 responses were received on Q24, once again ranging from a few words to 
several paragraphs in length.  A common theme of the responses to Q24 is that the senior 
business decision-makers and public markets influencers, who took the time to add a 
second written text response after completing an admittedly lengthy survey, care deeply 
about the phenomenon of public company decline and are concerned about the trajectory 
of the public markets.  Many of the responses in Q24 took the opportunity to provide 
clarity on their hypothesis of the public company decline phenomenon and further 
238 
 
expound on their answers from Q17, many of which were very articulate and thought-
provoking.  A number of the responses commended the PCD Study initiative as being of 
vital importance and indicated that the writers looked forward to seeing the ultimate 
survey reports when published. 
Admittedly, several responses in Q24 provided constructive criticism of elements of the 
PCD Study design.  Mostly, these comments pointed out the challenges in answering the 
hypothetical valuation premium question in Q19, but a number provided suggestions as 
to refinement of the research methodology moving forward. 
Given the broad riverbanks provided to the respondents on this question, it was found 
that it is impractical to code the data in a similar manner to the methodology applied on 
Q17.   There is simply too much variation in the topics covered in the Q24 responses.   
As such, rather than trying to summarize the sentiments expressed in Q24, representative 
excerpts are provided so that readers of the Dissertation can view the comments as 
originally phrased.   
The following response excerpts from Q24 have been selected as being representative of 
the sentiments most commonly expressed by the respondents and reflect consistent 
themes that are repeated throughout the Q24 responses. 
Q24 Comments- Representative Comments 
Cost and disclosure overload make it cumbersome from a financial reporting perspective to go public. 
 
Although I see a decline in the interest of my clients to take their companies public and believe that 
some of this decline is a result of the regulatory environment, I do think that there are other key factors 
at stake. I believe that in the past businesses were taken public without a proper understanding by the 
ownership group of the other options available or what being public would mean long term.  
 
The rise of private equity and debt transactions has provided alternative financing routes that 
sometimes are simply better solutions than becoming public which better serves the long term interests 
of some businesses.  Additionally, I work with many enterprising families who have witnessed the loss 
of family legacy by a public transaction and in reflecting on this prefer to keep the ownership of their 
enterprises within their extended family. 
 
Being a small cap Canadian stock with little coverage holds scant appeal while private markets are so 
healthy. 
 
Consolidate Provincial Security Regulators to one National Regulator to reduce number of filings. 
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Q24 Comments- Representative Comments 
From an investor perspective, the clear trend is towards getting access to private company investments 
as a result of demonstrated historical return premiums v. public market investments - the trend towards 
increased private market investment will continue. 
 
I personally feel the regulators need to find ways to make going public more attractive by streamlining 
the process of listing and reducing the disclosure burden/scrutiny on companies to conform to 
institutional investor preferences (vs. minority retail). 
 
Unless the regulatory environment changes or the ability to raise capital in the private markets 
weakens, I would expect to see a continued reduction in the number of businesses who chose to become 
publicly traded. 
 
Through recent experience, I am very concerned that bureaucrats at the TSX have replaced any desire 
to facilitate the mutually beneficial capitalization and growth of business with a paternalistic desire and 
naive approach to protect small shareholders, not only through complex and redundant rules but also 
through the exercise of their discretion in many matters. 
 
There is no "light" version for smaller public reporting requirements. Be it a $50M market cap or much 
higher, all documents and reporting deadlines are the same. Public reporting takes away from the 
added-value work senior financial people should be doing. We do understand the requirement for 
strong guidelines to avoid issues that arise in the past and to protect investors, but it seems that the 
swing of the pendulum needs to come back slightly to the middle. 
 
The public markets increasingly have made sense only for the largest corporations. Mid-market 
companies (most of Canada, and particularly Western Canada) struggle to get the attention of investors, 
analysts and investment bankers. Without that attention, the ongoing value of the public listing is 
greatly diminished. 
 
Private markets are getting a lot more efficient and now offer many of the benefits that you used to only 
get through public markets: - you can get liquidity through secondary sales - decent access to growth 
capital - follow-ons are easy privately But with the more developed market also has greater demands as 
institutional private capital providers have rigorous reporting requirements so I'm not sure there is quite 
the difference vs. public. 
 
The next set of response excerpts from Q24 are chosen for inclusion because they 
represent novel opinions on the topic of public company decline that are unique and not 
reflective of other responses.  These particular responses evidence a deep consideration 
of the complicated nuances of the phenomenon. 
Q24 Comments- Novel Comments 
I think we should consider what is the appropriate scale required for a public company to exist 
successfully in the long run (enough trading volume, analysts, etc.) and work backwards from that to 
identify the right profile of companies to be public before assuming that public is always best option. 
 
Service providers out there generate fees from activity of going public so there is a perception that if 
anyone will take your money it's not because the business necessarily should be public. Canada can 
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Q24 Comments- Novel Comments 
have more public companies if it focuses on the right profile of public companies and builds the 
supporting conditions to identify those companies and make the transition easier for them. Part of this 
can happen naturally as more CEO stories on why they became public get out there or more education 
on the phases/alternatives of financing are understood. 
 
I don't believe the reduction is a result of securities regulation but rather market forces.  A review of the 
average size of a public company in the US vs a public company in Canada is a factor that should be 
reviewed.  Canada is a small-mid cap market vs the US which is mid-large cap.  A consolidation of 
capital on the buyside has influenced the ability of investors to invest in smaller cap companies.  I 
believe you will find a higher correlation in this than regulatory framework of the securities 
commissions.  Capital flows are also impacted by fiscal environment which in Canada is very high 
which increases the cost of doing business in Canada and inherently makes our businesses less 
competitive from a return standpoint.   (ie higher corporate taxes, greater government involvement in 
business, higher labor costs, increased government regulation and approval requirements = increased 
costs and lower revenues).  
 
Capital flows will not return to Canada until our business are able to generate more globally efficient 
returns.  We have the best technology in the world but are plagued by higher cost structures as a result 
of the above. 
There is also a systemic shift to larger capitalization companies with increased liquidity.  This trend 
will not reverse easily and is in large part a function of the ever increasing amount of passive investing 
(index or basket investing vs active portfolio management) and quantitative / technical investing (vs 
fundamental research) which requires increased market size and liquidity to smooth out the volatility 
generated by the velocity of capital flows moving into and out of a sector or stock. 
 
Your survey is focused primarily on the downsides of being a public company. I would encourage you 
to explore the key upsides of being a private company, particularly a private equity-backed company 
with access to the patient capital, strong, well-aligned governance and domain expertise of a hands-on, 
actively engaged board/shareholder group. In my opinion, the advantages of being private, as much as 
the clear disadvantages of being public, are now well-understood by top-tier management teams and are 
the primary driver of the shift towards private ownership. The other factor to bear in mind is that 
private equity-backed companies have outperformed the public markets over the past twenty years. 
This has attracted significant institutional capital to the private markets at the expense of the public 
markets. This tectonic shift in capital (which shows no signs of abating) will continue to reinforce the 
attractive opportunities for management teams in the private space. 
 
The costs of being public are real and I think underestimated by the majority of private companies. The 
public shareholder (in general) has changed from relationship managers to quant based short term 
traders. This has real implications for how you try and build a company in addition to all the 
implications for liquidity, compensation and ability to use paper to fund potential acquisitions (cost of 
capital). This is arguably one of the starkest differences between private equity backed businesses and 
the general public company today. 
 
I mostly advise public companies and only the occasional private company, but both are in my scope of 
activity.  I think there are a lot of human factors as mentioned earlier that will swing you one way or 
another between P/E and IPO. Age and stage and number of the principal shareholder(s). Size of the 
company and requirement for continuous capital investment to grow the business. Estate planning 
considerations. The often times considerable difference in valuation multiples between P/E and IPO.  
P/E investment structures are 5 to 10 years and then the business is sold (or IPO'd). With the IPO, if all 
goes well, you can be set for a very long time with ease of raising capital if your business is successful, 
both in financial terms and in the view of the capital markets. 
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Q24 Comments- Novel Comments 
One advantage of the public company route is that it allows for a faster migration of the shareholder 
base to investors that matter at different stages of growth.   
 
Conversely, private shareholders can be more supportive of a company whose strategy is to maximize 
market penetration at the expense of financial performance. 
 
Likely the most important reason for a decline in public companies is the very deep amount of capital 
in the private market combined with the reduced hassles of private ownership, however that is 
somewhat offset by the give-up of control to large private holders.  Only in the public market can you 
get differential voting shares. 
Overall, the Q24 responses offer a rich repository of data.  There is nothing in the 
question Q24 responses that contradict the overall sentiments expressed in Q17, but 
certain answers such as those included above provide significant additional context on the 
broader subject of public company decline.   
Although it is impractical to summarize all of the disparate comments in Q24 further 
given the restrictions of the Dissertation format, it is clear that these responses 
demonstrate the depth of the experience of the respondents in the capital markets and the 
extent to which they have given thought to the challenges of public company decline.   
Certainly, the depth and breadth of the qualitative data from Q17 and Q24 of the PCD 
Study is sufficiently rich that it could serve as the foundation for a stand-alone academic 
publication.  It is hoped that the opportunity arises in the future to revisit the qualitative 
data gleaned in Q17 and Q24 in analysis completed on a stand-alone basis, giving more 
space to discuss the nuances of the data and delving into greater detail with respect to the 
differences and similarities in priorities and perceptions across the various demographic 
groups and the relationship between the issues prioritized by each group.  
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 Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study Data 
7.1- Selecting and Applying the Appropriate Statistical Tests 
As stated in the earlier discussion on the nature of Likert Scale data, the different 
statistical tests that are used in the following analysis of the PCD Study are those that are 
deemed appropriate for the interpretation of ordinal data, summarized in the following 
paragraphs. 
 Two Proportions Z-Test 
The Two Proportions Z-Test is used to compare two different observed proportions to 
determine if a statistically significant difference exists.416  This can be used when you are 
comparing two different subgroup responses on a single question.   
In reference to the analysis of Likert Scale data, the Two Proportions Z-Test is generally 
used to compare whether the proportion of respondents who select “agree” or “strongly 
agree” in the 5-Point Likert Scale is significantly different between two groups.  
Likewise, you can also compare the proportions of the “disagree” or “strongly disagree” 
responses to see if there is a difference, or even whether there is a difference with respect 
to the strongly held opinions on the question (i.e., compare the “strongly agree” responses 
or the “strongly disagree” responses). 
Since we are only looking for a significant difference, not direction of the difference, the 
Two Proportions Z-Test is two-tailed, meaning that it allows for differences that are 
higher or lower between two samples. No pre-existing hypothesis as to which of the two 
observations should be higher or lower than the other is necessary. 
The most significant limitation of the Two Proportions Z-Test is that it focuses only one 
side of the data on a particular question at a time; i.e., those who agree or those who 
disagree, but not those who agree and those who disagree.  As such, it does not take into 
 
416 Jerold H. Zar, Biostatistical Analysis, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1998) 
at 555-557. 
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consideration the full range of the scale.  It is possible that a statistically significant 
difference could be observed on either the agree or disagree side of the responses on a 
single question, but not on the other.  The Two Proportions Z-Test also does not factor in 
the neutral responses, which is another limitation of the test. 
The Two Proportion Z-Test can also be a one-tailed test if there is a hypothesis 
explaining that one group’s proportion will be greater or less than another.  Rather than 
just testing whether a difference exists between the two statistics, it requires a pre-
existing hypothesis that predicts both the difference and the direction of the difference 
(higher or lower) in order for valid application.  A one-tailed test is more statistically 
powerful than a two-tailed test, since you do not have to consider the effect in the other 
direction.   
For simplicity in terminology, the reference to the Two Proportions Z-Test in this 
Dissertation will generally refer to the two-tailed test.  If a one-tailed Two Proportions Z-
test is being utilized anywhere in the analysis of PCD Study, that fact will be specifically 
stated. 
 Mann-Whitney Test 
The Mann-Whitney Test is also used to compare the significance of difference in 
outcomes on Likert Scale data between two groups answering the same question.417  It 
was discussed above that the two-tailed Two Proportions Z-Test has a number of 
limitations, particularly its inability to encompass the neutral responses and to consider 
both ends of the Likert Scale in the same calculation.  The Mann-Whitney Test does not 
suffer from these same limitations, and therefore is the preferred statistical test in 
comparing rankings by the two different groups.  
The limitation on the use of the Mann-Whitney Test is that it can only be applied on two 
different populations.  In other words, all of the respondents must fall into two mutually 
 
417 Ibid at 146-149. 
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exclusive and exhaustive categories for the Mann-Whitney Test to be applied.  In the 
PCD Study, this condition naturally exists when comparing Group I- Senior Decision-
Makers to Group II- Public Markets Influencers.  Within the subset of the PCD Study that 
is limited to Group I respondents, the condition also exists between DG4- TSX and DG5- 
Private Company respondents, and again between DG10-SME and DG11-Non-SME 
respondents.  For these pair analyses, the Mann-Whitney test is available and is applied 
as the preferred test during the PCD Study analysis discussion.  For all of the other linked 
demographic groups with three or more components, resort is made to the Two 
Proportions Z-Test.  
It should be noted that the data for the linked demographic subgroups with more than two 
constituents can be synthetically converted for Mann-Whitney use by defining two 
subgroups: one being an actual subgroup in the PCD Study, the other being the 
combination of all of the other linked subgroups within that grouping. However, this 
requires that a unique database be created for every Mann-Whitney test, and even then, 
the test is limited to comparing the particular subgroup response to all other responses 
and does not allow the test to be run between two existing subgroups.  As such, this 
methodology is not utilized in the PCD Study analysis. 
 Three Sample Tests: Kruskal Wallis Test and Chi Square Goodness 
of Fit Test 
Three samples (i.e. subgroups in the PCD Study) can be compared using the Kruskal 
Wallis Test.  This test compares the rankings of response to the three questions.  If the 
three samples are demonstrated to be different on a statistically significant basis, then a 
pairwise comparison is done as a follow-up calculation to determine which of the three 
samples are different. 
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Three samples can also be compared using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit test.  If the 
samples are demonstrated to be different, then a pair comparison is once again 
undertaken as a second step to determine which of the three are different.418 
 One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
The One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is used to compare an observed response to 
a hypothetical number of relevance.419  With reference to the PCD Study data, this test 
has material value in terms of comparing the Likert Scale data to the theoretical level of 
neutrality for Question 16 and Question 18.420  As such, the One Sample Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test is used in the PCD Study analysis to determine whether the overall 
sentiment expressed by a subgroup on a particular question generally can be calculated to 
represent a departure from neutrality on a statistically significant basis. 
 Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
The Spearman Rank Correlation Test is used to determine whether a statistically 
significant correlation exists between a specific group on two different questions.421  The 
correlations can be positive or negative.  The nature of the Spearman Rank Correlation 
Test is described in more detail later in this Dissertation in Chapter 8- Correlation in the 
PCD Study. 
 Confidence Levels and P-values 
The information most often reported in the statistical analysis of the PCD Study includes 
the confidence level and the P-values.  In statistical analysis, a P-value measures the 
 
418 Ibid at 562-563. 
419 Ibid at 110. 
420 This is appropriate when the middle selection on a particular Likert Scale is a neutral option, such as 
when the question is framed on an agree vs. disagree, or likely vs. unlikely, construct.  The relevance of 
this test is less obvious when the middle selection is “moderately important” on a scale between extremely 
important and not at all important, where moderately important does not imply neutrality. 
421 Supra note 416 at 395-396. 
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probability that a null hypothesis (i.e., that the two groups being compared have the same 
opinion on the particular question) is true.  Therefore, a researcher would look for a small 
P-value in order to be confident that the two groups being compared are actually 
different. 
A confidence level, such as a 90% confidence level, is reported as one minus the amount 
of Type 1 error allowed in the survey design.  Type 1 error is the chance of concluding 
that two things are different from each other when, in fact, they are not.  If the researcher 
is willing to be wrong a maximum of 10% of the time, then the researcher can dictate a 
90% confidence level, which is the level at which the researcher is 90% confident in his 
or her findings.  By extension, if a 95% confidence level is established, the researcher can 
be 95% confident that he or she is not concluding that two observations are different 
when they are not.  Another way to characterize a 95% confidence level is that it predicts 
that a difference observed between two groups in a particular test will be observed 95% 
of the time (i.e., 19 out of 20 times) in repeated samplings of the same population with 
different respondents comprising the survey participants. 
As long as the P-value is smaller than the Type 1 error allowed in the survey design, then 
the researcher can be confident that his or her findings are different, but only up to the 
confidence level specified.  For example, a P-value of 0.08 would indicate that there is a 
statistically significant difference at confidence level of 90%, but not for a confidence 
level of 95%.  The higher the P-value that is mandated by the research design, the lower 
the level of error that is accepted.  The amount of allowable error that is acceptable in the 
research design (and therefore what confidence levels are determined as acceptable by the 
research design) depends on the cost and/or risk associated with concluding that there is a 
difference between groups when there is not (Type 1 error) versus the cost and/or risk 
associated with concluding there is no difference between two groups when there is 
(Type II error). 
The ability to detect a difference in a sample, and then infer that difference also exists in 
the general population, depends on how big the sample size is and how big of a 
difference is observed in the samples.  Both of these factors are considered in comparing 
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the P-value to the Type 1 error.  Only when the P-values are less than the Type 1 error 
can the researcher be confident in his or her findings (which is often noted as constituting 
a statistically significant observation).  To be more confident in the findings (i.e., to 
establish results that are statistically significant at a higher confidence level) requires 
either a greater difference in the samples or a larger sample size. 
In the analysis of the PCD Study, reference to “weak statistical significance” will be used 
to describe differences that are detected at a 90% confidence level (but less than a 95% 
confidence level).  Reference to “strong statistical significance” will refer to differences 
that can be detected at or above a 99% confidence level).  Differences that can be 
detected between a 95% confidence level and a 99% confidence level are described as 
evidencing “moderate statistical significance”.  Obviously, the lower the P-value and the 
higher the confidence level associated with a particular observation of differences in the 
PCD Study data, the more influential the outcome and the increased reliance that can be 
placed on an observation. 
 Use of MANCOVA Calculations in PCD Study Analysis 
As previously discussed in section 5.16 hereof, the statistical analysis in this Dissertation 
generally applies analytical methodologies which are universally accepted as being 
appropriate for ordinal-level data, given the difference in opinion with academia as to 
whether the Likert-scale outputs should be used for tests designed for interval-level data.  
However, there is no question that additional meaning, at a big picture level, can be 
quickly extracted from the PCD Study data by applying the more powerful statistical tests 
designed for interval-data, particularly MANCOVA analysis. 
Ultimately, it was determined that MANCOVA calculations would be utilized for 
specific purposes in assessing the PCD Study data, but that those calculations, along with 
the bulk of the MANCOVA analysis, would be segregated in an appendix outside the 
main body of the Dissertation.  As such, Appendix 6 is dedicated specifically to the 
application of MANCOVA analysis of the PCD Study.  Appendix 6 also provides 
confidence interval charts (with reference to the mean) for all of the independent 
variables (i.e., demographic characteristics) that are determined to be statistically 
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significant in predicting outcomes on the Likert Scale questions after completion of the 
MANCOVA analysis. 
As a quick summary, MANCOVA provides a quick assessment of which independent 
variables in the PCD Study data can be used to predict variability within a particular 
dependent variable, after removing the variability impact of the confounding covariates.   
The independent variables of interest in the PCD Study data are all demographically 
defined, with the following five different sets of independent variables tested in 
MANCOVA calculations: (a) Group I respondents (i.e., senior business decision-makers) 
vs. Group II respondents (i.e., public markets influencers); (b) senior business decision- 
makers of SME’s vs. senior business decision-makers of non-SME’s; (c) senior business 
decision-makers of TSX-listed companies vs. senior business decision-makers of TSX-
eligible private companies; (d) the four types of public markets influencers; and (e) the 
six main respondent demographic sub-groups (senior business decision-makers of TSX-
listed companies, senior business decision-makers of TSX-eligible private companies, 
securities / corporate lawyers, auditors / public accountants, investment bankers and 
private equity investors). 
The dependent variables tested are the four major Likert Scale questions in the PCD 
Study: (a) Question 16 (with seven sub-questions); (b) Question 18 (with two sub-
questions); (c) Question 20 (with 31 factors assessed); and (d) Question 21 (with 14 
factors assessed). 
The five covariates tested were the following: (a) industry (Q13); (b) geography (Q23); 
(c) number of years of public company experience (Q22-3); (d) number of years of total 
career experience (Q22-1); and (e) SME / non-SME (combined Q7 and Q8).  Of these 
covariates tested, industry and SME / non-SME are only applicable as covariates for the 
Group I- Senior Business Decision-makers.  The other three covariates tested are relevant 
to all of the respondents in the PCD Study. 
All MANCOVA calculations were run in the R database, which runs four different 
variations of the MANCOVA tests: namely, Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s 
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Trace and Roy’s Largest Root.  In each MANCOVA calculation, any covariates 
determined not to be statistically significant as confounding factors at first instance were 
removed and the MANCOVA tests were re-run without those factors in order to increase 
the degrees of freedom in the calculation. 
The MANCOVA calculations were also used for enrichment of the data analysis process 
to provide a quick overview of the most influential independent variables after extraction 
of the impact of confounding covariates.  The outputs of the MANCOVA calculations in 
Appendix 6 were checked against the relevant statistical analysis contained in the body of 
the Dissertation to ensure that there were no material inconsistencies between the 
MANCOVA analysis and the other ordinal-appropriate calculations. 
The MANCOVA calculations do not constitute the core analysis of the PCD Study Data.  
Notably, application of MANCOVA calculations to ordinal-level variables can attenuate 
effect sizes such that Type II error rates increase, meaning that statistically significant 
variations may be missed in the MANCOVA analysis.  However, as the MANCOVA 
calculations included in Appendix 6 hereof are only being used to generate summary data 
and are used as a check on the other ordinal-appropriate statistical calculations utilized in 
the body of this Dissertation, it was considered appropriate to use MANCOVA for these 
specific purposes. 
The MANCOVA calculations in Appendix 6 were compared against the statistical 
analysis done using the interval-specific statistical tests that are applied throughout the 
body of the Dissertation. No material inconsistencies were identified between the 
MANCOVA analysis and the statistical analysis undertaken in the body of this 
Dissertation.  However, the MANCOVA data in Appendix 6 does offer a readily-
accessible high-level summary that is useful in attaining an overview of the variability in 
responses between the different demographic groups without going through the detailed 
data and charts that underpin the analysis in the body of the Dissertation. 
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7.2- Order of Analysis of Quantitative Elements of PCD Study 
Turning now to the analysis of the quantitative elements of the PCD Study, the following 
analysis sections begin with summary tables providing a general overview of the 
disposition of the PCD Study participants, as a whole, on the various questions.  After the 
summary tables, each question is analyzed in greater detail with respect to the variation in 
disposition amongst the 25 demographic subgroups tracked throughout the PCD Study. 
As a final note before delving into the quantitative analysis aspects of the PCD Study, it 
should be noted that the majority of the ensuing analysis in this Chapter 7 goes through 
the questions in sequential order.  However, the analysis of the various sub-questions 
embedded in Question 16 is undertaken out-of-sequence in order to group the questions 
according to topical heading.  Within each topic, the order or analysis is determined 
according to perceived importance of the question.  The following is the order in which 
the data derived from the sub-questions within Question 16 are analyzed and their 
grouping by topic: 
• Q16-1: General disposition towards relative long-term benefits of an IPO 
• Q16-7: Regulatory overreach hypothesis 
• Q16-3 & Q16-5: Impact of technology 
• Q16-4, Q16-2 & Q16-6: Impact of increased access to private equity 
It is worth noting, once again, that the question orders of the Question 16 sub-questions 
were scrambled in terms of their appearance in the online version of the PCD Study 
survey.  As such, the question numbering of the sub-questions only has relevance in 
terms of providing a reference for discussion in this analysis, as the question order does 
not reflect the order in which the sub-questions appeared to the PCD Study participants. 
7.3- Summary Charts for PCD Study Quantitative Questions 
The following tables summarizes the output of the PCD Data on the given main 
quantitative questions that were posed to all respondents in the PCD Study.   The sub-
questions within Question 16 are organized by topics.  Within each element of Question 
18 and Question 20, the various elements tested are presented in descending order of the 
mean for each variable / factor. The specific Likert Scales utilized in each instance are 
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also included above each question.  The minimum and maximum responses in each 
question ranged from 1 to 5.  
Table 8- Quantitative Summary Tables- Likert Scale- Question 16  
 
 
Table 9- Quantitative Summary Tables- Likert Scale- Question 18  
 
 
 
Table 10- Quantitative Summary Tables- Multiple Choice with Text Response- Question 19 
  
Likert 
Scale Used
Strongly Disagree / Disagree /  Neither Agree or Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree
      1                              2                             3                                        4                             5
Label Variable Mean Std Dev N=
Q16-1 Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages than disadvantages. 2.82 0.95 358
Q16-7
Securities regulators in Canada have been too aggressive in protecting public 
shareholder interests at the expense of public companies. 3.34 1.14 358
Q16-3
Technological advancements have made it harder for public companies to compete 
with private companies. 2.58 0.98 359
Q16-5
The rapid pace of technological change has made it more attractive for private 
companies to sell out to larger corporations rather than pursue their own IPO. 3.27 1.01 359
Q16-4
Private equity financing to fund company growth in Canada is significantly easier to 
access now than it used to be. 3.72 1.09 359
Q16-6
The decline in IPO volume is primarily attributable to the increased availability of 
private equity as an alternative. 3.37 1.1 359
Q16-2
Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only when private equity 
funding is not readily available. 2.95 1.13 358
General Disposition on the Net Advantages of an IPO
Regulatory Overreach Hypothesis
Impact of Technologial Advancements
Proliferation of Private Capital Alternatives
Likert 
Scale Used
Extremely Unlikely / Unlikely /  Neutral / Likely / Extremely Likely
      1                      2               3               4                     5
Label Variable- With reference to the hypothetical fact patttern outlined above …. Mean Std Dev N=
Q18-1 How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred course of action? 2.69 1.04 342
Q18-2
How likely are you to recommend the private equity option as ABC's preferred course 
of action? 3.61 0.95 343
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Q-19: How much would the pre-money valuation premium 
offered to ABC by an investment bank with respect to an IPO 
transaction need to exceed the pre-money valuation offered to 
ABC with respect to a private equity transaction in order to make 
the two alternatives equally attractive to you? 12.9% 9.6% 77.5% 26.6% 251
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Table 11- Quantitative Summary Tables- Question 20 
 
 
Likert 
Scale Used
Not at All Important / Moderately Important / Extremely Important
      1                      2               3               4                     5
Label
Variable- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are 
each of the following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO 
in your analysis? Mean Std Dev N=
Q20-23 The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets 3.97 1.03 333
Q20-7 The increased cost of continuous disclosure obligations due to regulatory changes 3.94 0.93 333
Q20-6 The complexity of continuous disclosure obligations arising from regulatory changes 3.81 1.02 333
Q20-5 Running a public company creating too many distractions for management 3.78 0.97 332
Q20-3 The cost that it takes to complete an IPO 3.68 1.04 333
Q20-19 Concern that being public leaves too little time for management to focus on the core 
business of the company 3.65 1.08 332
Q20-2 The management effort required to complete an IPO 3.53 1.13 333
Q20-10 Concern the company will be able to generate sufficient trading volume to keep 
shareholders happy 3.47 1.09 333
Q20-24 Redundancy of filing requirements for public companies 3.42 1.15 332
Q20-1 The time required to complete an IPO 3.39 1.09 333
Q20-9 The increased litigation risk associated with being public 3.38 1.07 333
Q20-31 Concern that being public will not ultimately provide quicker access to follow-on 
financing in the future 3.37 1.15 331
Q20-16 The challenges of competing against private companies that don't have to disclose 
any secrets 3.36 1.2 332
Q20-30 Overall fatigue arising from being a senior executive in a public company 3.26 1.2 333
Q20-15 The hassle of short-term traders looking for quick profits 3.22 1.1 333
Q20-11 Concern as to ability of company to maintain sufficient analyst coverage 3.16 1.09 333
Q20-26 The risk of proxy battles initiated by activist shareholder groups 3.06 1.06 333
Q20-13 The hassle of dealing with proxy advisory firms 3.01 1.13 333
Q20-28 The requirement to adopt corporate governance best practices that are continuously 
evolving 3.00 1.15 333
Q20-27 Having to listen and respond to the opinions of uninformed shareholders 2.99 1.22 333
Q20-12 Concern that the current regulatory environment favors minority investor protection 
above the interest of the public company 2.97 1.1 333
Q20-21 Increased risk to personal reputation being associated with a public company if things 
go bad 2.95 1.22 332
Q20-4 Executive compensation disclosure of public companies being overly invasive for 
management 2.95 1.13 333
Q20-25 An increase in short-sellers in the public markets 2.90 1.07 333
Q20-14 Fear that special interest groups will use public status to exert pressure on the 
company to adopt their agendas 2.88 1.12 333
Q20-17 Challenges for public companies to complete acquisitions efficiently due to Business 
Acquisition Report requirements 2.86 1.13 332
Q20-29 Risk of a hostile take-over 2.80 1.1 333
Q20-8 The requirement to file insider reports so that everyone is aware of management 
trading activities 2.63 1.17 333
Q20-23 Restrictions resulting from public conflict-of-interest regulations for related party 
transactions 2.59 1.08 332
Q20-20 Inability in a public company to keep personal income and shareholdings secret from 
family, friends and acquaintances. 2.56 1.18 333
Q20-18 The requirement of financial statement certifications by senior executives 2.55 1.15 333
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Table 12- Quantitative Summary Tables- Question 21 
 
 
7.4- Question 16-1: General Disposition on the Long-Term Net 
Benefits of an IPO 
“Q16-1: Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages 
than disadvantages” 
 General Observations and Statistical Analysis 
Q16-1 is one of the core questions of the survey.  This question tests overall perception 
on the relative merits of public markets, and whether going public is perceived as being a 
net benefit to a business over the long-term.  Respondents' perception on this question 
can be logically inferred to be linked to the likelihood that they will support an IPO 
alternative in the hypothetical situation posed later in the PCD and, more importantly, in 
the real-world of their daily business lives.422  Given that Q16-1 is viewed as core to 
understanding the phenomenon of public company decline, the breadth of the statistical 
 
422 By inference, individuals who answer more favorably on Q16-1 would be expected to be more likely to 
choose or recommend the going-public option at a key inflection point in a company’s growth cycle 
(reflected later in the PCD Study in Q18-1).  Conversely, individuals who answer more negatively on the 
net benefits of being public on Q16-1 would be expected to be less likely to choose or recommend the 
going public option.  See correlation analysis in Chapter 8 of this Dissertation for verification of this 
hypothesis. 
Label
Variable- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are 
each of the following potential upside opportunities associated with pursuing the TSX 
IPO in your analysis? Mean Std Dev N=
Q21-4 Easier ability to use public stock as currency for future acquisitions 4.01 0.93 329
Q21-5 Opportunity for founding shareholders to obtain liquidity for a portion of their 
investment 3.94 0.99 328
Q21-2 Anticipated higher valuation post-IPO 3.81 0.96 327
Q21-3 Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings 3.78 0.99 328
Q21-1 Higher pre-money valuation in an IPO than in a private equity financing 3.68 1.04 329
Q21-6 Increased ability to use stock options to recruit and retain key employees 3.67 0.98 329
Q21-14 Opportunity to grow the business to a more advanced stage of maturity 3.66 1.03 329
Q21-11 Enhanced credibility with potential investors 3.28 1.06 329
Q21-8 Increased public visibility as a public company with potential customers 3.12 1.1 329
Q21-9 Enhanced credibility as a public company with suppliers 2.89 1.14 329
Q21-7 Ability for the largest shareholders to keep stronger management control of ABC as a 
public company 2.88 1.12 328
Q21-12 Opportunity to increase your personal profile as a leader of a public company 2.38 1.18 329
Q21-10 You look forward to the challenges associated with managing a public company 2.26 1.08 329
Q21-13 Opportunity to increase effective voting control by diluting minority shareholder 
positions 2.19 0.95 327
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analysis discussed on this particular topic will be significantly more comprehensive than 
for questions viewed as less core. 
Looking at the first headline statistic, we immediately observe that the mean on Q16-1 
for DG1-All Respondents is at 2.82.  Considering the wording of the Likert options on 
Q16-1, it is obvious that neutrality on this question would be expressed at a mean of 
3.00.423  Therefore, the average score evidenced by respondents is lower than the level of 
theoretical neutrality.  That the PCD Study demonstrates a negative inclination on the 
proposition contained in Q16-1 is supported at a strong level of significance (Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test, P-value<0.001).  Only 23.5% of respondents in the PCD Study 
moderately or strongly agreed with the proposition that taking a company public is a net 
benefit to the corporation, whereas 37.4% of respondents expressed moderate or strong 
disagreement. 
The PCD Study data from Q16-1 reflects that a significant bias against the public markets 
exists in the current Canadian business environment.  Simply, amongst senior business 
decision-makers and public markets influencers, the group who believes that taking a 
company public in Canada is negative for the business over the long term is significantly 
larger than the group that believe it represents a net positive.   Unless these perceptions 
can be altered in the future at a fundamental level, the overriding negative perception on 
net benefit of public listing clearly bodes poorly for future IPO volume in Canada. 
Looking deeper, the negative inclination on Q16-1 is reflected in the responses from 19 
of the 25 demographic subgroups in the PCD Study.  Only six of the demographic 
subgroups tested scored Q16-1 with a mean at 3.0 or above, and the same six 
demographic subgroups were the only demographic subgroups where the percentage of 
respondents who agreed with the proposition was larger than the percentage of 
respondents who disagreed.424 
 
423 i.e., (3= Neither Agree or Disagree). 
424 DG19: Atlantic Provinces is excluded from the discussion on this question.  As discussed previously, 
the Atlantic Provinces is an undersized respondent group (N=19) and over-weighted with representation 
from DG6: Lawyers (N=6) and DG7: Auditors (N=9).  As both of these subgroups are also positively 
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Table 13, Six most favorable demographic subgroups on Q16-1 
 
It should be noted that, for the above six demographic subgroups that scored at 3.00 or 
above on mean on Q16-1, none can be demonstrated to have a positive disposition on this 
question above the minimum acceptable level of statistical significance (i.e., 90% 
confidence level) stipulated in this Dissertation. 
Compared to the top six demographic subgroups, the bottom six demographic subgroups 
(in terms of their responses on Q16-1) exhibit a much higher degree of statistical 
strength.  Each of the bottom six demographic subgroups evidence a negative deviation 
from the theoretical neutral position (i.e., 3.00) with a strong level of statistical 
significance.  The lowest level of statistical significance in the following table is for the 
DG10-SME subgroup (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, P-value<0.001), which still exceeds 
the threshold of a 99.9% confidence level.  The rest of the p-values are even smaller, 
thereby allowing us to confirm a deviation from the neutral position with a high level of 
confidence. 
Table 14, Question 16-1, Six least favorable demographic subgroups 
 
To summarize the statistical outcome on Q16-1, the negative disposition of the bottom 
six demographic subgroups can be validated as being strongly statistically significant as 
 
disposed towards Q16-1, we are unable to decipher any meaningful geographic data about the Atlantic 
Provinces on this question based on the confounding impact of these non-geographic factors. 
DG
Group # Demographic Group Category
Strongly Agree + Agree
5 or 4
3 Neither Agree 
or Disagree
Strongly Disagree + Disagree
1 or 2 Mean N
6 Lawyers 34.1% 40.9% 25.0% 3.14 44
13 Mining 38.2% 32.4% 29.4% 3.09 34
8 Investment Bankers 35.4% 37.5% 27.1% 3.06 48
4 TSX 32.0% 42.3% 25.8% 3.03 97
25 Extensive Pubco Experience 30.8% 42.0% 27.3% 3.01 143
7 Auditors 25.6% 53.8% 20.5% 3.00 39
DG
Group # Demographic Group Category
Strongly Agree + Agree
5 or 4
3 Neither Agree 
or Disagree
Strongly Disagree + Disagree
1 or 2 Mean N
5 Private Company 8.5% 28.2% 63.4% 2.34 71
9 Private Equity 8.5% 37.3% 54.2% 2.47 59
23 Limited Pubco Experience 12.6% 33.0% 54.4% 2.50 103
10 SME 16.9% 30.8% 52.3% 2.60 65
14 Non-Resource 18.6% 33.0% 48.5% 2.61 96
16 Prairies 17.0% 39.4% 43.6% 2.61 95
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compared to the hypothetical neutral position, while the positive disposition of the top six 
demographic subgroups cannot.  This is not particularly surprising considering the overall 
negative inclination of respondents on the question discussed above.  Nevertheless, it is 
an important observation and valuable in explaining the perception issue that is one of the 
main impediments to increased IPO activity. 
The specific identity of the top six demographic subgroups and the bottom six 
demographic subgroups is also of interest, and will be addressed in the following section 
on linked subgroup observation and analysis. 
 Linked Subgroup Observations and Statistical Analysis 
Group I v. Group II- On the Group I vs. Group II dichotomy, we observe from the 
following figure that Group II (public company influencers) appears slightly more 
favorable than Group I (senior business decision-makers) on Q16-1. 
Figure 16,Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Group I v. Group II 
 
However, the relatively small variation between these two groups does not meet the 
minimum significance test for us to conclude that there is a difference between Group I 
and Group II on Q16-1 at a statistically significant level (Mann-Whitney Test; P-
value=0.1416).  As such, the important differences between the various demographic 
groups are not inherently manifested at the level of the Group I vs. Group II analysis.   
This may initially appear to be a surprising outcome, but consideration of the make-up of 
each of these two main groups provides an explanation.  Each of Group I and Group II 
are comprised of specific subgroups that are inherently either more significantly positive 
or more negative on Q16-1 than the PCD Study average on this question.  If we consider 
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Group I and Group II only at the composite level, the difference in predispositions of the 
component subgroups are largely obscured.  It is only when we break down each of 
Group I and Group II further and conduct the analysis by subgroups that the statistically 
significant differences are manifested.  Recognizing that this "cancelling out" effect is 
occurring within the larger groups in Q16-1 is a clear reminder as to why a fulsome 
analysis of the dataset in the PCD Study requires a disciplined approach that assesses the 
subgroups at various levels in the search for significant observations.   
Group I: TSX v. Private- At this more granular level of analysis, one of the key 
observations linked to a recurrent theme in the PCD Study data comes into focus.  When 
comparing the senior business decision makers of public and private companies, we 
observe with reference to the mean that DG4-TSX (mean=3.03) is notably more 
favorable on Q1-16 than DG5-Private Company (mean=2.34). 
Figure 17, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Group I, TSX-Listed v. Private Company 
 
On a statistical basis, the difference between these two outcomes is strongly significant 
(Mann-Whitney Test, p<0.0001), which would support a confidence level greater than 
99.99%. 
This outcome demonstrates that senior decision-makers of existing TSX public 
companies are materially more positive on the long-term net benefits of taking a 
company public than senior-decision makers of private companies.   
Why is this the case?  There are two potential explanations.  Does increased familiarity 
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with the public markets (i.e., better information and a higher level of personal experience) 
lead to improved perceptions with respect to the net advantages of the public markets?  
Or, alternatively, do the senior decision-makers who are more predisposed to perceive 
public markets positively naturally gravitate towards being involved in public companies, 
while senior decision-makers who are more negatively disposed towards public markets 
stay away from being involved in public companies?  Although we see correlation 
between experience in public markets and positivity towards public markets, the research 
is not designed to establish causality that would prove either of those alternative 
explanations of this outcome.   Further details on the potential explanations of this 
correlation occur later in the analysis of the PCD Study.  The linkage between increased 
familiarity with public companies and positivity towards public companies recurs as a 
theme throughout the PCD Study data. 
Finally, on this particular observation, it should be pointed out that, even though DG4- 
TSX is significantly more positive on the topic of the net benefits of being a public 
company than DG5-Private Company, it would be inaccurate to state that DG4-TSX is 
positively disposed on the point.  With a mean at 3.03, it is apparent that DG4-TSX is 
essentially neutral on the net benefits of public companies.  The reason that DG 4-TSX is 
significantly more positive than DG5-Private Company is because DG5-Private 
Company is the most negative of any demographic subgroup on any component of 
Question 16.425  Only 7.4% of the DG5-Private Company respondents (or approximately 
1 in 14 individuals) agreed that the being public was a net long-term value.   
Relevant to consider with respect to this particular observation is that it does not matter if 
these DG-5 Private Company respondents can be proven objectively correct in their 
belief that being public has more downside than upside in the long term.  The point of the 
question is to establish perceptions, not objective truth.  It is the perception of the public 
markets that is most significant here.  That DG5-Private is so negatively disposed on this 
topic demonstrates again the depth of the negative perception challenge facing the TSX 
 
425 The mean of DG5- Private Company on Q16-1 is 2.34. 
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in convincing senior decision makers of private Canadian companies to consider an IPO. 
Group II Constituents-  The headline statistic amongst the constituent subgroups that 
collectively form DG3- Group II is that DG6- Lawyers, DG 7-Accountants and DG 8-
Investment Banks are all notably more favorable in their disposition on Q16-1 than DG9-
Private Equity investors (means of 3.14, 3.00 and 3.06 respectively vs. 2.47). 
Figure 18, Q1: Linked Subgroups- Group II, Public Company Influencers 
 
The observed difference between DG9- Private Equity and the other three DG subgroups 
making up the remainder of DG3- Group II supports a strong level of statistical 
significance (Mann-Whitney Test, p<.0001).   Using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test 
followed by pairwise tests on each of the various subgroups further confirms that DG9- 
Private Equity is significantly more negative on Q16-1 than the other three subgroups 
comprising DG3- Group II. 
Utilizing the Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test to analyze the responses of DG6- Lawyers, 
DG7- Auditors and DG8- Investment Bankers on Q16-1, we can determine that none of 
these three subgroups evidences a statistically significant variation from the other two (P-
value=0.0234).   
It is not particularly surprising that the DG9- Private Equity subgroup evidences a 
significantly more negative view in Q16-1 on the net benefits of becoming a public 
company than the other three subgroups of public market influencers.  Private equity is 
often viewed as a direct competitor to the public markets on the same potential deals.  
Yet, the degree to which private equity evidences negativity towards the public markets 
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in Q16-1 should be concerning for public markets advocates. 
Also worth noting, private equity firms are not always competitors to the public markets 
as the two alternatives for a company to consider.  On occasion, private equity firms rely 
on the public markets in order to secure liquidity for their private company investments 
by completing an IPO.   
Once again, it is important not to confuse the fact that lawyers, auditors and investment 
bankers are significantly more positive on Q16-1 than private equity investors as 
indicating that they are overall positive towards the public markets as subgroups.  As 
previously discussed, although these three subgroups are in the six top subgroups in terms 
of the median score on Q16-1, none of them can be demonstrated to have a statistically 
significant variation from the neutral position.  To the extent that they are more positive 
than the other subgroups in the PCD Study, one wonders to what extent the perceptions 
of the lawyers, auditors and investment bankers are influenced by the financial self-
interest of each subgroup resulting from the transaction revenue generated by IPOs and 
the higher compliance revenue (for lawyers and accountants) generated by public clients.   
Of course, as one would anticipate, the subgroups of lawyers, auditors and investment 
bankers in the PCD Study also include a higher percentage of individuals with significant 
public company experience than either DG9- Private Equity or DG5- Private Company.  
The theme in the PCD Study data that increased experience in public companies 
improves perception of public markets is a thread seen throughout the Dissertation. 
Company Size- DG10-SME’s are observed in the chart below to be less favorable on 
Q16-1 than DG11-Non-SME (mean 2.60 vs. 2.85).  The difference between the two 
subgroups is statistically significant on the disagree / strongly disagree side of the scale at 
a 95% confidence level (Two Proportion Z-Test, P-value= 0.0355).   That respondents in 
subgroup DG10-SME's are less favorably disposed towards public markets than non-
SME's is another theme observed in multiple instances in the PCD Study. 
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Figure 19, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Company Size 
 
Industry- We observe, with reference to the mean, that DG13-Mining appears more 
favorable on Q16-1 than DG14-Non-Resources (mean of 3.09 vs. 2.61).  The mean for 
the third subgroup, DG12-O&G, is between the other two, slightly below the overall 
respondent average on Q16-1 (2.76 vs. 2.82).  Applying statistical analysis, however,  it 
is determined that any differences between the three groups are not significantly different 
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.2011) 
Figure 20, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Industry 
 
The fact that DG12-Oil & Gas and DG13-Mining cannot be proven to be different from 
DG14-Non-Resource on a statistically significant basis is, in and of itself, an interesting 
outcome in the PCD Study.  Both the oil & gas and mining sectors have come through a 
challenging commodity cycle over the past five years, generally faring poorly in the 
public markets as a result.  Liquidity and enterprise valuation have both suffered 
significantly during this cycle.  Orphan stocks have become common place. These two 
extractive industries have traditionally been core to the Canadian public markets 
generally, and the high-risk portion of investment portfolios specifically, but have clearly 
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struggled to retain the attention of the public markets investors who have migrated their 
high-risk portfolio attention to cannabis and blockchain during those recent boom cycles.  
On the flip-side, it has been previously discussed in this Dissertation that non-resource 
sectors in Canada have generally seen steady growth over the past five years.  As such, 
one might anticipate that both of these extractive sector industries would evidence a 
significantly more negative perception of the relative benefits of taking a company public 
than non-resource sectors.  Yet the PCD Study does not demonstrate the anticipated 
result.   
A hypothesis to explain the observed outcome is that the junior capital markets in Canada 
have historically been acknowledged as one of the premier mechanisms for raising high-
risk mining exploration capital in the world.  The inherent nature of mining exploration in 
Canada has traditionally made early stage exploration and development efforts too risky 
for all other avenues of financing.  Speculators place small bets on mining stocks on the 
junior markets with the hope of windfall returns for the rare successful discoveries, but 
the understanding is that the vast majority of exploration-stage mining ventures will 
ultimately fail.  As such, investment in mining exploration is often perceived as being 
more a form of legalized gambling than disciplined investing.  Individual investors are 
often only willing to bet small amounts of capital on any particular venture given the 
inherent risk, meaning that the funds to pursue mining exploration need to be raised from 
a large number of investors each investing a small amount of high risk capital they are 
willing to lose in its entirety.  This is certainly not the type of investment for which 
private equity is generally competing, and therefore the public market is often the only 
option still available for this type of financing.  If we look at the small-sized IPOs that 
have been completed in Canada in 2019 on the TSXV and CSE, we see that these are 
indeed heavily weighted towards mining exploration, making junior mining exploration 
the only new-listings sector in Canada with even the hint of a pulse this year.  In this 
light, it is not surprising that the senior decision-makers of TSX mining companies retain 
a higher degree of belief in the net benefit of taking a company public than non-resource 
companies for whom multiple non-public financing options are available. 
Geographic Location-  In analyzing the geographically-defined demographic subgroups 
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from a statistical basis, we are forced to largely ignore individual subgroup analysis of  
DG18-Quebec and DG19-Maritmes in our analysis of all but the largest variations 
because of the small sample sizes of these two particular subgroups.  These two 
subgroups are simply too small in size to support statistically significant observations in 
most instances. 
Figure 21, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Geographic Location 
 
Referring first to the mean as a guide pointing towards any testable observations on 
geographic differences, its is noted that DG16-Prairies is lower than any of the other 
geographic areas (mean of 2.61 for Prairies vs. means of 2.83 and above for all other 
regions).   Is this a sufficient variance to constitute statistical significance?  Compared to 
all other regions, the DG16-Prairies difference fails to meet the minimum level of 
significance at 90% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.1377).  As 
such, the PCD Study data does not support any statistically significant observations based 
on geographic subgroups.   This result is in and of itself worth noting, as it evidences that 
general negative perception of the respondents on Q16-1 is reflected across the entire 
country with no demographic group having a mean above 2.88. 
Total Career Experience-  A quick look to the mean for the demographic subgroups 
defined by total career experience appears to indicate that individuals with more overall 
career experience are less inclined to believe that being public offers more long-term 
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advantages than disadvantages.426  However, the differences are not sufficient to reach 
the minimal level of statistical significance under the Kruskal Wallis test (P-value= 
0.7571). 
Figure 22, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Career Experience 
 
Pubco Experience-  With respect to the demographic subgroups defined by total years of 
experience working with, or advising, public companies, the opposite trend appears 
compared to what was observed in the analysis on total career experience.427  The mean 
in Q16-1 (and the degree of favourablity towards taking a company public) increases as 
the level of experience working with public companies increases.   
Looking at the three-group comparison test, we see that there is a difference between the 
three subgroups at strong level of significance (Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0071).   In 
fact, the difference between DG23-Limited Pubco Experience and DG24-Moderate 
Pubco Experience and the difference from DG24 to DG-25 Extensive Public Experience 
are both statistically significant (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.054 and 0.042, 
respectively). 
 
426 Mean=2.98 for DG20- Early Career, 2.86 for DG21- Mid-Career and 2.71 for the three groups. 
427 Mean = 2.50 for DG23- Minimal Pubco Experience, 2.85 for DG24- Moderate Pubco Experience and 
3.01 for Extensive Pubco Experience. 
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Figure 23, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience 
 
Once again, we are faced with the recurrent theme that increased exposure to public 
companies improves the disposition of the respondents to public markets.  A possible 
explanation is that increasing familiarity with public companies increases the 
understanding of the benefits associated with being public, while simultaneously 
reducing concerns about the downsides.    
One may infer from the PCD Study data that experience with public companies is a more 
influential factor than general career experience, and may even act as a countervailing 
force.  This hypothesis is supported by the following chart, which reports the responses 
on Q16-1 for those respondents who have more than 25 years of overall career 
experience, but five years or less of experience being involved with public companies.  
For this subgroup, the mean on Q16-1 drops to 2.41, indicating that public company 
experience is a moderating and countervailing factor on overall experience that leads to 
greater support for public companies.   
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Figure 24, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- DG22- Late Career, but limited public company experience 
 
 Implications of PCD Study Outcomes for Public Company Decline 
Analysis 
Ultimately, consideration of the data on Q16-1 in the PCD Study gets straight to the core 
of the issue of public company decline in Canada.   The key decision-makers and 
influencers in Canadian capital markets simply do not, on the average, believe that taking 
a company public in Canada offers a net long-term advantage. 
Everyone who has been through the IPO process understands that completing an IPO is a 
difficult, time-consuming and expensive process.  This is especially true for SME's, for 
whom senior management time and attention is a finite resource.  Distractions associated 
with completing an IPO frequently lead to a short-term deterioration in operating results 
due to the distraction of senior management away from the profitability of the core 
business operations during the IPO process. 
Logic dictates that completing an IPO will almost never be the path of least resistance for 
a company.  Rather, the IPO options will likely be amongst the most challenging and 
time-consuming of the alternatives under consideration.   In order to justify committing to 
the challenges, distraction, and cost of an IPO, there needs to be a significant consensus 
amongst the collective group of decision-makers that the IPO alternative will deliver a 
long-term net benefit to the company.  
Moreover, the decision to pursue an IPO is rarely made by a single decision-maker within 
an organization.  Unless the IPO mandate is forced on a company through a shareholder 
exercising compulsory registration rights, the decision to pursue an IPO is usually 
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reached only after an extensive consultative process in which the C-Suite executives, 
company directors and significant shareholders take advice from the lawyers, auditors, 
accountants and investment bankers.   
If more negative opinions than positive opinions are being voiced around the discussion 
table in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing the IPO option, it is 
difficult to build the consensus necessary to commit to the IPO process.  The data from 
the PCD Study indicate that there are likely to be significantly more negative opinions 
expressed within the decision-making team than positive opinions on the IPO question 
over the entire group of participants (37.4% negative compared to 23.5% positive). The 
PCD Study also evidences a significant cohort who are neutral on the proposition in Q16-
1 (i.e., 39.1%).  As such, the cohort of respondents who support the IPO process (23.5% 
in the PCD Study) need to be sufficiently committed to the IPO process to overcome both 
the negative and the ambivalent opinions being voiced in the decision-making process 
(who combined, represent 76.5% in the PCD Study). 
Being in the minority, it is likely that the IPO proponents in a specific company are going 
to have to feel strongly about the merits of completing an IPO in order to overcome the 
more numerous voices who are negative or ambivalent towards the IPO option.  Someone 
in a position of significant influence with the company must champion the IPO option 
internally and secure the consensus needed to initiate the process.  How many of these 
potential champions are out there? In the PCD Study, only 3.1% of all respondents 
indicated that they strongly agreed with the proposition in Q16-1.  This is less than half 
the number of respondents who strongly disagreed on Q16-1.  Moreover, no single 
demographic subgroup had more than 6.3% who strongly agreed that taking a company 
public offered a long-term net benefit.   
With this low of a level of strong agreement for Q16-1, the pool of individuals willing to 
be the internal champion for advancing the IPO initiative within the organization is 
worryingly small.  As such, the overall bias against IPOs demonstrated in Q16-1 of the 
PCD demonstrates the size of the hurdle that public markets proponents in Canada face in 
the current environment. 
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7.5-  Question 16-7: Regulatory Overreach 
“Q16-7: Securities regulators in Canada have been too aggressive in 
protecting public shareholder interests at the expense of public 
companies.” 
 General Observations and Statistical Analysis 
This question is also considered fundamental to the PCD Study, as it is the clear 
expression of the regulatory overreach hypothesis.  Respondents who agree or strongly 
agree with the proposition in Q16-7 evidence a belief that the Canadian securities 
commissions and stock exchanges have missed the mark in balancing the competing 
interests between efficiency and ease of compliance in IPOs, transactional reporting and 
continuous disclosure reporting, on the one side, and the interests of protecting public 
shareholder interests and the integrity of the public markets on the other side.  Again, the 
statistical analysis will be more detailed on this particular question because of the fact 
that it is identified as core to understanding the nature of the public company decline 
phenomenon in Canada. 
The first item of note at a surface level is that the mean on this question is 3.34, 
demonstrating a notable level of support for the proposition in Q16-7 across the study. 
Across the entire PCD Study, nearly twice as many participants agreed /strongly agreed 
with the regulatory overreach hypothesis than disagreed / strongly disagreed.428  On the 
two extremes of the Likert scale, the difference was even greater for Q16-7; 17.0% of all 
respondents strongly agreed with the proposition while only 5.9% expressing strong 
disagreement with the proposition.  The difference between the observed responses in the 
PCD Study and the neutral value of 3.00 is strongly significant, which would achieve a 
confidence level greater than 99.99% (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, 
p<.00001). 
The next observation that jumps out from the PCD Study data on Q16-7 is that only a 
single demographic subgroup, DG20- Early-Career, out of the 25 different demographic 
 
428 The percentage of respondents who chose 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree) on Q16-7 was 48.0% 
compared to 25.2% who chose 2 (disagree) or 1 (strongly disagree). 
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subgroups considered, produced a mean (2.89) lower than the neutral mean of 3.00.  
However, even this lone subgroup cannot be claimed to be lower than the neutral mean 
on a statistically significant basis (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, P-
value=0.2365).  
Looking elsewhere for groups that are less harshly disposed towards the actions of the 
regulators, only one other DG included in the PCD Study exhibited a higher percentage 
of "disagree" answers than "agree" answers on Q16-7.429  DG 15- Investment Bankers 
ended up with 35.5% selecting either 4 or 5 vs. 41.7% selecting 1 or 2, but this group also 
included a higher number of respondents who strongly agreed with the proposition 
(18.8%) than those who strongly disagreed with it (10.4%).  As such, the mean for DG8- 
Investment Bankers was at 3.02.   
On the whole, anyone combing the data in the PCD Study searching for any demographic 
subgroup who comes to the defence of the Canadian securities regulators and disagrees 
with the regulatory overreach hypothesis on a statistically significant basis will be left 
empty-handed. 
 Linked Subgroup Observations and Statistical Analysis 
Group I v. II-  DG2- Group I decision makers scored notably higher in mean on Q16-7 
than DG-3 Group II Influencers. (3.54 mean v. 3.17 mean).  The difference between the 
two groups is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level (Mann-Whitney Test, P-
value=0.0021).   
That DG2- Group I respondents in the PCD Study hold a position on the regulatory 
overreach statement that is notably different than that of DG3- Group II is not surprising. 
The direction of the difference is also not surprising.  After all, one must recognize that 
there is a fundamental distinction between being a decision-maker in a public company 
paying the professional services invoice for continuous disclosure or transactional advice 
 
429 I.e., Those who chose 1 (strongly disagree) or 2 (disagree) versus those who chose 5(strongly agree) or 
4 (agree) on Q16-7. 
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and support, on the one hand, and being the service provider who relies on that fee 
revenue, on the other hand.  As such, it is expected that DG2- Group 1 respondents would 
be more disposed to agree with the proposition in Q16-7. 
Figure 25, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Group I vs Group II Respondents 
 
However, this outcome also demonstrates two inherent problems in the current capital 
markets environment that should be keeping the securities regulators awake at night.  
First, it is the members of the DG2- Group I cohort who make the final decisions about 
whether to pursue an IPO or stay private.  With a mean of 3.54 on Q16-7, it has to be 
concluded that there is a strong level of support for the regulatory overreach hypothesis 
amongst the PCD Study cohort whose opinions matter the most in understanding the 
public company decline phenomenon.   
Secondly, the outcome on Q16-7 specifically demonstrates the risks in pursuing a 
consultation process intended to instruct regulatory streamlining initiatives without 
sufficient participation from senior business decision-makers in Canada.  The nature of 
these processes is discussed earlier in this Dissertation under Chapter 4- Analysis of the 
CSA and OSC Regulatory Processes, and the implications of the PCD Study outcomes on 
these processes are discussed later under Chapter 10- Implications of the PCD Study for 
Regulatory Reform Initiatives.  However, it is clear that relying primarily on the 
voluntary input of individuals and organizations who respond to the requests for 
comments sent out by the securities regulators, and are disproportionately weighted 
towards public markets influencers and against senior business decision-makers, will 
result in the regulators relying on comments that do not accurately reflect the view of the 
critical population of senior business decision-makers in Canada. 
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Group I, Public v. Private- This is one of the most interesting and unexpected 
observations in the entire PCD Study.  It should also be one of the most sobering 
observations for provincial securities regulators throughout Canada.  In the preceding 
discussion on Q16-1, it was reported that DG4- TSX is one of the subgroups that 
demonstrated the most favorable disposition in accepting the proposition that taking a 
company public provides more long-term advantages than disadvantages (mean 3.01).  
Now, in our analysis of Q16-7, we observe that DG4- TSX also is one of the most 
favorable demographic subgroups in terms of supporting the proposition that Canadian 
securities regulators have missed the mark in striking the appropriate balance between the 
competing interests of public issuers and public shareholders, having tipped the balance 
too far towards shareholder protection.430 
Figure 26, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- TSX-Listed vs. Private Respondents 
 
Some might interpret these two outcomes for DG4-TSX on Q16-1 and Q16-7 as hinting 
at a paradox.  However, that is not true.  It was hypothesized in the analysis on Q16-1 
that the most intuitive explanation of the fact that senior decision-makers of TSX-listed 
companies were more positively disposed to the public markets than other subgroups in 
the PCD Study was as a result of their increased knowledge and familiarity with the 
public markets.  The perceptions of DG4-TSX participants are informed by direct 
 
430 DG4 TSX mean=3.59 on Q17-7; percentage of those who agree /strongly agree on Q16-7 at 59.9% vs/ 
21.7% who disagree / strongly disagree. 
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experience managing public companies.   
It follows that the opinions of DG4-TSX participants on Q16-7 have to reflect some of 
the most informed opinions of the various demographic groups on the topic of regulatory 
overreach, because each respondent in this subgroup lives with the reality of operating a 
public company under the Canadian securities law on a daily basis.  Certainly, the 
members of subgroup DG4-TSX have had a front-row seat in observing the trendlines in 
Canada public company regulation over the past decade, and their perspective is defined 
by personal experience rather than through the third-party perceptions and anecdotal 
evidence that would influence many of the respondents in the DG5-Private Companies 
subgroup. 
With reference back to the Q16-1 outcomes on DG4- TSX and DG5 Private Company, 
the case can be made that heightened personal knowledge and experience on public 
markets may act as a countervailing force to the general negative perception on the net 
disadvantages of taking a company public.  As such, one can advance the hypothesis that 
the reality of the public markets experience is better than the perception of the public 
market experience by outsiders, a hypothesis that would be supported by considering 
both the DG4-TSX / DG Private Company subgroups and the DG23-25 subgroups cross-
referenced against the amount of public company experience each respondent possesses. 
Yet, if one subscribes to that rationale for the Q16-1 analysis, the same logical inference 
supports the hypothesis that the degree of regulatory overreach experienced in reality by 
public markets insiders is even worse than what is perceived by public markets outsiders.  
If that hypothesis is true, then the expectation would be that, in reference to Q16-7, the 
results would demonstrate an increased level of support for the regulatory overreach 
proposition.  Indeed, that anticipated trend is observed in the PCD Study data at a 
statistically significant level, with the mean on Q16-7 increasing contemporaneously with 
the degree of public company experience.431 
 
431 The specifics of which are discussed hereafter in this section under the analysis of the variations 
between the results for DG23, DG24 and DG25. 
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Is the difference observed on Q16-7 between the subgroups DG4-TSX and DG5- Public 
Company statistically significant?  While the mean for DG4-TSX is relatively high on 
Q16-7 at 3.59, the mean for DG5- Private Company is also relatively high at 3.46.  As 
such, it would be expected that it will be difficult to establish statistical significance on 
the difference between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company at the sample sizes used 
in the PCD Study.  Indeed, running the available tests discloses that testing the hypothesis 
that DG4-TSX will be lower than DG5-Private Company with respect to the proportion 
of  disagree/strongly disagree responses, a weakly significant difference can be reported 
(Single-Tailed Two Proportion Z-Test, P-value=0.0670), sufficient for the 90% 
confidence level, but not reaching the 95% confidence level.    
It is recognized that these weak levels of statistical significance are insufficient to draw 
conclusions on the hypothesis that increased experience and knowledge increases one's 
belief in the regulatory overreach proposition between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private 
Company.  Yet, the data does suggest that this is an appropriate area for further analysis.  
If further research can demonstrate at higher levels of statistical significance that an 
increased degree of direct participation and experience in the public markets leads to both 
an increased appreciation of the net benefit associated with being public and a 
strengthened belief that the regulators are overreaching, that outcome would certainly be 
relevant in instructing the arc of future regulatory reform.    
One additional interesting observation can be made by looking at the ratio of combined 
agree and strongly agree versus combined disagree and strongly disagree answers on 
Q16-7 from these two subgroups. DG4-TSX evidences 59.8% respondents agreeing with 
the regulatory overreach proposition (i.e., selecting 4 or 5) compared to 21.7% of 
respondents evidencing disagreement (i.e., selecting 1 or 2).   By comparison, DG5-
Private Company is at 49.3% 4 or 5 answers vs. 14.1% 1 or 2 answers.  This is unusual in 
that, although DG4 is overall more supportive of the regulatory overreach proposition in 
Q16-7 than DG5-Public Company respondents, there are a higher proportion of DG4-
TSX participants who also disagree with the proposition than DG5-Public Company 
participants.  Although counter-intuitive, this observation indicates that direct personal 
experience of the DG4-TSX respondents appears to crystallize their opinion either for or 
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against the regulatory overreach proposition, as further evidenced by the fact that only 
18.6% of DG4 respondents answered with the neutral “3” compared to 36.5% of DG5-
Private Company respondents who answered with a “3”. 
In terms of strongly held opinions, the PCD Study data shows that 26.8% of DG4-TSX 
respondents answered Q16-7 with a “5” (strongly agree), which is the highest percentage 
of strongly agree responses of all 25 demographic subgroups in the PCD Study.  Again, 
the regulators should consider this particular outcome soberly, as having more than one-
quarter of the crucial DG4-TSX demographic strongly agreeing with the regulatory 
overreach proposition has to be viewed as an indictment of the collective actions of 
Canadian securities regulators in the past years. 
Group II Constituents- Noteworthy here is that three out of the four constituent Group 
II’s demographic subgroups ranked in the lowest quartile based on mean:  DG6- Lawyers 
(mean 3.18); DG8- Investment Bankers (mean 3.02) and DG9- Private Equity (mean 
3.07).  This indicates that these subgroups of public company influencers are less likely 
to subscribe to the regulatory overreach proposition than either of the Group I subgroups.   
Figure 27, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Group II Constituents  
 
Again, as in the preceding Group I analysis on this question, it bears mentioning that a 
significantly different opinion is exhibited between Group I and Group II.   This 
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observation makes it particularly concerning that Group I opinions form such a small part 
of comment letters filed in response to OSC Notice 11-784 initiative.  
It is not particularly surprising that DG6-Lawyers and DG8- Investment Bankers appear 
to be less exorcised about regulatory overreach than Group I senior decision-makers in 
general.  Both subgroups secure some direct financial benefit from the additional 
securities regulation over the past few years.  Lawyers gain benefit in the form of 
additional revenue from their compliance advising.  Investment bankers gain benefit in 
the form of additional fee revenue related to valuations and fairness opinions on both 
related-party transactions and independent transactions.  However, it is admittedly 
surprising that DG19- Private Equity also ranks on the lower end of the demographic 
subgroups on this particular topic.  One might assume that private equity would be 
particularly averse to increasing regulatory complexity, but this is not borne out in the 
PCD Study data.  No obvious explanation comes to mind to explain this outcome other 
than private equity investors have little reason to pay attention to the ongoing changes in 
securities regulation and therefore have not formed any strong opinions relating thereto. 
Also surprising is the fact that it is the fourth subgroup, DG7-Auditors, who score notably 
higher on the regulatory overreach hypothesis than the other constituent DG3- Public 
Markets Influencer subgroups with a mean at 3.49.   This difference between DG7- 
Auditors and the other three constituent subgroups in the PCD Study with respect to 
regulatory overreach is moderately statistically significant, supporting a 95% confidence 
level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0178).   
A number of participants from the DG7- Auditors subgroup were keen to discuss the 
subject of public company decline orally via phone after participating in the PCD Study.  
Anecdotally from these conversations, which were not recorded and do not form part of 
the official PCD Study record, the accountant / auditor subgroup largely focused their 
regulatory displeasure on the perceived continually increasing complexity, risk and cost 
added to the public company review process by the Accounting Standards Board of 
Canada (the "ASBC").   A common sentiment expressed by several members of this 
subgroup was that it is no longer sufficiently profitable for auditing firms to complete 
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public company audits to the extent that the profits justify the legal risks.  They 
particularly expressed a belief that there has been a misalignment in risk vs. reward for 
public company auditors, which has been exacerbated by the pronouncements of the 
ASBC in recent years.  As reported by these individuals, the public review process has 
become so time-consuming that they believe their clients would revolt if they billed for 
all the verification time spent on a file.  Instead, the auditors frequently end up writing 
down the auditing bills in order to preserve their reputation and relationships.   A senior 
partner in the audit group of one of the "big four" accounting firms expressly stated that 
their firm no longer prioritizes marketing in an attempt to secure new public company 
audit files.  Rather, they continue to engage in public company audit work primarily as a 
service to long-time clients with whom they have a level of mutual trust.   
Clearly, the auditors are in a unique position compared to the other two main public 
markets service provider subgroups, DG6- Lawyers and DG9- Investment Bankers.  Each 
of the three different subgroups of service providers has a degree of legal liability in 
servicing the capital markets.  However, the perception amongst the accountants / 
auditors subgroup is that the auditing function has historically borne the lion's share of 
the legal risk for the large public company collapses, essentially being forced to provide 
insurance policies against financial reporting irregularities which they do not necessarily 
have the ability to detect. 
Company Size- As evidenced by the following chart, there is little distinction in 
disposition on Q16-7 between DG10-SME’s and DG11-Non-SME’s. 
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Figure 28, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- SME vs. Non-SME Respondents 
 
If there is a significant demographic difference to be found within the subgroup 
components of DG2, it appears to be based on a public company / private company 
distinction rather than with respect to company size. 
Industry- DG 12- Oil & Gas has the highest mean of any of the 25 demographic 
subgroups (3.71) on Q16-7.  With respect to the relative percentages of favorable and 
unfavorable responses for DG12- Oil & Gas, the ratio is 63.1% agree and strongly agree 
to 15.8% disagree and strongly disagree.  This represents a four-to-one ratio between 
overall positive and negative responses on Q16-7, which is also the highest of any 
significant demographic group in the PCD Study.   
Why does DG12- Oil &Gas exhibit a strong belief in the regulatory overreach statement 
proposition?  Nothing in the PCD Study questionnaire format delves deep enough to 
identify root causes.  However, we can refer back to the qualitative analysis section of the 
PCD Study for clues.  The overall level of frustration of oil & gas issuers with 
government policy in general was a common theme in the text responses.  Continuing to 
go through one of the longest market downturns in Canadian oil & gas history, senior 
decision-makers of oil & gas companies repeatedly discussed their perception that the 
decline has been exacerbated by the failure of various levels of government in Canada to 
respond to the crisis proactively, and even to recognize the importance of the oil & gas 
industry to the overall economy.   
There is, unquestionably, a present widespread perception in the oil & gas industry in 
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Canada that they have been abandoned by government for the sake of maintaining 
popularity with the environmentally-focused lobby domestically and abroad who focus 
on Alberta heavy-oil production as a special culprit in global warming.  It may well 
simply be that the general antipathy of senior oil & gas decision-makers towards all 
levels of government at this juncture is manifested in the extreme Q16-7 response 
relating to regulatory overreach.  Of course, initiatives such as the recent CSA Staff 
Notice 51-354 “Report on Climate Change-Related Disclosure Project”, perceived by 
many oil & gas executives as laying the groundwork for more invasive disclosure 
regulations targeted at the oil & gas industry, might also contribute to the outcome.  
Figure 29, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Industry-Based 
 
The DG15- Non-Resource subgroup also has an above-average mean on Q16-7 at 3.54, 
but that variation can be attributed to the knock-on effect of the higher ratings of all DG2- 
Group I respondents generally on Q16-7 rather any industry-related differences.   DG13- 
Mining also appears to be lower based on mean (3.33), but the sample sizes on the two 
extraction-based demographic subgroups are too small for that level of variation to 
approach the minimum levels of statistical significance necessary to report any 
conclusions on the observation. 
Geographic Location- Since Ontario is, by far, the largest subgroup represented in the 
PCD Study at 47.7% of the total survey population, the analysis logically begins with 
consideration of perceptions of DG17- Ontario on the regulatory overreach statement in 
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Q16-7.  The quick observation is that Ontario-based respondents evidence a materially 
lower average on Q16-7 (mean=3.09) than PCD Study respondents from other 
geographic regions (mean=3.54).   The difference between DG17-Ontario respondents 
and all non-Ontario demographic subgroups based on agree/strongly agree responses is 
significant at the 95% confidence interval (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0125). 
DG18- Quebec and DG19- Atlantic Provinces both evidence a disposition on Q16-7 
similar to the DG1- All Respondents subgroup and, given the small size of each of those 
two samples, do not bear any further discussion here.  
Looking westward, it is obvious that both DG15- British Columbia (mean=3.54) and 
DG16-Prairies (3.60) subgroups appear notably higher on average than Ontario in their 
disposition on Q16-7.  There is a strong statistically significant difference between the 
three demographic subgroups (Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0015).  The follow-on pairwise 
test using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test demonstrates that biggest differences are 
between DG15-Prairies and DG17- Ontario (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value<0.001).  
The difference between DG15- British Columbia and DG17-Ontario reaches the 
threshold for statistical significance at a 95% confidence level (Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
Test, P-value=0.0257). 
Figure 30, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Geographically-Based  
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What are the implications of these geographically-based statistical observations?  One 
interesting observation to consider is that the mean of DG-15 British Columbia on Q16-7 
is 0.21 higher than the mean of DG13-Mining.  Given that the mining industry has the 
largest representation amongst the subgroup of British Columbia-based respondents, we 
can conclude from this observation that the higher support for the regulatory overreach 
proposition from British Columbia participants in the PCD Study is not driven by 
sentiment in the mining industry.   
With respect to the Prairies, the mean score of Q16-7 is similar whether you include 
respondents from the oil & gas industry (mean=3.60) or exclude them (mean=3.55), so 
that industry is also not significantly skewing the DG16- Prairie results on Q16-7.  In 
both resource and non-resource industries, the Prairie-based respondents have the highest 
averages supporting the regulatory overreach proposition.  The dissatisfaction with the 
balance struck by the securities regulators operates independently of the extractive sector 
industries throughout western Canada. 
Clearly, there is a higher level of discontentment on the Prairies and, to a lesser extent 
British Columbia, with the arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past number of 
years.  In other areas of the economy, this would be hypothesized as being at least 
partially attributable to western alienation generally, as the most important policy 
pronouncements are dictated by the population concentration in Ontario and Quebec.  In 
the case of regulatory overreach, however, the convenient bogeyman of western 
alienation fails to have the same degree of resonance because each province has its own 
securities commission and any wounds associated with regulatory overreach are largely 
self-inflicted at the individual provincial securities regulation level.  In fact, within all 
areas of the economy, securities regulation is one of the areas in which the provinces 
(particularly Alberta in its steadfast opposition to the national securities regulator 
initiatives) retain the highest degree of autonomy. 
On the flip side, there is nothing to suggest that the securities commissions in western 
Canada have adopted regulations that are any more invasive or restrictive than those 
adopted by the Ontario Securities Commission.  Yet, while Ontario-based respondents 
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were close to the level of neutrality on regulatory overreach in Q16-7, the western 
Canadian-based respondents supported the regulatory overreach proposition in 
significantly higher numbers.  Without any industry-based linkages to point to, the 
simplest inference from the data is that western Canadians are simply less tolerant of 
increasing securities regulation generally than their Ontario-based counterparts.   
Career Experience-  The headline statistic from a quick analysis of the responses on 
DG20, DG21 and DG22 is that the early-career respondents are the one subgroup with 
the lowest average on Q16-7, producing a mean=2.89.432   Comparing DG20- Early 
Career to all other respondents in the PCD Study, the difference on Q16-7 is significant at 
a confidence level of 95% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0119).   
Figure 31 Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Total Career Experience 
  
What factors give rise to this outcome?  There are two alternative intuitive explanations.  
The first is based on the belief that the length and nature of career experience alters 
perception on the regulatory overreach proposition stated in Q16-7.  This theory would 
argue that exposure to the arc of changing securities regulation over a longer period of 
 
432 In fact, DG20- Early-Career is the only subgroup in the PCD Study with a mean lower than the 
theoretical neutral outcome of 3.00.  However, the difference between DG20 and the neutral value of 3.00 
is not enough to be statistically significant at our minimum threshold (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test, P-value=0.2365) 
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time gives public market participants more experience and history on which to assess the 
regulatory overreach proposition in Q16-7 and that this longer experience makes 
individuals more disposed to believe that regulators have overreached.   
The alternative explanation is that the millennial generation is fundamentally more 
accepting of public regulations than the preceding Gen X and baby-boomer generations.  
This theory does not imply any causation between length of career experience and 
perception on regulatory overreach summarized in Q16-7, simply correlation based on 
generational characteristics.  The PCD Study does not contain any data to support one 
explanation over the other, although it is argued that the first alternative is the more likely 
explanation absent any specific data as to the willingness of millennials to accept 
regulation more readily than earlier generations.   
Pubco Experience- It was discussed previously (in the DG4-TSX analysis on Q16-7) that 
the relationship between general career experience and specific public company 
experience appears to work in the opposite direction for Q16-7 as compared to Q16-1.  In 
the Q16-1 analysis, it was discussed that public company experience appears to act as a 
countervailing force to general career experience in terms of perception of the net benefit 
of being public, resulting in a negative correlation.  In Q16-2, the correlation between 
these same two factors appears to be positive, meaning that public company experience 
correlates with an increase in the strength of belief in the regulatory overreach 
proposition. 433 
 
433 In fact, running a Spearman Rank correlation analysis (the specifics of which are discussed later in 
Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study) demonstrates a statistically significant correlation between these 
two items: P-value=0.08693, RS=0.1023. 
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Figure 32 Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience  
 
We can test the hypothesis, informed from these earlier observations on DG4-TSX, that 
the perceptions of the regulatory overreach hypothesis will increase in strength along 
with the amount public company experience. The difference between DG23- Limited 
Pubco Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience is significant at a 90% 
confidence level (Single-Tailed Two-Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0588) and just under 
the 95% confidence level.  Further analysis of the correlation is undertaken later in 
Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study Data. 
 Implications of PCD Study Outcomes in Q16-7 for Public Company 
Decline Analysis 
The PCD Study was not designed to test causality on an empirical basis.  As wonderful as 
it would be to identify a magic bullet, nobody has yet identified a realistic and practical 
method for empirically testing causality with reference to public company decline.  
Rather, the empirical data collected in the PCD Study is designed to be descriptive and 
illuminative in many areas that have been posited as being relevant to public company 
decline. It is also intended to provide additional context for deeper analysis of the 
phenomenon, hopefully providing instruction on specific areas to prioritize for 
completing further research. 
Analysis of the PCD Study responses on question Q16-7 demonstrates that the majority 
of the respondents believe that the securities regulators have indeed overreached and 
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tipped the balance against reporting issuers.  Overall, nearly twice as many participants 
agreed with the regulatory overreach proposition in the PCD Study as disagreed with it.  
That is not an insignificant result, and certainly should be taken seriously by the 
securities regulators across the country.  In particular, the relationship indicating that 
more experience in public companies leads to an increased belief that regulators have 
overreached should be soberly considered.  The implication of this statistic is that the 
most knowledgeable and experienced subgroups in the PCD Study agreed most strongly 
with Q16-7, suggesting that, the more you deal with public markets, the more inclined 
you are to support the regulatory overreach proposition. 
However, regulatory overreach is simply a perception.  There is no objectively right or 
wrong answer to Q16-7, just opinions of market participants.  The regulators are tasked 
with the critical function of protecting the integrity of the capital markets, but are 
entrusted to do so utilizing policy that is not so restrictive as to damage the robustness of 
the capital markets they are tasked with protecting.  This is unquestionably a challenging 
balancing act, and it is unlikely that any regulator will ever execute his or her task to 
perfection in finding the optimal balance between maintaining market freedom and 
market protection.434    
The fact that the cross-section of market participants targeted for participation in the PCD 
Study evidence a significant level of belief that the regulatory field is tilted too far in 
favour of investor protection is noteworthy, and hopefully will provide further impetus to 
other provincial jurisdictions outside of the OSC who have yet to take up the gauntlet of 
burden reduction passed onto them by the CSA in Notice 51-404.  The mandate for 
burden reduction of the OSC has been already delivered top-down from the governing 
Conservative government of Premier Doug Ford in Ontario.  Ideally, the data gathered in 
the PCD Study on Q16-7 will push other securities commissions to also prioritize moving 
 
434 Notably, the PCD Study does not solicit the opinions of the investor rights lobby on this topic, whose 
members may well evidence the overriding belief that the securities commissions have not yet reached far 
enough to protect public shareholder interests.  However, the investor rights lobby does not exert material 
influence on the go public / stay private decision in Canada and therefore were not identified as a priority 
group to study in the PCD Study. 
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forward with their own regulatory streamlining processes.  Based on the geographic 
break-down on Q16-7, it would seem that Alberta-based senior business decision-makers 
in particular are anxious for this process to begin. 
What the data on Q16-7 cannot do in any meaningful way is quantify the degree to which 
the perception of senior business decision-makers on the topic of regulatory overreach is 
responsible for the phenomenon of public company decline.  Intuitively, the fact that 
twice as many respondents agree with the regulatory overreach proposition as disagree 
with it provides an indication that the perception of regulatory overreach in Canada is a 
contributing factor to public company decline.  Assessing whether it’s a major factor or a 
minor factor requires us to continue down the analytical path further in the PCD Study. 
7.6- Question 16-3: Impact of Technology- Part A 
“Q16-3: Technological advancements have made it harder for public 
companies to compete with private companies.” 
This particular question asks respondents’ opinions of the hypothesis that the immediate 
and universal access to public company information by all markets participants as a result 
of technological advances (proliferation of smartphones with internet capabilities, high 
speed data connections, easy access to SEDAR filings, data mining and monitoring 
programs to track competitor filings, etc.) has made it harder for public companies to 
compete with private companies.  It was included in the PCD Study to provide an 
additional data point on the “Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage” factor, which was 
considered as a potential "sleeper" factor not widely discussed in the academic or 
business literature that might be demonstrated to be more important to public company 
decline than widely perceived.   
The smartphone revolution truly began in Canada in July, 2008 with the commercial 
release of the first iPhone to consumers by Rogers Wireless.  It has been previously 
discussed that the peak of public company listings in Canada occurred at roughly the 
same point in time, and that the public markets have been in continual decline in Canada 
ever since.  Thus, the specific hypothesis behind Q16-3 is that proliferation of 
smartphone technology over the past dozen years has fundamentally changed the 
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competitive landscape between public companies and private companies in Canada.  
Whereas throughout the past decades there was a time-lag between the release of 
information and its dissemination, and it required a moderate degree of effort to access 
that information, every competitor, customer and supplier can now download apps to 
keep them apprised of every detail that is publicly reported by competitors within 
seconds of its release.  If you are a senior executive of a public company meeting with a 
key supplier, that supplier will certainly know whether you have just reported blow-out 
positive quarterly financial results.  They will also know if you are in financial trouble 
and a credit risk for further deliveries, even if you have never been late on payment thus 
far.  Access to that information intuitively gives more negotiating power to the 
counterparties and makes it more difficult for the public company to retain their operating 
margins than for private company competitors. 
Although other items related to the Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage topic are tested 
in the major matrix at Question 20, this hypothesis was considered sufficiently plausible 
that it merited an independent verification question in Q16-3.  Based on the data in the 
PCD Study, however, the respondents do not support this hypothesis to any material 
degree.  The mean across all respondents on Q16-3 was 2.58, with the number of agree 
and strongly agree answers amongst all respondents at only 13.9% compared to disagree 
and strongly disagree at 44.6%.  More surprising, there was not a single demographic 
subgroup in the PCD Study for whom the number of agree / strongly agree responses 
outnumbered the disagree / strongly disagree responses. 
The two demographic subgroups that were most favorable on the competitive disclosure 
disadvantage proposition as a result of technology proliferation in Q16-3 were DG10-
SME’s (3.02 mean- the level of ambivalence) and DG5-Private Company at 2.87.   This 
result is intuitive for SME's, as smaller companies have fewer resources to compete on 
financial strength and would be expected to be more focused on the value of retaining 
privacy in competition.   Private companies are accustomed to being able to keep their 
key financial data private in the competitive environment and would be expected to be 
wary of the prospect of having their data available to competitors, customers and 
suppliers. 
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Figure 33 Q16-3:  Top Subgroups in Terms of Support for Q16-3 Proposition 
 
The difference between DG5- Private Company and DG4-TSX in terms of agree and 
strongly agree responses is weakly statistically significance at the 90% confidence level 
(Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0842).  The difference between DG10- SME and 
DG11- Non-SME in terms of agree and strongly agree responses is significant (Two 
Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.001) above a 99% confidence level.  
There are no material observations to be made in the analysis of which particular 
demographic subgroups are the least favorable on the proposition in Q16-3 other than the 
fact that those demographic subgroups come from across the different subgroup 
definitions. 
One trend in the PCD Study data on Q16-3 that is worth noting is the positive 
relationship between years of total career experience and tendency to support the 
proposition in Q16-3,435 whereas there appears to a negative relationship between public 
company experience and the degree of support for Q16-3.436  Once again, the correlation 
between factors is discussed in Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study. 
 
435 On Q16-3: DG20- Early Career, mean=2.39; DG21- Mid-Career, mean=2.57; DG22- Late-Career, 
mean=2.65.  
436 On Q16-3, DG23- Limited Pubco Experience, mean=2.76; DG24- Moderate Pubco Experience, mean= 
2.62; DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience, mean=2.43. 
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Figure 34 Q16-3: Linked Subgroups- Total Career Experience  
 
Figure 35, Q16-3: Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience 
 
With respect to overall career experience, the difference between DG20- Early Career 
and DG22- Late Career on the agree / strongly agree answers in Q16-3 is statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0260).  With 
respect to public company experience, the difference between DG24- Limited Pubco 
Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience for the disagree / strongly disagree 
side of the Likert Scale demonstrates strong statistical significance at the 99% confidence 
level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0096). 
As in Q16-1, the implication of the data here is that general career experience is linked 
with a corresponding increase in one's belief in the Q16-3 proposition, but that public 
company experience operates in the opposite direction as a countervailing factor.  
Namely, the public company experience effect is sufficient to overcome the trendline of 
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general experience and invert the trendline. 
7.7- Question 16-5: Impact of Technology- Part B 
“Q16-5: The rapid pace of technological change has made it more 
attractive for private companies to sell out to larger corporations rather 
than pursue their own IPO.” 
This particular question represents a simplistic formulation of the Fundamental Economic 
Change Hypothesis proposed by Dr. Jay Ritter and discussed earlier in this Dissertation 
in Chapter 1-Introduction and Chapter 2- Literature Review.  Ritter's Fundamental 
Economic Change Hypothesis has many nuances beyond what can be properly expressed 
in a single sentence proposition, but it is submitted that Q16-5 articulates the key 
elements of the hypothesis. 
Overall, the respondent group was moderately supportive of the Q16-5 proposition, with 
an average mean amongst all respondents of 3.27.   For DG1- All Respondents, there 
were nearly twice as many individuals who selected agree or strongly agree (41.8%) 
compared to those who selected disagree or strongly disagree (21.1%). Although the 
support of the PCD Study participants on Q16-5 was not as high as for some of the other 
propositions, the support was widely distributed across all demographic groups.  In fact, 
each of the 25 demographic subgroups assessed in the PCD Study generated a mean on 
Q16-3 above the level of neutrality at 3.00, as well as a higher percentage of agree and 
strongly agree responses than disagree and strongly disagree responses. 
Table 15, Q16-5: Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis 
DG  Subgroup 
5 and 4 
Strongly Agree 
 and Agree 
3  
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
1 and 2 
Strongly Disagree 
and Disagree 
DG1: All Respondents 41.8% 37.0% 21.1% 
DG2: Group I 40.9% 38.5% 20.7% 
DG3: Group II 42.7% 35.8% 21.6% 
DG4: TSX-Listed 35.8% 39.8% 24.5% 
DG5: Private Company 47.9% 36.6% 15.5% 
DG6: Lawyers 36.4% 47.7% 15.9% 
DG7: Auditors 66.6% 20.5% 12.8% 
DG8: Investment Bankers 39.6% 33.3% 27.1% 
DG9: Private Equity 33.9% 39.0% 27.1% 
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DG  Subgroup 
5 and 4 
Strongly Agree 
 and Agree 
3  
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
1 and 2 
Strongly Disagree 
and Disagree 
DG10: SME 46.2% 40.0% 13.8% 
DG11: Non-SME 39.2% 37.1% 23.7% 
DG12: Oil & Gas 28.9% 50.0% 21.0% 
DG13: Mining 29.4% 44.1% 26.5% 
DG14: Non-Resource 49.5% 32.0% 18.6% 
DG15: British Columbia 37.5% 35.0% 27.5% 
DG16: Prairies 42.1% 41.1% 16.9% 
DG17: Ontario 36.7% 40.5% 22.8% 
DG18: Quebec 62.5% 12.5% 25.1% 
DG19:  Atlantic Provinces 63.2% 21.1% 15.8% 
DG20: Early-Career 42.9% 35.7% 21.5% 
DG21: Mid Career 51.3% 32.4% 16.2% 
DG22: Late Career 32.9% 42.2% 24.9% 
DG23: Limited Pubco Experience 49.5% 35.0% 15.5% 
DG24: Moderate Pubco Experience 37.1% 34.6% 28.4% 
DG25: Extensive Pubco Experience 36.8% 41.7% 21.5% 
Overall, therefore, the Fundamental Economic Change hypothesis of Dr. Ritter secured 
broad support amongst the PCD respondents.  Given the relative consistency in opinions 
expressed on Q16-5, there are only a couple of observations within the linked 
demographic groups worthy of further note.  First, the DG7- Auditors subgroup appears 
to be an outlier on the favorable side with the highest percentage of agree and strongly 
agree responses at 66.6%.  The difference between DG7- Auditors and the remainder of 
the Group II respondents on the agree and strongly agree responses is significant at a 
confidence level of 99% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0013).  There is no obvious 
explanation as to why the auditors and public company accounting group would support 
this proposition at a significantly higher level than other public markets influencers.  
Possibly, it is a function of the higher level of risk that the DG7- Auditors subgroup 
perceives in the IPO process compared to other subgroups arising from the financial 
statement certification process.  However, with no logical hypothesis arising from 
elsewhere in the data to explain the outcome, it remains an anomaly to be noted for future 
consideration in other research. 
Second, the two extractive-sector industries both appear to rate the proposition in Q16-5 
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lower than DG14- Non-Resource.  Whereas DG14-Non-Resource has 49.5% of its group 
choosing agree or strongly agree on Q16-5, DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining have 
only 28.9% and 29.4%, respectively, in agreement.  Applying the Kruskal Wallis test, the 
difference in rankings between these three groups evidence weak statistical significance 
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0928).   Follow-on pairwise analysis demonstrates that the 
most significant difference in responses here are between the DG12- Oil & Gas and 
DG15- Non-Resource subgroups (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value=0.065).  A possible 
explanation for these outcomes is that there is easier access to transactional liquidity for 
trade sales of companies outside of the extractive sector in Canada, which would be 
anticipated given the commodity downturn in Canada over the past few years.  Another 
possible explanation is that technology has been less impactful in the extractive sector 
industries than in the non-resource industries with respect to general competitiveness and 
time-to-market. 
No other differences within any of the linked subgroups are of sufficient size to rise to 
anything close to the minimum level of statistical significance. 
On the whole, it is submitted that the PCD Study outcome on Q16-5 provides a level of 
support that the hypothesis identified by Ritter is recognized by the respondent group as 
being real.  However, the extent of the support does not rise to a level which would 
indicate that this factor is likely as critical to the overall phenomenon of public company 
decline as suggested by Dr. Ritter.  Rather, the Fundamental Economic Change 
hypothesis appears to be one of a series of factors that are each contributing to ongoing 
public company decline in Canada. 
7.8- Question 16-4: Private Equity Impact- Part A  
“Q16-4: Private equity financing to fund company growth in Canada is 
significantly easier to access now than it used to be.” 
Q16-4, Q16-2 and Q16-6 all deal with the proliferation of private capital in Canada and 
its connection to the phenomenon of public company decline.  Each of these three 
questions deals with a slightly different topic.  Q16-4 simply asks respondents whether 
private equity funding has become easier to access in Canada.  Q16-2 asks respondents to 
292 
 
give their opinion on the proposition that private equity capital should be the default 
funding option and that IPOs should only be considered when private equity capital is not 
available.  Q16-6 asks respondents to give their opinion on the proposition that public 
company decline is primarily attributable to the increased availability of private equity.  
The correlation between these three private equity-focused questions will be explored 
later in this Dissertation. 
Starting with Q16-4, this is the single question that scored highest of the group of seven 
different sub-questions contained with Q16 with reference to mean.  As such, there is a 
high degree of consensus amongst senior decision-makers and public markets influencers 
that private equity financing in Canada is indeed significantly easier to access than in 
previous eras.  The average mean for Q16-4 amongst all respondents was 3.72.   On a 
proportion basis, the number of respondents who chose agree or strongly agree on Q16-4 
was 66.0%, compared to only 13.9% who chose disagree or strongly disagree with the 
statement, a ratio exceeding four-to-one.  Strongly held positions were even more skewed 
on the favorable side. 25.1% of respondents chose strongly agree compared to 5.3% who 
chose strongly disagree, a ratio of nearly five to one.  
The high level of support for Q16-4 supports the text responses in the Qualitative 
Analysis part of this Dissertation, pointing to increased availability of private equity 
financing in Canada as one of the fundamental factors relevant to the public company 
decline phenomenon.   
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Figure 36, Q16-4, All Respondents, Group I and Group II 
 
From the above chart it is relatively clear that DG3- Group II respondents are more 
favorably disposed on Q16-4 than DG2- Group I respondents.  The difference between 
DG3- Group II and DG2- Group I is strongly significant (Mann-Whitney Test, 
p<0.0001).  There are two simple explanations for this difference between Group I and 
Group II respondents.  The first is that the perception of the ease with which private 
equity funding can be secured is greater than the reality, therefore the Group I 
respondents perceive it as being more difficult than Group II respondents.  The second is 
that the Group II respondents see a larger number of corporate transactions as advisors 
than the Group I respondents do as senior business decision-makers, giving the Group II 
respondents a broader exposure to the trends in private equity financing observed over a 
larger number of deals. 
Notably, there is very little divergence between the DG2 subgroups, DG4 TSX and DG5- 
Private Company.  As evidenced below, the senior decision-makers of the TSX-listed and 
private companies have the highest degree of consistency in their opinion on Q16-4. 
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Figure 37, Q16-4, Group I, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies 
 
As would be anticipated from the four constitute subgroups of public markets influencers, 
DG9- Private Equity scored the highest on Q16-4.  Although expected, the outcome is 
notable in that DG9- Private Equity respondents possess the highest level of direct 
knowledge of the trendlines in the private equity market and its growth over the past 
number of years. 
Figure 38, Q16-4, Group II- Public Markets Influencers  
 
With respect to company size, non-SME's rate moderately higher on this question than 
SME’s.  The observation to be made here is that the increase in access to private equity 
funding seems to be more accessible in larger companies than in smaller companies.  
This observation is noteworthy, but also unsurprising given the trajectory of the private 
equity market in the past number of years and the minimum investment size implemented 
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by a number of the larger pools of private capital.   The difference between DG10-SME's 
and DG1- Non-SME's is statistically significant at a 90% confidence level (Two 
Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0720). 
Figure 39, Q16-4, SME vs. Non-SME
 
On an industry basis, another moderate difference can be observed in Q16-5 between the 
resource and non-resource companies.   
Figure 40, Q16-4, Industry Breakdown  
 
DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining companies appear to not find it as easy to access 
private equity in the current economic environment as DG14- Non-Resource companies.    
Running a Kruskal Wallis test on the three industry-based demographic subgroups, it is 
observed that there is a significant difference in the rankings of the subgroups on Q16-5 
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value <0.001). Running the follow-on pairwise tests, it is apparent 
that the difference occurs between the two extractive sectors industries and the non 
resource -based subgroup (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value<0.001) for mining v. non-
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resources and P-value= 0.0046 for oil & gas vs non-resources).  There is no statistically 
significant difference between the two extractive sector industry demographic subgroups, 
DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining.   Again, given the recent depressed economic 
environment for extractive sector businesses, this outcome is not unexpected. 
Geographically, DG16-Prairies (mean=3.40) are notably less favorable in their response 
to Q16-5 than any other geographic region. Sentiment on the Prairies indicates that the 
increased private equity accessibility increases have not been as accessible as across other 
regions in Canada.  This difference is partly explained by the concentration of O&G 
companies in the Prairies respondents, but the mean for the Prairies excluding all DG12- 
O&G respondents (i.e., mean=3.53) is still lower than the mean of all other respondents 
outside of the Prairies (i.e., mean=3.83).   The difference is statistically significant at a 
90% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0518). 
Figure 41, Q16-4, Geographic Breakdown  
 
With respect to total career experience and public company experience, there is nothing 
noteworthy beyond the fact that these subgroups all exhibit a significant degree of 
similarity in their dispositions on this question.  
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Figure 42, Q16-4, Career and Public Company Experience Based  
 
7.9- Question 16-2: Private Equity Impact- Part B 
“Q16-2: Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only 
when private equity funding is not readily available.” 
Like Q16-1, Q16-2 again represents a general predisposition test on the topic of IPOs and 
the public markets, this time focusing specifically on the decision to take a company 
public or keep it private.  This question is considered less core to the overall PCD Study 
analysis than Q16-1 and our discussion will, accordingly, focus only on the notable 
highlights.  
In effect, Q16-2 states the proposition that IPOs should be pursued only as a last resort if 
private equity financing is not otherwise available.  As such, Q16-2 was included in the 
PCD Study as a check to determine the embedded level of inherent anti-IPO bias that 
exists in the Canadian markets at this point in time.  If a respondent agrees or strongly 
agrees with the proposition in Q16-2, they are exhibiting a fundamental bias against the 
public markets and in favour of private financing alternatives.  That bias can be formed 
by personal experience with the public markets or through conclusions reached by 
observing the public markets and the experiences of others.  Regardless of the source of 
the bias, the presence of an anti-IPO bias demonstrates that capital market proponents 
have a bigger hurdle to overcome when trying to identify policies that will stem the 
ongoing tide of public company decline in Canada.   
What public capital markets proponents would like to see in the PCD Study data on Q16-
2 is a mean that is significantly below the level of neutrality (3.00) in order to provide 
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evidence that market participants at least retain an open mind on pursuing IPOs.  The 
actual outcome demonstrates a mean on Q16-2 for DG1- All Respondents at 2.95, which 
is slightly below the level of theoretical neutrality.  However, the difference is not far 
enough below the level of neutrality to be statistically significant (One Sample Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test, P-value=0.1787).  This has to be a disappointing outcome for public 
markets supporters, as it demonstrates that a certain level of bias does exist against even 
considering IPOs except as an alternative of last resort.  
More bad news for future IPO prospects in Canada is drawn from analysis of the 
demographic breakdown of the Q16-2 responses. 
Figure 43, Q16-2, All Respondents and Group 1 v Group II 
 
From the above chart, it is apparent that DG2- Group I respondents are significantly more 
favorable on Q16-2 than DG3-Group II respondents.  DG2- Group I respondents have a 
mean of 3.11 on Q16-2, compared to a mean of 2.81 for DG3- Group II respondents. This 
difference is strongly significant, supporting a 99% confidence level (Mann-Whitney 
Test, P-value=0.0088).  As the Group I participants are understood to be more influential 
in the ultimate going public decision than the Group II participants, this difference is 
discouraging for public markets proponents. 
Even more concerning is the fact that, within the two component elements of DG2- 
Group I respondents, the senior business decision makers of DG5- Private Company are 
significantly more favorable on Q16-2 than DG4- TSX on a strong statistically significant 
basis (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0060).   DG5- Private Company respondents have 
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a mean on Q16-2 of 3.37 compared to a mean of 2.92 for DG4- TSX respondents.  
Figure 44, Q16-2, Senior Decision Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private companies 
 
Considering that the members of the DG5- Private Company subgroup are all senior 
decision-makers of TSX-eligible private companies in Canada, it is alarming that only 
one in five respondents from this subgroup disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that IPOs should only be considered as a last resort when private equity 
financing options have been exhausted.  This is particularly disconcerting when 
considering that the DG5- Private Company subgroup is the single most important 
demographic group to consider when looking at the prospects for arresting the public 
company decline phenomenon. 
Within the constituent subgroups of DG3- Group II, it was expected that there would be 
one outlier subgroup that would generate a notably higher mean on Q16-2 than the rest.  
However, the expectation was that the outlier would be DG9- Private Equity as a result of 
the anticipated bias in favour of the merits of private equity financing options; however, 
the data from the PCD Study evidences that outlier group on Q16-2 is actually DG7- 
Auditors.  The difference between DG7- Auditors and the other three subgroups of public 
markets influencers is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level (Two Proportions 
Z-Test, P-value=0.0022). 
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Figure 45, Q16-2, Group II Public Markets Influencers  
 
It is unknown why the group of auditors and public accountants that comprise DG7 
evidence this higher degree of bias against IPOs.  However, this higher-than-expected 
anti-public market sentiment is observed in the DG7- Auditor responses elsewhere in the 
PCD Study as an unanticipated recurring theme. 
Also notable, yet anticipated, is the fact that the PCD Study shows that senior decision 
makers in DG10-SME's have a higher degree of aversion to IPOs than senior decision 
makers in DG11- Non-SME's.  The difference is sufficient to be statistically significant at 
a confidence level of 95% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0105). 
Figure 46, Q16-2, SME's and Non-SME's 
 
There is nothing particularly noteworthy in the data on the linked subgroups defined by 
industry or geography.  However, with respect to overall career experience and specific 
public company experience, we see a similar effect to what was observed in Q16-1. 
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Figure 47, Q16-2, Overall Career Experience  
 
Figure 48, Public Company Experience 
 
Once again, it appears that increased overall career experience is linked with a less 
favorable disposition towards IPOs, but increased public company experience operates as 
a countervailing force working in the opposite direction.  If there is any solace to be 
found in the PCD Data on Q16-2 for public markets proponents, it is that increased 
familiarity with public companies is linked to increased positivity on IPOs in general.  
This suggests again that the reality of public markets experience is more positive than the 
perception by outsiders.  Unfortunately, the prime target market in which to solicit future 
IPOs is generally not the senior decision-makers who already possess extensive public 
markets familiarity, but the senior decision-makers of private companies eligible to go 
public. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, if a PCD Study respondent agrees with the anti-IPO 
proposition stated in Q16-2, inferentially they should also generally evidence a positive 
disposition on Q18-2 (favourability towards private equity option), a negative disposition 
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on Q18-1 (favourability towards IPO option) and, to a lesser degree, a negative 
disposition on Q16-1 in order to be internally consistent in disposition.  As such, Q16-2 
also serves as an internal validity check on Q18-1, Q18-2 and Q16-3 to validate the 
consistency of the answers on these questions between specific demographic subgroups.   
The correlations are discussed later in this Dissertation under Chapter 8- Correlation 
Analysis in the PCD Study. 
7.10- Question 16-6: Private Equity Impact- Part C  
“Q16-6: The decline in IPO volume is primarily attributable to the 
increased availability of private equity as an alternative.” 
This is an interesting question in that it acts as a counterpoint to Q16-4 in the PCD Study, 
which asks participants whether private equity was easier to secure now than in the past. 
As discussed above, this proposition is widely supported by the respondents across the 25 
demographic subgroups in the PCD Study.  In Q16-6, however, the question asked is 
whether respondents believe that increased availability of private equity is the primary 
driver of the decline in IPO volume (and therefore, by extension, overall public company 
decline).   This statement was included to test the hypothesis being advanced in the 
United States by de Fontenay, Ewens and Farre-Mensas, discussed previously in this 
Dissertation in Chapter 2- Literature Review, as to the critical role that increased access 
to private capital plays in overall public company decline.  Overall, the proposition in 
Q16-6 was positively supported by respondents with a mean of 3.37, although at a 
materially lower level than in Q16-4, where the mean was 3.72.   
Indeed, it was surprising that respondents rated this question as positively as they did, 
given the plethora of other contributing factors discussed in the PCD Study having been 
posited as contributing to public company decline.  If this ranking is truly an accurate 
reflection of the beliefs of the respondent groups, that outcome is both extremely 
significant and extremely depressing to those who believe that regulatory streamlining 
initiatives offer a prospect of stemming the tide of public company decline.  No amount 
of burden reduction in the public markets will reduce the availability of private equity 
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financing as an alternative.437   
If, indeed, private equity proliferation is the primary driver of public company decline, 
then no amount of burden reduction that streamlines IPOs and reduces the cost and 
complexity of continuous disclosure for public companies will be sufficient to stem the 
inevitable tide further decline in Canada. 
At face value, it certainly appears that the respondent group in the PCD Study is 
supporting the proposition that increased private equity access is the primary cause of 
public company decline in Canada.   However, it is submitted that the outcome on this 
Q16-6 should be considered in the context of the broader dataset of the PCD Study and 
taken with a proverbial grain of salt.   
Looking at the qualitative data analysis from Q17, there is no question that the 
proliferation of private equity is one of the factors that is cited most frequently, and 
posited in the strongest language, in answer to the question: "Why do you think fewer 
senior business decision-makers are choosing to take their companies public".  Yet, it was 
presented as an explanation in slightly less than half of the written explanations on Q17, 
similar in frequency to the obvious twin bogeymen of regulatory complexity and 
compliance costs.  In other words, private capital proliferation was presented on an 
unprompted basis by 152 respondents in Q17, representing 46.1% of all responses. Yet 
199 respondents, representing 55.4% of all responses on Q16-6, selected agree or 
strongly agree on essentially the same question.   Many of the respondents who discussed 
private capital proliferation in the qualitative responses in Q17 also presented a number 
of other factors contributing to the phenomenon.  This points to a small disconnect 
between the text answers in Q17 and Likert Scale answers to this question in Q16-6, if 
the responses in Q16-6 are all taken at face value. 
Possibly, a number of the respondents in Q16-6 chose agree or strongly agree in 
 
437 It stretches credulity to believe that, in order to stimulate the IPO markets, it would be palatable to 
governments to bring in new restrictions that limit private equity availability, thereby forcing companies 
back towards public financing options. 
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answering Q16-6 who consider private capital proliferation to be an important factor 
contributing to public company decline, but not necessarily the primary factor, to the 
exclusion of the other important factors, that they also list in Q17.  This may well be an 
example of a case where the language utilized in this particular question was suboptimal 
in terms of its clarity.  As such, it would appear to be reasonable to interpret the agree and 
strongly agree answers in Q16-6 as sometimes indicating a belief that private equity 
proliferation is one of the primary factors that they believe is contributing to public 
company decline, but failing to appreciate the distinction in Q16-6 that is asking if 
increased private equity is the primary factor. 
Turning briefly to analysis of differences amongst linked DG subgroups, the proposition 
proposed in Q16-6 (mean=3.54) has notably higher support from DG4- Group II than 
DG3- Group I (mean=3.18)  This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level 
(Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0016).   
Figure 49, Q16-6, Group I v. Group II Respondents  
 
Often in the analysis of the PCD Study thus far, we have inferred that the perceptions of 
the DG2- Group I respondents might be more informed compared to the DG3- Group II 
respondents, who can be viewed as being one step removed from the decision-making 
process by virtue of their status as service providers in the public and private market-
place.  DG2- Group I Respondents have direct experience as senior business decision-
makers operating on the "front lines" of managing Canadian companies. 
However, in reference to this particular issue, an argument can be advanced that the 
opposite is true.  Even serial entrepreneurs from Group I, who become senior decision-
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makers of multiple companies during the course of their career, are at most involved in a 
handful of private equity transactions.  The perception of the Group I respondents as to 
the availability of private equity is, therefore, formed by a high level of direct 
involvement in a limited number of transactions.  Of course, Group I respondents' 
perceptions on private equity will also be influenced by the experiences of other 
businesses that they observe, but these observations occur at a distance and the 
perceptions are formed based on hearsay evidence relayed to them by their friends and 
business associates. 
In comparison, each of the subgroups that collectively form the class of Group II 
participants in the PCD Study are likely to be involved at a significant level in dozens, 
and possibly hundreds, of transactions involving private equity investment over the 
course of their careers.  Although the depth of their experience on each individual 
transaction will likely be less than for a Group I participant, the breadth of their 
experience will be informed by a significantly larger number of transactions. 
In terms of viewing trends in the availability of private equity investment over a period of 
time (Q16-2) and the impact of the proliferation of private equity on public company 
decline (Q16-6), it is submitted that increased depth of experience of the DG2- Group I 
respondents may lead to personal-experience bias, whereas the increased breadth of 
experience possessed by DG3- Group II respondents positions them to more objectively 
and accurately form opinions on overall market trends.  As such, a strong argument can 
be made on Q16-6 (and Q16-2) that the Group II public markets influencers are 
positioned to provide at least equally informed, if not better informed, analysis on this 
particular topic. 
With respect to DG4-TSX and DG5- Private Company, quick reference to the mean 
provides an indication that DG5- Private Company (mean=3.48) more strongly supports 
the proposition in Q16-6 than DG4- TSX (mean=2.98).  This difference is strongly 
significant from a statistical point of view (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0047), 
supporting a 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 50, Q16-6, Group I, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies 
 
There are two possible explanations for this observed difference.  The first is that the 
DG4- TSX respondents, having greater exposure to the public markets on a daily basis, 
can identify more alternative causes to explain public company decline from their 
personal experience, and are therefore less likely to rate private equity proliferation as the 
"primary" factor.  The second explanation is that DG-4 TSX respondents, having already 
gone public, are more removed from the trendlines and opportunities presented by private 
equity alternatives than the DG-5 Private Company respondents who deal with private 
equity pitches more frequently.  The PCD Study data does not point to one explanation or 
the other, and the cause of the observed differences may well be a result of a combination 
of both explanations. 
Turning quickly to both geographic location and industry demographic analysis, it is 
apparent that the Western provinces and the extractive-sector industries are both less 
likely to support the proposition in Q16-6 than DG17- Ontario-based respondents and 
DG14- Non-Resource companies respondents.  
Figure 51, Q16-6, Industry-Based 
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Figure 52, Q16-6, Geography-Based 
 
The explanation for these observations is previously discussed in the analysis of Q16-4, 
which evidenced similar differences based on these demographic factors.  The extractive 
sector industries, concentrated in British Columbia and the Prairies, have had 
significantly more difficulty accessing private capital during the commodities downturn, 
compared to the non resource-based companies in the PCD Study concentrated in 
Ontario.  As such, it is intuitive that the western respondents and the resource-based 
respondents are all more likely to identify factors other than easier accessibility to private 
capital as a primary factor contributing to public company decline. 
On the whole, the data gathered in response to Q16-6 is amongst the most important in 
the entire PCD Study.  Unequivocally, it supports the conclusion that the respondents 
exhibit a strong belief that private equity proliferation is a key factor contributing to the 
phenomenon of public company decline in Canada.  Whether you can infer more than 
this conclusion from the data is a matter of some debate, based on the totality of the data 
gathered throughout the PCD Study.  It is submitted that there is not a sufficient degree of 
clarity arising from the analysis of the data on Q16-6 to support a conclusion that private 
capital proliferation is the single-most important factor contributing to public company 
decline.   
To reach such a critical conclusion, further research focusing specifically on this issue 
needs to be undertaken.  Regardless, it is submitted that the data gathered in both Q17 
and Q16-6 of the PCD Study on the importance of private capital proliferation to the 
phenomenon of public company decline makes it challenging to advance an argument 
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that public policy intervention designed to stimulate the public markets in Canada will 
likely be successful unless it addresses the implication of this fact: private capital is 
significantly easier to access in Canada today than in previous eras.  The financing 
choices to secure growth capital available to senior business decision-makers today are 
greater than they were when the public markets in Canada were thriving.  Although not 
necessarily the primary factor contributing to public company decline, increased 
availability of private equity certainly has played a role in this phenomenon. 
7.11- Question 18-1 and Question 18-2: General Preference for 
IPO or Private Equity Alternative 
Question 18 outlines a simple hypothetical fact situation as follows:   
“Imagine that you are the key decision-maker in ABC Inc., a highly 
successful private company based in Canada that now needs to access 
significant equity capital in order to finance its ambitious 
international expansion plans.    
In answering the questions, please draw on the knowledge and beliefs 
that you have gained through your real-life experiences. 
A very short background on ABC's status is as follows: 
• ABC has been repeatedly approached by several investment 
banks offering to raise the necessary funds by sponsoring ABC 
in a TSX IPO. 
• ABC has also been repeatedly approached by several private 
equity firms offering to give ABC the necessary funds by 
investing in ABC privately. 
The entire management team of ABC is waiting for you to decide 
whether ABC will pursue an IPO or take investment from private 
equity.  The strategy decision that will define the future of ABC is 
yours alone! 
Q18-1: How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC’s 
preferred course of action? 
Q18-2: How likely are you to recommend the private equity option as 
ABC’s preferred course of action?” 
The point of this short hypothetical fact pattern is to place the respondent (whether from 
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Group I or Group II) in the role of a key decision-maker, forced with determining which 
of the two alternative paths to pursue in order to access growth capital in a TSX-eligible 
private company: public offering through IPO or private equity financing.   Significant 
additional capital is required by the company in the hypothetical fact pattern, so not 
completing any type of significant corporate finance transaction is not an option.  
However, the two options of pursuing an IPO track or a private equity financing in order 
to secure the necessary capital to execute the planned international expansion are both 
described as being clearly accessible.   
In creating this question, no additional details were presented other than what is disclosed 
above in order to prevent further complication of the key point in this question and in 
order to prevent biasing the respondent towards one option or another. 
Obviously, any real-world scenario will involve many more variables that will impact the 
ultimate decision-making process and may influence the ultimate outcome. However, the 
goal on Q18-1 and Q18-2 in the PCD Study is not to test the response to a real-world fact 
pattern, but to once again test the respondents’ predisposition towards public or private 
alternatives where both options are equally available.  By providing only basic facts in 
the fact pattern, the goal is to have the output of this question reflect the respondents 
disposition towards IPOs and private equity financing options generally, rather than to 
seek their opinions on a set of facts that simulates a specific real-world scenario.   
In a perfect world, the responses to Q18-1 and Q18-2 would have direct inverse 
correlation with a correlation coefficient of -1.0.  However, in the real world, it is 
understood that various individuals will interpret the question differently. One 
interpretation of Q18 is that an answer of "unlikely" on Q18-1 should mandate an answer 
of "likely" on Q18-2, an answer of "highly likely" on question 18-1 should mandate an 
answer of "highly unlikely" on Q18-2, and so forth, thereby interpreting the two 
questions as mutually exclusive.  This is the most obvious interpretation.   
An alternative interpretation, however, is that the questions Q18-1 and Q18-2 are asking 
how likely the respondent is to put forth the option of IPO or private equity financing as 
an option for consideration to the management team, interpreting the two questions as 
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non-exclusive.   
The majority of the respondents applied the first interpretation, but some respondents 
applied the second interpretation.  The PCD Data evidences a Spearman Rank correlation 
coefficient between Q18-1 and Q18-2 of -0.6655 with P-value of less than 0.001.  It is 
submitted that this correlation demonstrates a sufficiently strong degree of internal 
consistency in the answers between Q18-1 and Q18-2, evidencing that the respondent 
group on the whole did properly comprehend the inverse relationship between the two 
questions.   
Yet, a number of respondents indicated that they were likely or extremely likely to 
recommend the private equity option in Q18-2, but also indicated that they were neutral 
on the IPO option in Q18-1.  While some may perceive these two answers as 
inconsistent, it is in fact a normal phenomenon in survey research. This occurs because 
certain respondents, particularly in Canada, have an innate aversion to selecting negative 
answers and will instead select the neutral option in a survey even when they are, in 
reality, negatively disposed on a question.438    Five-Point Likert Scales are therefore 
amongst the most challenging research formats to analyze because of such proclivities, 
and the correlation coefficients are often lower for Five-Point Likert Scales based on 
opinion responses than in research assessing "hard" scientific data.  As such, the observed 
correlation between Q18-1 and Q18 in the PCD Study at -0.6655 is robust by the 
standards of Five-Point Likert Scale data. 
Reference to the headline statistics on Q18-1 and Q18-2 demonstrate that the respondent 
group in the PCD Study overall leans heavily towards favoring the Private Equity option 
over the IPO option.  The mean for Q18-1 (the IPO as the preferred alternative) amongst 
DG1- All Respondents is 2.69 compared to 3.61 (the private equity option as the 
preferred alternative) for Q18-2.   The percentage of respondents who indicated that they 
are likely or extremely likely to recommend the private equity option (i.e., 58.6%) is 
 
438  Alvin C. Burns and Ronald F. Bush, Marketing Research, 6th Edition (Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2010). 
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more than 2.5 times the number of respondents who indicated that they are likely or 
extremely like to recommend the IPO option (23.1%).  Any way you look to analyze the 
data to improve the picture, it is hard to find much encouragement for public markets 
advocates in the PCD Study responses in Q18-1 and Q18-2. 
Figure 53, Q18-1, All Respondents and Group I v. Group II  
 
Figure 54, Q18-2, All Respondents and Group I v. Group II 
  
A quick visual inspection of the above charts demonstrates the overall strength of the 
support for the private equity alternative over the IPO alternative.  The charts above also 
clearly point to another notable observation, which is that the DG2- Group I and DG3- 
Group II respondents evidence an unusually high level of similarity on both Q18-1 and 
Q18-2.   
The demographic subgroups most likely to recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 (and, by 
extension, the subgroups least likely to recommend the private equity option in Q18-2) 
are the following:  
312 
 
Figure 55, Q18-1, DG Subgroups Most Likely to Recommend IPO Option 
 
Again, it should be noted that the most positive subgroups listed above are not, in fact, 
positive on the IPO alternative in Q18-1 overall.  In fact, not even the most favorable of 
the above subgroups (DG13- Mining) can be statistically validated as being more positive 
on the IPO option than the hypothetical neutral ranking of 3.00 (One Sample Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank, P-value=0.1952).  The most optimistic statement that can be made about 
the above groups is that they are effectively neutral on the IPO proposition. 
The demographic subgroups in the PCD Study most likely to recommend the private 
equity option in Q18-2 (and, by extension, the subgroups least likely to recommend the 
IPO in Q18-1) are the following:  
Figure 56, Q18-2, DG Subgroups Most Likely to Recommend Private Equity Option 
 
What can be surmised from a quick review of the charts above?  We observe immediately 
that two different sets of demographically-linked subgroups appear in the two different 
charts, evidencing that they fall on opposite ends of the spectrum in their dispositions 
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towards IPOs and private equity.  DG5- Private Company and DG23-  Limited Pubco 
Experience are amongst the subgroups most favorable to the private equity option (and 
least favorable to the IPO option), while the linked subgroups DG4: TSX and DG25- 
Extensive Pubco Experience are amongst the subgroups most favorable to the IPO option 
(and least favorable to the private equity option).  That observation points us towards the 
likelihood of a statistically significant difference in opinions existing between these 
particular linked subgroups.  The extent of the differences is highly visible in the 
following set of charts:  
Figure 57, Q18-1, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies 
  
Figure 58, Q18-2, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies 
 
Figure 59, Q18-1, Degree of Public Experience 
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Figure 60, Q18-2, Degree of Public Experience 
 
When the statistical calculations are run, that the variation is strongly significant is easily 
confirmed.  Calculating the significance of the difference on the agree / strongly agree 
responses between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company, and between DG23-Limited 
Pubco Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience, gives us P-values of 0.0024 
or lower on each of the four calculations.  As such, there is strong statistical significance 
in the difference on each of those four relationships at a confidence level of 99% and 
higher. 
Based on these observations of linked subgroups, we can determine that increased 
exposure to, and experience working in, public companies is linked to a higher likelihood 
of a respondent being willing to recommend the IPO option in the PCD Study. 
Looking further at the summary charts above, we see that the DG8- Investment Bankers 
and DG13- Mining subgroups also rate comparatively high in their willingness to support 
the IPO option.  It is not at all surprising to see investment bankers being more likely to 
support the IPO than other demographic subgroups, given their increased familiarity with 
public companies and the opportunity for fee revenue associated with IPOs.   
It is somewhat surprising to see DG13- Mining on this list of subgroups more favorable 
to IPOs, particularly since the public mining capital markets have been significantly 
depressed for several years.  However, the pro-public market sentiment for the DG13-
Mining subgroup is consistent with the opinions that were expressed by the mining 
company decision-makers discussed earlier in reference to Q16-1.  As was discussed in 
the analysis on that topic in Q16-1, the junior mining exploration market in Canada has 
historically evidenced a high level of affinity with the public markets.  Mining is also one 
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of the industry sectors that benefitted least from the increased ease of access to private 
equity.  As such, senior decision-makers in the mining sector appear to have retained a 
more favorable opinion of the public markets overall than the other industry sectors in the 
PCD Study as evidenced by the following figures:   
Figure 61, Q18-1, Senior Decision-Makers of Mining vs. Non-Resource Companies 
  
Figure 62, Q18-2, Senior Decision-Makers of Mining vs. Non-Resource Companies 
 
Finally on Q18-1 and Q18-2, a quick reference to the mean on Q18-1 and Q18-2 also 
points towards a notable difference between DG11-SME (mean on Q18-1 is 2.46; mean 
on Q18-2 is 3.79) and DG12- Non-SME (mean on Q18-1 is 2.88; mean on Q18-2 is 
3.48). The difference between these two linked subgroups on Q18-1 achieves statistical 
significance (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0538) at a 90% confidence level.  The 
difference between these two linked subgroups on Q18-2 falls just outside the minimum 
significance level (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.1011).  On the whole, it appears  that 
senior decision-makers of larger companies are more positively disposed towards IPOs 
and public markets than the senior decision-makers of SME's, although the demographic 
factor is not as significant as the differences defined by the extent of public company 
experience. 
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7.12- Question 19: Pre-Money Premium Required to Achieve 
Equal Attractiveness 
“Q-19: How much would the pre-money valuation premium offered to 
ABC by an investment bank with respect to an IPO transaction need to 
exceed the pre-money valuation offered to ABC with respect to a private 
equity transaction in order to make the two alternatives equally 
attractive to you? “     
It has long been accepted in the capital markets that some level of valuation premium is 
required in most situations before the public and private financing alternatives will be 
equally attractive.  The public premium is required in order to justify the extra time and 
expense associated with operating a public company.  The goal in Q19 is, therefore, to 
determine, all other factors being equal, what the required level of pre-money premium is 
in order for the IPO option to be equally attractive to the private equity option.   
With the benefit of hindsight, this question proved to be more challenging for 
respondents to answer than intended, and certainly could have been better articulated.  A 
few respondents wrote editorial comments on the question design in the "Premium 
Required" text box, indicating that they believed additional context and background on 
the nature of the competing IPO and private equity alternatives was required before they 
could realistically determine what the necessary premium would be to make the two 
alternatives equally attractive.  These comments included statements such as “it depends” 
and “need more facts”.  This is an understandable position and demonstrated that the 
respondents were not generally confused about the nature of the question being asked, but 
were hesitant to commit to a generic equivalency premium without more detailed 
information to better understand the nuances of the two alternatives being presented. 
To allow for the possibility that some respondents would not be comfortable committing 
to an equivalency premium without more detailed facts to support the analysis, Q-19 is 
designed to allow respondents to opt out of answering, either by simply skipping the 
question entirely or choosing the "I don't have an opinion on this question" option.  
Overall, just under 30% of respondents selected the option not to answer this question.  
This is unquestionably a high percentage of the PCD Study participants, and 
demonstrates the conceptual challenges that the respondents encountered with this 
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problem as a whole.  Due to the challenges in question design, it is imprudent to analyze 
and draw inferences from the response data in Q19 using the same level of detailed 
subgroup analysis as is applied in other elements of PCD Study analysis.  However, it is 
nevertheless submitted that a few valuable insights can be gleaned from the 70% of  
respondents who chose to provide substantive answers on Q19.   
All percentages reported on Q19 below are based on the pool of respondents who 
provided a substantive answer; i.e., the percentage reported excludes from the calculation 
respondents who selected the "I have no opinion" option.  The number of PCD Study 
respondents who provided a substantive answer to Q20 is 240, which still constitutes a 
significant cohort. 
Q19 reflects a key embedded assumption, which is that the decision-maker will require 
some form of valuation premium in the IPO transaction in order to make the IPO and the 
private equity routes equally attractive.  In other words, the private equity alternative will 
generally be the preferred transaction alternative if there is no premium offered for an 
IPO alternative.  This assumption has historically constituted a key element of the IPO 
narrative in Canada, which is that companies pursing an IPO anticipate they will be able 
to command a pre-money valuation premium in the IPO transaction that exceeds what 
private equity investors are prepared to offer to their business.   
Critically, as we saw in the qualitative responses in Q17, along with the quantitative 
responses to Q16-2 and Q16-4, there is a widely-held perception that private equity in 
Canada is now significantly easier to access than in previous generations.  Also expressed 
frequently in the Q17 responses is the belief that private equity investors are now paying 
materially higher valuations on transactions because of an increased intensity of 
competition for good deals in which to invest.  This is a fundamental change from the 
historical belief in Canada that the number of reasonable investment opportunities 
exceeded the pool of private capital seeking investments.  If the perception expressed by 
the respondents in Q17 as to the proliferation of private equity is indeed accurate 
(validation of which is beyond the scope of this research project), the responses in Q19 
become highly illuminative in terms of explaining the extent to which private capital 
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proliferation is linked to the phenomenon of Canadian public company decline as a 
whole.439 
Although Q19 reflects the embedded assumption, articulated above, that a valuation 
premium at some level is generally required in the IPO alternative before the private 
equity option and the IPO option are equally attractive, the question does clearly allow 
the opportunity for respondents to rebut this assumption by indicating that the two 
alternatives are equally attractive without any premium.  This alternative was 
intentionally placed as the first alternative in the answer order to overcome any perceived 
bias in the framing of the question.  Ultimately,12.9% of the Q19 respondents in the PCD 
Study indicate that they believe the IPO transaction is equally attractive without any 
premium. 
In comparison, 77.5% of respondents indicate that some form of valuation premium is 
indeed required in order for the IPO alternative to be equally attractive to the private 
equity alternative.  An additional 9.6% of respondents state that no potential premium is 
sufficient in their opinions to make the make the two transactions equally attractive. 
As such, the presumption that private equity will be the preferred alternative in the PCD 
Study hypothetical fact situation without any IPO valuation premium is supported by the 
answers of 87.1% of respondents in Q19.  This level of support validates that the 
assumption reflected in the question design is, in fact, accurate in reflecting the opinion 
of the large majority of respondents in the PCD Study. 
 
439 There are numerous sources quantifying the amount of private equity dry powder (i.e., undeployed 
capital committed to private equity) that is available for investment around the world and tracking the 
increase in that number over a period of time.  Clearly, the amount of dry powder available for private 
equity investment worldwide has increased exponentially over the past dozen years. Tawfic Hammoud and 
Vinay Shandal, "Canada Needs to Work on its Private Equity Game" The Globe and Mail (13 April 2017).  
The volume of private equity investments is also tracked and reported quarterly by the Canadian Venture 
Capital Association.  See, for example, Darrell Pinto and David Kornacki, "VC & PE Canadian Market 
Overview / Q1 2019", Canadian Venture Capital Association, accessed July 30, 2019, online:< 
file:///C:/My%20Documents/Western%20Law/PhD%20Dissertation-%20Public%20Markets/Literature-
Public%20Markets%20Decline/Stats/CVCA_EN_Canada_Q1-2019_Final.pdf>.  However, there are no 
reliable public data-sources available on the amount of dry power that has been available in Canada 
specifically, a notable deficiency in the public record. 
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Turning to the quantification of the required valuation premium to achieve equality in 
attractiveness of the IPO and private equity alternatives, the average premium in the PCD 
Study is 26.6% calculated based on the mean.  To allow for the potential impact of 
outliers, the median was also calculated at 25% for all respondents on Q19.  However, it 
should be noted that the median was on the boundary between 20% and 25% (with no 
responses between 20% and 25%), so the most accurate summary of central tendency in 
Q19, adjusting for the impact of outliers on the upper end, would be to say that the 
average premium required for equality of preferences is between 20% and 25%.  
Amongst the various demographic subgroups in the PCD Study, there was a surprising 
degree of consistency in Q19.  No significant subgroup evidenced a materially different 
position than the other groups, and even the range of the average premium required for 
the two paths to be equally attractive was not as large as might have been expected (i.e., 
21.8% at the minimum to 39.6% at the maximum). 
Ultimately, the goal for including Q19 in the PCD Study was to come up with a 
percentage number that reasonably reflects the point where the IPO and private equity 
options become equally attractive for the average respondent.  As a topic for future 
research thereafter, it would be a relatively simply matter to determine whether the 
average IPO valuation premiums being seen in the market compared to available private 
equity valuations are indeed reaching the minimum premium required.  If the specified 
premiums necessary to achieve equality in preference between the two alternatives are 
not being reflected in the market, then an inference can be drawn that the inability to 
secure the required valuation premium is a factor contributing to public company decline.   
Although the execution of the original intention behind Q19 was admittedly less than 
perfect in hindsight, it is submitted that the data collected in this question certainly retains 
value on the broader topic of public company decline.  While not being sufficiently 
robust to serve as a single definitive datapoint on which to base the follow-on research 
due to the limitations of the question discussed above, it is submitted that the data does 
provide a useful measure to serve as a starting point for comparison in other research 
studies.   
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Intuitively, the required premium of 20% to 25% in an IPO transaction indicated by 
analysis of the median in the PCD Study is reasonable and within the range that would 
have been anticipated in the response.  If that range of premium is not being reflected in 
the current IPO market, then that fact provides a level of support to a particular 
hypothesis articulated by a number of PCD Study respondents in Q17; namely, that the 
private financing valuation increases, attributable to an excess of private equity capital 
chasing the same attractive deals in Canada, has reduced the premium between IPO and 
private equity financing alternatives below the threshold at which senior decision makers 
view as necessary to reach equality between public and private financing options.  
Certainly, the perceived reduction in valuation spread over the past number of years 
between IPO financings and private equity alternatives is an area that merits further study 
to better understand to what degree this issue is linked to overall public company decline. 
7.13- Question 12: Recent Consideration of Going Public by 
TSX-Eligible Private Companies 
“Q-12: Has your private company considered going public?  Select the 
answer that best applies.”   
Question 12 reflects the expressed intentions of the respondents from DG5-Private 
Company subgroup.  As a reminder, the eligibility conditions of this subcategory 
determine that all the respondents in DG5- Private Company subgroup are from 
companies that are of a sufficient size that they are eligible to go public on the TSX, and 
significantly exceed the TSX minimum listing criteria.   In fact, review of the PCD Study 
data demonstrates that nearly half (i.e., 33 out of 68) of the responses in this subgroup 
come from key decision-makers of non-SME companies, confirming that they have more 
than 500 employees or $50 million in annual revenue.  Over 20% of the respondents in 
Q12 (i.e., 14 out of 68) are senior business decision-makers of companies with more than 
$250 million in revenue.  As such, DG5-Private Company respondents should represent 
fertile ground for future IPOs all other factors remaining equal. 
The implication of the PCD Study data, however, is that there is little momentum at the 
current time to suggest that the existing supply-side constraint with respect to prospective 
IPO candidate companies will change in the near future.  Of 68 respondents in the DG5-
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Private Company subgroup who answered Q12, not a single respondent indicated that 
they have current plans to go public.  Moreover, 86.7% of the DG5-Private Company 
respondents indicated that they have either not considered an IPO option or have already 
rejected the idea of pursuing an IPO in the future. 
Figure 63, Q12, DG5-Private Company 
  
To conclude that the sentiment expressed by the senior business decision makers of TSX-
eligible private companies who responded to Q12 does not bode well for a significant 
uptick in IPO volume is to state an obviosity.  The data may not be overly surprising 
considering the terrible state of the present IPO market in Canada, but it is nevertheless 
ominous for the future of our public markets.  There is no escaping the conclusion that, at 
this point in time, the pool of companies that are open to the idea of pursuing an IPO in 
Canada is a small subset of the companies that are currently eligible to pursue an IPO. 
Although we have certainly witnessed a difficult period in the two key extractive industry 
sectors over the past five years, the cyclical commodity downturn cannot be blamed for 
the complete lack of IPO activity.  Benefitting from a relatively low Canadian dollar that 
is significantly influenced by the commodity downturn, the non-resource portion of the 
Canadian economy has performed well, as evidenced by consistent GDP growth over the 
last five years.440  Yet, this period of economic growth across all non resource-based 
industries has not led to any resurgence in non-resource IPO activity in Canada.  Clearly, 
waiting for Canadian IPOs volume to return to historic volumes absent some type of 
 
440 Statistics Canada, "Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by industry, annual average (x 
1,000,000)" online statistical chart on Government of Canada- Statistics Canada website, accessed July 22, 
2019, online:< https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043403>. 
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significant intervention represents a fool’s hope. 
7.14- Question 10: Recent Consideration of Going-Private 
Transactions by TSX-Listed Public Companies 
“Q-10: You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-
Maker of a TSX-listed company.  Has your public company considered 
going private?”     
Turning now to analysis of Question 10, which reflects the opinion of senior business 
decision makers of TSX-listed companies in the DG4-TSX subgroup.  This question 
represents the mirror image of the question asked of private company senior business 
decision makers discussed above in Q12.  As the respondents answering Q12 are all 
Senior Decision Makers of companies that are already public and listed on the TSX, the 
question is simply asking whether they are satisfied with their experience as public 
companies or whether they are considering a going private transaction.   
Just over half of all DG4-TSX respondents on Q12 (i.e., 56.4%) reported that their 
companies had not considered a going-private transaction and were satisfied remaining as 
a public company.  The other 43.6% of respondents indicated either that: (i) they had 
considered going private and decided not to (20.2%); (2) are still in the process of 
evaluating a going-private transaction (22.3%); or (3) have adopted a definitive plan to go 
private (1%). 
The PCD Study of the senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies on this question 
can be interpreted in a variety of ways.  An optimistic interpretation would point out that 
there does not appear to be an imminent risk of a slew of going-private transactions, with 
only a single respondent to Q12 indicating that a going-private transaction was in their 
company's immediate plans.  While that is accurate, going-private transactions are often 
as costly, time-consuming and complex as IPOs, particularly if there is any related-party 
element to the going-private transaction that brings Multilateral Instrument 61-101 into 
play.   
Public company decline has occurred over the past dozen years at an alarming rate in 
Canada primarily as a result of organic attrition in the public markets; i.e., the loss of 
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public companies through acquisition and consolidation without a sufficient number of 
new listings to replace the losses.  This history demonstrates that a company that is 
unsatisfied with its existing public status may well look towards selling itself as a means 
of exiting the public markets rather than undergoing the cost, hassle and legal risk 
associated with a going-private transaction. 
A pessimistic interpretation of the data derived from Question 10 of the PCD Study, on 
the other hand, would point to the fact that over 40% of the senior decision-makers are 
sufficiently unhappy with their public company status that they have actively considered 
a going private transaction at some point.  Even those who have concluded that a going-
private transaction is not optimal for the businesses may still well be looking to secure a 
public exit by executing some form of corporate sale transaction.  That question was not 
asked of respondents. As such, while the PCD Study data does not portend an imminent 
collapse of the public markets in Canada resulting from a stampede of going-private 
transactions, it is equivocal, at best, and offers little in the way of comfort to the 
supporters of the Canadian public markets hoping for a recovery. 
What else can be gleaned from analysis of the responses on Question 10? The relevant 
academic literature, the business media commentary and the Qualitative Analysis 
component of the PCD Study all evidence a widely-held belief that SME's are having a 
significantly more difficult time succeeding in the public markets than larger companies. 
If that is an accurate perception, then one would expect to observe a lower percentage of 
DG4-TSX respondents from SME companies indicating that they are satisfied with 
remaining as a public company, and a corresponding higher percentage indicating that 
they are considering or planning a going-private transaction in the future, than for their 
non-SME counterparts (i.e., Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers of larger TSX-
listed companies). 
Figure 64, Q10, DG4-TSX 
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When looking at the data, we observe that 39.3% of the DG10-SME subgroup stated that 
they remain in active consideration of a going-private.  Another 17.9% have previously 
explored going-private options, but have decided not to pursue a going-private 
transaction at this time.  Only 42.9% of DG10-SME respondents indicate that they are 
sufficiently satisfied with the experience of being public on the TSX such that they have 
not actively considered a going-private transaction.   
The data are indeed more positive with respect to contentment with remaining as a public 
company for respondents from the DG5-Non-SME subgroup. For this subgroup, 60.9% 
of decision-makers from Non-SME companies indicated that they are satisfied with being 
public and have not considered a going-private transaction.  Another 21.9% considered 
going-private opportunities and decided to remain public.  Only 15.6% of DG5-Non-
SME respondents continue to have a going-private transaction under consideration. 
Applying statistical analysis, the hypothesis that senior business decision-makers of Non-
SME’s are more satisfied remaining as a public company than their SME counterparts is 
demonstrated at a confidence level of 90% (Single-Tailed Two Proportions Z-Test, P-
value=0.0842).  The lower confidence level here is due to the small sample size in the 
PCD Study (n=28) of respondents whose companies qualify as fitting within both the 
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DG10-SME and DG4-TSX subgroups. However, using the same Single-Tailed  Two 
Proportions Z-Test, the hypothesis that respondents associated with TSX-listed SME's are 
more likely to be considering going-private transactions than TSX-listed non-SME's is 
supported at a strong level of statistical significance (P-value=0.0037) notwithstanding 
the small sample size.  This difference is supported at a confidence level of 99%.  In 
combination, both of these observations provide support to the proposition that TSX-
listed SME’s have a less favorable experience as public companies than TSX-listed non-
SME's. 
Considering the implication of the data from Question 10 and Question 12 together, the 
overall sentiment expressed by the two subgroups of senior business decision-makers in 
Canada does not bode well for a significant uptick in Canadian IPO volume in the near 
future absent significant intervention.  However, it also does not portend an imminent 
stampede to the door in the form of going-private transactions on the TSX.  Rather, the 
implication of the data is that, absent a significant intervention, the current trendlines in 
public company decline will continue to occur and the number of public companies listed 
on the TSX will further decline through overall attrition as the volume of future IPOs is 
insufficient to replace the listings lost through merger and acquisition. 
7.15- Question 20: Ranking Potential Downside Risks in IPOs 
“Q20- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how 
important are each of the following potential downside risks associated 
with pursuing the TSX IPO in your analysis?” 
 Q20 Overview  
Q20 is a large matrix question, representing one of the core elements of the PCD Study.  
Q20 operates in concert with Q17, which earlier asks respondents (without the benefit of 
seeing the comprehensive list of downside risk factors suggested in the literature) to give 
their opinion as to why fewer companies are going public in Canada.  Here, Q20 provides 
respondents with the extensive list of factors gleaned from the literature that have been 
posited by others as potentially contributing to public company decline, then asks the 
respondents how important each factor is in their analysis of whether to pursue an IPO 
option versus a private equity financing option in the hypothetical fact pattern posed in 
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Q18.   Thereby, Q20 summarizes the posited potential downsides that may be keeping 
decision-makers away from pursuing IPOs in Canada and allows us to assess which of 
these factors are most important in the deliberations of the key decision-makers and 
influencers. 
Once again, it should be noted clearly that the PCD Study was not designed to establish 
causality.  The downside factors that rank most highly in Q20 are not, as a result, 
statistically proven to be the specific causes of public company decline within the 
scientific definition of cause and effect.  There is no ability, for example, to conclude 
from the PCD Study data that Factor 1 is 30% responsible for the phenomenon of public 
company decline in Canada while Factor 2 is 20% responsible, or even that Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 can be proven to be causal on any statistical basis of a decision to avoid an IPO.   
Moreover, some of the critical factors that are contributing causes of public company 
decline are not downsides associated with being public.  For example, both the 
proliferation of private equity as an alternative to the public markets and the Fundamental 
Economic Change Hypothesis operate independently of any negative factors associated 
with the public markets.  Q20 is limited to assessing downsides associated with being 
public, and does not consider those other contributing factors. 
What is being tested in Q20 is the level of importance of the key downside factors 
associated with being public to the IPO decision-making process.  By the application of 
inference and simple logic, the more important that a down-side risk factor associated 
with being a public company is in the decision-making process, the greater the degree to 
which that particular factor ultimately influences the path that is chosen by the decision-
makers.  As such, while the data in Q20 does not prove statistical causation, it is 
nevertheless instructive on the ultimate question of what downside factors may be 
amongst the most significant in contributing to the phenomenon of public company 
decline.  Yet, the output on Q20 must also be considered in combination with the relative 
importance of the other potential factors contributing to public company decline that are 
not public company downsides in order to assess the full picture of relative causality. 
Much of the analysis on Q20 focuses on the ranking of the various factors according to 
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mean.  This is the simplest way of organizing the large volume of data collected in Q20 
and conveying the results in summary form.  Reference to the mean does not provide any 
information as to the variability in responses on a particular factor.  However, variability 
in responses for each factor is presented visually in Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO / 
Public Downsides, All Respondents. 
It should be noted that the volume and depth of the data collected in Q20 (and, by 
extension, in Q21) provide an opportunity for analysis (through a variety of forms) in 
significantly greater depth and statistical sophistication than what is included in the 
following analysis.  As discussed earlier in this Dissertation, the PCD Study represents 
the first time that an attempt has been made to collect any type of similar data on public 
company risk factors from a large cohort of senior business decision-makers and public 
markets influencers.  However, even in a Dissertation format, there is a practical limit to 
the length of a document that can be filed and this Dissertation already runs to over 
125,000 words without expanding the analysis on Q20 or Q21 any further. 
Also, there is a limit to the statistics analytical capacity of the author, coming from a legal 
background and not a formal statistics background.  As such, it is hoped that the data 
gathered in the PCD Study will underpin follow-on research efforts beyond the scope of 
the analysis in this Dissertation, in which the author collaborates with other statistical 
analysis experts to engage in more sophisticated statistical analysis of the PCD Study 
data.   
In particular, one area identified that is ripe for further analysis is in terms of predicting 
responses in Q18-1 and Q18-2 based on the response to the downside factors in Q20 and 
the upside factors in Q21 using ordinal regressions.  However, those future collaborations 
are for another day in another forum. 
 Summary Tables 
Turning now to analysis of the PCD Study data collected for Q20, one of the biggest 
challenges in conveying the research output is determining how to best summarize and 
present the most important information.  There are 31 different potential downside factors 
associated with being public included in Q20.  This Dissertation has consistently utilized 
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25 specific demographic groups throughout the PCD Study analysis, and will continue to 
do so here for the purposes of consistency.  However, discussing each demographic 
subgroup’s specific disposition on each specific downside factor associated with the 
public markets in Q20 results in 775 different permutations to consider.  Even 
summarizing the data in chart form at an individual subgroup level requires 25 different 
charts for Q20 and 25 different charts for Q21 to display the summary data (each with 31 
different rows of data).441 
Instead, presentation methodologies have been selected for Q20 and Q21 herein that 
allow readers of this Dissertation to digest the largest amounts of summary data as 
quickly as possible in simple visual formats.  The result is fewer charts and tables with 
large amounts of data in each table. These tables in particular are designed to enable the 
identification of critical trends and outcomes across the entire dataset of 31 questions and 
25 demographic subgroups. 
In each of Q20 and Q21, a stacked bar graph format is utilized to summarize the overall 
rank-order for the various factors tested.  The data are organized sequentially according 
to the mean as determined by the all PCD respondents (i.e., DG 1- All Respondents).  
This stacked bar graph also demonstrates the distribution of the answers on the 5-Point 
Likert Scale used for these questions.  Next, a series of tables is presented that discloses 
the mean and the rank order of each factor according to each of the 25 demographic 
subgroups.  In each of these tables, the five highest means or rank orders (white 
backgrounds) and five lowest means or rank orders (black background) with respect to 
each particular factor amongst the 25 demographic subgroups are highlighted. 
 
441 Those 50 individual subgroup charts have been compiled, but are omitted from inclusion in this 
Dissertation for reasons of limiting the length of the document.  Formatting rules for this Dissertation 
require that any charts be included in the body of the document, and not in the appendices.  Adding those 
50 charts into this document along with a summary analysis of each chart would add an additional 100-150 
pages in length to this document at the minimum.  Clearly, that would be too much depth of analysis on 
Q20 and Q21.  As such, the 25 individual subgroup charts for Q20 and the 25 individual subgroup charts 
for Q21 are being withheld from inclusion in this Dissertation, but will be made available for review by any 
interested party who desires to analyze the response data in further depth upon written request to the author 
via email at contact@groupwilson.com.   
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Unlike Q16 and Q18 previously, the middle position (i.e., a response of “3”) on the 5 
Point Likert scale used in Q20 is not neutral, but rather "moderately important".   An 
answer of “1” on Q20 is defined as “Not at all Important”, and an answer of “5” is 
defined as “Extremely Important”.  Positions “2” and “4” are not defined, but clearly 
represent mid-points between the extremes of “1” or “5” and “moderately important” in 
the middle.  Visually, the Likert Scale on both Q20 and a Q21 were presented in the PCD 
Study as follows: 
Figure 65- Likert Scale Response Layout for Q20 and Q21 
 
As a general, yet critical, observation on Q20, it should be noted that the bulk of the 
analysis on this question is a discussion about the comparative ranking and importance of 
31 downside factors associated with IPOs and public companies that have been suggested 
in literature as being potential contributors to public company decline.  The fact that a 
specific factor ranks near the bottom of a list in the rank order does not indicate that it is 
inherently unimportant or of little consequence to the decision-making process.  
In fact, the data indicates that most of the factors included in Q20 are not insignificant to 
the decision-making process.  A downside factor that is of moderate importance is still 
clearly a factor that can be significant in the course of IPO deliberations.  Moreover, a 
number of moderately important downside risk factors can have a cumulative effect of 
combining to create a strong disincentive to pursue an IPO option when private financing 
alternatives are available.  It is not necessary to identify a group of extremely important 
downside factors in order to collectively explain the phenomenon of public company 
decline.  Notably, the lowest mean of any of the 31 factors tested in Q20 came in at 2.55, 
which is a level at which an argument can be made that the factor continues to have 
relevance in the decision-making process.  
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In total, 19 out of the 31 factors in Q20 scored with a mean higher than 3.00.  The 
implications of this particular observation are once again ominous for the proponents of 
public capital markets in Canada.  Any hope that the PCD Study would demonstrate that 
there are only a few contributing factors with material relevance to the public company 
decline phenomenon is simply not supported by the data.  Rather, the overall ratings on 
Q20 alone make it apparent that the factors contributing to public company decline are 
numerous and complex, ruling out any simple fixes to reverse public company decline. 
The core of the analysis on Q20 will begin with a discussion of the rankings of the 31 
different factors tested, grouped according to topical categories, to provide a context for 
the ensuing analysis.  Second, will be the presentation of a number of summary tables 
that serve as the foundation of the Q20 analysis.  Third, the downside factor associated 
with public companies that was ranked most as the single most important factor of the 31 
factors tested is discussed.  Fourth, the top ranked factors from the PCD Study will be 
discussed in the context of what they imply as to the importance the topical categories 
into which they are categorized.  Fifth, the PCD Study data will be analyzed in more 
detail according to these topical categories.  Finally, the perspectives and differences 
exhibited within the demographic subgroups will be considered to highlight any key 
findings not otherwise articulated. 
To bring the big-picture trends in the PCD Study into sharper focus, and to assist in 
digesting the large amount of data collected throughout Q20 more quickly, the 31 
downside factors have been broken down into eight topical categories.  These categories 
and the overall rank order of each of the 31 factors according to mean is summarized in 
Table 16, Q20, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Downside 
Factors.  The rankings in this table are based on all responses received in the PCD Study. 
This is followed by Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO / Public Downsides, All 
Respondents.  This figure shows the variability and range of the responses in the PCD 
Study on each of the 31 factors for all respondents in the PCD Study. 
Next is Table 17, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part I and Table 18, Q20- 
Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part II.  The information in these tables has been 
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broken into two separate tables, as the responses from the 25 different demographic 
subgroups could not be presented legibly on a single sheet of paper.  The means indicated 
in these tables are the means for the particular factor according to the specific 
demographic subgroup indicated.  Also, the top 5 and bottom 5 responses in each row are 
calculated on the basis of all 25 different demographic subgroups.  To see all of the top 5 
and bottom 5 of each category, one needs to look at both tables to see results of the 25 
subgroups. 
The last in the string of summary tables are Table 19, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) 
by Demographic Group, Part I and Table 20, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by 
Demographic Group, Part II.  Once again, the data are broken into two separate tables in 
order to legibly summarize the responses from the 25 different demographic subgroups.  
The ranking numbers indicated in these tables are the ranking of the particular factor 
according to the specific demographic subgroup indicated. Again, the top 5 and bottom 5 
results in each row are calculated on the basis of all 25 different demographic subgroups. 
The reader should consult both tables to see all subgroups. 
Table 16, Q20, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Downside Factors 
Downside Category 
Q# 
20- Specific Downside Summary 
Rank Order 
(by DG1) 
Regulatory Complexity / 
Regulatory Overreach 
6 Increasing compliance complexity 3 
12 Belief that regulatory environment favors 
minority investor protection above the 
interest of the public company 
21 
17 Business Acquisition Reports 26 
18 Financial statement certification 31 
23 Related party transaction 
disclosure/restrictions 
29 
24 Redundancy of filing requirements 9 
28 Evolving corporate governance practices 27 
 
Time / Distraction / Effort of 
Going and Being Public  
1 Time to complete IPO  10 
2 Management effort to complete IPO 7 
5 General public management distractions  4 
13 Proxy advisory firms 18 
19 Inability to focus on core business 6 
27 Responding to uninformed shareholders 20 
30 Management overall public company 
fatigue 
14 
 
Public Company Costs 3 Cost of IPO 5 7 Increasing compliance cost 2 
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Downside Category 
Q# 
20- Specific Downside Summary 
Rank Order 
(by DG1) 
 
Liquidity, Valuation and 
Access to Capital 
10 Trading volume concerns 8 
11 Analyst coverage concerns 16 
31 Lack of surety of access to follow-on 
financing 
12 
 
Public Disclosure Disadvantage 
and Privacy 
4 Executive comp disclosure 23 
8 Insider reporting requirements 28 
16 Competitive disclosure disadvantage 13 
20 Public disclosure of shares and income 30 
21 Reputational risk 22 
 
Short Termism 
15 Short-termism by shareholders 15 
22 Pressures of meeting quarterly targets 1 
25 Short sellers 24 
 
Company Control Concerns 
14 Special interest groups 25 
26 Proxy battle risk 17 
29 Hostile takeover risk 27 
 
Legal Risk 9 Increased litigation risk 11 
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Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO / Public Downsides, All Respondents 
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Table 17, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part I 
   
NOTE: 
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on 
mean are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on 
mean are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor according to 
mean. 
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25 
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only 
the DG's reflected on this particular table. 
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1. Time to complete IPO 3.39 3.36 3.41 3.17 3.63 3.12 3.87 3.23 3.47 3.64 3.26 3.22 3.30 3.42
2. Management effort to complete IPO 3.53 3.50 3.56 3.28 3.81 3.33 4.05 3.27 3.63 3.83 3.35 3.28 3.33 3.68
3. Cost of IPO 3.68 3.66 3.70 3.62 3.72 3.56 4.11 3.45 3.74 3.90 3.58 3.59 3.47 3.75
4. Executive comp disclosure 2.95 3.08 2.85 2.94 3.27 2.86 2.79 2.86 2.86 3.17 3.01 2.84 2.80 3.23
5. General management distractions 3.78 3.75 3.80 3.47 4.14 3.49 3.95 3.55 4.12 3.97 3.64 3.84 3.47 3.79
6. Increasing compliance complexity 3.81 3.81 3.80 3.62 4.08 3.53 4.26 3.55 3.89 3.93 3.70 3.50 3.40 4.05
7. Increasing compliance cost 3.94 4.07 3.83 4.02 4.14 3.65 4.32 3.52 3.88 4.12 4.07 3.81 3.87 4.22
8. Insider reporting requirements 2.63 2.74 2.54 2.48 3.09 2.51 2.79 2.30 2.60 2.90 2.67 2.38 2.67 2.92
9. Increased litigation risk 3.38 3.59 3.21 3.34 3.92 3.33 3.39 2.98 3.19 3.81 3.44 3.44 3.17 3.76
10. Trading volume concerns 3.47 3.41 3.53 3.34 3.50 3.28 3.45 3.59 3.72 3.51 3.34 3.19 3.40 3.44
11. Analyst coverage concerns 3.16 3.15 3.17 3.16 3.13 2.91 3.00 3.30 3.39 3.27 3.05 2.72 3.03 3.31
12. General regulatory overreach 2.97 3.21 2.77 3.00 3.48 2.81 3.00 2.55 2.77 3.27 3.20 3.38 2.77 3.30
13. Proxy advisory firms 3.01 3.20 2.85 3.07 3.38 2.86 3.00 2.59 2.93 3.22 3.23 3.00 3.23 3.26
14. Special interest groups 2.88 2.95 2.82 2.78 3.17 2.86 2.71 2.48 3.12 2.90 2.95 3.03 3.03 2.92
15. Short-termism amongst shareholders 3.22 3.27 3.18 3.14 3.45 3.30 2.89 3.05 3.39 3.46 3.12 3.06 3.30 3.35
16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage 3.36 3.44 3.29 3.40 3.48 3.26 3.39 3.28 3.25 3.54 3.37 3.34 3.07 3.59
17. Business Acquisition Reports 2.86 2.97 2.76 2.82 3.17 2.79 3.24 2.41 2.70 3.17 2.84 2.72 2.90 3.08
18. Financial statement certification 2.55 2.68 2.44 2.49 2.92 2.47 3.00 2.34 2.12 2.86 2.58 2.44 2.53 2.84
19. Inablity to focus on core business 3.65 3.66 3.64 3.36 4.08 3.56 3.76 3.37 3.82 3.88 3.53 3.69 3.30 3.75
20. Public disclosure of shares and income 2.56 2.65 2.48 2.36 3.05 2.37 2.74 2.32 2.51 2.85 2.55 2.47 2.20 2.84
21. Reputational risk 2.95 3.05 2.88 2.93 3.20 2.84 2.92 2.64 3.07 3.22 3.00 2.91 3.00 3.08
22. Pressures of meeting quarterly  targets 3.97 3.79 4.13 3.59 4.06 3.98 4.00 3.91 4.49 3.92 3.71 3.72 3.43 3.93
23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions 2.59 2.65 2.54 2.45 2.92 2.67 2.71 2.39 2.45 2.76 2.59 2.41 2.70 2.73
24. Redundancy of filing requirements 3.42 3.55 3.31 3.49 3.63 3.10 3.76 2.91 3.47 3.63 3.52 3.50 3.37 3.64
25. Short-sellers 2.9 2.91 2.90 2.85 2.98 3.19 2.82 2.70 2.88 3.07 2.80 2.66 2.77 3.01
26. Proxy battle risk 3.06 3.08 3.05 2.90 3.33 3.26 2.95 2.77 3.18 3.02 3.09 2.81 2.77 3.22
27. Responding to uniformed shareholders 2.99 3.19 2.84 2.86 3.63 2.56 3.00 2.61 3.11 3.54 3.00 3.06 3.00 3.30
28. Evolving corporate governance practices 3 3.15 2.87 3.07 3.27 2.91 3.05 2.61 2.91 3.19 3.20 3.19 2.90 3.25
29. Hostile takeover risk 2.8 2.71 2.88 2.56 2.91 2.95 2.71 2.84 2.98 2.66 2.76 2.53 2.47 2.86
30. Management overall public company fatigue 3.26 3.36 3.18 3.10 3.72 2.93 3.45 2.82 3.46 3.68 3.20 3.44 2.83 3.47
31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing 3.37 3.44 3.31 3.30 3.63 3.10 3.42 3.23 3.47 3.51 3.43 3.81 3.07 3.47
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Table 18, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part II 
  
NOTE: 
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on mean 
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on 
mean are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor according to 
mean. 
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25 
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only 
the DG's reflected on this particular table. 
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1. Time to complete IPO 3.39 3.25 3.47 3.27 3.50 4.11 3.21 3.32 3.48 3.53 3.56 3.17
2. Management effort to complete IPO 3.53 3.55 3.44 3.46 3.94 4.00 3.63 3.52 3.49 3.82 3.77 3.18
3. Cost of IPO 3.68 3.70 3.61 3.60 3.81 4.47 3.64 3.58 3.75 3.89 3.83 3.43
4. Executive comp disclosure 2.95 2.88 2.88 2.96 3.06 3.26 2.84 2.84 3.06 3.13 2.91 2.83
5. General management distractions 3.78 3.55 3.90 3.73 3.81 4.05 3.71 3.93 3.69 4.07 3.91 3.49
6. Increasing compliance complexity 3.81 3.77 3.76 3.79 3.81 4.05 3.70 3.76 3.85 4.02 3.85 3.60
7. Increasing compliance cost 3.94 4.05 3.87 3.87 3.88 4.53 3.71 3.97 3.97 4.09 3.91 3.82
8. Insider reporting requirements 2.63 2.58 2.59 2.60 2.75 3.05 2.70 2.58 2.63 3.01 2.68 2.31
9. Increased litigation risk 3.38 3.20 3.34 3.41 3.38 3.53 3.30 3.39 3.38 3.56 3.41 3.21
10. Trading volume concerns 3.47 3.30 3.47 3.43 3.94 3.79 3.32 3.43 3.53 3.59 3.58 3.31
11. Analyst coverage concerns 3.16 3.02 2.94 3.26 3.69 3.16 3.09 3.05 3.24 3.29 3.04 3.11
12. General regulatory overreach 2.97 2.92 3.10 2.82 3.06 3.42 2.77 3.00 2.99 3.16 3.01 2.78
13. Proxy advisory firms 3.01 3.15 3.10 2.88 3.19 3.11 2.91 3.06 2.98 3.03 3.14 2.90
14. Special interest groups 2.88 2.60 3.01 2.78 3.06 3.00 2.88 2.74 2.93 3.03 2.80 2.76
15. Short-termism amongst shareholders 3.22 3.15 3.14 3.28 3.50 3.00 3.25 3.23 3.19 3.26 3.33 3.11
16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage 3.36 3.17 3.42 3.28 4.00 3.53 3.23 3.35 3.39 3.50 3.26 3.28
17. Business Acquisition Reports 2.86 2.73 2.87 2.77 3.06 3.47 2.70 2.88 2.87 3.03 3.02 2.61
18. Financial statement certification 2.55 2.48 2.55 2.47 2.56 3.11 2.32 2.73 2.47 2.72 2.56 2.39
19. Inablity to focus on core business 3.65 3.77 3.73 3.50 3.81 4.21 3.63 3.75 3.58 3.90 3.79 3.38
20. Public disclosure of shares and income 2.56 2.25 2.70 2.46 2.69 3.11 2.45 2.58 2.56 2.84 2.62 2.29
21. Reputational risk 2.95 2.63 2.97 2.95 2.94 3.42 2.93 2.91 2.97 3.05 3.01 2.83
22. Pressures of meeting quarterly  targets 3.97 3.55 3.94 4.06 4.50 4.26 4.29 4.05 3.84 4.27 4.05 3.75
23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions 2.59 2.35 2.48 2.59 2.69 3.47 2.50 2.61 2.58 2.78 2.70 2.35
24. Redundancy of filing requirements 3.42 3.65 3.47 3.28 3.44 3.68 3.29 3.41 3.45 3.64 3.46 3.21
25. Short-sellers 2.9 2.67 2.80 2.99 3.00 2.95 3.07 2.86 2.86 3.03 3.01 2.73
26. Proxy battle risk 3.06 2.85 3.01 3.15 3.00 3.05 3.16 3.16 2.94 3.22 3.27 2.81
27. Responding to uniformed shareholders 2.99 3.10 3.05 2.91 2.94 3.05 2.89 3.08 2.94 3.42 2.93 2.69
28. Evolving corporate governance practices 3 2.75 2.97 3.02 3.06 3.32 2.75 3.01 3.06 3.16 2.93 2.90
29. Hostile takeover risk 2.8 2.67 2.71 2.82 3.25 2.84 3.09 2.72 2.75 2.97 2.90 2.62
30. Management overall public company fatigue 3.26 3.15 3.40 3.10 3.50 3.84 3.13 3.23 3.31 3.60 3.19 3.03
31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing 3.37 3.30 3.65 3.20 3.44 3.42 3.05 3.43 3.42 3.45 3.27 3.34
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Table 19, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by Demographic Group, Part I  
 
  
NOTE: 
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on rank 
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on 
rank are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor. 
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25 
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only 
the DG's reflected on this particular table. 
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2. Management effort to complete IPO 7 9 7 12 7 8 4 10 8 7 11 13 8 8
3. Cost of IPO 5 6 5 3 9 4 3 6 6 5 5 6 3 7
4. Executive comp disclosure 23 22 23 20 21 23 27 16 25 23 21 22 23 21
5. General management distractions 4 4 4 6 2 6 6 4 2 2 4 1 2 4
6. Increasing compliance complexity 3 2 3 2 4 5 2 3 3 3 3 8 6 2
7. Increasing compliance cost 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 5 4 1 1 3 1 1
8. Insider reporting requirements 28 27 29 29 26 29 26 31 28 27 28 31 28 27
9. Increased litigation risk 11 7 13 10 6 7 14 14 16 8 8 10 13 5
10. Trading volume concerns 8 12 8 9 14 10 11 2 7 15 12 16 5 13
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13. Proxy advisory firms 18 17 22 18 18 22 19 24 22 20 14 20 12 19
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16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage 13 11 12 7 15 12 13 9 15 13 10 12 15 10
17. Business Acquisition Reports 26 24 27 25 23 26 15 27 27 22 25 24 21 24
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19. Inablity to focus on core business 6 5 6 8 3 3 9 7 5 6 6 5 9 6
20. Public disclosure of shares and income 30 31 30 31 27 31 28 30 29 29 31 28 31 29
21. Reputational risk 22 23 20 21 22 24 23 21 20 19 22 21 19 23
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29. Hostile takeover risk 27 28 19 27 31 17 29 17 21 31 27 27 30 28
30. Management overall public company fatigue 14 13 14 16 8 18 10 18 12 9 17 9 22 12
31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing 12 10 10 11 10 15 12 11 9 14 9 2 14 11
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Table 20, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by Demographic Group, Part II 
 
  
NOTE: 
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on rank 
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on 
rank are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor. 
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25 
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only the 
DG's reflected on this particular table. 
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2. Management effort to complete IPO 7 8 11 7 4 4 7 7 8 7 7 12
3. Cost of IPO 5 4 7 5 9 9 5 6 4 6 5 5
4. Executive comp disclosure 23 20 24 20 23 23 24 25 17 21 25 19
5. General management distractions 4 7 2 4 8 8 3 3 5 3 2 4
6. Increasing compliance complexity 3 3 4 3 7 7 4 4 2 4 4 3
7. Increasing compliance cost 2 1 3 2 5 5 2 2 1 2 3 1
8. Insider reporting requirements 28 28 29 28 28 28 28 30 28 27 29 30
9. Increased litigation risk 11 12 14 9 16 16 9 11 13 11 11 10
10. Trading volume concerns 8 10 9 8 3 3 8 8 7 10 8 8
11. Analyst coverage concerns 16 18 23 14 10 10 17 19 15 16 18 14
12. General regulatory overreach 21 19 17 25 22 22 25 21 19 19 20 22
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15. Short-termism amongst shareholders 15 15 15 12 12 12 11 14 16 17 12 15
16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage 13 13 12 11 2 2 12 12 12 13 15 9
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18. Financial statement certification 31 29 30 30 31 31 31 27 31 31 31 28
19. Inablity to focus on core business 6 2 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 6
20. Public disclosure of shares and income 30 31 28 31 30 30 30 31 30 29 30 31
21. Reputational risk 22 26 22 21 27 27 20 22 21 22 21 20
22. Pressures of meeting quarterly  targets 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2
23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions 29 30 31 29 29 29 29 29 29 30 28 29
24. Redundancy of filing requirements 9 5 8 10 15 15 10 10 10 8 10 11
25. Short-sellers 24 25 26 19 25 25 18 24 26 26 22 24
26. Proxy battle risk 17 21 19 16 24 24 14 16 22 18 13 21
27. Responding to uniformed shareholders 20 17 18 22 26 26 22 17 23 15 23 25
28. Evolving corporate governance practices 19 22 21 18 19 19 26 20 18 20 24 18
29. Hostile takeover risk 27 24 27 24 17 17 16 28 27 28 26 26
30. Management overall public company fatigue 14 14 13 17 11 11 15 15 14 9 16 16
31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing 12 9 6 15 14 14 19 9 11 14 14 7
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 The Single Worst Thing About Being Public? 
So, based on the PCD Study data in Q20, can any of the prospective downside factors 
associated with going public, or being public, be defined as representing the "single worst 
thing about being public"?  It was hoped that the PCD Study would establish a particular 
factor that could be definitively categorized as being the single most important negative 
factor associated with taking a company public.  Based on the PCD Study data for all 
respondents, the most important negative factor associated with the public markets is 
Q20-22, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst targets.  This is certainly an unexpected 
outcome and worth discussing further.  This particular factor is also complex, and it 
implicates a variety of different underlying elements arising from different conceptual 
foundations.   
The first element to discuss on the quarterly target pressure issue relates to managing 
analyst expectations.  Analysts generally set their earnings expectations with reference to 
the guidance provided by the senior management of the issuers.  However, analyst 
estimates also embed the analysts’ own personal research and beliefs on the prospects of 
the issuer. Senior management do not have control over the final numbers that are 
published by the analysts.  Although the final numbers are outside the control of 
management, the public markets seem to place an inordinate amount of importance on 
these estimates being met.  Failure to meet analyst estimates often results in a significant 
decline in share price immediately after announcement of results.  Is the higher-than-
expected ranking of this factor in the PCD Study a reflection of the degree of frustration 
that senior decision-makers feel towards being held accountable to outsider expectations 
that they cannot control?  Intuitively, this would seem to be a component behind the 
higher-than-expected ranking of the pressure of meeting quarterly analysts targets in the 
PCD Study.  However, this particular source of frustration operates independently of the 
broader short-termism topic. 
The second element of the quarterly target pressure issue relates to short-termism.  Given 
the importance that the public markets place on meeting quarterly targets, senior 
executives certainly feel a significant amount of pressure to meet these targets to satisfy 
both the pool of analysts covering the issuer and the public shareholders.  In many cases 
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this means evaluating both short-term and long-term strategic decisions with a continual 
eye towards the impact that these decisions will have on the ability of the company to 
meet quarterly analyst targets over the next several quarters.   
However, it is widely understood that decisions made to maximize short-term 
profitability may often come at the expense of long-term business growth.  Positioning a 
business for ultimate success years and decades down the road often requires a 
commitment to making continued investment over a long period of time. This long-term 
commitment may diminish profitability in the near term for multiple quarters, and even 
up to several years, before the success or failure of the long-term strategy becomes 
apparent.  The high ranking of this particular factor, relating to the pressures of meeting 
quarterly analysts targets, in the PCD Study strongly suggests that the key decision-
makers and influencers in Canadian business collectively believe that the public markets 
fail to exhibit sufficient patience to allow companies to make the necessary long-term 
investments and optimally position the company for long-term success.  Instead, the 
strong inference from the high ranking of this particular factor is that private financing 
alternatives are perceived as offering a company an investment partner that is more 
patient and willing to support investment strategies that will only pay off over longer 
periods of time compared to the public markets. 
A third element of the quarterly target pressures issue is the frequency of the occurrence. 
There has been a strong lobby in the United States pushing to reduce the frequency of 
reporting to a six month or biannual cycle.  Indeed, President Donald Trump has 
specifically requested that the SEC evaluate a move to biannual reporting (i.e., twice a 
year instead of quarterly) and the proposal was one of the specific items considered in CP 
51-404. 442 These proposals have been widely debated by forces that both strongly 
support and oppose biannual reporting, and the ultimate outcome on these proposals in 
both the U.S. and Canada remains uncertain at the current time. 
 
442 David Michaels, Michael Rapoport and Jennifer Maloney, "Trump Asks SEC to Study Six-Month 
Reporting for Public Companies", Wall Street Journal (17 August 2018), online:< https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/trump-directs-sec-to-study-six-month-reporting-for-public-companies-1534507058>. 
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One has to wonder if the degree to which the knowledge that the debate over biannual 
reporting is continuing to be fought daily behind closed doors impacted the outcome of 
the PCD Study on this particular question, moving the pressures of meeting quarterly 
analyst targets higher in the rankings than might otherwise have occurred.  In other 
words, is there some effect in the PCD Study data resulting from respondents reporting a 
higher importance on this particular issue in an attempt to build the empirical case for 
adoption of biannual reporting? Did respondents in significant numbers “strategically 
vote” to influence the outcome of the debate? 
If this strategic voting effect was indeed occurring to any significant degree in the PCD 
Study data, one would anticipate that this issue would be more highly ranked by DG4- 
TSX respondents than by DG3-Group II and DG5- Private Company respondents.  If 
biannual reporting were adopted in Canada, it is the DG4- TSX respondents who have the 
most to gain through a reduction in cost and time spent on reporting.  DG5- Private 
Company respondents should be more ambivalent about the prospect of biannual 
reporting because it will not directly affect their businesses, and both DG6- Lawyers and 
DG7- Auditors actually face a significant loss of revenue in their continuous disclosure 
compliance support practices if biannual reporting is ultimately adopted.   
The data in the PCD Study, though, demonstrates the opposite result.  DG4- TSX 
respondents have one of the lowest means on Q20-22 of any demographic subgroup at 
3.59.  DG5- Private Company respondents rated Q20-22 higher with reference to the 
mean (4.06), but one also needs to recognize that DG5- Private Company respondents 
generally evidenced a higher mean across all 31 factors than their public company 
counterparts (DG5- Private Company had an average mean of 3.48 on the 31 factors in 
Q20; DG4-Public Company had an average mean of 3.10).  On a rank-order basis, DG4-
TSX respondents ranked Q20-22 fourth in order of importance, and DG5- Private 
Company respondents ranked Q20-22 fifth in order of importance.  As such, there is little 
difference between the rank order of the private and public company senior decision-
makers on Q20-22. 
Clearly, DG3- Group II respondents collectively are the driving force behind Q20-22 
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achieving the top overall ranking of amongst Q20 factors.  Three of the four linked 
subgroups constituting DG3- Group II respondents (i.e., DG6- Lawyers, DG8- 
Investment Bankers and DG9- Private Equity Investors) each ranked Q20-22 as the single 
most important downside factor that would influence their decision-making process.443   
As such, does the top ranking of Q20-22, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst 
targets, deserve an asterisk or can it legitimately claim the title of "Single Worst Thing 
About Being Public" in the PCD Study?  The answer depends on your perspective, and 
whether you believe that the opinions of the DG2- Group I respondents should be more 
heavily weighted in the Q20 rankings than the opinions of DG3- Group II respondents.  If 
so, then there is a case to be made that the factor tested in Q20-7, increasing compliance 
cost, can also lay claim to the crown as the most important downside factor driving 
companies away from the public markets.  This claim is bolstered by the fact that 
increased disclosure costs had the lowest standard deviation of any of the 31 downside 
factors tested (σ=0.93), evidencing a high degree of consistency amongst the respondents.   
In this Dissertation, no definitive position is taken and the title of "Single Worst Thing 
About Being Public" is left for others to interpret based on their own opinions and 
methodologies.  The conclusion on the factor of pressures of meeting quarterly analyst 
targets is best summarized by stating that it is certainly materially more important to the 
Canadian business community than was anticipated in advance of the PCD Study and, 
regardless of the demographic subgroups being considered, significant angst with respect 
to the pressure of meeting quarterly analysts targets is certainly one of the most important 
factors affecting the public / private decision-making process.  As such, the pressure of 
meeting quarterly analyst targets can be inferred to represent an important factor relevant 
to the topic of overall public company decline in Canada. 
 
443 The fourth linked demographic subgroup (i.e., DG7- Accountants/Auditors) ranked this factor as the 
fight most important out of the 31 factors. 
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 The Most Important Downside Factors Associated with Being 
Public 
The thirteen factors ranked as the most important in the PCD Study based on the mean 
responses by all PCD Study respondents are summarized below in Table 21.  When 
analyzing the data, both the mean and the rank order are equally useful for summarizing 
data. There is value in referring to the mean to determine the extent of the gap between 
different rank ordered items, which is useful in determining cut-off points for reporting 
tiers.444 
With respect to comparisons of the Q20 responses between different subgroups, however, 
it is submitted that reference to the mean can be misleading given the nature of the 
particular 5-Point Likert Scale.  Different subgroups exhibited a material difference in 
their grading scale across Q20.  It has been previously mentioned that the DG5- Private 
Company subgroup has a significantly higher average mean than DG5- TSX-Listed.  As 
another example, the average mean across all 31 factors for DG8- Investment Bankers on 
Q20 was 2.95, whereas the average mean was 3.40 for DG10 SME's.  A simple 
explanation for the difference is that senior decision makers of SME's are generally more 
concerned about the downside factors associated with being a public company than 
investment bankers.   
Regardless, the result is that the different demographic subgroups are applying the scales 
differently.  When comparing the answers of two subgroups, therefore, utilizing the mean 
as the basis for the comparison can lead to error.  Comparing subgroups by ranking order 
provides a more accurate comparison.  For example, the mean of DG8- Investment 
Bankers on the factor in Q20-4 (executive compensation disclosure) is 2.86, where the 
mean of DG10- SME's on the same factor was 3.17.  It would be easy to imply that 
DG10-SME viewed this factor as more important than DG8- Investment Bankers.  
 
444 Normally, this type of summary table would be limited to the top 1/3 or top 10 factors.  However, in 
this case, factors 10-13 are essentially tied based on mean before a significant drop-off occurs between the 
13th and 14th ranked factors.  As such, it would be arbitrary to cut off the list at the top 10 and this list 
essentially represents the top 10 plus statistical ties. 
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However, Q20-4 was only the 23rd highest ranked factor for DG10-SME's, compared to 
being the 16th highest ranked factor for DG8- Investment Bankers.  As such, whereas the 
mean will be used for determining rankings slots within subgroups, only the rank order 
will be reported when analyzing comparisons between the various subgroups. 
Table 21, Q20, List of Top Factors Ranked as Most Important 
What is apparent from this list is that there is no single category of downside factors that 
dominates the top of the rankings.  In fact, six of the eight categories defined previously 
are represented in the list of the top 13 factors.  Once again, this result makes it clear that 
the challenges facing the public markets are complex and broad-based.  Possibly most 
sobering is the fact that, even if the wisest of public company regulators in Canada could 
identify an ideal package of burden reduction and regulatory streamlining reforms that 
magically eliminated all of the concerns associated with the two critical categories of 
regulatory complexity / overreach and public company costs, nine out of the thirteen most 
important downside factors associated with the public markets as per the PCD Study data 
would still remain as barriers to renewed IPO activity. 
 Overview by Category of Downside Risk 
 Regulatory Complexity / Regulatory Overreach 
Understanding the degree to which regulatory complexity and regulatory overreach can 
be inferentially linked to public company decline in Canada is one of the recurring 
themes in the PCD Study research.  Six different factors fitting within the umbrella of 
regulatory complexity / regulatory overreach were tested.  The factor in Q20-6, 
Rank Q-ID Downside Factor Mean Std Dev Count
1 22 The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets 3.97 1.03 333
2 7 The increased cost of continuous disclosure obligations due to regulatory changes 3.94 0.93 333
3 6 The complexity of continuous disclosure obligations arising from regulatory changes 3.81 1.02 333
4 5 Running a public company creating too many distractions for management 3.78 0.97 332
5 3 The cost that it takes to complete an IPO 3.68 1.04 333
6 19
Concern that being public leaves too little time for management to focus on the core business of the 
company 3.65 1.08 332
7 2 The management effort required to complete an IPO 3.53 1.13 333
8 10 Concern the company will be able to generate sufficient trading volume to keep shareholders happy 3.47 1.09 333
9 24 Redundancy of filing requirements for public companies 3.42 1.15 332
10 1 The time required to complete an IPO 3.39 1.09 333
11 9 The increased litigation risk associated with being public 3.38 1.07 333
12 31
Concern that being public will not ultimately provide quicker access to follow-on financing in the 
future 3.37 1.15 331
13 16 The challenges of competing against private companies that don't have to disclose any secrets 3.36 1.2 332
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increasing compliance complexity, was the highest ranked of these factors in the PCD 
Study, coming in as the 3rd most important of the 31 factors.  Q20-24, redundancy of 
filing requirements, also ranked relatively high as the 9th most important factor.  The high 
ranking of these two particular factors was not surprising, as compliance complexity and 
redundancy are two of the favorite areas of complaint amongst senior business decision-
makers and public company influencers.   
However, what is surprising in the PCD Study data is that the other four regulatory 
complexity / overreach factors scored relatively low compared to a number of other 
factors.  In the earlier analysis on Q16-7 of the PCD Study (i.e., the proposition 
summarizing the regulatory overreach hypothesis), the general disposition of the 
respondent group supporting the regulatory overreach hypothesis was discussed at some 
length.  Yet, a similar articulation of the regulatory overreach hypothesis in Q20-12 only 
ranked as the 21st most important factor from the list of 31 amongst all respondents.  
What should one make of this outcome?  It is submitted that relatively low ranking of the 
regulatory overreach factor (Q20-12) as the 21st most important factor in the PCD Study 
should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with the outcome in Q16-7 on this topic.  
Rather, it is a reflection of the comparatively high importance placed on the other factors 
that exceed regulatory overreach in importance for the respondent group.   
Another regulatory complexity-linked factor, the hassle of dealing with evolving 
corporate governance practices, came in ranked as 19th most important.  
Finally, the three specific regulatory requirements tested in Q20 all came in at or near the 
bottom of the rankings.445  The irony of this outcome, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3 of 
this Dissertation, is that the one tangible regulatory reform recently proposed by the CSA 
that is directed at Operating Companies is streamlining of the Business Acquisition 
 
445 Namely: (i) Q20-17- the requirement to file Business Acquisition Reports for significant acquisitions, 
which ranked 26; (ii) Q20-23- related party transaction restrictions and disclosure requirements in MI 61-
101, which ranked 29; and (iii) the requirement for senior executives to provide certificates on financial 
statements, which ranked dead last at 31. 
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Report rules, which ranked 26th out of the 31 factors in Q20 in terms of importance. 
 Time / Distraction / Effort of Going and Being Public  
The time and effort of going and remaining public is one particular subject area that is 
certainly acknowledged in the academic literature on public company decline, but never 
gets top billing as being one of the most critical categories.  The PCD Study results 
indicate that this area should be included as one of the most important topics for future 
research projects and regulatory streamlining initiatives, as each of four of the individual 
downside factors fitting under this umbrella ranked in the top 10 most important factors 
across all respondents.446   
This result represents one of the most important observations arising from the PCD Study 
data. It is clear from this outcome that there is a strong perception amongst the Canadian 
business community that the collateral requirements associated with running a public 
company are time-consuming and mentally draining, taking away from one's ability to 
focus their time and attention on building the core business of the company. 
 Public Company Costs 
Both the cost of completing an IPO and the increasing costs of ongoing compliance 
ranked in the top five most important factors in the PCD Study.  As discussed earlier, the 
increasing cost of ongoing compliance could be also argued to be the single most 
important factor in the PCD Study.  It was certainly the top ranked factor according to 
both subgroups of senior business decision-makers in the PCD Study. 
 Liquidity, Valuation and Access to Capital 
The liquidity, valuation and access to capital concerns ranked more highly in the PCD 
Study than one might have expected.   Although this group of factors is largely an 
 
446 Specifically: (i) Q20-5- the distractions associated with running a public company, which ranked 4th; 
(ii) Q20-19- concern that being public leaves insufficient time to manage the core business, which ranked 
6th; (iii) Q20-2- the management effort required to complete and IPO, which ranked 7th; and (iv) Q20-1- the 
time required to complete an IPO, which ranked 10th. 
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afterthought in the academic literature on public company decline, the three factors in this 
category ranked at 8th (trading volume concerns), 12th (concern about access to follow-on 
financing) and 16th (ability to attract analysts).   This suggests that this category of factors 
is underrated in the academic literature and should be given more attention in follow-on 
research in Canada. 
One likely explanation of the relatively high rankings of this particular group of factors in 
the PCD Study is the size and liquidity in the Canadian public markets compared to the 
U.S. markets.  Whereas the availability of liquidity, access to capital and quality analyst 
coverage may all be taken for granted in the much larger U.S. public markets, in Canada 
even companies listed on the senior TSX exchange remain in real danger of becoming 
orphaned if they fail to execute on their business plans and lose the following of analysts 
and institutional traders. 
 Public Disclosure Disadvantage and Privacy 
This is one of the two categories in the PCD Study that was ranked comparatively low, 
with only one of the five factors in this group ranking in the top half of the 31 factors.  
This was also a surprising result, as it was anticipated that this group of factors might be 
proven to be more important than the PCD Study data demonstrated.  
Competitive disclosure disadvantage ranked in 13th position in importance, evidencing a 
moderate degree of belief in the proposition that the nature of the disclosure obligations 
for public companies puts them at a disadvantage compared to their private competitors. 
Worth noting, however, is that this factor was rated as the 7th most important factor by 
DG4-TSX and the 15th most important factor by DG5-Private Company.  This suggests 
that public disclosure disadvantage is significantly more important to senior business 
decision-makers than it is to public markets influencers.  As such, it is another example in 
the PCD Study of the reality of the situation based on personal experience being worse 
than perception of the problem by outsiders. 
 Short-Termism 
The data from the PCD Study as a whole demonstrates that short termism in the public 
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markets is one of the most interesting categories that is largely ignored in the academic 
literature.  As previously discussed in Chapter 6, the topic of short-termism was raised 
frequently in the open-ended text responses to Q17.   The surprising ranking of the 
pressure of meeting quarterly analyst targets (Q20-22) as the most important factor in the 
Q20 across all respondents in the PCD Study has already been discussed at some length 
previously.  Although the pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets is not exclusively 
a short-termism issue, short-termism is clearly a significant component.  This outcome 
should be an indication for future academic research that this particular topic is worthy of 
further attention in order to better understand which of the various elements discussed 
relating to quarterly analyst targets are the most significant in it ranking so highly in the 
PCD Study.  
The other key element of short-termism tested in the PCD Study was the trend towards 
shorter investment horizons by shareholders, including program trading and day trading.  
This factor ranked in the middle of the pack in Q20 as the 15th most important position.  
Again, this factor has attracted very little discussion in the academic literature and the 
business media literature as a factor possibly contributing to public company decline, and 
it ranked more highly in Q20 than a number of the other factors which have received 
significantly more ink thus far. 
The final element in the short-termism category is the topic of short sellers, which ranked 
24th of the 31 factors in Q20.  Short sellers certainly remain as a concern for companies 
operating in the public markets, with the ability to cause significant damage to a public 
company.  It is admittedly surprising that the short sellers topics did not rank more highly 
on Q20.  Notably, the DG4- TSX subgroup and the DG6- Lawyers subgroup were both 
significantly more concerned about short sellers than other respondents, ranking this 
factor at 18th and 13th most important, respectively.  As these two subgroups are most 
familiar with short sellers, it may be that it is a topic that is not on the radar screen of the 
other subgroups. 
 Company Control Concerns 
This is a subject area that ranked relatively low on an overall basis with the three factors 
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tested in Q20 under this umbrella all falling to the bottom half of the rankings, again a 
surprising result.  Even more surprising is the fact that DG5- Private Company 
respondents did not rank the company control downside factors significantly higher than 
other demographic subgroups in the survey.  Although caution is indicated to assure that 
the PCD Study data does not imply that company control concerns are insignificant to 
senior decision-makers of private companies looking at taking their companies public, it 
is accurate to conclude that this subject area is not amongst the most important factors in 
the decision-making process. 
One potential explanation of this outcome is the fact that founders’ control concerns can 
be ameliorated in public companies through the use of dual-class share structures 
providing super-voting shares, a feature which is relatively common in Canadian public 
companies.  However, in private equity transactions, the investors are much less likely to 
accept dual-class share structures that dilute their ability to exercise voting control equal 
to their equity interests.  In fact, many private equity financing structures include ratchet 
provisions that specifically increase the voting rights of the shares held by the non-
management investors in the event that the company fails to meet mutually-agreed 
targets.447 
 Legal Risk 
Increased litigation risk is a stand-alone factor that ranked surprisingly high on the list of 
importance (i.e., 11th), particularly considering the comparatively benign securities class 
action litigation climate for public companies in Canada.  Although not yet at the top of 
the list, the PCD Data demonstrates that this is an item that bears watching in the future.  
Of particular importance, increased litigation risk ranked as the 6th most important factor 
amongst DG5- Private Company respondents, who are the prime target market for future 
IPOs.  As such, the perception of this subgroup is particularly critical to the future arc of 
 
447 For an overview of the history and use of dual-class share structures in Canadian public companies see: 
Daniel Cipollone, “Risky Business: A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in Canada and a Proposal for 
Reform” (2012) 21 Dalhousie L.J. 62; Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri, “Dual Class Shares in 
Canada: A Historical Analysis” (2006) 29 Dalhousie L.J. 118. 
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IPOs and they clearly are more concerned about public company litigation risk than their 
DG4-TSX counterparts.  Also of note, this factor was rated as the 7th most important 
factor by DG6- Lawyers, evidencing a similar concern about the trendline of securities 
class action litigation in Canada over the past years.  Based on importance of the 
subgroups who evidenced the highest level of concern about litigation risk in public 
companies, Canadian legislators should take this outcome seriously when considering 
any further liberalization of securities class action rules in Canada.  
 Overview of Differences on Q20 by Demographic Subgroup  
The following analysis looks at the differences in disposition on the 31 downside factors 
in Q20 on the basis of the various linked demographic subgroups. 
 Group I vs. Group II 
As an overall observation, the opinions of DG2- Group I and DG3-Group II respondents 
on the relative ranking of the public company downside factors in Q20 evidence a 
surprising degree of consistency.   The differential in rank order between these two main 
groups was within three on 21 out of the 31 different factors.  
Highlighting the areas in which the differential in rank order is five or higher as 
representing a significant variation between these groups, DG2- Group I ranked the 
following three downside factors as significantly less important than DG3- Group II: 
Q20-1 (time to complete IPO); Q20-25 (short-sellers); and Q20-29 (hostile take-over 
risk).  On the flip-side, DG2- Group I ranked the following four factors as significantly 
more important than DG3- Group II: Q20-9 (increased litigation risk); Q20-12 (general 
regulatory overreach); Q20-13 (proxy advisory firms); and Q20-27 (responding to 
uninformed shareholders).   
The identity of the factors in the preceding paragraph should be important to the OSC 
particularly in pursuing their burden reduction initiative.  As has been discussed, the 
senior business decision-makers of Operating Companies (i.e., DG2- Group I in the PCD 
Study) are woefully underrepresented in the consultation process thus far, leading to the 
possibility that the degree of concern over these particular factors has not been properly 
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conveyed to the regulators. 
  Group I- Senior Decision-Makers of TSX vs. Private Companies 
Again, the focus in this summary is on the specific downside factors where the 
differential in the rankings is five or greater between the two subgroups, DG4-TSX and 
DG5- Private Company.  DG4- TSX respondents ranked the following four downside 
factors as significantly less important than DG5- Private Company respondents: Q20-2 
(management effort to complete IPO); Q20-19 (inability to focus on core management); 
Q20-27 (responding to uninformed shareholders); and Q20-30 (management overall 
public company fatigue)  On the flip-side, DG4- TSX respondents ranked the following 
four factors as significantly more important than DG5- Private Company respondents: 
DG3 (cost of an IPO); DG 11 (analyst coverage concerns); DG16 (competitive disclosure 
disadvantage); and DG24 (redundancy of filing requirements). 
Considering the nature of the specific differences in the previous paragraph can be argued 
to be one of the most important elements of the analysis in the PCD Study data.  DG5- 
Private Company senior decision-makers represent one of the most important groups in 
the study, as they are the individuals who will have to be convinced to take their 
companies public in far greater numbers if the phenomenon of public company decline is 
to be arrested.  We have already discussed the biggest concerns in Q20 amongst all the 
respondents, but in which specific areas are the DG-Private Company respondents more 
concerned than their public company counterparts?  The above list gives us clear 
direction that the heightened concerns, unique to private company senior business 
decision-makers, principally relate to the perceived distractions and time commitments 
required of public company executives. They are significantly more worried than other 
subgroups that pursuing an IPO will prevent them from devoting sufficient time to 
focusing on the core business growth.   
 Group II- Public Markets Influencers 
It has already been discussed that the position of Q20-22 (pressures of meeting quarterly 
analyst targets) at the top overall ranking of most important negative factors associated 
with being public in the PCD Study is largely attributable to the contributions of the DG-
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6 Lawyers, DG8- Investment Bankers and DG9- Private Equity subgroups, each of which 
ranked that particular factor as highest of the 31.   
It was also discussed that the DG7- Auditors subgroup still ranked the pressure of 
meeting quarterly analyst targets as relatively important, but gave it the lowest ranking of 
any subgroup in the PCD Study as the 5th most important factor.    Nobody will be 
surprised to find out that D7- Auditors ranked Q20-7 (increasing compliance cost) as the 
most important factor.   
Beyond the top rankings, the four subgroups of public markets influencers evidenced a 
surprising degree of consistency throughout their rankings of the 31 downside factors in 
Q20.  The only material differences in opinion were reflected by DG8- Investment 
bankers on the specific factors of Q20-4 (executive compensation disclosure), Q20-10 
(trading volume concerns) and Q20-11 (analyst coverage concerns), each of which they 
ranked materially higher than the other three public markets influencer subgroups. 
 Group I- Company Size: SME's vs. Non-SME's 
These two subgroups were largely consistent in their rankings of the downside factors in 
Q20, with the exception that DG10-SME's evidenced a materially higher ranking on Q20-
27 (responding to uninformed shareholders) and Q20-30 (management overall public 
company fatigue) than DG11- Non-SME's.   
As previously noted, DG10-SME's were the subgroup with the higher average mean 
throughout Q20.448  The fact that they ranked the downside factors the highest on an 
absolute basis is consistent with the greater aversion to the public market that senior 
decision-makers of SME's have exhibited throughout the PCD Study analysis compared 
to senior decision-makers of larger companies.  The specific public market challenges 
faced by SME's are well-documented in the literature. 
 
448 Excluding the Atlantic Provinces, which had a slightly higher mean, but at N=16 is below the minimum 
target subgroup size for general statistical analysis purposes. 
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 Group I- Industry 
Again, these subgroups were relatively consistent in their Q20 rankings with a couple of 
exceptions.  First, DG13- Mining ranked Q20-10 (liquidity concerns) as being materially 
more important than the non-mining respondents, placing it as the 5th most important 
factor.  One would assume that this is a reflection of the reduced liquidity in mining 
stocks generally over the past few years during the commodity downcycle, although 
DG12- Oil & Gas only ranked liquidity concerns as the 12th most important.    
The DG12- Oil & Gas subgroup differed materially from the other two industry-linked 
subgroups in ranking of two different factors: Q20-10 (general regulatory overreach) and 
Q20-31 (lack of access to follow-on financing).   The outcome on Q20-10 is consistent 
with the earlier discussions on this topic in the analysis of Q16-7, where it was disclosed 
that DG12- Oil & Gas expressed the highest level of support for the regulatory overreach 
proposition of all the 25 demographic subgroups considered in the PCD Study.  The 
response on Q20-31 is also consistent with expectations, as the lack of access to follow-
on financings in the public markets has been a common complaint from senior oil & gas 
executives over the past several years due to the historically poor stretch for Canadian 
energy producers. 
 Other Linked Demographic Subgroups 
There are no observations arising from the other demographic subgroups defined by 
geography, career experience, or public company experience that are particularly 
noteworthy on Q20. 
7.16- Question 20: Ranking Potential Upside Opportunities in 
IPOs 
 Q20- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how 
important are each of following potential upside opportunities 
associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your analysis? 
The inclusion of Q21 in the PCD Study may appear unusual at first glance, particularly 
because it is the only element in the PCD Study that focuses on the perceived upsides 
associated with taking a company public.  While this is outside the apparent core scope of 
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the PCD Study, it was included for a specific purpose.  In the next section, positive and 
negative correlations between the various questions in the PCD Study will be analyzed.  
In addition to understanding what particular negative factors associated with the public 
markets are correlated with an increased or decreased willingness to consider taking a 
company public, there is value in understanding what particular positive factors also can 
be linked to specific outcomes. 
Second, one of the core goals in undertaking the research project on public company 
decline is to come up with as much helpful data as possible to support the ongoing 
regulatory reform processes and, potentially, substantiate the need for more aggressive 
intervention at higher levels of government to preserve robust capital markets in Canada 
in the years to come.  Ultimately, the desire is not to discourage those currently involved 
in the regulatory streamlining initiatives by pointing out that their efforts are unlikely to 
stem the inexorable tide of public company decline, but rather to supply them with as 
much valuable data as possible in order to position them to adopt the most effective 
outcomes within the range of options available to them.  
Unlike the topic of public company decline in which there has been a complete lack of 
empirical data collected prior to the PCD Study, there have been a couple of different 
studies in which the motivations of the senior decision-makers of companies pursuing 
IPOs have been assessed.  These include the two surveys discussed earlier in the 
literature review section of this Dissertation.449  However, none of these studies have 
considered the situation in Canada or been completed in recent years.  The opportunity 
cost of adding in Q21 to provide an update and Canadian-specific information relating to 
the perception of the respondent group on the perceived upsides associated with the 
public markets was small, and the potential accretive benefit of having access to this 
information in the Canadian context is significant. 
Having gone to the effort of collecting the data in Q21 primarily for the purpose of 
 
449 Supra notes 87 and 91. 
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conducting the correlation analysis included later in this Dissertation, the analysis of the 
data in this section will be at a more summary level than the analysis undertaken on the 
mirror image questions earlier in Q20.  Additional analysis of the Q21 data, along with a 
more detailed comparison of the data collected on motivations for going public in the 
PCD Study to the results reported in the two studies previously completed focusing on 
the U.S. and Europe, is identified as a topic for further research and analysis in a different 
format.450 
Similar to Q20, the most obvious framework for extracting meaning from the PCD Study 
Data at a macro level is by considering the rank order of the factors according to a 
grouping determined by topical categories.  The categories identified for analysis of the 
14 potential upside factors associated with the public markets and the rank order of each 
factor across all participants in the PCD Study are as follows: 
Table 22, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Upside Factors 
Upside Category 
Q# 
21- Specific Upside Fact 
Rank Order 
(by DG1) 
Liquidity/  
Stock as Currency/  
Access to Capital 
3 Quicker access to capital in follow-on 
financings 
4 
4 Ability to use stock for future acquisitions 1 
5 Liquidity option for founding shareholders 2 
6 Stock options to recruit and retain key 
employees 
6 
 
Public Company 
Credibility/  
Visibility 
8 Increased public visibility with potential 
customers 
9 
9 Enhanced credibility with suppliers 10 
11 Enhanced credibility with potential 
investors 
8 
12 Increased personal profile 12 
 
Control 
7 Stronger management control by large 
shareholders 
 
11 
13 Diluting minority shareholder positions 
 
14 
 
Public Company 1 Higher pre-money valuation in IPO 5 
 
450 Ibid. 
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Upside Category 
Q# 
21- Specific Upside Fact 
Rank Order 
(by DG1) 
Valuation Premium 2 Higher post-money valuation in IPO 3 
 
Challenge / Opportunity 
to Grow Business 
10 Enjoy public company challenges 13 
14 Opportunity to grow the business further 7 
Unlike in the earlier analysis of the downside factors in Q20, the data from the PCD 
Study relating to the upside factors in Q21 discloses a clear hierarchy based on the 
categories defined in the preceding table. The most highly ranked upside factors in 
Q21were the factors relating to liquidity, the ability to use public stock as currency and 
access to growth capital.  All four of the factors in this category ranked in the top six in 
overall importance.  Q21-4 (ability to use company stock as currency for acquisitions) 
was rated as the single most important factor by both DG-2- Group I respondents and 
DG3- Group II respondents.  Q21-5 (liquidity option for founding shareholders) was 
rated as the 2nd most important factor.  Q21-3 (quicker access to capital in follow-on 
financings) was ranked 3rd most important, and Q21-6 (easier use of stock options to 
recruit and retain key employees) was the 4th highest ranked factor. 
The clear implication throughout Q21 is that the prime motivation for taking a business 
public in Canada, at this point in time amongst the respondents in the PCD Study, is the 
desire to leverage the opportunities associated with having publicly traded securities 
available to use as currency for growing the business through acquisition, and also 
providing existing shareholders liquidity at the time, and on the terms, of their choosing. 
This outcome is notably consistent with the findings by Brau and Fawcett back in 2006 
discussed in the literature review section of this Dissertation.451  However, the factors of 
increased prestige and recognition, cited as being critical in Bancel and Mitoo in 
European IPOs, do not rate highly in the PCD Study.452 
 
451 Supra note 87. 
452 Supra note 91. 
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The second category of upside factors that was ranked highly in the PCD Study was the 
anticipation of higher valuations for the company during the IPO and afterwards 
compared to what would be expected from private equity alternatives.  Ultimately, how 
decisive these valuation-based factors are in motivating senior decision-makers to pursue 
an IPO may well depend on the level of comfort that the expected valuation premium will 
actually be realized. 
All of the other categories identified above place well behind those first two categories in 
terms of the rank order.  In particular, the factors related to increasing company 
credibility / visibility or using the public markets to retain negative control of the 
company business by avoiding the influential shareholder positions associated with 
private equity investment, rated near the bottom in the ranking of importance.  Clearly, 
these potential upside benefits are viewed as ancillary by the respondents and not highly 
motivating in terms of pushing decision-makers towards the IPO option. 
The ultimate rankings and the breakdown on the responses in Q21are summarized as 
follows: 
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Figure 67, Q21- Rank Order of IPO / Public Upsides, All Respondents 
 
 
The next two pages summarize the means and rank order based on the 25 demographic 
subgroups. 
358 
 
Table 23, Q21- Mean Analysis of IPO / Public Company Upsides by Demographic Subgroup  
 
 
NOTE: In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row are 
highlighted in white;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on reach row are 
highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor  
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Table 24, Q21- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-14) Analysis by Demographic Subgroup 
 
 
NOTE: In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row are highlighted 
in white;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on reach row are 
highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
 in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor  
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Referring to the data in Table 24 above, it is apparent that there is a material degree of 
consistency in the rank order of the 14 upside factors across the 25 demographic groups.  
As in Q20, the rank order between DG2-Group II and DG3- Group II demonstrate that 
the perceptions of senior-decision makers and public market influencers are very much 
aligned on Q21.   
With respect to the linked demographic subgroup analysis, there are only a few variations 
within the linked subgroups that are worthy of note.  Between DG4-TSX and DG5 
Private Company, the senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies rank the ability of 
using public equity to raise financing on an expedited basis (Q21-3) more highly than 
their counterparts in private companies.  However, DG5 Private Company respondents 
placed a higher importance on both liquidity for founding shareholders (Q21-5) and the 
ability to use stock options to recruit and retain key employees (Q21-6).  One could argue 
that the difference on Q21-5 is attributable to the fact that the respondents from DG4-
TSX are less likely to be founding shareholders of the company compared to the 
respondents from DG5- Private Company, so therefore underestimate the value of this 
potential upside for founding shareholders.  With respect to Q21-6 (ability to use stock 
options to recruit and retain employees), one might question whether the DG4-TSX 
respondents take this opportunity for granted, with the DG5-  Private Company 
respondents better able to appreciate the value of this factor as it is something that they 
do not have access to as private companies.453 
With respect to the subgroups of public markets influencers, it appears that the DG-8 
Investment Banker subgroup places less importance on liquidity for founding 
shareholders than the other subgroups.  It is unclear what influences this outcome, but 
some may perceive that as relating to the challenges of raising funds for IPOs where a 
significant portion of the proceeds are being used to provide liquidity for founders as 
opposed to grow the business. 
 
453 Obviously, stock options, or synthetic equivalents thereto, can be used in private companies. However, 
they are more significantly complex to manage on an ongoing basis without a public market to provide 
liquidity for the sale of shares obtained on exercise of the stock options. 
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Finally, it appears that those with limited experience in public markets (i.e., DG23) place 
less value on the quicker access to follow on financings available to public companies 
(Q21-3).  This is a consistent outcome with the outcomes observed with the overlapping 
subgroup DG4- TSX respondents.  On the whole, the trendline shows that increased 
public company exposure increases one's appreciation for the ability to complete follow-
on financings quickly and also to use public stock as currency for acquisitions. 
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 Correlation in PCD Study Data 
8.1- Overview of Approach to Correlation Analysis 
It has been stated repeatedly throughout this Dissertation that the PCD Study is not 
designed to establish statistical causation relating to the root causes of public company 
decline.  Nowhere in the literature has anyone yet even suggested a credible research plan 
that can reach such an outcome.   
Rather, this Dissertation has been consistent in stating that the PCD Study was designed 
primarily to determine which of the various factors, posited in the literature as 
contributing the phenomenon of public company decline, are most important to the key 
business decision-makers and influencers in Canada.  Although not determined to be 
causal, the downside factors validated in the PCD Study as being the most important to 
the key decision-makers and influencers can be inferred to have a material degree of 
relevance to the study of public company decline. 
The PCD Study was designed to include the following four specific questions testing the 
general attitudes and predisposition of the survey respondents towards public capital 
markets in Canada and the relative merits of pursuing IPOs versus private equity 
alternatives. 
Question 16-1: Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages than 
disadvantages. 
 
Question 16-2: Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only when private 
equity funding is not readily available. 
 
Question 18-1:  How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred 
course of action? 
 
Question 18-2: How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred 
course of action? 
The attitudes and predispositions of each respondent on these questions are obviously 
influenced by their personal experiences in the business world as well as by the 
experiences of their friends, family and business associates.  The logical inference 
connecting the PCD Study (and, particularly, the hypothetical fact pattern involving the 
decision to recommend an IPO alternative or a private equity financing alternative for 
ABC used in Q18, Q19, Q20 and Q21) to the real world phenomenon of public company 
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decline is as follows: the more favorably disposed a respondent is towards taking a 
company public as evidenced by their positions on the four questions above, the more 
likely that same respondent will be to consider supporting an IPO option in their 
professional or business roles.  Likewise, if a respondent exhibits a significant aversion to 
the public capital markets in the PCD Study, they are more likely to recommend avoiding 
an IPO and pursuing private equity alternatives in their professional or business roles. 
In this final section of analysis of the PCD Study results, the positive and negative 
correlations between each of the four core questions and the remainder of the Likert Scale 
questions will be assessed.  A strong positive or negative correlation does not determine 
that a causal relationship exists between the two factors.  It simply defines a significant 
linkage between the factors.  Correlations do not take into account the impact of other 
dependent and independent factors on the relationship.  A strong correlation between two 
items can exist without a causal relationship, but a causal relationship cannot exist 
without some degree of correlation.  As such, identifying the most statistically significant 
positive and negative correlation relationships in the PCD Study data is an important 
starting point for any further research into causality in the future. 
Finally, for the readers without significant statistics background, two statistics will be 
reported with respect to the correlation analysis.  The first statistic is the P-value, which 
once again is the calculated probability of concluding that there is no relationship 
between two variables when a relationship does, in fact, exist.  Related to the P-value is 
the confidence level, which is met if the P-value is less than alpha (i.e., the probability of 
making a Type 1 error).  As with all the other statistical tests used previously in this 
Dissertation, the lower the p-value, the higher the level of confidence that a correlation 
exists.  The second statistic is the correlation coefficient, or the size of the correlation 
effect observed.  Spearman rank correlation coefficients (for which the symbol rs is used 
interchangeably in this Dissertation) can range from 1 (representing perfect positive 
correlation) to -1 (representing perfect negative correlation).  A correlation coefficient of 
0 evidences that there is no effect whatsoever.  The further away a correlation coefficient 
is from 0, the larger the size of the effect observed. 
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In order to focus on the most important elements, generally only those relationships that 
are most significant (i.e., generate the lowest p-values and highest correlation 
coefficients) will be highlighted in this portion of the analysis.   
Second, the focus of the correlation analysis will be on the relationships between the four 
general predisposition questions (Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2) on the one hand and: 
(i) the other propositions stated in Question 16; (ii) the 31 downside factors associated 
with being public in Question 20; and (iii) the 14 upside factors associated with being 
public in Question 21. 
Most of the analysis in this section was calculated based on the PCD Study data for all 
respondents together and not broken down by the 25 demographic subgroups.  It was 
considered whether there is additional value in discussing the degree to which the 
specific subgroup perceptions of DG-4 TSX respondents and DG5- Private Company 
respondents differ from each other, and from the DG3- Group II public markets 
influencers, leading to different correlation statistics for each group.  Correlations 
statistics based on the specific responses of each of these three key subgroups have been 
assessed and compared to the correlations produced for DG1- All Respondents.  
 Ultimately, this comparison demonstrated that there is little value in complicating the 
analysis here by reporting the correlation coefficients broken down according to the four 
subgroups.  First, the correlation statistics were very similar irrespective of which of the 
four demographic subgroups are considered.  Second, sample size has a greater impact on 
P-values for the Spearman Rank Correlation Test, so it is more difficult to validate the 
existence of correlations at the 99% confidence level for the smaller subgroups 
(specifically DG5- Private Company) than it is for DG1- All Respondents.  The value of 
reporting similar statistics at less significant P-values seems dubious, so the decision was 
made to focus the bulk of the correlation analysis at the all-inclusive level of DG-1 All 
Respondents. 
8.2- Spearman Rank Correlation as Internal Validity Check and 
as Between the General Disposition Questions 
As discussed in the Question 18 analysis earlier, the Spearman Rank Correlation Test can 
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be used to run an internal validity check on PCD Study Responses.  There are certain 
questions which by their nature should demonstrate very strong positive or negative 
correlations if the respondents are answering consistently throughout the PCD Study.  
Running a check on these particular questions validates that the respondents are indeed 
answering with an appropriate degree of consistency (i.e., they are thinking through the 
questions and not answering randomly) as well as validating that compilation error has 
not occurred during the extensive data manipulation processes occurring between the 
situs of the original data on the Qualtrics online survey platform and the final Spearman 
Rank Correlation spreadsheets compiled to support this element of the analysis.   
Since multiple imports, exports and data manipulations occur between the source 
locations and the final output of these tables, running the internal validity checks on the 
questions where the anticipated correlations are obvious serves a valuable check function.  
As discussed previously in the Question 18 analysis section, it is an obviosity that there 
should be a very low P-value and a very high negative correlation coefficient between 
Q18-1 and Q18-2, even for the smaller subgroups.  Indeed, the following table 
demonstrates that the P-values and correlation coefficients do indeed meet these 
expectations, passing the internal validation tests for each subgroup. 
Table 25- Internal PCD Study Validity Check- Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and P-values 
 
Looking next at the relationships between the four core questions testing general 
disposition toward the public markets, it is clear that the PCD Study data should disclose 
a positive correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-1, and a negative correlation between 
Q16-1 and Q18-2.  This inference is based on the logic that, the higher the level of 
support for the proposition tested in Q16-1 (i.e., taking a company public offers more 
long-term advantages than disadvantages), the more likely the same respondent will be to 
DG1 All Respondents Q18_2 DG4 -TSX Q18_2
Q18_1-P 4.23493E-45 Q18_1-P 9.22E-17
Q18_1-RS -0.665467422 Q18_1-RS -0.73894767
DG3 -Group II Q18_2 DG5-Private Company Q18_2
Q18_1-P 1.802E-22 Q18_1-P 3.43824E-07
Q18_1-RS -0.637276635 Q18_1-RS -0.57579224
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recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 and the less likely to recommend the private equity 
alternative in Q18-2.   It is also anticipated that a negative correlation between Q16-2 and 
Q18-1 should be observed along with an accompanying positive correlation between 
Q16-2 and Q18-2.  Again, this inference is based on expectation that the higher the level 
of support for the proposition tested in Q16-1 (i.e., taking a company public offers more 
long-term advantages than disadvantages), the more likely the same respondent will be to 
recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 and less likely to recommend the private equity 
alternative in Q18-2.  Looking to the Spearman Rank Correlation outputs, we see that 
these inferences are indeed reflected in the PCD Study data.    
The P-value for the correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-2 is 3.68E-13 with RS=0.380 for 
DG1- All Respondents.  This is statistically significant beyond 99.99%.  A similar 
correlation is confirmed for DG3-Group II, DG4-TSX and DG5-Private Company.  The 
highest RS value for the correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-1 amongst the four 
demographic subgroups is RS=0.505 for DG-5 with a P-value of less than 0.001.  From 
this statistic, we observe that there is a very strong positive relationship between the 
belief in the net benefit of taking a company public and the willingness to recommend an 
IPO option for senior decision-makers of private companies. 
For the correlation between Q16-1 and 18-2 for DG1- All Respondents, the P-value is 
less than 0.001 with RS=-0.230.   A significant correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-2 is 
also confirmed for DG3- Group II respondents (P-value=0.0072, RS =-0.197).  The 
correlation is still significant, but only for confidence level of 90% for DG4-TSX (P-
value=0.0585, RS=-0.200).  
For DG5- Private Company respondents, the P-values are not sufficiently high to meet 
the threshold of statistical significance.  A portion of this outcome on DG5- Private 
Company is attributable to the smaller sample size; however, the effect size is also lower, 
indicating that the underlying correlation is less strong here than for the other subgroups.  
This outcome is not unexpected, as DG5- Private Company respondents evidence a 
greater aversion to pursuing IPO options than most other demographic subgroups 
throughout the PCD Study.  Even a belief that the net long-term benefits of being public 
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outweigh the costs is insufficient to fully overcome the inherent aversion of this group to 
recommending an IPO alternative. 
The correlation between Q16-2 and both Q18-1 (negative correlation) and Q18-2 
(positive correlation) are also very strong for DG1- All Respondents and DG3-Group II 
(P-values below 0.001) and significant (P-values below 0.05) for DG4- TSX and DG5- 
Private Company respondents.  This outcome was anticipated because Q16-2 specifically 
seeks the opinion of respondents on the preferred outcome in the IPO / private equity 
decision, similar to Q18-1 and Q18-2. 
In summary, the correlation analyses between the general disposition questions of 16-1, 
16-2, 18-1 and 18-2 demonstrate the anticipated correlation relationships at sufficient 
levels of statistical strength to serve as general validation of the consistency of responses 
of the PCD Study respondents.  
8.3- General Observations on Correlations in the PCD Study 
It is interesting to make certain general observations on the Spearman Rank correlation 
data from the PCD Study when comparing the summaries of the calculations for the four 
related general disposition questions to the independent questions.  Before looking at the 
data, one would expect that Q16-1 and Q18-1 would generally evidence a negative 
correlation to most of the public company downside factors in Q20 and a positive 
correlation to most of the public company upside factors in Q21.  Conversely, one would 
anticipate that Q16-2 and Q18-2 would demonstrate the opposite correlative relationship. 
When looking at the output data from the Spearman Rank correlation calculations, it is 
noted that the 31 potential downside factors in Q20 do indeed evidence a consistent 
negative correlation relationship to both Q16-1 and Q18-1, and an accompanying 
consistent positive correlation to Q16-2 and Q18-2.454  Certainly, not all of those 
 
454 The sole outlier in 200 different Spearman Rank correlation calculations is the relationship between 
Q16-1 and the downside factor in Q20-18 (financial statement certification) which produces a miniscule 
positive correlation coefficient, but a P-value of 0.929, clearly demonstrating that particular calculation 
cannot be said to reflect any correlation at all. 
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correlations are strong, and few of the P-values associated are sufficient to report those 
observations as statistically significant, but it is nevertheless interesting to point out the 
consistency of the outputs.  The data demonstrates that, the more concerned a respondent 
is about the 31 downside factors, the less likely that the same respondent will be willing 
to recommend the IPO option as the preferred alternative.  The same respondent will be 
more likely to support the private equity options, and also more likely to believe that 
taking a company public is a net long-term detriment.  On the flip-side, the less 
concerned that a respondent is about the 31 downside factors in Q20, the more likely the 
same respondent is to be willing to recommend the IPO option.  The same respondent 
will be less likely to recommend the private equity option and the more likely to support 
that taking a company public is a net long-term benefit. 
As expected, with reference to Q16-1 and Q18-1, the 14 upside factors are positively 
correlated to the upside factors in Q21,455 but the strength is less than what is observed 
with respect to the negative correlations relating to Q20.  The negative correlation 
between the 14 upside factors in Q21 and Q16-2 and Q18-2 is even weaker, and there are 
only a couple of items that meet the minimum levels in order to be classified as 
statistically significant.  However, those specific outcomes are worth noting as they 
provide an empirical basis to indicate where marketing efforts to sell the benefits of a 
public listing should be focused.  The details are discussed later in this correlation 
analysis section. 
With respect to the propositions in Q16-3 to Q16-7, there are only a couple of correlation 
outputs of sufficient strength to be worth noting.   Most interesting of these observations 
is that Q16-7 (the regulatory overreach statement) does not meet the threshold of 
significance for a correlation with Q16-1 (P-value=0.191, RS=-0.069).   Q16-7 does, 
however, demonstrate a weakly significant negative correlation with Q18-1 (P-value= 
0.0151, RS=-0.131), and a stronger positive correlation with Q16-2 (P-value=0.0001, 
 
455 Subject only to a single outlier (Q21-5) relating to going public in order to get liquidity for founding 
shareholders.   
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RS=0.205) and Q18-2 (P-value>0.001, RS=0.914). 
The Spearman Rank correlation statistics on Q16-7 are particularly surprising, and 
somewhat ominous for the ability of the ongoing OSC and CSA burden reduction process 
to meaningfully impact the health of the public markets.  Although we have discussed 
previously that there is a material level of support for the regulatory overreach 
proposition amongst the PCD Study respondents, the negative correlation between that 
proposition and Q16-1 and Q18-1 simply does not appear in the data to the degree one 
would have expected.   
The observed outcome here is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, it provides a 
measure of defense for all of those regulators in Canada who have been blamed by 
libertarians and laissez-faire marketeers as being principally responsible for public 
company decline.  On the other hand, however, it fails to provide much hope that 
reversing any perceived regulatory overreach in Canada, through the ongoing burden 
reduction process of the CSA and OSC, offers the prospect of pushing senior business 
decision-makers in Canada back towards the public markets in significant numbers.456 As 
such, there may be a strong belief that regulatory overreach has occurred in Canada 
amongst the PCD Study respondents, but that belief appears to operate independently of 
people's aversion to taking companies public in the current environment. 
8.4- Identifying the Most Significant Correlations in the PCD 
Study 
The number of Spearman Rank correlation calculations available from the PCD Study 
makes the task of summarizing and analyzing the outcomes almost overwhelming.  It is 
extremely easy to get too deep into weeds and lose the big picture on how the correlation 
data should be presented to the readers to keep the focus on the most important items.  
After combing through the data carefully and looking at a multitude of options, the 
 
456 The Spearman Rank data for the DG5- Private Company subgroup data does not indicate that senior 
decision-makers of private companies evidence any greater correlation between Q16-7 and the four 
disposition questions. 
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conclusion was reached that the most important correlations to highlight in this portion of 
the analysis are the correlations between the two major questions relating to general 
perceptions on the relative merits of the public markets: Q16-1- Degree of support for the 
proposition that taking a company public offers net long-term advantages; and Q18-1- 
Likelihood of recommending the IPO option as the preferred alternative in the 
hypothetical fact pattern.  Ultimately, of the four general disposition questions discussed 
above, these two particular items are the most logically connected to the outcome of the 
public / private decision-making process. 
The following correlation charts exclude correlations amongst the four general 
disposition questions previously discussed (Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2) because of 
the conceptual overlap between those questions.   What is being sought in the following 
correlation analysis is identification of the most statistically strong relationships between 
the general disposition questions in Q16-1 and Q18-1 and the intuitively independent 
propositions in Q16-3 to Q16-7, the potential downside factors associated with the public 
markets in Q20-1 to Q20-31 and the upside factors associated with the public markets in 
Q21-1 to Q21-14. 
The analysis begins with consideration of which factors are correlated most strongly with 
Q18-1 (likelihood of recommending the IPO option in the hypothetical as the preferred 
option).  The following table includes the top 20 strongest correlations on the Spearman 
Rank correlation test in descending order of correlation strength.  Negative correlations 
are displayed on a white background and positive correlations are on a grey background. 
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Table 26- Top 20 Spearman Rank Correlations for Q18-1 
 
Notably, all of the top 20 factors in the preceding table exhibit a Spearman Rank 
correlation coefficient greater than 0.20 and a P-value that is statistically significant at a 
level of at least 99.9%.  For correlations on 5-Point Likert Scale responses, these all 
qualify as strongly significant correlations. 
Also, it is apparent that the Q20 downside factors overall are more highly correlated to 
Q18-1 than the Q21 upside factors.  17 of the 20 strongest correlations to Q18-1 come 
from the list of factors in Q20, and only 3 from Q21.  The implication of this observation 
is that the strength of negative perceptions is a stronger influence on our ultimate actions 
than strength of our positive perceptions.   
Completely absent from this list are any of the Q16-3 to Q16-7 propositions, 
demonstrating that respondents' dispositions on those specific propositions are not linked 
to inclination to recommend the IPO option as are the upside and downside factors.  That 
is not entirely surprising; the statements in Q16-3 to Q16-7 are propositions summarizing 
alternative theories of public company decline.  
In interpreting the Spearman Rank correlation data, it is essential that one understands the 
difference between the strength of correlation and the overall importance of the factor as 
Q# Factor P-value RS
4 1 Q20_5 General management distractions 5.42E-12 -0.368
9 2 Q20_24 Redundancy of filing requirements 5.03E-11 -0.352
14 3 Q20_30 Management overall public company fatigue 6.26E-10 -0.332
7 4 Q20_2 Management effort to complete IPO 1.16E-09 -0.327
3 5 Q20_6 Increasing compliance complexity 7.9E-09 -0.311
6 6 Q20_19 Inability to focus on core business 8.78E-09 -0.310
2 7 Q20_7 Increasing compliance cost 1.44E-08 -0.306
10 8 Q20_1 Time to complete IPO 2.29E-08 -0.302
5 9 Q20_3 Cost of IPO 3.13E-08 -0.299
4 10 Q21_3 Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings 1.27E-06 0.265
20 11 Q20_27 Responding to uniformed shareholders 1.83E-06 -0.259
1 12 Q21_4 Ability to use  stock for future acquisitions 4.64E-06 0.251
11 13 Q20_9 Increased litigation risk 1.04E-05 -0.240
13 14 Q21_10 Enjoy public company challenges 2.37E-05 0.232
22 15 Q20_21 Reputational risk 4.96E-05 -0.222
26 16 Q20_17 Business Acquisition Reports 7.16E-05 -0.217
30 17 Q20_20 Public disclosure of shares and income 0.000118 -0.210
1 18 Q20_22 Pressures of meeting quarterly  targets 0.000125 -0.210
21 19 Q20_12 General regulatory overreach 0.000188 -0.204
23 20 Q20_4 Executive comp disclosure 0.000261 -0.200
Spearman
 Strength 
Ranking
Q20-Q21
Rank 
Order
Q18-1, DG1
All Respondents
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ranked by the PCD Study respondents.  Q20 and Q21 both asked the respondents to rank 
which of the upside or downside factors are most important in their decision-making 
process in deciding what to recommend.  The outcome of those rankings has been 
previously discussed in this Dissertation.  The highest rankings in terms of overall 
importance to the decision-making process likely represent a significant consistency 
amongst the respondents in their perceptions.   
In the correlation analysis, however, the more significant results are the ones that 
evidence the highest linkage between one item and another item.   Once again, a high 
level of correlation does not imply causality, as other factors may be more responsible for 
causing an outcome.  Likewise, an item may evidence a high degree of correlation 
strength to Q18-1, but may also have ranked as relatively unimportant in the rank order of 
Q-20 factors.  For example, Q20-27 (responding to uninformed shareholders) rates as 
having the 11th strongest correlation overall to Q18-1 amongst the 50 factors tested, but 
only ranked as the 20th most important downside factor in the Q20 rank order.  This 
implies that the significant correlation strength associated with this factor is likely not 
indicative of causality. 
In the chart in Table 26 above, we observe that nearly all of the top Q20 downside factors 
in terms of the strength of their Spearman Rank correlation to Q18-1 also were in the top 
10 in rank order of importance in the Q18-1 analysis. 457  Once again, these factors are 
drawn from a variety of different categories, demonstrating that the phenomenon of 
public company decline is multifactorial, interrelated and highly complex.   
The highest proportion of factors that demonstrated both a strong statistical negative 
 
457  The only factor that did not meet this criteria is Q20-30 (management overall public company fatigue).  
The fact that this factor ranked in middle of the rank order on perceived importance but demonstrates a 
high correlation coefficient to Q18-1 leads one to consider whether the question was not worded 
sufficiently clearly in the PCD Study.  Did it rank lower than it should have because the respondents did 
not connect with some element of the wording, such as the specific use of the word "fatigue" instead of an 
alternative like "frustration". This is particularly the case since the other four downside factors falling 
within the category of Time / Distraction / Effort of Going and Being Public that are in the top 10 in 
correlation strength all ranked in the top 10 in the Q20 importance rank order. 
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correlation to Q18-1 and a high rank order in the Q20 importance rankings relate to the 
following categories: the time / distraction associated with being public that prevents 
management from focusing on the core business; compliance complexity and 
redundancy; and public company costs.  As such, the collective evidence indicates that 
these are the specific areas with the highest likelihood of being linked to public decline 
causation and therefore merit heightened attention in further research efforts.  
Turning now to the correlations on Q16-1 (taking a company public offers net long-term 
benefits), we see that the strength of the correlations is slightly less here than for Q18-1 
generally.  However, the data evidences a number of relatively strong correlations 
between Q16-1 and the downside factors in Q20, as well as the upside factors in Q21.  
There are 13 factors which evidence Spearman Rank correlation P-values supporting a 
confidence level of 99.9% and an RS value stronger than 0.20 in reference to Q16-1.    
Table 27- Top 20 Spearman Rank Correlations for Q16-1 
 
Notably, the upside factors in Q21 are more prominent in this table than they were with 
respect to Q18-1, indicating that there is a stronger linkage between the strength of 
perception on the upside factors and the belief that taking a company public represents a 
Q# Factor P-value RS
4 1 Q20_5 General management distractions 8.52E-08 -0.289
4 2 Q21_3 Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings 1.12E-07 0.288
3 3 Q20_6 Increasing compliance complexity 4.96E-07 -0.272
6 4 Q20_19 Inability to focus on core business 6.68E-07 -0.269
2 5 Q20_7 Increasing compliance cost 1.74E-06 -0.259
10 6 Q21_11 Enhanced credibility with potential investors 3.51E-06 0.253
14 7 Q20_30 Management overall public company fatigue 4.88E-06 -0.248
9 8 Q20_24 Redundancy of filing requirements 1.06E-05 -0.240
1 9 Q20_22 Pressures of meeting quarterly  targets 4.72E-05 -0.221
13 10 Q21_10 Enjoy public company challenges 9.46E-05 0.214
10 11 Q21_9 Enhanced credibility with suppliers 0.000106 0.212
12 12 Q20_31 Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing 0.00011 -0.211
11 13 Q20_9 Increased litigation risk 0.000174 -0.205
5 14 Q20_3 Cost of IPO 0.000263 -0.199
31 15 Q20_17 Financial statement certification 0.000485 -0.191
9 16 Q21_8 Increased public visibility with potential custome 0.000837 0.184
7 17 Q21_14 Opportunity to grow the business further 0.000897 0.183
10 18 Q20_1 Time to complete IPO 0.001159 -0.178
30 19 Q20_20 Public disclosure of shares and income 0.001372 -0.175
14 20 Q20_2 Management effort to complete IPO 0.001815 -0.171
16-1, DG1
All Respondents
Q20-Q21
Rank 
Order
Spearman
 Strength 
Ranking
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net long-term advantage.  This suggests placing a higher importance on the upside factors 
associated with being a public company may be linked to higher overall positivity 
towards being a public company, but that the increased positivity is not sufficient as a 
motivating factor to increase the likelihood of recommending the IPO as the preferred 
option in the PCD Study hypothetical fact pattern. 
Turning briefly to the significant correlations for Q16-2 and Q18-2, the PCD Study data 
only produces two correlations for each that meet the minimum threshold of evidencing 
both a P-value below 0.01 and a correlation coefficient close to 0.20.  Both of those 
relationships exhibit a negative correlation with the upside factors in Q21, and the two 
significant relationships to Q16-2 and Q16-1 are the same upside factors in both cases. 
Table 28, Q16-2 & Q18-2 Significant Correlations 
 
Moreover, the two upside factors were also the two strongest factors from Q20 in 
correlation to Q18-1, and Q21-3 was the strongest factor from Q20 in correlation to Q16-
1.  The combination of those results points to these two factors being the two most 
important of all the Q20 factors in terms of correlation to the four general disposition 
questions.   
What is particularly noteworthy is that these two factors have a common focus.  Q21-3 
(quicker access to capital in follow-on financings) and 21-4 (ability to use stock for future 
acquisition) both focus on the unique benefits that accrue to public companies as a result 
of being able to use their shares as currency to complete transactions more quickly than is 
available from private equity basis.  It has been previously discussed that these two 
factors also rank first and fourth in the overall rank order of importance on Q20.  
Q# Q16_2-P-value Q16_2-RS Column1 Q18_2-P-value Q18_2-RS
Q21_3 0.00002 -0.231 Q21_3 0.00012 -0.212
Q21_4 0.00011 -0.212 Q21_4 0.00029 -0.199
DG1
All Respondents
DG1
All Respondents
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It is interesting to note than neither of these factors is highlighted as a benefit of going 
public by the TSX in their summary marketing materials.458  It may be useful for the 
TSX listing staff and other public markets proponents to take note of this particular 
outcome of the PCD Study, and begin to highlight the public benefit of having a listed 
stock available to use as currency on short turnaround for follow-on financings and 
acquisitions.  At least the PCD Study demonstrates that belief has a significant correlation 
to increased likelihood to consider an IPO transaction. 
Returning to the big picture on the correlation analysis for both Q18-1 and Q16-1 to 
conclude this part of the analysis, it is apparent that a number of statistically significant 
correlations exist.  The majority of the strongest correlations are between Q18-1 and the 
downside factors in Q20.  However, there are also significant correlations to the upside 
factors in Q21, particularly when calculated in reference to Q16-1. 
What correlation defines in the PCD Study data is only a starting point to consider which 
particular items may in fact be causally-linked to other factors. Before any conclusions 
can be reached on causality, however, the analysis must continue on to effectively isolate 
the potential impact of all other correlated factors.  This is beyond the scope of the PCD 
Study data and the analysis in this Dissertation and, in fact, the methodology for doing so 
on a practical basis has not yet been suggested anywhere in the literature.  Yet, where the 
factors in the PCD Study data are identified as combining both a high standing in the rank 
order analysis, along with a strong correlation to both Q18-1 and Q16-1, this outcome 
provides a strong clue that the particular factor should be a priority area in any further 
research seeking to take the next steps in establishing statistical causality of the public 
company decline phenomenon. 
  
 
458 TMX Website, "Benefits of Going Public", accessed August 2, 2019, online:< https://www.tsx.com/ 
listings/listing-with-us/listing-guides. 
376 
 
 Summary of Key Findings and Observations of PCD 
Study 
9.1- Summary of Rankings of Groups of Factors and Ability to 
Address Factors Through Securities Regulatory Reform 
In Chapter 1 of this Dissertation, ten different categories of factors posited in the 
literature as potential factors contributing to public company decline in Canada were 
outlined.  The following table reviews the ten categories of factors with reference to what 
has been observed in the PCD Study data, the importance of those factors in the go public 
/ stay private decision-making process (and therefore relating to the bigger issue of public 
company decline) and the ability to address those factors through regulatory reform. 
Category of 
Factors 
Relative Importance of Factors as 
Indicated by PCD Study 
Ability to Address Factors Through 
Securities Regulatory Reform 
Regulatory 
Overreach 
& Cost of 
Ongoing Public 
Company 
Compliance 
High Importance 
-Q17- Cited by large numbers of 
respondents on an unprompted basis in 
the text responses Q17. 
Q16-7: Evidences an overriding belief 
that regulators have unfairly tilted the 
capital markets playing field against 
reporting issuers, a position particularly 
strongly held by Group I senior decision-
makers. 
-Q20-7: Increasing compliance costs cited 
as 2nd most important factor of downsides 
associated with capital markets. 
-Q20-6: Increasing regulatory complexity 
cited as the 3rd most important factor in 
downsides associated with capital 
markets. 
-Q20-7: Costs of IPO cited as 5th most 
important factor of downsides associated 
with capital markets. 
 
 
High 
This is the category of factors that 
links directly to increased securities 
regulation, so therefore is the category 
of factors that can be most directly 
addressed by securities reform. 
 
Requires a strong mandate to the 
securities regulators from government 
empowering the securities regulators 
to implement unpopular reforms, 
along with potential refinement of the 
traditional regulatory reform 
methodology.  However, such a 
mandate also raises by necessity 
issues associated with the 
independence of the securities 
regulators. 
 
Cautionary Note- Current regulatory 
consultation process relying on 
voluntary responses to requests for 
comments is wholly inadequate in 
securing sufficient representation 
from the critical population of senior 
business decision-makers in Canada.  
This population is also the group that 
supports the Regulatory Overreach 
proposition most strongly in Canada.  
As such, securities regulators in 
Canadas should consider modifying 
their current consultation processes to 
remedy this defect. 
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Category of 
Factors 
Relative Importance of Factors as 
Indicated by PCD Study 
Ability to Address Factors Through 
Securities Regulatory Reform 
Private Capital 
Proliferation 
High Importance 
-Q17: Cited by large numbers of 
respondents. 
-Q16-4 & Q16-6: Strong support for the 
proposition that easier access to private 
capital is widely recognized as being 
important factor in public company 
decline. 
 
Low 
-Private capital proliferation 
represents a systemic change in the 
markets over a period of time.  
Restricting access by placing 
regulatory impediments in the way of 
private capital would be unpopular 
and counter-productive. 
 
General Public 
Company 
Distraction 
Fatigue 
High Importance 
Q20-5: General management distractions 
ranked 4th out of 31 factors. 
Q20-19: Inability to focus on core 
business ranked 6th out of 31 factors. 
Q20-30: Overall public company 
management fatigue ranked 14th of 31 
factors. 
Other related factors ranked lower, but the 
above factors demonstrate that the 
distraction topic is an important 
impediment to IPOs. 
 
Low 
This has always been a fundamental 
challenge of being a senior executive 
of a public company and will always 
be thus. However, the increased 
availability of private alternatives now 
makes this more important because 
other choices to IPOs are more 
accessible. The only thing that can be 
managed is the degree of distraction 
by burden reduction. 
Litigation Risk Moderate Importance 
Q20-9: Legal risk is cited as the 11th 
most important factor of downsides 
associated with capital markets.  This was 
higher than anticipated given the low 
number of Canadian securities class 
actions. Demonstrates fear of litigation 
may be higher than actual litigation risk, 
but still ranks as a moderate deterrent to 
IPOs. 
High 
-Historically, Canadian legal system 
inherently less plaintiff-friendly than 
US system.  Securities class-actions 
have become a reality in Canada since 
regulatory changes were introduced in 
2005, but all cases have been settled 
prior to judgment since that time. 
Legislation preventing class actions 
for civil liability on 
misrepresentations could be 
introduced, but not without serious 
opposition of the securities class-
action bar and shareholder rights 
lobby. 
 
Lack of SME 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Moderate Importance 
Q20-10: trading volume concerns ranked 
8th of 31 factors; Q20-11 analyst coverage 
concerns ranked 16th of 31 factors; 
Q20-31: lack of access to follow-on 
financings ranked 12th of 31 factors; 
Combined, these factors evidence that 
liquidity, analyst coverage and resulting 
valuations are a moderate deterrent to 
IPOs. 
 
Low 
-Results from systemic changes in the 
public markets ecosphere, particularly 
worsening economics for broker-
dealers at all sizes.  Recent failed U.S. 
pilot on tick-sizes demonstrates 
challenges of coming up with 
effective regulatory policy. 
Shareholder 
Short-Termism 
Moderate Importance 
Q17: Short-termism issues brought up 
more frequently than anticipated. 
Low 
The underlying shift in attention span, 
day-trading and institutional trading 
make the move to short-termism 
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Category of 
Factors 
Relative Importance of Factors as 
Indicated by PCD Study 
Ability to Address Factors Through 
Securities Regulatory Reform 
Q20-15: Shareholder short-termism 
ranked 15th in list of 31 factors. 
Q20-25: Short-sellers ranked 25th of 31 
factors. 
systemic and unfixable without 
serious intervention (i.e., such as 
providing tax breaks on capital gains 
for stocks held over a certain length or 
providing enhanced voting rights for 
long-term shareholders such as 
implemented in France in 2014 under 
the Florange Act, which doubles 
voting rights after a two-year hold 
period). 
 
Fundamental 
Economic 
Change 
Hypothesis 
Moderate Importance 
Q16-5: evidenced a moderate level of 
support (mean=3.27) for the summary of 
the fundamental economic change 
hypothesis 
 
Low 
Reflects a systemic change with no 
obvious regulatory fixes.  Can only be 
addressed by making IPOs more 
economically attractive compared to 
trade sales. 
Quarterly 
Target 
Perseveration 
High Importance  
Q20-22: Pressure of meeting analyst 
targets ranked 1st of list of 31 factors.  
 
Moderate 
The pressures of quarterly analyst 
targets can be addressed somewhat by 
simply moving to semi-annual 
reporting.  However, the tension 
between managing for long term 
growth vs. meeting targets still 
remains. 
 
Public 
Disclosure 
Disadvantage 
Low to Moderate Importance 
Q16-3: Proposition not highly supported 
by respondents (mean=2.58) 
Q20-16: Competitive disclosure ranked 
13th of 31 factors, but was more important 
to SME’s and private company decision-
makers. 
Q20-4: Executive compensation 
disclosure ranked 23rd out of 31 factors. 
Q20-8: Insider reporting requirements 
ranked 28th of out 31 factors. 
Q20-20: Disclosure of shareholdings and 
income from trading ranked 30th out of 31 
factors. 
Q20-21: Reputational risk ranked 21st out 
of 31 factors. 
Moderate 
Lessening the requirements for 
disclosure and allowing public 
companies to keep more secrets in 
order to better compete in the markets 
is conceptually simple, but practically 
very difficult.  Would face stiff 
opposition from shareholder rights 
lobby.  Would also be a practical 
impossibility unless these changes 
were coordinated with similar U.S. 
initiatives due to the large number of 
interlistings. 
9.2- Recurrent Themes Observed in the PCD Study Data 
 Strong Overall Negative Bias Towards the Public Markets Exists in 
Canada 
Overall, there is a strong negative bias towards the public markets in Canada amongst the 
PCD Study survey participants.  The responses to Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2 
collectively demonstrate that the number of senior business decision-makers and public 
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company influencers who believe that taking a company public is normally in the best 
interests of the organization is significantly smaller than the number of individuals who 
believe that remaining private is generally a preferable alternative.  As such, there are 
likely to be more negative opinions expressed than positive opinions around the 
boardroom table during the discussion process leading up to a potential IPO. 
In order for the pro-IPO position to ultimately win the day, the IPO supporters need to be 
strong advocates arguing on behalf of the merits of pursuing an IPO in order to offset the 
more numerous voices that are likely to be expressed opposing the IPO alternative.  With 
the PCD Study demonstrating that the number of individuals who strongly support IPOs 
is very small,459 the likelihood of developing a senior management team consensus in 
favour of an IPO is very low. 
 Multifactorial Complexity of the Phenomenon of Public Company 
Decline 
There is no single factor, or even category of factors, that dominates the PCD Study and 
stands above all others in terms of importance to senior decision-makers in the IPO / stay 
private decision-making process.   
However, there are certainly different tiers of factor categories, with the top tier in terms 
of importance comprised of: regulation and reporting challenges (complexity, 
redundancy, regulatory overreach); excessive public company costs resulting from the 
regulation and reporting challenges; and increased access to private capital (and the 
resulting increase in private company valuations and improved investment terms due to 
competition amongst private investors for good deals). 
The second tier of factors in importance include: liquidity and public valuation concerns; 
public markets short-termism; and the additional management time and effort required to 
manage public companies. 
 
459 The percentage of respondents strongly supporting the merits of IPOs on the four general disposition 
questions in Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2 of the PCD Study averages less than 5%. 
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The third tier of factors in importance include: concerns over the ability to access capital 
in the public markets,  competitive disclosure disadvantages for public companies, 
increased legal risk in the public markets, reputational risks associated with the public 
markets, systemic market shift towards larger acquiring companies offering quick exits at 
the pre-IPO stage and resource-sector specific challenges. 
Beyond the third tier are a number of other categories of factors which retain some 
degree of importance in the IPO / stay private decision-making process, but are 
significantly below the categories of factors covered in the first three tiers. 
On the whole, the PCD Study clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon of public 
company decline is, without question, multifactorial in nature, interrelated and highly 
complex.  There is no single factor, or group of factors, that can be singled out as a target 
for reform offering a realistic hope that addressing the factor will remediate the malaise 
in the Canadian IPO market.   
Any regulatory reform attempt that offers a reasonable prospect of actually reversing 
public company decline must consider the wide breadth of factors that all have a 
meaningful impact on the go public / stay private decision.  Such a broad regulatory 
reform effort must necessarily engage the federal and provincial governments working in 
concert with the securities regulators and using novel inducements to realign the 
fundamental economic calculation that has shifted to favour private financing 
alternatives. 
 The Opinions of Senior Business Decision-Makers Vary Materially in 
Key Areas from the Opinions of Public Markets Influencers 
The PCD Study data repeatedly evidences important topics in which the opinions of 
senior business decision-makers in Canada vary materially from the opinions of public 
markets influencers.  The current regulatory consultation process relying on voluntary 
responses to requests for comments from the regulators as the key method of securing 
public feedback is, therefore, fundamentally flawed.  The recent processes have failed to 
secure an appropriate level of participation from the key population of senior business 
decision-makers in Canada.  As such, securities regulators need to modify their current 
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consultation processes, being proactive in the recruitment of feedback from the critical 
population of senior business decision-makers and directing more time and resources to 
securing feedback that appropriately incorporates the various constituencies whose 
opinions matter on the initiatives. 
 The Surprising Prominence of the Factor of Increased Availability of 
Private Financing Alternatives 
The prominence of the increased availability of private financing alternatives as a factor 
rating in the first tier was surprising, due to the limited focus given to this factor in the 
literature (up to the last couple of years where only de Fontenay, Ewens and Farre-
Mensas have focused on the topic).  Both the open text responses and the quantitative 
response questions demonstrate that this issue is one of the most important factors 
embedded in the phenomenon of public company decline. 
The recent stream of literature that points to an increase in private financing alternatives 
as a major factor in the U.S. should receive further attention.  However, the tendency of 
that stream of literature to discuss the factor of private capital availability to the exclusion 
of all others fails to properly account for the complexity and number of factors that are 
relevant to the phenomenon. 
 Increased Public Markets Experience Correlates to Improved 
Dispositions Toward the Net Benefits of the Public Markets 
Respondents with a higher level of exposure to public companies in their careers are 
more favorably disposed to view the public markets in a positive light across all 
questions.   
 Increased Public Markets Experience Correlates to an Increased 
Perception that Regulatory Overreach has Occurred 
Even though increased public markets experience correlates with an overall improved 
perception of the public markets in terms of the net benefits offered by being public, it 
also correlates positively with an increased belief that securities regulators in Canada 
have overreached and tilted the capital markets playing field too far in favour of investor 
protection and against public company interests.  Since this is the subgroup that has the 
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greatest direct experience dealing with the Canadian regulatory landscape, this outcome 
should be especially pertinent for Canadian securities regulators. 
 SME’s Are More Negative on the Canadian Public Markets than 
Larger Companies 
Respondents who are decision-makers of SME's are more negatively disposed with 
respect to public markets than decision-makers of the larger non-SME's.  This supports 
the thread in the literature that SME’s bear a disproportionate regulatory burden without 
the financial depth to offset the regulatory costs.  As such, expanding the streamlined 
reporting regulations in Canada beyond venture issuers to TSX SME’s should be a 
priority item in the regulatory reform agenda. 
 Auditors / Accountants are More Negative on Public Markets than 
Other Public Market Influencers 
Surprisingly, the DG7- Auditors subgroup proved to be the group of Public Markets 
Influencers that were the most negative of the subgroups of public markets influencers on 
the public capital markets.  The accountants and auditors anecdotally expressed a 
particularly high level of dissatisfaction with recent pronouncements of the Canadian 
Accounting Standards Board.  They also repeatedly expressed the sentiment that the legal 
and professional risk associated with public company audits is no longer worth the 
economic reward.  Public company audits are being provided as a service to long-term 
public company clients, but several accounting firms indicated that they are not focusing 
on recruiting new public company audit clients because of the professional risks 
associated with those files. 
 Management Distractions / Time Commitment Associated with Going 
Public and Being Public are a Major Concern 
All four of the downside risk factors tested in Q20 relating to management distractions 
and the time required to manage a public company ranked in the top 10 out of the 31 
factors.  Clearly, the hassles and distractions of going public, and managing a public 
company, are a significant impediment to attracting more companies to the public 
markets. 
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 The Overall Trend of Public Company Decline in Canada Shows 
No Signs of Abating 
All of the data collected in the PCD Study points to continued public decline in the future 
absent meaningful reform that goes beyond the scope of public company burden 
reduction initiated by the securities commissions.  There is currently no momentum 
whatsoever towards future IPOs, as evidenced by the complete void of TSX-eligible 
private companies from the PCD Study indicating that they are working towards an IPO 
alternative in Canada.  Although there is extensive literature demonstrating that IPO 
volumes have been historically cyclical, this lack of momentum (excluding blockchain 
and cannabis) has lasted for too long to reasonably believe that we are simply 
experiencing any type of cyclical downturn. 
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 Implications of PCD Study for Regulatory 
Reform Initiatives 
One of the fundamental questions for consideration at the end of the PCD Study analysis 
is the following:  What are the implications of the PCD Study in terms of the ability of 
regulatory reform initiatives to meaningfully impact the phenomenon of public company 
decline in Canada?  In other words, based on the empirical evidence gathered from the 
PCD Study, is it reasonable to expect that regulatory reform alone will be able to 
significantly stem the tide of public company decline? 
The quick answer to these questions is that the PCD Study data demonstrates that there 
are a multitude of different factors that can be inferred as being meaningfully connected 
to the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada.  Some of these factors can 
intuitively be addressed through securities regulatory reform and streamlining initiatives, 
while others cannot.  The number and importance of factors considered in the PCD Study 
that cannot obviously be addressed through securities regulatory reform are several, 
leading to the conclusion that securities regulatory reform alone cannot be realistically 
relied on to stem the tide of further reduction in the number of Operating Companies 
listed on Canadian stock exchanges.   
However, the PCD Study Data also evidences that the contributing factors that can be 
addressed through securities regulatory reform are also numerous and of significant 
importance to the phenomenon of public company decline.  As such, securities regulatory 
reform initiatives focused on streamlining processes and reducing the overall reporting 
burdens on public companies need to be elevated to an even higher priority in provincial 
securities commissions in Canada, and the securities commissions need to be empowered 
by clear governmental mandates to undertake aggressive reforms, even if those reforms 
are unpopular with certain constituencies who can be relied on to oppose any meaningful 
changes that favour reporting issuers.  However, the securities commission reform 
imperative should only be one prong of the intervention initiative; the federal and 
provincial governments need to simultaneously launch significant interventions that 
fundamentally improve the relative attractiveness of accessing the public markets in 
Canada.  In doing so, the federal and provincial governments should consider accessing 
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the most powerful tools that only they possess, namely the power of the public purse 
through tax policy. 
This Dissertation has sought to collect meaningful empirical data as to the perceptions of 
senior business decision makers and key public markets influencers in Canada on a host 
of potential factors posited in the literature as potentially contributing to public company 
decline.  Analysis of the PCD Study data demonstrates that there is overriding perception, 
across all the demographics groups tracked in the PCD Study, that securities regulators 
have been too aggressive in bringing in regulatory reforms that have complicated and 
increased the expense associated with ongoing regulatory compliance for public 
companies.  This belief in regulatory overreach is particularly high amongst the critical 
subgroups of DG4- TSX decision-makers, DG5- Private Company decision-makers and 
DG10- SME decision-makers. 
Given the general negativity towards the public markets, every reasonable action that can 
be undertaken to improve perception of the public markets should be pursued as a priority 
as quickly as possible. Streamlining securities regulation and reducing the burden for 
public companies are certainly worthwhile initiatives.  This is one obvious area where 
overall perceptions towards the public markets can be improved at a limited financial cost 
to society.  Certainly, investor rights groups will object to every proposal to reduce the 
burden of regulatory compliance, but that is inevitable.  With respect, the investor rights 
groups may not possess sufficient context on the broader challenges of public company 
decline to fully appreciate the possible linkages between the positions for which they are 
advocating, and the phenomenon of public company decline.  Ultimately, continued 
public decline is certainly not in the best interests of any constituency, including the 
investor rights groups.  
The process summarized in the OSC Burden Reduction Report evidences that the OSC, at 
least, has begun to undertake some measure of reform designed to alleviate the types of 
concerns identified in the PCD Study.  However, as previously pointed out, many of the 
most aggressive and potentially impactful reform proposals from CP 51-404 have not 
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made it forward to the implementation phase as described in the OSC Burden Reduction 
Report. 
The following is a summary of each the 23 decisions and reform proposals from the OSC 
Burden Reduction Report that are relevant to public Operating Companies. 
 Decision or Recommendation 
A-1 
Recommend an amendment to the Securities Act to obtain authority to 
make exemptive relief orders applicable to multiple market participants 
(“blanket orders”) to avoid the costs associated with filing multiple 
separate exemptive relief applications. 
A-3 
Adopt and publish service standards that cover more processes, particularly 
compliance reviews, and establish a framework for performance 
measurement and continuous improvement. 
A-4 
In consultation with stakeholders, review compliance processes to improve 
focus on materiality, clarity, consistency, efficiency of interactions with 
staff and increased reliance on the principal regulator. 
A-5 
Enhance regulatory impact analysis for rule-making. 
A-6 
Improve clarity and consistency in drafting OSC rules, policies and 
guidance 
A-7 
Work with the CSA to improve clarity and consistency in drafting CSA 
rules, policies and guidance. 
A-8 
Engage in targeted consultations with market participants on how to better 
combine and balance principles-based rules, prescriptive rules and 
guidance. 
A-9 
Engage in targeted consultations to further understand and address 
stakeholders’ concerns that staff guidance is being applied as rules. 
A-10 
Redevelop the OSC website format and content, prioritizing the posting of 
updated consolidated rules and better access to staff contact information. 
A-11 
Evaluate the extent to which improvements to local filing systems can be 
made given the scope, resource and timing implications for existing local 
project work and SEDAR. 
A-12 
Consider improvements to existing outreach programs (e.g., checklists, 
guides, in-person outreach, and channels of delivery). 
A-13 
Review the terms of engagement with advisory committees to increase 
their value as a source of input. 
A-14 
Evaluate existing service standards for OSC stakeholders and establish a 
framework for determination, measurement and continuous improvement. 
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C-1 
Develop a process for mining issuers to request confidential staff review of 
publicly-filed mining disclosure prior to commencing an offering. 
C-2 
Develop a process for issuers to request confidential staff review of an 
entire prospectus prior to announcing an offering. 
C-3 
Publish guidance about issues that staff would raise during prospectus 
reviews that may impact the structure of an offering or where there may be 
questions regarding the interpretation of certain requirements. 
C-4 
Harmonize the requirements for financial statements to be included in a 
long form prospectus relating to an issuer’s primary business. 
C-5 
Review options for extending the filing deadline for exempt distributions, 
and engage in public consultation. 
C-6 
Cease-Trade Orders: Provide clearer information on the OSC website on 
an issuer’s CTO status. 
C-7 
Cease- Trade Orders: Where applicable, include additional information, 
such as CUSIP numbers or more details regarding individual officers and 
directors subject to a CTO, in published orders to better identify which 
securities are covered by the CTO. 
C-8 
Harmonize the crowdfunding exemption and publish proposed 
amendments for public consultation. 
C-9 
Amend the rules to reduce the number of instances when financial 
statements are required to be filed for significant acquisitions in business 
acquisition reports (BARs) and other disclosure. 
C-10 
Amend the disclosure required in the Annual Information Form (AIF) and 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) to avoid duplicative or 
unnecessary disclosure. 
C-11 
Develop a comprehensive approach to modernizing delivery requirements 
for corporate issuer documents and publish a concept paper for 
consultation. 
C-12 
Develop and publish proposals to make it more cost-effective for issuers to 
conduct a prospectus offering 
C-13 
Amend the rules so that at-the-market (ATM) offerings can be conducted 
without having to obtain prior exemptive relief  
Do these proposals individually and collectively go far enough based on the PCD Study 
Data?  It has already been stated that some of the most innovative and aggressive reform 
proposals in CP 51-404 (ex. biannual reporting of financial statements) have not survived 
the cut and made it into the OSC collection of decisions and proposals above.  Most of 
the proposals above fall into the category of streamlining processes, reducing duplication, 
reducing compliance costs and reducing complexity.  The PCD Study certainly 
demonstrates that each of these major topics has some degree of relevance to the topic of 
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public company decline.  Each proposal in the list above therefore also individually 
represents a positive step.   
However, there is little evidence in the PCD Study Data on which to base a realistic hope 
that the successful completion and implementation of all of the reforms proposed by the 
OSC above will have any significant impact on stemming the tide of public company 
decline.    
Only one of the specific proposals in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey deals with a 
subject matter that was individually of sufficient importance such that it was identified in 
the literature and included in the list of 31 downside factors considered in Q20 of the 
PCD Study; namely, the requirement to file a Business Acquisition Report.  The Business 
Acquisition Report topic placed 26th out of the 31 factors in ranking of importance to the 
public decision-making process.  Several of the other OSC proposals do relate to the 
broader topics of public company compliance costs, filing complexity and redundancy of 
filing requirements, which collectively rated higher in importance in the PCD Study.  
However, none of the individual proposals is sufficiently ambitious, or addresses a big 
enough underlying concern, such that any realistic observer would expect that the 
implementation of the proposal would have a meaningful impact on overall regulatory 
burden, complexity or cost.  
Certainly, each proposal in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey addresses a narrow 
subject area that is individually worthwhile to pursue.  However, all of the proposals 
together only represent a change in a small fraction of the overall compliance costs and 
disclosure obligations faced by public companies.  There are dozens of such individual 
elements beyond those topics addressed in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey that are 
embedded in the broader topics of regulatory complexity, regulatory redundancy and 
compliance costs tested in the PCD Study, and the OSC proposals only deal with a few of 
these factors.  None of the proposed reforms in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey are 
sufficiently big-picture or impactful in scope that would be expected to individually move 
the needle on overall compliance costs or complexity.  Only time will tell whether the 
collective effect of a number of minor reforms has any meaningful impact, but the OSC 
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has missed out on the opportunity to support the adoption of more ambitious and far-
reaching reform proposals at this juncture. 
 
Also apparent from the consultation responses in both CP 51-404 and OSC 11-784 is the 
heightened concern with the traditional CSA/OSC processes in which few public 
Operating Companies perspectives are represented, compared to the numerous 
submissions from public markets influencers and financial markets advocacy groups.  
Underlying this concern is the data from the PCD Study demonstrating that the Group I 
decision-makers feel materially stronger about regulatory overreach than Group II 
participants, but that their views are not sufficiently represented in the totality of the 
consultation process. 
It has been discussed repeatedly in this Dissertation that the current securities regulatory 
reform processes in Canada are wholly inadequate in securing the participation of 
representative samples of the specific senior business decision-maker population which is 
so critical to the Canadian capital markets landscape.  With the evidence clearly 
demonstrating that the opinions of the senior business decision-makers in Canada 
materially vary from the opinions of public markets influencers on key topics, it is 
imperative that regulators modify their consultation processes.  This includes dedicating 
additional resources to proactively soliciting the opinions of senior decision-makers 
during the consultation processes.  It should also extend to prioritizing the collection and 
analysis of empirical data related to prospective regulatory reforms much earlier in the 
process as advocated by legal commentators such as Roberta Romano and Robert Clark, 
as discussed in chapter 3 of this Dissertation. 
Securities regulators will likely respond by stating that they simply do not have the 
budget to devote additional resources to improving the breadth and quality of the data 
that they collect by proactively soliciting participation of senior business decision-makers 
during the consultation process.  However, the obvious rebuttal to this argument is that it 
is not a matter of budget, but simply a matter of prioritization of resources.  It is clear 
from the OSC Burden Reduction Report that significant financial and personnel resources 
have been allocated to the overall burden reduction process. Those allocations have not, 
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however, prioritized collecting empirical data from decision-makers of Operating 
Companies in Canada. 
As an example, a single researcher completed the entire enrollment effort for the PCD 
Study during a four-month intensive process, with a limited financial budget to support 
the enrollment effort.  Also, the PCD Study data-gathering effort did not have the 
inherent credibility advantage or the database access that would be available to a data 
gathering initiative working under the auspices of a provincial securities commission or 
the CSA.  With approximately 500 full-time employees, it is hard to imagine that the 
OSC cannot repurpose individuals to focus on securing responses from a broader group 
of market participants on proposed regulatory reform initiatives such that their analysis is 
being undertaken with better empirical data and broader participation from senior 
business decision makers of both public and private companies. 
At a macro level, the PCD Study data evidences that there is a widely-held belief 
amongst Canadian business leaders that taking a company public in Canada is a net 
disadvantage in the long term.  This negative perception plagues the Canadian public 
markets at this point in time.  In order to stem the tide of further public company decline, 
it is clear that immediate and aggressive regulatory reform is needed to combat the 
overall negative perception towards the Canadian public markets evidenced in the PCD 
Study, focusing on improving both the perception and the reality of the public company 
experience in Canada.   
It is submitted that there are many tools within the reach of Canadian securities regulators 
from a regulatory reform perspective that would significantly improve the overall public 
perception towards the capital markets.  Many of the innovative and ambitious ideas, 
offering the prospect of material burden reduction, were included in the original 33 
suggestions put forth for consideration by the CSA in CP 51-404.  However, the most 
ambitious and promising ideas were abandoned in the follow-on CSA 51-353 instrument 
and the OSC Burden Reduction Report after pushback from the investor rights lobby in 
the consultation process.   
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Without question, the watered-down list of proposed reforms ultimately recommended in 
CSA 51-353 and the OSC Burden Reduction still include some worthwhile elements.  
However, it is submitted that these reform suggestions in CSA 51-353 and the OSC 
Burden Reduction Report go nowhere near far enough in addressing foundational issues 
currently manifested in the Canadian capital markets.  Nor do they provide a sufficiently 
strong clear signal to the Canadian business community that the securities regulators are 
willing to commit themselves to fostering meaningful public capital markets growth.  A 
much more robust regulatory response, akin to adopting all of the original burden 
reduction ideas floated in CP 51-404, is necessary in order to reverse the general 
negativity towards the capital markets displayed in the PCD Study.  With respect, CP 51-
404 demonstrates that current securities regulatory reform initiatives are not failing due to 
a lack of ideas on ways to streamline regulation and reduce the overall reporting burden 
for public companies; what is lacking in these initiatives is the willingness of the 
securities regulatory authority leadership driving the agenda to push forward the most 
ambitious, and controversial, ideas in the face of opposition from the shareholder rights 
lobby. 
The PCD Study, as a whole, demonstrates that the phenomenon of public company 
decline is unquestionably multi-factorial in nature, interrelated and extremely complex.  
Considering the specific nature of the factors that the PCD Study indicates are significant 
contributing factors to public company decline, it appears highly unlikely that any 
package of aggressive regulatory reforms will be sufficient, in and of themselves, to stem 
further erosion in the number of Operating Companies listed in Canada. 
Yet, it is equally clear from the PCD Study Data that the factors of regulatory overreach 
and increasing regulatory compliance cost are important negative factors in the minds of 
key public markets decision-makers and influencers in the Canadian market.  As such, 
there is no chance of a public markets recovery without an aggressive package of 
regulatory reforms that deliver material burden reduction for Operating Companies.  That 
package of regulatory reforms should begin with the most aggressive and far-reaching of 
the 33 discussion points initially put forth in CP 51-404 as a starting point, and then 
continue building on those initiatives.   
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As stated in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, aggressive intervention of the 
provincial securities regulators to reduce the public company burden is an absolutely 
essential element to stemming the tide of further public company decline; however, the 
PCD Study data indicates that no amount of regulatory reform from securities regulators 
can be expected to single-handedly reverse the decline and result in an actual recovery of 
the public capital markets in Canada.  
Ultimately, the quandary of public company decline in Canada is something that should 
not be left to the securities regulators alone to fix if the federal and provincial 
governments in Canada accept the position that maintaining robust public capital markets 
is an important policy objective.  Although the securities regulators may bear some 
degree of blame for contributing to the phenomenon through regulatory overreach in the 
past number of years, the blame does not extend so far as to support a conclusion that the 
regulators are solely, or even primarily, responsible for the occurrence of the 
phenomenon.  It is clear that the malaise surrounding the IPO market at this point in time 
in Canada is the result of multiple contributing factors that have evolved to collectively 
conspire against the competitive position of the public capital markets, many of which 
operate completely independent of the actions of the provincial securities regulators or 
any other governmental bodies.  Specifically, the federal and provincial governments 
should consider implementing co-ordinated policy initiatives in which the comparative 
economic benefits in the private / public calculation are readjusted.   
Beyond the critical intervention from the securities regulators to reduce public company 
burden, then, what other avenues exist in Canada to regain momentum in the public 
markets?  If the securities regulators cannot achieve this result through burden reduction 
alone, then the inevitable conclusion is that the cause of the public markets must be taken 
up by higher levels of government in Canada with additional policy tools at their 
disposal.460   
 
460 How? The answer is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. However, there are certain prospects that are 
immediately obvious.  One such alternative is the creation of material financial incentives that are directly 
either at the Operating Companies or at the public investor level, such as providing benefits similar to flow-
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However, it should also be acknowledged that government intervention also involves 
risk, and not every government initiative can be expected to be successful in its real-
world implementation.  The failure of the SEC pilot program operated by FINRA on the 
imposition of artificial tick sizes, discussed earlier in this Dissertation in Chapter 2, is a 
prime example of a failed legislative initiative in the U.S. directed at reversing public 
company decline.  Yet, it should be noted that the entire SEC pilot initiative was based on 
the erroneous assumption that the primary driver of public company decline in the U.S. 
was the deterioration of the support ecosystem of research and market-makers due to the 
decimalization of the trading function.  
The U.S. initiative on tick sizes serves as a warning for potential Canadian governmental 
interventions.  The U.S. initiative failed because it was based on an over-simplified belief 
that public company decline was a relatively straight-forward phenomenon.  It was also 
implemented without any solid empirical research backing the design of the legislative 
program.  The failure of this program again underlines the importance of undertaking 
solid empirical research to inform prospective regulatory intervention before the 
implementation of the new programs.   Failing to have done so, the U.S. initiative of tick-
sizes targeted only a single root cause of a phenomenon that the PCD Study has 
demonstrated is multi-factorial and extremely complex, with the inevitable result that the 
initiative failed to achieve its goals of increasing liquidity for the piloted companies.  
While still laudable in that the U.S. government has actually tried something to reverse 
 
through shares for investors who invest directly in IPOs.  Another alternative would be providing a 3-5 year 
tax horizon after completion of an IPO in which newly-listed public companies are eligible to pay lower 
taxes on active business income, possibly determined by the number of full-time Canadian-based 
employees that are hired during that period and/or investment in research and development.  A third 
alternative would be to tax capital gains on public shares at a lower rate than gains on private investments.   
Without doubt, if you have access to tax policy as a tool to fix the public company decline problem, the 
nature of the incentives that can be identified is extensive.  Moreover, the benefits of tax policy changes 
can be apportioned between the companies and investors with a focus on job creation and research 
investment, thereby aligning public company incentives with other government priorities. 
The flow-through tax program in the mining industry is a prime example of a government intervention for 
the benefit of business that has had major impact in preserving mining finance as a viable industry in 
Canada.  Absent the flow-through tax incentives, there is a broad consensus in mining finance that the 
junior exploration side of the mining industry in Canada would have atrophied to a much greater extent 
during the numerous down-cycles that it has faced over the past three decades. 
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the tide of public company decline (including both the tick-size pilot and the JOBS Act), 
unlike Canada (where nothing has yet been attempted), it demonstrates the risk of 
attempting narrowly-focused interventions in this area.  
One way or another, the Canadian federal and provincial governments are going to have 
to step up and take a true leadership role in protecting the public markets if they believe 
that maintaining robust public markets is of significant value to the economy.  This may 
entail revising the regulations that dictate the current public consultation methodologies 
mandated for the securities commissions, thereby adopting new engagement procedures 
specifically designed to bring more voices from the Operating Company constituency to 
the table.  It should also involve bringing empirical evidence to the analysis much earlier 
in the process, preferably before the reforms are enacted. 
Perhaps the most ominous of the conclusions to be drawn from the PCD Study is that, if 
the governments continue to avoid direct intervention and push the mandate for stemming 
public company decline down to the securities commissions alone, it appears inevitable 
that the public capital markets will be further reduced to a mere shadow of their historical 
position as key drivers of growth in the Canadian economy. 
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 Indications for Further Research 
The following are items that have been identified through the course of the PCD Study as 
being issues on which further research and analysis is warranted:  
A.  Junior Capital Markets Analysis- The PCD Study was limited in scope to public 
companies listed on the TSX or private companies eligible for listing on the TSX.  The 
rationale for this limitation was discussed in the research methodology portion of the 
Dissertation as being linked to the unique issues facing junior stock exchange-listed 
companies in Canadas.  However, it is clear that the public company decline phenomenon 
is most severe in the case of SME’s, and that SME senior business decision-makers are 
more negatively disposed towards the public markets at a whole.   In Canada particularly, 
the junior markets have traditionally played a critical role as incubators for companies 
that graduate to the TSX and the health of the junior capital markets is clearly a matter of 
priority.  As such, additional empirical research focusing on senior business decision-
makers of companies listed on the Canadian junior stock exchanges (TSXV and CSE) is 
indicated, comparing the perceptions and experiences for the junior companies to the data 
gathered in the PCD Study. 
B. Voluntary vs. Forced IPOs-  In light of the significant overall negative perception 
towards the public markets reported in the PCD Study, it would be valuable to understand 
what portion of the IPOs completed in Canada (and in the U.S.) over the past decade have 
been undertaken voluntarily by management and controlling shareholders of the 
companies compared to those that are forced on the companies due to registration rights 
granted to private equity investors.  This would provide clarity as to how many, of the 
very limited number of IPOs that have been completed, are pursued as being the optimal 
strategic option for the company instead of being pursued because of the contractual 
liquidity rights previously granted to a shareholder. 
C.  Potential Impairment of IPO Capital Sources Due to Passive Fund Flows-  This 
item deals with a recurring theme that was brought up in live presentations to investment 
banks in Canada during the course of the PCD Study; i.e., that the flow of funds from 
actively-managed funds to passively-managed funds in Canada serves as a potential 
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threat to IPO financing sources in the future.  Further analysis is required to determine to 
what extent the flow of capital from actively-managed investment funds into passively 
managed ETF’s and closed-end funds might constrain the ability of investment banks to 
support an increased volume of IPOs.  Although the PCD Study has demonstrated that 
this issue has not been a historical cause of public company decline thus far, certain 
participants in the PCD Study indicated their concern that the issue may prove to be a 
bottleneck in the future, if and when the desire of companies to pursue IPOs increases.  
The additional research should seek to quantify the degree to which actively-managed 
funds retain sufficient liquidity to invest in future IPOs. 
D. Quantifying the Growth of Private Equity in Canada-  Perhaps most critical in 
understanding the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada, additional research 
is indicated in terms of quantifying how much easier and quicker it has become to access 
private equity in Canada over the past 25 years.  This research should focus on the overall 
growth of the private equity financing targeted to Canadian companies, but should also 
include a mechanism for determining the ease with which such capital can be accessed.  
This should focus on both ease of access, timing to close of private equity transactions 
and valuations.  Intuitively, increased dry powder should lead to increased competition 
for the best private deals, thereby reducing timing and streamlining processes to close 
private equity financings.     
E. Pre-Money Valuation Delta Between Public and Private Deals- Further analysis 
is required to determine how the average pre-money valuation of transactions in the 
private markets has evolved over the past 25 years, specifically compared to evolution of 
pre-money valuation in the public markets.  Has this gap narrowed to the degree 
indicated by many individuals who participated in the PCD Study?  Indeed, has the gap 
actually become inverted as expressed by some PCD Study participants (i.e., where 
private transactions are securing higher valuations than public market valuations?).  How 
does the actual difference between the private and public valuations in the current market 
compare to the minimum premium specified by the respondents in Q19 of the PCD 
Study?  
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F. Follow-Up on Question 16-7- Question 16-7 of the PCD Study demonstrated that 
increased exposure to the public markets correlates positively with an increased support 
for the regulatory overreach hypothesis.   This is an important finding in terms of its 
ramifications for provincial securities regulators, and therefore additional empirical 
research is warranted to determine why increased exposure in the public markets is 
correlated to a higher acceptance of regulatory overreach.  However, increased familiarity 
with public markets also was found to correlate with an overall increased belief in the 
value of the public markets for the long-term benefit of companies.  The implication of 
these findings is that regulatory overreach is a real phenomenon, yet improved education 
of senior business decision-makers of private companies offers the prospect of increasing 
IPO volumes to at least some degree.  Further research focusing on these two particular 
findings should seek to validate these two perceptions from the PCD Study, both of 
which are important in instructing future strategy to combat further public company 
decline. 
G. Replicating the PCD Study in the U.S. and Europe- Consideration should be given 
to replicating the PCD Study in the United States and in Europe, comparing the results to 
the Canadian data.  Important information can be gleaned by comparing how the 
Canadian data compares to these other countries, which data would be particularly useful 
in determining how to combat public company decline in Canada.  The comparative data 
would also be instructive in the United States and Europe, as those jurisdictions seek to 
craft their own strategies to combat further public company decline.  Research 
methodology lessons learned from the Canadian study should be instructive in the design 
and implementation of the U.S. and European surveys.  Ultimately, the goal will be to 
determine: what factors are similar in importance between the Canadian, U.S. and 
European studies; and what factors are materially different? 
H. Replicate the PCD Study in Countries Not Yet Evidencing Public Company 
Decline- Consideration should be given to repeating the PCD Study in key Asian markets 
such as Singapore and Hong Kong in order to gain comparative data from capital markets 
in regions that have not yet gone through a period of decline.  Is future public company 
decline in these markets inevitable once they reach a comparative stage of maturity to the 
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western markets? Is there something fundamentally different in the public markets in 
Asia that would indicate that public company decline is an issue endemic only to the 
western developed democracies?  Comparing the perceptions of senior business decision-
makers and public markets influencers operating in key Asian markets to the opinions 
expressed in the western industrialized democracies should provide some indication as to 
whether there is something systemically different between the capital markets systems in 
the east and the west that works in favour of the eastern public markets, or is future 
capital markets decline in the east an inevitability. 
I. Completion of Ordinal Regression Analysis-  Using the data already gathered in 
the PCD Study, an ordinal regression analysis should be undertaken to strengthen our 
understanding of the correlation data and determine what predictions can be made, with 
various degrees of confidence, as to the disposition of respondents on certain factors 
based on their answers on other factors. 
J. Further Analysis of Question 21 Data- Upside Factors Associated with Being 
Public-  The PCD collected data on the upside benefits associated with being public in 
Question 21, but detailed analysis of this data and comparison of the study data to 
previous studies undertaken in the U.S. and Europe was not prioritized in the Dissertation 
analysis.  As the data has been collected and is accessible for further analysis, it is an area 
meriting further consideration in the format of a follow-on paper. 
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Appendix 1- 
Excerpt of Decisions and Recommendations Relevant to 
Operating Companies from the OSC Burden Reduction Report 
DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IMPACTING ALL ISSUERS 
 
 
Number 
 
Description 
 
Start 
Target Date 
(from start) 
 
Status 
 
Benefits 
A-1 Recommend an amendment to the Securities 
Act to obtain authority to make exemptive 
relief orders applicable to multiple 
market participants (“blanket orders”) 
to avoid the costs associated with filing 
multiple separate exemptive relief 
applications 
Completed Completed Complet
ed 
Reduced red tape 
A-2 Evaluate whether to recommend relocating 
various provisions found in the Securities Act 
into National Instruments to harmonize the 
placement of OSC requirements with those of 
other Canadian jurisdictions 
Summer 
2019 
24 months In 
progress 
Harmonization 
A-3 Adopt and publish service 
standards that cover more processes, 
particularly compliance reviews, 
and establish a framework for performance 
measurement and continuous improvement 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
More timely and 
focused reviews 
A-4 In consultation with stakeholders, review 
compliance processes to improve focus on 
materiality, clarity, consistency, efficiency of 
interactions with staff and increased 
reliance on the principal regulator 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
More timely and 
focused reviews 
A-5 Enhance regulatory impact analysis for rule-
making 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
More tailored 
and flexible 
regulation 
A-6 Improve clarity and consistency in drafting 
OSC rules, policies and guidance 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
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Number 
 
Description 
 
Start 
Target Date 
(from start) 
 
Status 
 
Benefits 
A-7 Work with the CSA to improve clarity and 
consistency in drafting CSA rules, policies and 
guidance** 
Summer 
2019 
TBD In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
A-8 Engage in targeted consultations with market 
participants on how to better combine and balance 
principles-based rules, prescriptive rules and guidance 
Summer 
2019 
24 months In 
progress 
More tailored 
and flexible 
regulation 
A-9 Engage in targeted consultations to further 
understand and address stakeholders’ concerns 
that staff guidance is being applied as rules 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
More timely and 
focused reviews 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
A-10 Redevelop the OSC website format and content, 
prioritizing the posting of updated consolidated 
rules and better access to staff contact information 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
A-11 Evaluate the extent to which improvements to 
local filing systems can be made given the scope, 
resource and timing implications for existing 
local project work and SEDAR+ 
Summer 
2019 
24 
months 
In 
progress 
Reduced red tape 
A-12 Consider improvements to existing outreach 
programs (e.g., checklists, guides, in-person 
outreach, and 
channels of delivery) 
Summer 
2019 
24 
months 
In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
A-13 Review the terms of engagement with advisory 
committees to increase their value as a source of 
input 
Summer 
2019 
24 
months 
In 
progress 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
A-14 Evaluate existing service standards for OSC 
stakeholders and establish a framework for 
determination, measurement and 
continuous 
improvement 
January 
2020 
24 
months 
Plannin
g 
Better and more 
accessible 
information 
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Decisions and Recommendations Impacting Companies 
 
Number 
 
Description 
 
Start 
 
Target Date 
(from start) 
 
Status 
 
Benefits 
C-1 Develop a process for mining issuers to 
request confidential staff review of 
publicly-filed mining disclosure prior to 
commencing an offering 
Completed Completed Completed. 
See OSC Staff 
Notice 43-706 
Pre-filing 
Review of 
Mining 
Technical 
Disclosure 
More timely and 
focused reviews 
C-2 Develop a process for issuers to 
request confidential staff review of an 
entire prospectus prior to announcing an 
offering** 
Summer 
2019 
12 months In progress More timely and 
focused reviews 
C-3 Publish guidance about issues that staff 
would raise during prospectus reviews 
that may impact the structure of an 
offering or where there may be questions 
regarding the interpretation of certain 
requirements 
Fall 2019 12 months In progress Better and more 
accessible 
information 
C-4 Harmonize the requirements for 
financial statements to be included in a 
long form prospectus relating to an 
issuer’s primary business** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress Harmonization 
C-5 Review options for extending the filing 
deadline for exempt distributions, and 
engage in public consultation ** 
Summer 
2019 
24 months In progress More tailored 
and flexible 
regulation 
C-6 Cease-Trade Orders: Provide clearer 
information on the OSC website on an 
issuer’s CTO status 
Summer 
2019 
18 months In progress Better and more 
accessible 
information 
C-7 Cease- Trade Orders: Where applicable, 
include additional information, such as 
CUSIP numbers or more details regarding 
individual officers and directors subject 
to a CTO, in published orders to better 
identify which securities are covered by the 
CTO 
Summer 
2019 
18 months In progress Better and more 
accessible 
information 
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Number 
 
Description 
 
Start 
 
Target Date 
(from start) 
 
Status 
 
Benefits 
C-8  Harmonize the crowdfunding 
exemption and publish proposed 
amendments for public consultation** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress Harmonization 
C-9 Amend the rules to reduce the 
number of instances when financial 
statements are required to be 
filed for significant acquisitions in business 
acquisition reports (BARs) and other 
disclosure** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress. 
Proposed 
amendments 
were 
published in 
August 2019 
Reduced red 
tape 
C-10 Amend the disclosure required in the 
Annual Information Form (AIF) and 
Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) to avoid duplicative or 
unnecessary disclosure** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress Reduced red 
tape 
C-11 Develop a comprehensive approach to 
modernizing delivery requirements for 
corporate issuer documents and publish a 
concept paper for consultation** 
Fall 2018 18 months In progress Reduced red 
tape 
C-12 Develop and publish proposals to make it 
more cost-effective for issuers to conduct a 
prospectus offering** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress More tailored 
and flexible 
regulation 
C-13 Amend the rules so that at-the-market 
(ATM) offerings can be conducted without 
having to obtain prior exemptive relief ** 
Fall 2018 24 months In progress. 
Proposed 
amendments 
were 
published in 
May 2019 
Reduced red 
tape 
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Appendix 2- 
Excerpt of 33 Consultation Questions in CP 51-404 
 
General consultation questions 
 
1. Of the potential options identified in Part 2: 
(a) Which meaningfully reduce the regulatory burden on reporting issuers while 
preserving investor protection? 
(b) Which should be prioritized and why? 
 
2. Which of the issues identified in Part 2 could be addressed in the short-term or 
medium-term? 
 
3. Are there any other options that are not identified in Part 2 which may offer 
opportunities to 
meaningfully reduce the regulatory burden on reporting issuers or others while preserving 
investor protection? If so, please explain the nature and extent of the issues in detail and 
whether these options should constitute a short-term or medium-term priority for the 
CSA. [p.4] 
 
Consultation questions  
 
4. Would a size-based distinction between categories of reporting issuers be preferable to 
the current distinction based on exchange listing? Why or why not? 
 
5. If we were to adopt a size-based distinction: 
(a) What metric or criteria should be used and why? What threshold would be 
appropriate and why? 
(b) What measures could be used to prevent reporting issuers from being required 
to report under different regimes from year to year? 
(c) What measures could be used to ensure that there is sufficient transparency to 
investors regarding the disclosure regime to which the reporting issuer is subject? 
(d) How could we assist investors in understanding the distinction made and the 
requirements applicable to each category of reporting issuer? 
 
6. If the current distinction for venture issuers is maintained, should we extend certain 
less onerous venture issuer regulatory requirements to non-venture issuers? Which ones 
and why? [p.5] 
 
Consultation questions 
7. Is it appropriate to extend the eligibility criteria for the provision of two years of 
financial statements to issuers that intend to become non-venture issuers? If so: 
(a) How would this amendment assist in efficient capital raising in the public 
market? 
(b) How would having less historical financial information on non-venture issuers 
impact 
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investors? 
(c) Should we consider a threshold, such as pre-IPO revenues, in determining 
whether two years of financial statements are required? Why or why not? 
(d) If a threshold is appropriate, what threshold should be applied to determine 
whether two years of financial statements are required, and why? 
 
8. How important is the ability to perform a three-year trend analysis? [p.6] 
 
Consultation questions 
9. Should auditor review of interim financial statements continue to be required in a 
prospectus? Why or why not? 
 
10. Should other prospectus disclosure requirements be removed or modified, and why? 
[p.7]” 
 
Consultation questions 
11. Is the current short form prospectus system achieving the appropriate balance (i.e., 
between facilitating efficient capital raising for reporting issuers and investor protection)? 
If not, please identify potential short form prospectus disclosure requirements which 
could be eliminated or modified in order to reduce regulatory burden on reporting issuers, 
without impacting investor protection, including providing specific reasons why such 
requirements are not necessary. 
 
12. Should we extend the availability of the short form prospectus offering system to 
more reporting issuers? If so, please explain for which issuers, and why this would be 
appropriate.” [p.7] 
 
Consultation questions 
“13. Are conditions right to propose a type of alternative prospectus model for reporting 
issuers? If an alternative prospectus model is utilized for reporting issuers: 
(a) What should the key features and disclosure requirements of any proposed 
alternative prospectus model be? 
(b) What types of investor protections should be included under such a model (for 
example, rights of rescission)? 
(c) Should an alternative offering model be made available to all reporting 
issuers? If not, what should the eligibility criteria be?” [p.9] 
 
Consultation questions 
14. What rule amendments or other measures could we adopt to further streamline the 
process for ATM offerings by reporting issuers? Are there any current limitations or 
requirements imposed on ATM offerings which we could modify or eliminate without 
compromising investor protection or the integrity of the capital markets?  
 
15. Which elements of the exemptive relief granted for ATM offerings should be codified 
in securities legislation to further facilitate such offerings? [p.10 
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Consultation questions 
16. Are there rule amendments and/or processes we could adopt to further streamline the 
process for cross-border prospectus offerings, without compromising investor protection, 
by: (i) Canadian issuers and (ii) foreign issuers?  
 
17. As noted in Appendix B, in 2013 a number of amendments were made to liberalize 
the premarketing/ marketing regime in Canada. Are there rule amendments and/or 
processes we could adopt to further liberalize the prospectus pre-marketing and 
marketing regime in Canada, without compromising investor protection, for: (i) existing 
reporting issuers and (ii) issuers planning an IPO, and if so in what way? [p.10] 
 
Consultation questions 
18. Does the BAR disclosure, in particular the financial statements of the business 
acquired and the pro forma financial statements, provide relevant and timely information 
for an investor to make an investment decision? In what situations does the BAR not 
provide relevant and timely information? 
 
19. Are there certain BAR requirements that are more onerous or problematic than 
others? 
 
20. If the BAR provides relevant and timely information to investors: 
(a) Are each of the current significance tests required to ensure that significant 
acquisitions are 
captured by the BAR requirements? 
(b) To what level could the significance thresholds be increased for non-venture 
issuers while still providing an investor with sufficient information with which to 
make an investment decision? 
(c) What alternative tests would be most relevant for a particular industry and 
why? 
(d) Do you think that the disclosure requirements for a significant acquisition 
under Item 14.2 of 51-102F5 (information circular) should be modified to align 
with those required in a BAR, instead of prospectus-level disclosure? Why or why 
not? [p.11] 
 
Consultation questions  
21. Are there disclosure requirements for annual and interim filing documents that are 
overly burdensome for reporting issuers to prepare? Would the removal of these 
requirements deprive investors of any relevant information required to make an 
investment decision? Why or why not? 
 
22. Are there disclosure requirements for which we could provide more guidance or 
clarity? For example, we could clarify that discussion of only significant trends and risks 
is required, or that the filing of immaterial amendments to material contracts is not 
required under NI 51-102. [p.12] 
 
421 
 
Consultation questions  
23. What are the benefits of quarterly reporting for reporting issuers? What are the 
potential problems, concerns or burdens associated with quarterly reporting?  
 
24. Should semi-annual reporting be an option provided to reporting issuers and if so 
under what 
circumstances? Should this option be limited to smaller reporting issuers?  
 
25. Would semi-annual reporting provide sufficiently frequent disclosure to investors and 
analysts who may prefer to receive more timely information? 
 
26. Similar to venture issuers, should non-venture issuers have the option to replace 
interim MD&A with quarterly highlights? [p.13] 
 
Consultation questions 
27. Would modifying any of the above areas in the MD&A form requirements result in a 
loss of significant information to an investor? Why or why not? 
 
28. Are there other areas where the MD&A form requirements overlap with existing 
IFRS requirements? 
 
29. Should we consolidate the MD&A, AIF (if applicable) and financial statements into 
one document?  Why or why not? 
 
30. Are there other areas of overlap in continuous disclosure rules? Please indicate how 
we could remove overlap while ensuring that disclosure is complete, relevant, clear, and 
understandable for investors. [p.14] 
 
31. Are there any aspects of the guidance provided in NP 11-201 which are unclear or 
misaligned with market practice? 
 
32. The following consultation questions pertain to the “notice-and-access” model under 
securities legislation and consideration of potential changes to this model: 
(a) Since the adoption of the “notice-and-access” amendments, what aspects of 
delivering paper copies represent a significant burden for issuers, if any? Are 
there a significant number of investors that continue to prefer paper delivery of 
proxy materials, financial statements and MD&A? 
(b) Do you think it is appropriate for a reporting issuer to satisfy the delivery 
requirements under securities legislation by making proxy materials, financial 
statements and MD&A publicly available electronically without prior notice or 
consent and only deliver paper copies of these documents if an investor 
specifically requests paper delivery? If so, for which of the documents required to 
be delivered to beneficial owners should this option be made available? 
(c) Would changes to the “notice-and-access” model as described in question (b) 
above pose a significant risk of undermining the protection of investors under 
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securities legislation, even though an investor may request to receive paper 
copies? 
(d) Are there other rule amendments that could be made in NI 54-101 or NI 51-
102 to improve the current “notice-and-access” options available for reporting 
issuers? 
 
33. Are there other ways electronic delivery of documents could be further enhanced 
through securities legislation? [p.15] 
 
2.1- Extending the application of streamlined rules to smaller reporting issuers 
 
Under Canadian securities legislation, venture issuers are permitted to comply with 
continuous disclosure requirements that are generally less onerous than those imposed on 
other reporting issuers. For example, venture issuers have: 
• longer filing deadlines for annual and interim financial statements 
• a higher threshold for significant acquisition reporting 
• no requirement to file an annual information form (AIF) 
• ability to file a quarterly highlights document to meet interim management’s 
discussion and 
analysis (MD&A) requirements 
• different corporate governance requirements 
• reduced certification requirements 
We currently distinguish venture issuers from non-venture issuers based on their 
exchange listings. A reporting issuer generally qualifies as a venture issuer as long as it 
does not have securities listed or quoted on what we consider senior securities exchanges 
or most foreign exchanges (a Non-Venture Exchange). Some of the reasons for the 
current delineation between venture and non-venture issuers were stability and 
transparency.” [p.4] 
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Western NMREB Approval Certificate 
 
 
 
Date: 7 December 2018 
 
To: Professor Christopher Nicholls 
 
Project ID: 112912 
 
Study Title: Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public Markets in Canada? Assessing the Factors Impacting Decisions 
by Corporate Leaders to Avoid Canadian Public Listings 
 
Application Type: NMREB Initial Application 
 
Review Type: Delegated 
 
Full Board Reporting Date: January 11 2019 
 
Date Approval Issued: 07/Dec/2018 
 
REB Approval Expiry Date: 07/Dec/2019 
 
 
 
Dear Professor Christopher Nicholls 
 
The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) has reviewed and approved the WREM application form for 
the above mentioned study, as of the date noted above. NMREB approval for this study remains valid until the expiry date noted 
above, conditional to timely submission and acceptance of NMREB Continuing Ethics Review. 
 
This research study is to be conducted by the investigator noted above. All other required institutional approvals must also be 
obtained prior to the conduct of the study. 
 
Documents Approved: 
 
Document Name Document Type Document Document 
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Conference Table Poster-Main Study Recruitment Materials 05/Dec/2018 5 Dec 18  
Email Recruitment Script- Preliminary Study Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018 2  
Email Recruitment Script-Main Study Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018 2  
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Semi-Structured Intervew Guide Interview Guide 05/Dec/2018 5 Dec 18  
Survey Protocol - Research Plan. Final Protocol 16/Nov/2018 2  
Verbal Recruitment Script-Main Study Oral Script 16/Nov/2018 2  
Screening Question Excerpts Screening Form/Questionnaire 16/Nov/2018 2 
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Kelly Patterson, Research Ethics Officer on behalf of Dr. Riley Hinson, NMREB Vice-Chair 
 
Note: This correspondence includes an electronic signature (validation and approval via an online system that is 
compliant with all regulations). 
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Appendix 5 
Online Survey Format- Main Survey 
 
QUESTION 1- Project Title:   
Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public Markets in 
Canada?  Assessing the Factors Impacting Decisions by Corporate Leaders to 
Avoid Canadian Public Listings   
 
Principal Investigator: Christopher Nicholls 
 W. Geoff Beattie Chair in Corporate Law, Western University, Faculty of Law 
 Email: [redacted] 
 Phone: [redacted] 
 
 Co-Investigator: L. Daniel Wilson, JD, LLM, PhD (Candidate) 
 Doctoral Graduate Student, Western University, Faculty of Law 
 Email: [redacted] 
 Cell Phone: [redacted] 
 Office: [redacted]  
 
Letter of Information & Consent 
 
Introduction: 
You are being invited to participate in this research study concerning the factors 
contributing to operating public company decline in Canada because of your experience 
and knowledge as either a senior business decision-maker or a public markets 
influencer. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information required for you to 
make an informed decision regarding participation in this research. 
   
Purpose of the Study: 
The purpose of this study is to address a significant gap in the existing academic 
knowledge on the factors contributing to operating public company decline in 
Canada.  The study will seek to establish which of the various potential factors 
suggested as contributing to operating public company decline are indeed the most 
significant for business decision-makers in Canada and public markets influencers. 
   
Procedures and Duration: 
This study is restricted to individuals who currently live in Canada and work for 
Canadian-based businesses.  Two different groups of people are eligible to participate in 
the study: (i) Senior Business Decision-Makers and (ii) Public Markets Influencers. 
 
Senior Business Decision-Makers include C-suite executives, directors and controlling 
shareholders of public companies, private companies that are eligible to pursue an IPO 
on the TSX and private companies that have completed a going-private 
transaction.  Public Markets Influencers in this study include corporate/securities 
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lawyers, auditors/accountants, investment bankers, private equity investors and 
securities regulators/stock exchange employees.   
   
The first group of questions in the survey confirm your eligibility and ask limited 
questions on your vocation to gather information enabling us to properly categorize you 
within the various classes of sub-group participants. The second group of questions in 
the survey ask how you feel about pursuing public company status and being involved in 
a company public company on an ongoing basis. 
   
Potential Risks and Discomforts:  
There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts associated with participating in 
this study. 
   
Benefits:  
No financial remuneration is being offered for completion of the survey.  You may not 
directly benefit from participating in this study, but information gathered is expected to 
provide benefits to society as a whole in terms of understanding which factors are most 
important in the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada and what can be 
done from a regulatory reform perspective to combat that decline. 
   
Participation and Withdrawal: 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer 
any questions, or quit the online survey at any time with no effect on you 
whatsoever. Participants will be able to withdraw their participation and have their data 
removed prior to completion of the survey.  After completion of the survey, it is 
impractical to remove individual responses. Since no data are being collected to identify 
participants, it is impossible to scrub individual data as responses cannot be tracked to 
specific individuals. 
   
Confidentiality: 
We have designed this study to provide the highest level of confidentiality and 
anonymity.  No personal identifying personal information beyond the special eligibility 
questions contained in the survey will be collected or recorded anywhere in the survey 
process.   
   
Your study information will be combined with information from other people taking part in 
the study. The researcher will keep all data obtained in the study in a secure and 
confidential location for 7 years, at which point it will be confidentially destroyed.  
  
The results of the study will be included and analyzed in the Principal Investigator’s PhD 
Dissertation and may be included in follow-on publications or presentations.  If the 
results are published, no information that you provide that could reasonably be expected 
to allow others to realistically make guesses as to your identity will be included in the 
publication. 
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Representatives of the University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics 
Board may require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the 
research. 
   
Compensation for Participation: 
You will not be compensated for your participation in this study. 
   
Rights of Research Participants: 
If you choose not to participate or to leave the study at any time it will have no effect on 
you in any way.  You do not waive any legal right by consenting to participate. 
 
Who to Contact with Questions:   
If you require any further information regarding this research project or your participation 
in the study you may contact the Principal Investigator, Christopher Nicholls, Western 
University, Faculty of Law, at [redacted] or via email [redacted] or the Co-Investigator, L. 
Daniel Wilson at [redacted] or via email at [redacted].  If you have any questions about 
your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this study, you may contact The 
Office of Human Research Ethics [redacted] or [redacted], email: [redacted]  
 
If you would like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please contact Chris 
Nicholls or L. Daniel Wilson at the email addresses shown above. 
 
CONSENT 
Completion of this survey is indication of your consent to participate. 
   
If you would like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please contact L. Daniel 
Wilson at the email address shown above. 
   
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. Please print it now or contact the 
Principal Investigator or Co-Investigator for a copy. 
    
I agree I have read the Letter of Information, have had any all questions answered, 
and consent to participate. 
O Yes 
O No 
 
Skip To: End of Survey If Project Title:  Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public 
Markets in Canada?  Assessing... = No 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 2- Welcome to the Survey on Factors Influencing the Going Public / 
Staying Private Decision in Canadian Business! 
  
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey.        
In the past decade the number of operating companies in Canada choosing to access 
the public markets has decreased significantly.  In fact, the number of operating public 
companies listed on the TSX has declined by nearly 1/3 since the start of 
2008.  Maintaining the health of public markets is an important issue for the Canadian 
economy.  Obtaining your input as corporate decision-makers and public markets 
influencers will be valuable in instructing future policy initiatives.        
 
Your participation in this survey is essential in allowing us to make the proper 
analysis and recommendations.   
 
We realize that your time is very valuable and we have kept this survey as streamlined 
as possible to minimize the time required to respond.    
 
However, it will take an estimated fifteen minutes to complete this survey in full.      
 
If you get disrupted during the process, you can stop the survey at any time and 
complete at a later time.  You have the option not to answer any question in the 
survey.   For questions that are mandatory for validation of survey eligibility, declining to 
answer may prevent your survey from being valid for the purposes of analysis.  You will 
be notified during the course of the survey if this is the case.    
 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 3- Target Survey Participants:  This survey seeks input from two main 
groups of individuals whose opinions and perceptions are critical to study of factors 
contributing to the decline of the number of operating public companies in Canada: 
   
Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers, including: 
• C-suite Executives (Executive Chairperson, Chief Executive Office, 
President, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer or other senior 
officer titles with equivalent decision-making responsibility);   
• Corporate Directors; and  
• Major Shareholders (shareholders holding at least 20% of the voting equity 
of a company)    
Group II- Public Markets Influencers, including: 
• Corporate and Securities Lawyers   
• Accountants and Auditors   
• Investment Bankers   
• Private Equity Investors        
•  
Which of the two major categories of individuals listed above (Group I or Group 
II) do you fit into?    (Note: If you fit into both Group I and Group II, please select the 
category that you consider to be your principal occupation.) 
O  Group I: Senior Business Decision-Maker   
O  Group II: Public Markets Influencer   
O   None of the Above   
O   I Choose Not to Answer   
Skip To: Q14 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number 
of operating... = Group II: Public Markets Influencer 
Skip To: Q25 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number 
of operating... = None of the Above 
Skip To: Q26 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number 
of operating... = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
QUESTION 4- Of the three types of Senior Business Decision-Makers discussed 
outline in the previous question, which describes you?   (Note: If more than one 
applies, select each category that is accurate.) 
O C-Suite Executive  
O Corporation Director   
O Major Shareholder   
O None of the above    
Skip To: Q25 If Of the three types of Senior Business Decision-Makers discussed outline in the 
previous question,... = None of the above 
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Page Break  
QUESTION 5- You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker.  Before going 
further, we need to confirm a couple of quick survey eligibility questions.   
    
First, please note that this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who 
currently live in Canada and work for Canadian-based companies.  A Canadian-based 
company is a company with its headquarters in Canada that is not a subsidiary of a 
foreign company.    
    
Do you live in Canada and work for a Canadian-based company? 
O Yes    
O No    
O I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker.  Before going further, we 
need to confirm... = No 
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker.  Before going further, we 
need to confirm... = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 6- Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers 
who work with operating companies as defined below.     "Operating Company"- 
An operating company is a business that directly produces a product or delivers a 
service to customers, or else owns a subsidiary that directly produces a product or 
delivers a service to customers.  Note:  Mutual Funds, ETF's and REITS are not 
considered operating companies. 
  
 Is your company an Operating Company? 
O Yes   
O No    
O I Choose Not to Answer 
Skip To: Q25 If Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who work with 
operating companies... = No 
Skip To: Q26 If Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who work with 
operating companies... = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 7- What is the approximate size of your company based on employee 
count and total revenue? 
 
A.  Employees (including full-time contract personnel) 
O Less than 25   
O Between 25 and 50   
O Between 50 and 100   
O Between 100 and 250   
O Between 250 and 500   
O More than 500   
O I choose not to answer this question  
 
 
 
QUESTION 8- B. Total Annual Revenue 
O Less than $10 million   
O Between $10 million and $25 million 
O Between $25 million and $50 million   
O Between $50 million and $100 million   
O Between $100 million and $250 million   
O Between $250 million and $500 million   
O Between $500 million and $1 billion   
O More than $1 billion   
O I choose not to answer this question   
 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 9- For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need 
to come from one the following three different types of operating Canadian 
companies:     
• Private companies that have never been public.   
• Private companies that were previously listed on the TSX, but have completed a 
going-private transaction in the past ten years.   
• Public companies currently listed on the TSX.    
 Which of these categories describes your company?    
O Public operating company currently listed on the TSX.  
O Private operating company that has never been public.  
O Private company previously traded on the TSX which has gone private.  
O None of the above.  
O I Choose Not to Answer.  
Skip To: Q25 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from 
one the following thre... = None of the above 
Skip To: Q11 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from 
one the following thre... = Private operating company that has never been public. 
Skip To: Q13 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from 
one the following thre... = Private company previously traded on the TSX which has gone private 
Skip To: Q26 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from 
one the following thre... = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
QUESTION 10- You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker of 
a TSX-listed company. Has your public company considered going private? 
O No, we are satisfied remaining as a public company.   
O Yes, we have considered going private and decided not to.  
O Yes, we have considered going private and no final decision has been made.  
O Yes, we plan to go private a future time.  
O I choose not to answer this question. 
 
Skip To: Q13 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker of a TSX-
listed company. Has you...(Yes, we have considered going private and no final decision has been 
made.) Is Displayed 
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QUESTION 11- You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in 
a private operating company.    
  
We would like to confirm one final eligibility criteria for participation in this survey, namely 
the size and stage of development of your company.  We are looking for Senior 
Decision-Makers of private companies that are are of a sufficient size and stage of 
development that they would be eligible to pursue a TSX listing if they chose to.    
  
Does your private operating company meet all the criteria in at least one of the 
following categories? 
  
 Category A- Profitable Companies      
• Minimum of $10,000,000 in annual revenue;    
• Minimum of $2,000,000 in pre-tax cash flow; and    
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $10,000,000. 
Category B- Technology Companies and R&D Companies Not Yet Profitable    
• Company owns proprietary technology that is close to being ready 
for commercialization or is already at the commercialization stage;  
• Company has at least two years of development history in developing its 
technology;    
• Company has spent a minimum of $5,000,000 in developing its technology to 
date; and    
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000. 
Category C- Resource Companies Not Yet Profitable      
• Company owns a resource property which is already in production or else has an 
independent technical report confirming commerciality;    
• Company has spent at least $5,000,0000 on the acquisition and development of 
the property; and    
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.    
 
My private operating company meets all of the criteria of at least one category 
listed above. 
   O Yes 
O No 
O I Choose Not to Answer 
Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private 
operating company. ... = No 
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private 
operating company. ... = I Choose Not to Answer 
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Page Break  
QUESTION 12- Has your private company considered going public? Select the 
answer that best applies: 
O No, we have not yet considered going public.  
O Yes, we have considered going public and decided not to.  
O Yes, we have considered going public and no final decision has been made.  
O Yes, we plan to go public.  
O I choose not to answer this question  
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 13- Which industry category most accurately describes your 
company’s main business?  
 
 (Note:  If more than one applies, select each applicable category.) 
 
O Agricultural  
O Chemicals  
O Computers & Information Technology   
O Construction  
O Education 
O Energy 
O Entertainment  
O Food Services  
 
O Health Care  
O Hospitality   
O Manufacturing    
O Media   
O Mining  
O Transport 
O Other (Please specify below)   
_________________________________ 
Skip To: Q16 If Q13 Is Displayed 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 14- You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer.   
    
Our survey is limited to individuals currently living and working in Canada.   
    
Do you currently live and work in Canada? 
O Yes 
O No 
O Choose Not to Answer  
Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer.   Our survey is 
limited to individua... = No 
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer.   Our survey is 
limited to individua... = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 15- Which group of public markets influencer do you fit in? 
O Corporate and/or Securities Lawyer  
O Accountant and/or Auditor 
O Investment Banker 
O Private Equity Investor 
O I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Skip To: Q26 If Which group of public markets influencer do you fit in? = I Choose Not to Answer 
 
Page Break  
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Question 16- 
How do you feel about each of the following statements? 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Taking a company public offers more long-
term advantages than disadvantages. 
 
     
Companies should consider an IPO to finance 
growth only when private equity funding is not 
readily available. 
 
     
Technological advancements making public 
company information more readily accessible 
have made it harder for public companies to 
compete with private companies.  
 
     
Private equity financing to fund company 
growth in Canada is significantly easier to 
access now than it used to be. 
 
     
The rapid pace of technological change has 
made it more attractive for private companies 
to sell out to huge corporations rather than 
purse their own IPO.  
 
     
The decline in IPO volume is primarily 
attributable to the increased availability of 
private equity as an alternative.  
 
     
Securities regulators in Canada have been too 
aggressive in protecting public shareholder 
interests at the expense of public companies. 
     
  
441 
 
QUESTION 17-  
The decline in the number of operating public companies listed on the TSX over 
the past number of years is significant, and a similar trend has been observed in 
the public markets of the U.S., Europe and Australia. 
  
 Why do you think fewer senior business decision-makers are choosing to take 
their companies public?  
   
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 18-  
Imagine that you are the key decision-maker in ABC Inc., a highly 
successful private company based in Canada that now needs to access 
significant equity capital in order to finance its ambitious international 
expansion plans.    
  
In answering the questions, please draw on the knowledge and beliefs that 
you have gained through your real-life experiences. 
 
A very short background on ABC's status is as follows: 
 
• ABC has been repeatedly approached by several investment banks offering 
to raise the necessary funds by sponsoring ABC in a TSX IPO. 
  
• ABC has also been repeatedly approached by several private equity 
firms offering to give ABC the necessary funds by investing in ABC 
privately. 
 
The entire management team of ABC is waiting for you to decide whether ABC will 
pursue an IPO or take investment from private equity.  The strategy decision that 
will define the future of ABC is yours alone! 
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 Extremely 
Unlikely 
1 2 
Neutral 
3 4 
Extremely 
Likely 
5 
How likely are you to 
recommend the IPO option 
as ABC's preferred course of 
action? 
 
     
How likely are you 
to recommend the private 
equity option as ABC's 
preferred course of action? 
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QUESTION 19 
 
How much would the pre-money valuation premium offered to ABC by an investment 
bank with respect to an IPO transaction need to exceed the pre-money valuation offered 
to ABC with respect to a private equity transaction in order to make the two 
alternatives equally attractive to you?      
 
O The IPO transaction is equally attractive without any premium 
O I don't have an opinion on this question 
O The IPO transaction would need to be at a premium of the following percentage to 
be equally attractive:  
 
________________________________________% 
 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 20 
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the 
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your 
analysis? 
 
 Not at All 
Important 
1 2 
Moderately 
Important 
3 4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
The time required to complete an IPO 
      
The management effort required to complete an 
IPO 
 
     
The cost that it takes to complete an IPO 
      
Executive compensation disclosure of public 
companies being overly invasive for management 
 
     
Running a public company creating too many 
distractions for management 
 
     
The complexity of continuous disclosure 
obligations arising from regulatory changes 
 
     
The increased cost of continuous disclosure 
obligations due to regulatory changes 
 
     
The requirement to file insider reports so that 
everyone is aware of management trading 
activities 
 
     
The increased litigation risk associated with being 
public 
 
     
Concern the company will be able to generate 
sufficient trading volume to keep shareholders 
happy 
 
     
Concern as to ability of company to maintain 
sufficient analyst coverage 
 
     
444 
 
QUESTION 20 
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the 
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your 
analysis? 
 
 Not at All 
Important 
1 2 
Moderately 
Important 
3 4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
Belief that the current regulatory environment 
favors minority investor protection above the 
interest of the public company 
 
     
The hassle of dealing with proxy advisory firms 
      
Fear that special interest groups will use public 
status to exert pressure on the company to adopt 
their agendas 
 
     
The hassle of short-term traders looking for quick 
profits 
 
     
The challenges of competing against private 
companies that don't have to disclose any secrets 
 
     
Challenges for public companies to complete 
acquisitions efficiently due to Business Acquisition 
Report requirements 
 
     
The requirement of financial statement 
certifications by senior executives 
 
     
Concern that being public leaves too little time for 
management to focus on the core business of the 
company 
 
     
Inability in a public company to keep personal 
income and shareholdings secret from family, 
friends and acquaintances. 
 
     
Increased risk to personal reputation being 
associated with a public company if things go bad 
 
     
The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets  
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QUESTION 20 
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the 
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your 
analysis? 
 
 Not at All 
Important 
1 2 
Moderately 
Important 
3 4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
Restrictions resulting from public conflict-of-interest 
regulations for related party transactions 
 
     
Redundancy of filing requirements for public 
companies 
 
     
An increase in short-sellers in the public markets 
      
The risk of proxy battles initiated by activist 
shareholder groups 
 
     
Having to listen and respond to the opinions of 
uninformed shareholders 
 
     
The requirement to adopt corporate governance 
best practices that are continuously evolving 
 
     
Risk of a hostile take-over 
      
Overall fatigue arising from being a senior 
executive in a public company 
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QUESTION 21 
In making your decision on the future direction of 
ABC, how important are each of the following 
potential upside benefits associated with pursuing 
the TSX IPO in your analysis? 
 
Not at All 
Important
1 2 
Moderately 
Important 
3 4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
Higher pre-money valuation in an IPO than in a private 
equity financing 
 
     
Anticipated higher valuation post-IPO 
      
Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings 
      
Easier ability to use public stock as currency for future 
acquisitions 
 
     
Opportunity for founding shareholders to obtain 
liquidity for a portion of their investment 
 
     
Increased ability to use stock options to recruit and 
retain key employees 
 
     
Ability for the largest shareholders to keep stronger 
management control of ABC as a public company 
 
     
Increased public visibility as a public company with 
potential customers  
 
     
Enhanced credibility as a public company with 
suppliers  
 
     
You look forward to the challenges associated with 
managing a public company 
  
     
 
Enhanced credibility with potential investors 
 
     
Opportunity to increase your personal profile as a 
leader of a public company 
 
     
Opportunity to increase effective voting control by 
diluting minority shareholder positions 
 
     
Opportunity to grow the business further rather than 
selling to a third party 
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QUESTION 22- Please help us understand your professional background better.  
 
Please move the sliding scales to reflect the correct number.  (Note: If you have 
more than 30 years’ experience, choose "30") 
 
 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
 
Total number of years work experience  
 
Number of years working at the 
company / firm where currently 
employed  
 
Number of years working for or advising 
public companies   
Number of years working for or advising 
private companies  
 
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 23- In which province or territory do you currently work? 
O  British Columbia 
O  Alberta 
O  Saskatchewan 
O  Manitoba 
O  Ontario 
O  Quebec 
O  New Brunswick 
O  Prince Edward Island 
O  Nova Scotia 
O  Newfoundland 
O  Yukon, Northwest Territories or 
Nunavat 
 
 
 
Page Break  
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QUESTION 24- Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey.  It 
is greatly appreciated!   
    
From your knowledge and experiences, do you have any final thoughts that you 
would like to share with us on the topic of public company decline in Canada, the 
content or format of this survey or anything else that you would like to convey? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skip To: End of Survey If Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey.  It is 
greatly appreciated!   From... Is Displayed 
 
Page Break  
 
QUESTION 25- We are sorry!  Based on your responses, you appear to be outside of 
the specific sub-groups that we are targeting for this survey.  If you made an input 
mistake, you can hit “go back” and correct the mistake that led you to this screen. 
Otherwise, thank you for your time in engaging with the survey to this point, 
which is greatly appreciated! 
 
Skip To: End of Survey If We are sorry!  Based on your responses, you appear to be outside of 
the specific sub-groups that...() Is Displayed 
 
Page Break  
 
Q26 You have selected "I Choose Not to Answer" on a question that is mission 
critical for us to have an answer in order to use your contribution in our survey 
analysis.  
  
 You have the complete freedom to do so and we fully respect your decision!  
  
 However, we cannot use your input for this survey without knowing that you meet our 
target criteria.  
 If you wish to participate further, you can select "Go Back" from this screen and 
complete the question.  
  
 Otherwise, thank you taking for the time to participate in this survey. 
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Appendix 6- 
MANCOVA CALCULATIONS, 
 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TABLES 
 
Introduction to MANCOVA Analysis  
As discussed in the body of the Dissertation, the use of MANCOVA analysis for Likert-scale 
data is not universally embraced amongst statisticians coming from the “traditionalist” camp of 
statistical analysis and, therefore, the use of MANCOVA calculations for analysis of the PCD 
Study data has been consolidated in this Appendix.  The MANCOVA calculations are helpful in 
attaining a high-level overview of the variability in responses attributable to demographic 
characteristics without resorting to the volumes of data generated by the PCD Study data. 
In the ensuing MANCOVA analysis, five different sets of independent variables were defined 
and assessed, all of which are defined by demographic characterstics of the PCD Study 
respondents.  These five different independent variables were selected based on an assessment of 
which specific demographic factors were thought most likely to be responsible for material 
variation in the responses to the critical PCD Study Likert-scale survey questions.  The five 
independent variables tested under the MANCOVA analysis include: 
1. Group I (Senior Business Decision-Makers) vs. Group II (Public Markets 
Influencers); 
2. Senior Business Decision-Makers of SME Companies vs. Non-SME Companies; 
3. Senior Business Decision-Makers of TSX-listed Companies vs. Private TSX-Eligible 
Companies; 
4. Group II Public Markets Influencers (Lawyers vs. Auditors/Accountants vs. iBankers 
vs. Private Equity Investors); and 
5. All Six Major Demographics Groups (Senior Business Decision-Makers of TSX-
listed Companies vs. Private TSX-Eligible Companies Lawyers vs. Auditors / 
Accountants vs. iBankers vs. Private Equity Investors). 
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The specific dependent variables utilized in the MANCOVA calculations were selected based on 
what were considered as the most important and enlightening quantitative questions in the PCD 
Study: ie., Question 16, Question 18, Question 20 and Question 21.  The qualitative questions 
(Question 17 and Question 24) cannot be analyzed effectively using MANCOVA calculations.  
Question 19 was excluded due to the non-response issues and the other specific limiting factors 
associated with Question 19 discussed in the body of the Dissertation. 
The covariates utilized in the MANCOVA calculations are those specific confounding variables 
for which we seek to remove their impact in order to then focus on the variation specifically 
attributable to the independent variables.  In the MANCOVA analysis of the PCD Study data, 
four different covariates were used throughout the analysis: ie., industry, geography, public 
company experience and total career experience.  A fifth covariate, SME vs. Non-SME status, 
was used as a covariate only for the MANCOVA calculations in which the independent variable 
was TSX-listed companies vs. Private TSX-eligible companies, since it does not apply to the 
other independent variables.   
All covariates found to be insignificant in the initial MANCOVA calculations were removed, 
with the MANCOVA calculation re-run a second time in order to increase the degrees of 
freedom (ie., to increase the power of the MANCOVA test).  If a particular covariate was 
marginally significant in the first MANCOVA test, but determined to be insignificant in the 
second MANCOVA calculation once other insignificant covariates were removed, then the 
MANCOVA test was run a third time to ensure that only significant covariates (ie., covariates 
with a P-value below 0.05) were included in the final analysis.  To prevent this Appendix 6 from 
being any longer than necessary, only the final MANCOVA calculations are included. 
All MANCOVA calculations were completed utilizing the open-source R software program. R 
runs the four common MANCOVA tests: Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace and 
Roy’s Largest Root.  Pillai’s Trace is considered to be the most robust of the four MANCOVA 
tests for departures from the MANCOVA assumptions, particularly for violations of the 
assumption that there are equal numbers of responses in the within-cell covariance matrix (equal 
number of Group 1 and Prairies, as Group 2 and BC, as Group 1 and BC, as Group 2 and 
Prairies, etc.).  
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When the dependent variable consists of two categories (ex., Group I v Group II or SME v Non-
SME), then all four MANCOVA test statistics will give the same results. When the independent 
variable contains more than two categories (as occurs with our fourth and fifth set of 
MANCOVA tests), Pillai’s Trace is considered as the least powerful of the tests.  In certain 
instances (which in our particular calcuations only occurred with respect to the MANCOVA 
calculation where the six major demographic groups were used as our independent variable), 
complexity of the calculation results in irreconcilable errors for certain of the MANCOVA tests 
and only Roy’s Largest Root calculations can be completed. 
It should be noted that the picture graphs included in the ensuing MANCOVA analysis are 
simple summary tables that do not show the effect of removal of the covariates.  These picture 
graphs simply show the mean response for the particular dependent variable element, with 
confidence interval bars demonstrating the upper and lower parameters of the 95% confidence 
interval.  The picture graphs are limited to those dependent variable elements calculated as being 
significant.  The actual MANCOVA calculations, including the effect of removal of the 
covariates, are included after the MANCOVA picture graphs in each instance. 
For the purposes of the MANCOVA calculations, a single confidence level has been used in 
determining what is statistically significant in predicting variations.  In all of the MANCOVA 
caclulations, statistical outputs with a P-Value below 0.05 (representing a 95% confidence level) 
have been determined to be significant.  Those covariates with a P-Value above 0.05 have been 
classified as insignificant and eliminated from the MANCOVA cacluations.  Note that this is a 
different P-value for minimum significance than the P-Value of 0.10 that was applied in the 
ordinal-specific statistical tests in the analysis portion of the body of the Dissertation.  The lower 
minimum P-value of 0.05 is considered appropriate here because of the limited application of the 
MANCOVA tests for summary purposes in this Appendix 6. 
Although only a single confidence level of 95% has been used in determining significance, 
materially lower P-Values (leading to correspondingly higher confidence levels) are recognized 
and denoted throughout the ensuing tables, with a notation of “*” indicating a P-Value between 
0.05 and 0.01, a notation of “**” indicating a P-Value between 0.01 and 0.001, and a notation of 
“***” indicating a P-Value lower than 0.001.  In other words, the more stars, the higher the 
confidence level assoicated with the statistical output.  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
Three of the four covariates tested are determined to be significant in the first MANCVOA 
calculation.   
After re-running the MANCOVA tests and factoring away the impact of the three significant 
covariates, we observe a significant difference remaining between Group I and Group II 
participants in the responses to the following three sub-questions within Question 16: Q16-2, 
Q16-4 and Q16-7.  
 
 
  
453 
 
 
 
MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
    value      F         df1            df2             p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-  
Independent Variable: 
   Group I v. Group II       
            Pillai's Trace         0.1112     4.95       7     277     < .001  ***  
            Wilks' Lambda           0.889     4.95       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1251     4.95       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1251     4.95       7     277     < .001   *** 
 
Significant Covariates                                                                       
   Industry     
 Pillai's Trace         0.0961     4.21       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.904     4.21       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1063     4.21       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1063     4.21       7     277     < .001   ***                                                           
  Geography      
 Pillai's Trace         0.0579     2.43       7     277      0.020   * 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.942     2.43       7     277      0.020   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0615     2.43       7     277      0.020   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0615     2.43       7     277      0.020   *                                                                     
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1114     4.96       7     277     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.889     4.96       7     277     < .001   ***   
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1254     4.96       7     277    < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1254     4.96       7     277    < .001   *** 
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: Insignificant covariate removed in calculation is Total Career Experience (p=0.378) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Dependent Variable         Sum of Squares         df     Mean Square         F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   Group I v. Group II            
                Q16_1                         1.73593       1        1.73593       1.92111      0.167    
                Q16_2                        10.40564       1       10.40564      7.96389      0.005   ** 
                Q16_3                         2.20008       1        2.20008       2.30181      0.130    
                Q16_4                        16.29854       1       16.29854      14.78220     < .001    *** 
                Q16_5                        6.89e-4       1        6.89e-4       6.59e-4      0.980    
                Q16_6                         3.99717       1        3.99717       3.67236      0.056    
                Q16_7                        13.17858      1       13.17858      10.26870       0.002    ** 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Industry          
 Q16_1                      4.45661       1        4.45661       4.93202      0.027    * 
                Q16_2                         4.46369       1        4.46369       3.41626     0.066    
                Q16_3                         0.08561       1        0.08561       0.08957      0.765    
                Q16_4                         7.80375       1        7.80375       7.07772      0.008    ** 
                Q16_5                         2.24713       1        2.24713       2.14988      0.144    
                Q16_6                        23.21538     1       23.21538      21.32888    < .001    *** 
                Q16_7                        0.03590       1        0.03590       0.02797      0.867    
   
 Geography          
 Q16_1                         1.79472       1        1.79472       1.98617      0.160    
                Q16_2                         0.04698       1        0.04698       0.03595      0.850    
                Q16_3                         0.00224       1        0.00224       0.00235      0.961    
                Q16_4                         0.26230       1        0.26230       0.23790      0.626    
                Q16_5                         5.08e-4       1        5.08e-4       4.86e-4      0.982    
                Q16_6                         5.81406       1        5.81406      5.34160      0.022    * 
                Q16_7                        12.08519       1       12.08519       9.41674      0.002    ** 
    
Pubco Experience        
 Q16_1                        10.94436       1       10.94436      12.11184    < .001    *** 
                Q16_2                         5.92613       1        5.92613       4.53552      0.034    * 
                Q16_3                        10.32984       1       10.32984      10.80745     0.001    ** 
                Q16_4                        4.01871       1        4.01871       3.64483      0.057    
                Q16_5                         1.72714       1        1.72714       1.65239      0.200    
                Q16_6                         3.10571       1        3.10571       2.85334      0.092    
                Q16_7                         0.47449       1        0.47449       0.36972      0.544    
  
Residuals     
 Q16_1                       255.72115     283        0.90361                          
                Q16_2                       369.76866     283        1.30660                          
                Q16_3                       270.49334     283        0.95581                          
                Q16_4                       312.02990     283        1.10258                          
                Q16_5                       295.80231     283        1.04524                          
                Q16_6                       308.03087     283        1.08845                          
                Q16_7                       363.19459     283        1.28337                        
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1B 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
Running the MANCOVA tests the first time, we observe that the  Group I and Group II 
dichotomy is not significant as a predictor of variation in Question 18.   As such, we can 
conclude that the factor of respondents being Senior Business Decision-makers vs. Public 
Markets Influencers is not a significant predictor of difference in the responses to Question 18. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- 
Independent Variable   
 Group I v. Group II        
            Pillai's Trace         9.48e-4      0.133       2     280      0.876    
            Wilks' Lambda            0.999      0.133       2     280      0.876    
            Hotelling's Trace      9.49e-4      0.133       2     280      0.876    
            Roy's Largest Root     9.49e-4      0.133       2     280      0.876    
  
Covariates                                                                             
   Industry      
            Pillai's Trace          0.0332      4.804       2     280      0.009   ** 
            Wilks' Lambda            0.967      4.804       2     280      0.009   ** 
            Hotelling's Trace       0.0343      4.804       2     280      0.009   ** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0343      4.804       2     280      0.009   ** 
                                                                               
   Geography      
            Pillai's Trace          0.0120      1.706       2     280      0.183    
            Wilks' Lambda            0.988      1.706       2     280      0.183    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.0122      1.706       2     280      0.183    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.0122      1.706       2     280      0.183    
                                                                               
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace          0.0959     14.856       2     280     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda            0.904     14.856       2     280     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace       0.1061     14.856       2     280     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root      0.1061     14.856       2     280     < .001   *** 
                                                                               
   Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace          0.0175      2.500       2     280      0.084    
            Wilks' Lambda            0.982      2.500       2     280      0.084    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.0179      2.500       2     280      0.084    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.0179      2.500       2     280      0.084      
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:   GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary:  
Our first MANCOVA calculation discloses that all four covariates tested are significant.  After 
factoring away the impact of the four significant covariates, we observe a significant difference 
remaining in the responses to the following seven factors tested in Question 20. As such, we 
conclude that the Group I v. Group II dichotomy is a significant factor in predicting variability in 
these seven different downside factors associated with being a public company. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:    GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:         QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- 
Independent Variable 
  Group I v. Group II        
            Pillai's Trace         0.224     2.31      31     248    < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.776     2.31      31     248     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.289     2.31      31     248     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.289     2.31      31     248     < .001   *** 
                                                                           
Significant Covariates  
   Industry      
            Pillai's Trace         0.179     1.75      31     248      0.011   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.821     1.75      31     248      0.011   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.218     1.75      31     248      0.011   * 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.218     1.75      31     248      0.011   * 
                                                                           
   Geography      
            Pillai's Trace         0.162     1.55      31     248      0.037   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.838     1.55      31     248      0.037   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.194     1.55      31     248      0.037   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.194     1.55      31     248      0.037   * 
                                                                           
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.247     2.62      31     248     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.753     2.62      31     248     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.328     2.62      31     248     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.328     2.62      31     248     < .001   *** 
                                                                           
   Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.160     1.52      31     248      0.044   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.840     1.52      31     248      0.044   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.190     1.52      31     248      0.044   * 
            Roy's Largest Root   0.190     1.52      31     248      0.044   * 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Dependent Variable         Sum of Squares         df     Mean Square         F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────   
Group I v. Group II         
                Q20_1                         1.45698       1        1.45698      1.27093      0.261    
                Q20_2                         0.45037       1        0.45037      0.37009      0.543    
                Q20_3                         0.10005       1        0.10005      0.09385      0.760    
                Q20_4                         2.57584       1        2.57584      1.95433      0.163    
                Q20_5                         0.52573       1        0.52573      0.58684      0.444    
                Q20_6                         0.13158       1        0.13158      0.13143      0.717    
                Q20_7                         3.73310       1        3.73310      4.43397      0.036   * 
                Q20_8                         3.94457       1        3.94457      3.09868      0.079    
                Q20_9                        10.72663       1       10.72663      9.73361     0.002   ** 
                Q20_10                        1.57650       1        1.57650      1.27814      0.259    
                Q20_11                        0.54470       1        0.54470      0.44988      0.503    
                Q20_12                       12.69203       1       12.69203     10.52165     0.001   ** 
                Q20_13                        5.64753       1        5.64753      4.31119      0.039   * 
                Q20_14                       0.04917       1        0.04917      0.03975      0.842    
                Q20_15                        0.14022       1        0.14022      0.11087      0.739    
                Q20_16                        0.93085       1        0.93085      0.64498      0.423    
                Q20_17                        3.01770       1        3.01770      2.56550      0.110    
                Q20_18                        3.34903       1        3.34903      2.60475      0.108    
                Q20_19                        0.00619       1        0.00619      0.00564      0.940    
                Q20_20                        2.05824       1        2.05824      1.54305      0.215    
                Q20_21                        2.01050       1        2.01050      1.33898      0.248    
                Q20_22                        7.62979       1        7.62979      7.74973      0.006   ** 
                Q20_23                        0.70652       1        0.70652      0.61744      0.433    
                Q20_24                        2.29899       1        2.29899      1.72726      0.190    
                Q20_25                        0.25081       1        0.25081      0.22223      0.638    
                Q20_26                        1.42e-5       1        1.42e-5       1.30e-5      0.997    
                Q20_27                        8.06576       1        8.06576      5.74735      0.017   * 
                Q20_28                        7.00741       1        7.00741      5.17162      0.024   * 
                Q20_29                        3.17823       1        3.17823      2.57723      0.110    
                Q20_30                        1.03876       1        1.03876      0.75299      0.386    
                Q20_31                        0.59007       1        0.59007      0.44562      0.505    
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Industry          
  Q20_1                         0.51063       1        0.51063      0.44542      0.505    
                Q20_2                        10.18230      1       10.18230      8.36731      0.004   ** 
                Q20_3                        0.78689       1        0.78689      0.73812      0.391    
                Q20_4                        5.53749       1        5.53749      4.20138      0.041    
                Q20_5                         0.07347       1        0.07347      0.08201      0.775    
                Q20_6                        10.10383       1       10.10383     10.09244    0.002   ** 
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                Q20_7                        4.49059       1        4.49059      5.33368      0.022   * 
                Q20_8                        12.94232       1       12.94232     10.16691     0.002   ** 
                Q20_9                        4.80935       1        4.80935      4.36412      0.038   * 
                Q20_10                        0.37948       1        0.37948      0.30766      0.580    
                Q20_11                        8.96311       1        8.96311      7.40279      0.007   ** 
                Q20_12                        0.11900       1        0.11900      0.09865      0.754    
                Q20_13                        1.51791       1        1.51791      1.15874      0.283    
                Q20_14                        0.80889       1        0.80889      0.65388      0.419    
                Q20_15                        3.74150       1        3.74150      2.95841      0.087    
                Q20_16                        3.64678       1        3.64678      2.52685      0.113  
                Q20_17                        5.59563       1        5.59563      4.75713      0.030   * 
                Q20_18                        7.68443       1        7.68443      5.97667      0.015   * 
                Q20_19                        0.20780       1        0.20780      0.18937      0.664    
                Q20_20                        8.96311       1        8.96311      6.71958      0.010   * 
                Q20_21                        0.52838       1        0.52838      0.35190      0.554    
                Q20_22                        3.74150       1        3.74150      3.80032      0.052    
                Q20_23                        3.64678       1        3.64678      3.18702      0.075    
                Q20_24                        0.72268       1        0.72268      0.54296      0.462    
                Q20_25                        2.76639       1        2.76639      2.45108      0.119    
                Q20_26                        4.43852       1        4.43852      4.06300      0.045   * 
                Q20_27                        2.84897       1        2.84897      2.03006      0.155    
                Q20_28                        1.77049       1        1.77049      1.30666      0.254    
                Q20_29                        4.70188       1        4.70188      3.81277      0.052    
                Q20_30                        0.03415       1        0.03415      0.02476      0.875    
                Q20_31                        0.30738       1        0.30738      0.23213      0.630 
    
   Geography          
  Q20_1                         0.23672       1        0.23672      0.20649      0.650    
                Q20_2                         0.33087       1        0.33087      0.27190      0.602    
                Q20_3                         0.18290       1        0.18290      0.17156      0.679    
                Q20_4                         0.34103       1        0.34103      0.25875      0.611    
                Q20_5                         0.08029       1        0.08029      0.08962      0.765    
                Q20_6                         0.03421       1        0.03421      0.03417      0.853    
                Q20_7                         0.60259       1        0.60259      0.71572      0.398    
                Q20_8                         0.12589       1        0.12589      0.09889      0.753    
                Q20_9                         2.61967       1        2.61967      2.37716      0.124    
                Q20_10                       0.05520       1        0.05520      0.04475      0.833    
                Q20_11                       1.77682       1        1.77682      1.46750      0.227    
                Q20_12                       0.49039       1        0.49039      0.40653      0.524    
                Q20_13                        2.28124       1        2.28124      1.74144      0.188    
                Q20_14                        0.37226       1        0.37226      0.30093      0.584    
                Q20_15                        0.76211       1        0.76211      0.60260      0.438    
                Q20_16                        0.00315       1        0.00315      0.00218      0.963    
                Q20_17                        0.00123       1        0.00123      0.00104      0.974    
                Q20_18                        0.01355       1        0.01355      0.01054      0.918    
                Q20_19                        3.74455       1        3.74455      3.41238      0.066    
                Q20_20                        0.02513       1        0.02513      0.01884      0.891    
                Q20_21                        3.37746       1        3.37746      2.24936     0.135    
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                Q20_22                        4.30812       1        4.30812      4.37584      0.037    
                Q20_23                        2.30534       1        2.30534      2.01470      0.157    
                Q20_24                        4.43556       1        4.43556      3.33249      0.069    
                Q20_25                        2.79221       1        2.79221      2.47395      0.117    
                Q20_26                        2.46184       1        2.46184      2.25355      0.134    
                Q20_27                        1.29652       1        1.29652      0.92385      0.337    
                Q20_28                        2.79971       1        2.79971      2.06625      0.152    
                Q20_29                        0.10594       1        0.10594      0.08591      0.770    
                Q20_30                        0.49877       1        0.49877      0.36155      0.548    
                Q20_31                        1.98410       1        1.98410      1.49839      0.222    
    
Pubco Experience 
  Q20_1                5.11728       1        5.11728      4.46382      0.036   * 
                Q20_2                        19.33595       1       19.33595     15.88933    < .001   *** 
                Q20_3                         8.63488       1        8.63488      8.09972      0.005   ** 
                Q20_4                         3.79911       1        3.79911      2.88245      0.091    
                Q20_5                        18.13361      1       18.13361     20.24158    < .001   *** 
                Q20_6                        5.11269       1        5.11269      5.10693      0.025   * 
                Q20_7                        3.02684       1        3.02684      3.59511      0.059    
                Q20_8                        26.91566       1       26.91566     21.14375    < .001   *** 
                Q20_9                        6.84356       1        6.84356      6.21002      0.013   * 
                Q20_10                        3.17914       1        3.17914      2.57748    0.110    
                Q20_11                        0.11417       1        0.11417      0.09430      0.759    
                Q20_12                        9.95226       1        9.95226      8.25039      0.004   ** 
                Q20_13                        1.55916       1        1.55916      1.19023      0.276    
                Q20_14                        2.41466       1        2.41466      1.95193      0.163    
                Q20_15                        0.74319       1        0.74319      0.58765      0.444    
                Q20_16                        1.99406       1        1.99406      1.38168      0.241    
                Q20_17                        9.57820       1        9.57820      8.14291      0.005   ** 
                Q20_18                        5.69327       1        5.69327      4.42801      0.036   * 
                Q20_19                       21.80478       1       21.80478     19.87057    < .001   *** 
                Q20_20                       19.12443       1       19.12443     14.33745     < .001   *** 
                Q20_21                        5.56473       1        5.56473      3.70607      0.055    
                Q20_22                       11.07357       1       11.07357     11.24764     < .001   *** 
                Q20_23                        7.25882       1        7.25882      6.34368      0.012   * 
                Q20_24                        7.85002       1        7.85002      5.89781      0.016   * 
                Q20_25                        4.17466       1        4.17466      3.69883      0.055    
                Q20_26                       12.55546       1       12.55546     11.49319     < .001  *** 
                Q20_27                       28.34639       1       28.34639     20.19855     < .001   *** 
                Q20_28                        2.01920       1        2.01920      1.49021      0.223    
                Q20_29                        3.07487       1        3.07487      2.49342      0.115    
                Q20_30                       22.04155      1       22.04155     15.97771     < .001   *** 
                Q20_31                       0.34809       1        0.34809      0.26288      0.609 
    
   Total Career Experience 
                Q20_1                       9.20363       1        9.20363      8.02835      0.005   ** 
                Q20_2                         0.27162       1        0.27162      0.22320      0.637    
                Q20_3                         2.85711       1        2.85711      2.68003      0.103    
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                Q20_4                         3.92939       1        3.92939      2.98129      0.085    
                Q20_5                         2.26121       1        2.26121      2.52406      0.113    
                Q20_6                         1.32876       1        1.32876      1.32726      0.250    
                Q20_7                         2.92098       1        2.92098      3.46938      0.064    
                Q20_8                         0.22065       1        0.22065      0.17334      0.677    
                Q20_9                         0.55470       1        0.55470      0.50335      0.479    
                Q20_10                       3.05353       1        3.05353      2.47564      0.117    
                Q20_11                       0.39997       1        0.39997      0.33034      0.566    
                Q20_12                       0.84848       1        0.84848      0.70339      0.402    
                Q20_13                       0.82253       1        0.82253      0.62790      0.429    
                Q20_14                       1.00047       1        1.00047      0.80875      0.369    
                Q20_15                        0.21988       1        0.21988      0.17386      0.677    
                Q20_16                        0.16925       1        0.16925      0.11727      0.732    
                Q20_17                        1.76411       1        1.76411      1.49976      0.222    
                Q20_18                        0.76818       1        0.76818      0.59746      0.440    
                Q20_19                        0.10565       1        0.10565      0.09628      0.757    
                Q20_20                        7.97880       1        7.97880      5.98165      0.015   * 
                Q20_21                        0.23341       1        0.23341      0.15545      0.694    
                Q20_22                        1.19745       1        1.19745      1.21627      0.271    
                Q20_23                        0.94646       1        0.94646      0.82714      0.364    
                Q20_24                        0.50403      1        0.50403      0.37868      0.539    
                Q20_25                        0.29229      1        0.29229      0.25897      0.611    
                Q20_26                        0.57855      1        0.57855     0.52960      0.467    
                Q20_27                        1.24426       1        1.24426      0.88661      0.347    
                Q20_28                        6.43533       1        6.43533      4.74942      0.030   * 
                Q20_29                        0.00950       1        0.00950      0.00770      0.930    
                Q20_30                        4.45821       1        4.45821      3.23172      0.073    
                Q20_31                        1.44426       1        1.44426      1.09071      0.297    
  
  Residuals     
   Q20_1                              318.69660     278        1.14639                          
                Q20_2                       338.30212     278        1.21691                          
                Q20_3                       296.36776     278        1.06607                          
                Q20_4                       366.40868     278        1.31802                          
                Q20_5                       249.04894     278        0.89586                          
                Q20_6                       278.31358     278        1.00113                          
                Q20_7                       234.05690     278        0.84193                          
                Q20_8                       353.88964     278        1.27298                          
                Q20_9                       306.36157     278        1.10202                          
                Q20_10                     342.89349     278        1.23343                          
                Q20_11                     336.59559     278        1.21078                          
                Q20_12                     335.34502     278        1.20628                          
                Q20_13                     364.17163     278        1.30997                          
                Q20_14                     343.90383     278        1.23706                          
                Q20_15                     351.58675     278        1.26470                          
                Q20_16                     401.21365     278        1.44321                          
                Q20_17                      327.00088     278        1.17626                          
                Q20_18                      357.43520     278        1.28574                          
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                Q20_19                      305.06061     278        1.09734                          
                Q20_20                      370.81859     278        1.33388                          
                Q20_21                      417.42283     278        1.50152                          
                Q20_22                      273.69746     278        0.98452                          
                Q20_23                      318.10438     278        1.14426                          
                Q20_24                      370.01970     278        1.33101                          
                Q20_25                      313.76237     278        1.12864                          
                Q20_26                      303.69448     278        1.09243                          
                Q20_27                      390.14177     278        1.40339                          
                Q20_28                      376.68265     278        1.35497                          
                Q20_29                      342.82748     278        1.23319                          
                Q20_30                      383.50602     278        1.37952                          
                Q20_31                      368.11483     278        1.32415                          
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1D 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary:  
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the Group I / Group II dichotomy is a 
significant predictor of variation in Question 21.  However, only one of the four covariates tested 
in the first calculation (ie., public company experience) is significant.  After removing the three 
insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the single significant covariate, we 
observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to the following two factors tested in 
Question 21.  As such, we conclude that the Group I / Group II dichotomy is a significant 
predictor of variability in the responses to these two upside factors associated with being public. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1D (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  GROUP I V. GROUP II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- 
Independent Variable   
 Group I v. Group II        
           Pillai's Trace         0.0879     2.13      14     309      0.010 **    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.912     2.13      14     309      0.010 **   
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0964     2.13      14     309      0.010 ** 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.0964     2.13      14     309      0.010 **   
   
Significant Covariates                                                                          
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1523     3.97      14     309     < .001 ***  
            Wilks' Lambda           0.848     3.97      14     309     < .001 ***  
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1797     3.97      14     309     < .001 *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1797     3.97      14     309     < .001 *** 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                        
Note: The following three covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the 
above MANCOVA calculation: Total Career Experience (P=0.322), Industry (P=0.081) and Geography 
(P=0.370). 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Dependent Variable             Sum of Squares    df     Mean Square     F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   Group I v. Group II            
                Q21_1                        10.99119       1       10.99119     10.33892     0.001   ** 
                Q21_2                         6.35003       1        6.35003      6.92735      0.009   ** 
                Q21_3                         0.81685       1        0.81685      0.84448      0.359    
                Q21_4                         2.31e-5       1        2.31e-5      2.89e-5      0.996    
                Q21_5                         2.28871      1        2.28871      2.33039     0.128    
                Q21_6                         0.31512      1        0.31512      0.32746     0.568    
                Q21_7                         0.00480      1        0.00480      0.00387      0.950    
                Q21_8                         1.37629      1        1.37629      1.12930      0.289    
                Q21_9                         0.72238      1        0.72238      0.55417      0.457    
                Q21_10                       3.51634      1        3.51634      3.04019      0.082    
                Q21_11                        1.03435      1        1.03435      0.91075      0.341    
                Q21_12                        3.47017      1        3.47017      2.49837      0.115    
                Q21_13                        0.05736      1        0.05736      0.06484      0.799    
                Q21_14                        0.11703      1        0.11703      0.11229      0.738    
    
Pubco Experience 
    Q21_1                       1.05104     1        1.05104      0.98866      0.321    
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                Q21_2                         0.03576       1        0.03576      0.03901      0.844    
                Q21_3                         9.20609      1        9.20609      9.51744      0.002   ** 
                Q21_4                        15.48867       1       15.48867     19.38626    < .001   *** 
                Q21_5                         1.11322       1        1.11322      1.13349      0.288    
                Q21_6                         6.26395       1        6.26395      6.50928      0.011   * 
                Q21_7                         3.42754       1        3.42754      2.76363      0.097    
                Q21_8                         0.51971       1        0.51971      0.42644      0.514    
                Q21_9                         0.33247       1        0.33247      0.25506      0.614    
                Q21_10                       4.82178       1        4.82178      4.16886      0.042   * 
                Q21_11                        0.78720       1        0.78720      0.69314      0.406    
                Q21_12                        3.96962       1        3.96962      2.85795      0.092    
                Q21_13                        5.26314       1        5.26314      5.94951      0.015   * 
                Q21_14                        2.05142       1        2.05142      1.96827      0.162    
   
 Residuals     
   Q21_1                  342.31469     322        1.06309                          
                Q21_2                       295.16498     322        0.91666                          
                Q21_3                       311.46629     322        0.96729                          
                Q21_4                       257.26208     322        0.79895                          
                Q21_5                       316.24114     322        0.98212                          
                Q21_6                       309.86401     322        0.96231                          
                Q21_7                       399.35535     322        1.24023                          
                Q21_8                       392.42401     322        1.21871                          
                Q21_9                       419.73284     322        1.30352                          
                Q21_10                     372.43111     322        1.15662                          
                Q21_11                     365.69845     322        1.13571                          
                Q21_12                     447.24944     322        1.38897                          
                Q21_13                     284.85181     322        0.88463                          
                Q21_14                      335.60385     322        1.04225                          
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2A 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:   SME vs. NON-SME 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business 
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not 
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 16 (falling just below our minimum threshold 
of a 95% confidence level).  As such, additional MANCOVA tests removing the insignficiant 
variables were not run.    
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable   
    SME / Non-SME 
            Pillai's Trace         0.1056     2.02       7     120      0.057    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.894     2.02       7     120      0.057    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1181     2.02       7     120      0.057    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1181     2.02       7     120      0.057    
 
Covariates                                                                             
    Industry      
            Pillai's Trace         0.1984     4.24       7     120     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.802     4.24       7     120     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.2476     4.24       7     120     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.2476     4.24       7     120     < .001   *** 
                                                                            
   Geography      
            Pillai's Trace         0.0594     1.08       7     120      0.379    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.941     1.08       7     120      0.379    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0631     1.08       7     120      0.379    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0631     1.08       7     120      0.379    
                                                                             
    Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1487     2.99       7     120      0.006   ** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.851     2.99       7     120      0.006   ** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1747     2.99       7     120      0.006   ** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1747     2.99       7     120      0.006   ** 
                                                                            
  Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1337     2.65       7     120      0.014   * 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.866     2.65       7     120      0.014   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.1544     2.65       7     120      0.014   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1544     2.65       7     120      0.014   *  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2B 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:   SME vs. NON-SME 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business 
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not 
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 18.  As such, additional MANCOVA tests 
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.    
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- 
Independent Variable 
SME v. Non-SME 
   Pillai's Trace         0.0267     1.729       2     126     0.182    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.973     1.729       2     126     0.182    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0274     1.729       2     126     0.182    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0274     1.729       2     126     0.182    
 
Covariates                                                                            
   Industry      
            Pillai's Trace         0.0748     5.094       2     126     0.007   ** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.925     5.094       2     126     0.007   ** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0809     5.094       2     126     0.007   ** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0809     5.094       2     126     0.007   ** 
                                                                            
   Geography      
            Pillai's Trace         0.0385     2.520       2     126     0.085    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.962     2.520       2     126     0.085    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0400     2.520       2     126     0.085    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0400     2.520       2     126     0.085    
                                                                            
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.0649     4.369       2     126     0.015   * 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.935     4.369       2     126     0.015   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0694     4.369       2     126     0.015   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0694     4.369       2     126     0.015   * 
                                                                            
   Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.0122     0.780       2    126     0.461    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.988     0.780       2     126     0.461    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0124     0.780       2     126     0.461    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0124     0.780       2     126     0.461    
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2C 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:    SME vs. NON-SME 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:         QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary:  
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business 
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not 
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 20.  As such, additional MANCOVA tests 
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.    
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-    
Independent Variable 
    SME v Non-SME 
            Pillai's Trace         0.271     1.19      31      99     0.258    
            Wilks' Lambda          0.729     1.19      31      99     0.258    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.372     1.19      31      99     0.258    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.372     1.19      31      99     0.258    
                                                                          
Covariates  
   Industry      
            Pillai's Trace         0.335     1.61      31      99     0.041   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.665     1.61      31      99     0.041   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.504     1.61      31      99     0.041   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.504     1.61      31      99     0.041   * 
                                                                          
   Geography      
            Pillai's Trace         0.277     1.23      31      99     0.223    
            Wilks' Lambda          0.723     1.23      31      99     0.223    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.384     1.23      31      99     0.223    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.384     1.23      31      99     0.223    
                                                                          
   Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.326     1.54      31      99     0.056    
            Wilks' Lambda          0.674     1.54      31      99     0.056    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.483     1.54      31      99     0.056    
            Roy's Largest Root    0.483     1.54      31      99     0.056    
                                                                          
   Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.255     1.09      31      99     0.364    
            Wilks' Lambda          0.745     1.09      31      99     0.364    
            Hotelling's Trace      0.341     1.09      31      99     0.364    
            Roy's Largest Root    0.341     1.09      31      99     0.364    
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2D 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:   SME vs. NON-SME 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE-        QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSSESSED) 
 
Summary:  
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business 
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not 
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 21.  As such, additional MANCOVA tests 
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.    
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- 
Independent Variable  
   SME vs. Non-SME     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1438     1.380      14     115     0.174    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.856     1.380      14     115     0.174    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.168     1.380      14     115     0.174    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.168     1.380      14     115     0.174    
 
Covariates                                                                            
    Industry 
            Pillai's Trace         0.1828     1.837      14     115     0.041   * 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.817     1.837      14     115     0.041   * 
            Hotelling's Trace       0.224     1.837      14     115     0.041   * 
            Roy's Largest Root      0.224     1.837      14     115     0.041   * 
                                                                             
    Geography      
            Pillai's Trace         0.1173     1.091      14     115     0.373    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.883     1.091      14     115     0.373    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.133     1.091      14     115     0.373    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.133     1.091      14     115     0.373    
                                                                            
    Pubco Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.1286     1.213      14     115     0.276    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.871     1.213      14     115     0.276    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.148     1.213      14     115     0.276    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.148     1.213      14     115     0.276    
                                                                            
    Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.0948     0.860      14     115     0.604    
            Wilks' Lambda           0.905     0.860      14     115     0.604    
            Hotelling's Trace       0.105     0.860      14     115     0.604    
            Roy's Largest Root      0.105     0.860      14     115     0.604    
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary: 
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSX-
eligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 16.  Also, two out 
of the five covariates tested in the first calculation are significant.  After removing the three 
insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the the two significant covariates, 
we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to three sub-questions within 
Question 16.  As such, we concluded that the TSX vs. Private dichotomy is a significant 
predictor of variation in these three sub-questions within Question 16. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable   
   TSX-Listed vs. Private Company 
            Pillai's Trace         0.253     6.20       7     128     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.747     6.20       7     128     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.339     6.20       7     128     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.339     6.20       7     128     < .001   *** 
   
Significant Covariates                                                                         
    Industry      
            Pillai's Trace         0.129     2.70       7     128      0.012   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.871     2.70       7     128      0.012   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.148     2.70       7     128      0.012   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.148     2.70       7     128      0.012   * 
                                                                           
     Total Career Experience     
            Pillai's Trace         0.130     2.73       7     128      0.011   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.870     2.73       7     128      0.011   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.149     2.73       7     128      0.011   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.149     2.73       7     128      0.011   * 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: The following three covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the 
above MANCOVA calculation: Public Company Experience (P=0.280), Geography (P=0.392), and SME v. 
Non-SME (P=0.379). 
 
  
472 
 
 
 
MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
     Dependent Variable            Sum of Squares    df     Mean Square     F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   TSX-Listed vs. Private Company         
  Q16_1                        21.80173       1       21.80173     26.19691     < .001    ** 
                Q16_2                         5.28117       1        5.28117      4.51704      0.035   * 
                Q16_3                         2.62928       1        2.62928      3.11923      0.080    
                Q16_4                         0.41612       1        0.41612      0.39713      0.530    
                Q16_5                         1.58738       1        1.58738      1.68536      0.196    
                Q16_6                        11.65786      1       11.65786     10.31716     0.002   ** 
                Q16_7                         0.25271       1        0.25271      0.20406      0.652    
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Industry 
         Q16_1                         0.07985       1        0.07985      0.09595      0.757    
                Q16_2                         0.13256       1        0.13256      0.11338      0.737    
                Q16_3                         0.29732       1        0.29732      0.35273      0.554    
                Q16_4                        10.66592      1       10.66592     10.17921     0.002    
                Q16_5                        2.84432       1        2.84432      3.01990      0.085    
                Q16_6                        11.98766       1       11.98766     10.60903     0.001    
                Q16_7                         0.00993       1        0.00993      0.00802      0.929    
   Career Experience 
  Q16_1                       0.13647       1        0.13647      0.16398      0.686    
                Q16_2                         2.87479       1        2.87479      2.45884      0.119    
                Q16_3                         0.27355       1        0.27355      0.32452      0.570    
                Q16_4                         4.65577       1        4.65577      4.44332      0.037    
                Q16_5                         7.93876       1        7.93876      8.42881      0.004    
                Q16_6                         0.04287       1        0.04287      0.03794      0.846    
                Q16_7                        0.02541       1        0.02541      0.02051      0.886    
   Residuals     
   Q16_1                       111.51819     134        0.83223                          
                Q16_2                       156.66801     134        1.16916                          
                Q16_3                       112.95202     134        0.84293                          
                Q16_4                       140.40711     134        1.04781                          
                Q16_5                       126.20925     134        0.94186                          
                Q16_6                       151.41306     134        1.12995                          
                Q16_7                       165.95108     134        1.23844                           
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3B 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS. 
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary: 
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSX-
eligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 18.   
However, all five of the five covariates tested in the first MANCOVA calculation are determined 
to be insignificant.  After removing the five insignificant covariates and re-running the 
MANCOVA with only the independent variable left (which essentially becomes an MANOVA 
calculation), we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to both of the sub-
questions within tested in Question 18.  As such, we conclude that the TSX vs. Private 
dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability in Question 18. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3B (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
  TSX-Listed vs. Private Company         
         Pillai's Trace         0.0973     8.03       2     149     < .001    
         Wilks' Lambda           0.903     8.03       2     149     < .001    
         Hotelling's Trace       0.108     8.03       2     149     < .001    
         Roy's Largest Root      0.108     8.03       2     149     < .001    
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note:  All five covariates were determined to be insignificant in the first MANCOVA calculation and were 
removed from the second MANCOVA calculation above: Career Experience (P=0.726),  Public Company 
Experience (P=0.247), Geography (P=0.177), SME v. Non-SME (P=0.414), and Industry (P=0.277) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   Dependent Variable      Sum of Squares           df     Mean Square     F        p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  TSX-Listed vs. Private Company  
               Q18_1                            18.5       1         18.489      15.7     < .001   *** 
                Q18_2                            10.1       1         10.094      10.7      0.001   ** 
  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Residuals    Q18_1                   176.8     150          1.178                      
                Q18_2                           141.5     150          0.944                      
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary: 
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSX-
eligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 20.  However, 
only one of the five covariates tested in the first MANOVA calculation are determed to be 
significant (ie., industry).   
After removing the four insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the 
independent variable and the sole significant covariate, we observe a significant difference 
remaining in the following 15 out of the 31 downside factors tested in Question 20.  As such, we 
conclude that the TSX vs. Private dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability in responses 
for 15 of the 31 downside factors associated with being a public company tested in the PCD 
Study.  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable      
     TSX-Listed vs. Private Company 
           Pillai's Trace         0.353     1.97      31     112     0.005   ** 
           Wilks' Lambda          0.647     1.97      31     112     0.005   ** 
           Hotelling's Trace      0.545     1.97      31     112     0.005   ** 
           Roy's Largest Root     0.545     1.97      31     112     0.005   ** 
 
 Significant Covariate                                                                        
      Industry 
           Pillai's Trace         0.302     1.57      31     112     0.047   * 
           Wilks' Lambda          0.698     1.57      31     112     0.047   * 
           Hotelling's Trace      0.434     1.57      31     112     0.047   * 
           Roy's Largest Root     0.434     1.57      31     112     0.047   *  
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: The following four covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the 
above MANCOVA calculation: Public Company Experience (P=0.328), Total Career Experience (P=0.444), 
Geography (P=0.249) and SME v. Non-SME (P=0.484) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Dependent Variable              Sum of Squares       df                   Mean Square        F              p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  TSX-Listed vs. Private Company             
  Q20_1                       6.9931       1          6.9931      6.1319      0.014   * 
                Q20_2                         10.5931       1         10.5931      7.9107      0.006   ** 
                Q20_3                          0.0931       1         0.0931      0.0902      0.764    
                Q20_4                          1.5736       1          1.5736      1.2142      0.272    
                Q20_5                         15.4667       1         15.4667     15.6922     < .001   *** 
                Q20_6                          5.4724       1          5.4724      5.1153      0.025   * 
                Q20_7                          0.4598       1          0.4598      0.5421      0.463    
                Q20_8                         10.5931       1         10.5931      6.9848      0.009   ** 
                Q20_9                         13.4069       1         13.4069     12.3451     < .001   *** 
                Q20_10                        0.1655       1         0.1655      0.1424      0.706    
                Q20_11                         0.1149       1          0.1149      0.0953      0.758    
                Q20_12                         9.3103       1          9.3103      7.4135      0.007   ** 
                Q20_13                         2.9897       1          2.9897      2.2085      0.139    
                Q20_14                         3.2287       1          3.2287      2.5435      0.113    
                Q20_15                         2.9897       1          2.9897      2.3984      0.124    
                Q20_16                         0.3322       1          0.3322      0.2353      0.628    
                Q20_17                         3.6046       1          3.6046      3.2352      0.074    
                Q20_18                         9.5184       1          9.5184      6.3896      0.013   * 
                Q20_19                        21.2598       1         21.2598     20.4812     < .001   *** 
                Q20_20                        13.6563       1         13.6563      8.6073      0.004   ** 
                Q20_21                         2.3276       1         2.3276      1.4227      0.235    
                Q20_22                         9.3103       1          9.3103      8.5716      0.004   ** 
                Q20_23                         6.9931       1          6.9931      5.5716      0.020   * 
                Q20_24                         0.4149       1          0.4149      0.3118      0.577    
                Q20_25                         0.9667       1          0.9667      0.8939      0.346    
                Q20_26                         6.4655       1          6.4655      5.7659      0.018   * 
                Q20_27                        20.0276      1         20.0276    12.9335     < .001   *** 
                Q20_28                        1.0345       1          1.0345      0.6806      0.411    
                Q20_29                         3.1080       1          3.1080      2.8516      0.093    
                Q20_30                        13.4069       1         13.4069     10.3067      0.002   ** 
                Q20_31                         3.2287       1         3.2287      2.7213      0.101 
  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   Industry 
  Q20_1                 0.1255       1          0.1255      0.1101      0.741    
                Q20_2                          3.5051       1          3.5051      2.6176      0.108    
                Q20_3                          0.6196       1          0.6196      0.6000      0.440    
                Q20_4                          2.2938       1          2.2938      1.7700      0.186    
                Q20_5                          2.6154       1          2.6154      2.6535      0.106    
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                Q20_6                          7.5510       1          7.5510      7.0582      0.009    
                Q20_7                          4.4228       1          4.4228      5.2150      0.024    
                Q20_8                          4.2995       1          4.2995      2.8350      0.094    
                Q20_9                          1.3727       1          1.3727      1.2640      0.263    
                Q20_10                        0.6615       1          0.6615      0.5690      0.452    
                Q20_11                        11.9430       1         11.9430    9.9069      0.002    
                Q20_12                         0.1494       1         0.1494      0.1190      0.731    
                Q20_13                         0.7598       1          0.7598      0.5613      0.455    
                Q20_14                         1.1658       1          1.1658      0.9184      0.340    
                Q20_15                         1.5629       1          1.5629      1.2538      0.265    
                Q20_16                         2.9258       1          2.9258      2.0722      0.152    
                Q20_17                         3.7401       1          3.7401      3.3568      0.069    
                Q20_18                         3.1981       1          3.1981      2.1469      0.145    
                Q20_19                         1.4525       1          1.4525      1.3993      0.239    
                Q20_20                         1.6410       1          1.6410      1.0343      0.311    
                Q20_21                         0.1770       1          0.1770      0.1082      0.743    
                Q20_22                         0.2453       1          0.2453      0.2258      0.635    
                Q20_23                         0.6680       1          0.6680     0.5322      0.467    
                Q20_24                        0.6238       1          0.6238      0.4687      0.495    
                Q20_25                         2.4762       1          2.4762      2.2897      0.132    
                Q20_26                         1.6136       1          1.6136      1.4390      0.232    
                Q20_27                         0.1117       1          0.1117      0.0721      0.789    
                Q20_28                         0.3599       1          0.3599      0.2368      0.627    
                Q20_29                         3.5303       1          3.5303      3.2391      0.074    
                Q20_30                         0.9415       1          0.9415      0.7238      0.396    
                Q20_31                         1.6307       1          1.6307     1.3744      0.243    
   Residuals     
   Q20_1                             161.9434     142          1.1404                         
                Q20_2                        190.1500     142          1.3391                         
                Q20_3                        146.6390     142          1.0327                         
                Q20_4                        184.0223     142          1.2959                         
                Q20_5                        139.9593     142          0.9856                         
                Q20_6                        151.9145     142          1.0698                         
                Q20_7                        120.4278     142          0.8481                         
                Q20_8                        215.3557     142          1.5166                         
                Q20_9                        154.2135     142          1.0860                         
                Q20_10                       165.0627     142         1.1624                         
                Q20_11                       171.1835     142         1.2055                         
                Q20_12                       178.3334     142         1.2559                         
                Q20_13                       192.2229     142          1.3537                         
                Q20_14                       180.2538     142          1.2694                         
                Q20_15                       177.0061     142          1.2465                         
                Q20_16                       200.4938     142          1.4119                         
                Q20_17                       158.2139     142          1.1142                         
                Q20_18                       211.5318     142          1.4897                         
                Q20_19                       147.3981     142          1.0380                         
                Q20_20                       225.2958     142          1.5866                         
                Q20_21                       232.3230     142          1.6361                         
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                Q20_22                       154.2375     142          1.0862                         
                Q20_23                       178.2285     142          1.2551                         
                Q20_24                       189.0026     142          1.3310                         
                Q20_25                       153.5640     142          1.0814                         
                Q20_26                       159.2312     142          1.1213                         
                Q20_27                       219.8883     142          1.5485                         
                Q20_28                       215.8470     142          1.5200                         
                Q20_29                       154.7685     142          1.0899                         
                Q20_30                       184.7136     142          1.3008                         
                Q20_31                       168.4785     142          1.1865                         
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary: 
Running the first MANCOVA test, we once again observe that the TSX-listed company v. 
Private TSX-eligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 21. 
However, as was the case with MANCOVA analysis 3B, all five of the five covariates tested in 
the first calculation are insignificant.  After removing the five insignificant covariates and re-
running the MANCOVA with only the independent variable left (essentially an MANOVA 
calculation), we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to both of the sub-
questions within tested in Question 18.  As such, we conclude that the TSX vs. Private 
dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability for these two factors associated with the 
upsides of being a public company. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-  ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
   TSX-Listed vs. Private Company             
        Pillai's Trace         0.225     2.64      14     127     0.002   ** 
         Wilks' Lambda          0.775     2.64      14     127     0.002   ** 
         Hotelling's Trace      0.291     2.64      14     127     0.002   ** 
         Roy's Largest Root     0.291     2.64      14     127     0.002   ** 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Note:  All five covariates were determined to be insignificant in the first MANCOVA calculation and 
were removed from the second calculation above: Total Career Experience (P=0.494),  Public Company 
Experience (P=0.961), Geography (P=0.473), SME v. Non-SME (P=0.176), and Industry (P=0.460) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.  
 PRIVATE TSX-  ELIGIBLE COMPANY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
                Dependent Variable    Sum of Squares    df     Mean Square    F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  TSX-Listed vs. Private Company             
                Q21_1                         1.23561       1        1.23561      1.06722      0.303    
                Q21_2                         0.40829       1        0.40829      0.37763      0.540    
                Q21_3                         6.36731       1        6.36731      7.33009      0.008    
                Q21_4                        10.36192      1       10.36192     15.49696    < .001  ***  
                Q21_5                        2.60992       1        2.60992      2.52638      0.114    
                Q21_6                        0.35471       1        0.35471      0.34591      0.557    
                Q21_7                         1.44770       1        1.44770      1.03547      0.311    
                Q21_8                         1.27886       1        1.27886      0.95945      0.329    
                Q21_9                         1.19573       1        1.19573      0.83188      0.363    
                Q21_10                       3.46507       1        3.46507      2.76428      0.099    
                Q21_11                        7.94524       1        7.94524      7.55901      0.007   ** 
                Q21_12                        1.03784       1        1.03784      0.75153      0.387    
                Q21_13                        2.14924       1        2.14924      2.16330      0.144    
                Q21_14                        0.00633       1        0.00633      0.00647      0.936   
         
   Residuals    Q21_1                      162.08834     140        1.15777                          
                Q21_2                       151.36636     140        1.08119                          
                Q21_3                       121.61156     140        0.86865                          
                Q21_4                       93.60991     140        0.66864                          
                Q21_5                       144.62951     140        1.03307                          
                Q21_6                       143.56078     140        1.02543                          
                Q21_7                       195.73540     140        1.39811                          
                Q21_8                       186.60846     140        1.33292                          
                Q21_9                       201.23385     140        1.43738                          
                Q21_10                      175.49267     140        1.25352                          
                Q21_11                      147.15335     140        1.05110                          
                Q21_12                      193.33540     140        1.38097                          
                Q21_13                      139.09020     140        0.99350                          
                Q21_14                      137.09226     140        0.97923                          
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we 
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public 
company experience.  SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to 
Group I respondents. 
On the initial MANCOVA calculation, with Question 16 as the dependent variable, only one 
covariate tested was determined to be significant (ie., geography).  After re-running the 
MANCOVA test and factoring out the impact of geography, we observe a significant difference 
remaining amongst the responses of the 4 different Group II constituents to the following three 
sub-questions within Question 16: Q16-1, Q16-2 and Q16-6.   
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers      
      Pillai's Trace         0.324     2.51      21     435     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.707     2.51      21     411     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.372     2.51      21     425     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.200     4.15      7     145     < .001   *** 
                   
Significant Covariates 
Geography     
 Pillai's Trace         0.116     2.68       7     143      0.012   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.884     2.68       7     143      0.012   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.131     2.68       7     143      0.012   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.131     2.68       7     143      0.012   * 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Total Career Experience 
(P=0.311) and Pubco Experience (P=0.054) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  Dependent Variable               Sum of Squares    df                Mean Square       F            p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 4 Types of Public Markets Influencers      
     Q16_1                         17.0725       3          5.6908     6.8606     < .001   *** 
       Q16_2                         11.5140       3          3.8380     2.8581      0.039   * 
          Q16_3                          3.8298       3          1.2766     1.2150      0.306    
          Q16_4                          5.4952       3          1.8317     1.7211      0.165    
         Q16_5                          7.5890       3          2.5297     2.3228      0.077    
           Q16_6                          8.9867       3          2.9956     2.7561      0.045   * 
        Q16_7                          2.6610       3          0.8870     0.6573      0.580 
   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Geography   
 Q16_1                          2.1898     1          2.1898     2.6399      0.106    
   Q16_2                          3.0271       1          3.0271     2.2542      0.135    
   Q16_3                          0.0123       1          0.0123     0.0117      0.914    
         Q16_4                          0.6127       1          0.6127     0.5757      0.449    
 Q16_5                          0.6373       1          0.6373     0.5852      0.445    
     Q16_6                          5.4031       1          5.4031     4.9711      0.027   * 
         Q16_7                          8.9329       1          8.9329     6.6199      0.011   * 
   
Residuals    Q16_1                       123.5949     149          0.8295                        
      Q16_2                        200.0823     149          1.3428                        
   Q16_3                        156.5541     149          1.0507                        
       Q16_4                        158.5739     149          1.0643                        
        Q16_5                        162.2672     149          1.0890                        
       Q16_6                        161.9478     149          1.0869                        
           Q16_7                        201.0619     149          1.3494                        
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4B 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we 
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public 
company experience.  SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to 
Group I respondents. 
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 18 as the dependent variable, none of the 
three covariates tested was determined to be significant.  After re-running the test without the 
covariates (ie., a MANOVA test), we observe a significant difference amongst the responses of 
the 4 different Group II constituents to both Question 18-1 and 18-2.  As such, we conclude that 
the type of public markets influencer is a significant predictor of variability in Question 18.  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4B (cont.) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers      
             Pillai's Trace         0.151     4.94       6     362     < .001   *** 
           Wilks' Lambda          0.851     5.03       6     360     < .001   *** 
           Hotelling's Trace      0.172     5.13       6     358     < .001   *** 
           Roy's Largest Root     0.153     9.24       3     181     < .001   *** 
 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.351), 
Total Career Experience (P=0.179), Pubco Experience (P=0.092) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Dependent Variable            Sum of Squares           df                  Mean Square      F        p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 4 Types of Public Markets Influencers      
 Q18_1                       16.7       3           5.576     6.81     < .001   *** 
            Q18_2                            18.0       3           5.985     8.07     < .001   *** 
   
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Residuals     
 Q18_1                   148.2     181           0.819                      
          Q18_2                           134.2     181           0.742                      
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
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 MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
  
Summary:  
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we 
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public 
company experience.  SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to 
Group I respondents. 
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 20 as the dependent variable, only 
geography proves to be significant as a covariate.  In the first MANCOVA analysis, the type of 
public markets influencer as an independent variable falls right on the boundary of minimum 
significance we have established (ie., 95% confidence level) for Pillai’s Trace and is significant 
for the other three MANCOVA tests.  After re-running the MANCOVA test and factoring out 
the impact of the significant covariate (geography), however, we observe that the type of public 
markets influencer as an independent variable falls just outside our minimum level of 
significance on three out of the four alternative MANCOVA tests.  It is only utilizing Roy’s 
Largest Root as a test that significance is retained at the 95% confidence level.   
However, because the other three MANCOVA tests evidence a confidence level falling just 
outside the 95% confidence level established as the minimum and remain significant under 
Roy’s Largest Root, the summary tables are still shown below for the 11 downside factors in 
Question 20 that are determined to be significant in the follow-on MANCOVA analysis. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
    4 Types of Public Markets Influencers      
       Pillai's Trace         0.768     1.29      93     348     0.055    
            Wilks' Lambda          0.406     1.29      93     342     0.053    
            Hotelling's Trace      1.069     1.29      93     338     0.052    
            Roy's Largest Root     0.491     1.84      31     116     0.011   * 
                                                                         
Significant Covariates    
     Geography 
 Pillai's Trace         0.312     1.67      31     114     0.027   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.688     1.67      31     114     0.027   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.454     1.67      31     114     0.027   * 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.454     1.67      31     114     0.027   * 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.351), Total 
Career Experience (P=0.179), Pubco Experience (P=0.092) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C  (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Dependent Variable                 Sum of Squares    df                      Mean Square       F               p        
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
   4 Types of Public Markets Influencers          
  Q20_1                               9.45675       3         3.15225     2.70378     0.048   * 
                Q20_2                        11.95638       3         3.98546     3.64926     0.014   * 
                Q20_3                         6.40660       3         2.13553     1.87486     0.136    
                Q20_4                         1.84841       3         0.61614     0.45725     0.713    
                Q20_5                        11.33676       3         3.77892     4.93536     0.003   ** 
                Q20_6                        9.91909       3         3.30636     3.78076     0.012   * 
                Q20_7                        11.51471       3         3.83824     4.86740     0.003   ** 
                Q20_8                         4.37990       3        1.45997     1.22193     0.304    
                Q20_9                         1.99264       3         0.66421     0.57373     0.633    
                Q20_10                        8.68692       3         2.89564     2.26212     0.084    
                Q20_11                       10.25015       3         3.41672     2.86090     0.039   * 
                Q20_12                        2.41172       3         0.80391     0.71301     0.546    
                Q20_13                        3.17258       3         1.05753     0.83963     0.474    
                Q20_14                       10.88357       3         3.62786     2.99768     0.033   * 
                Q20_15                        5.09522       3         1.69841     1.36123     0.257    
                Q20_16                        1.39140       3         0.46380     0.31579   0.814    
                Q20_17                        6.82096       3         2.27365     1.76044     0.157    
                Q20_18                       10.80390     3         3.60130     3.20258     0.025   * 
                Q20_19                       6.33809       3         2.11270     1.98871     0.118    
                Q20_20                        3.11584       3         1.03861     0.86304     0.462    
                Q20_21                        7.59603       3         2.53201     1.80049     0.150    
                Q20_22                       11.06838       3         3.68946     4.31053     0.006   ** 
                Q20_23                        0.24446       3         0.08149     0.07228     0.975    
                Q20_24                       15.89077       3         5.29692     4.30272     0.006   ** 
                Q20_25                       5.72255       3         1.90752     1.56484     0.201    
                Q20_26                        7.31450       3         2.43817     2.23641     0.087    
                Q20_27                        9.57829       3         3.19276     2.47641     0.064    
                Q20_28                        2.76289       3         0.92096     0.72654     0.538    
                Q20_29                        1.32621       3         0.44207     0.33910     0.797    
                Q20_30                       16.40741       3         5.46914     3.93082     0.010   * 
                Q20_31                        3.64797       3         1.21599     0.82605     0.482 
    
   Geography          
  Q20_1                               0.49725       1         0.49725     0.42651     0.515    
                Q20_2                         1.98534       1         1.98534     1.81787     0.180    
                Q20_3                         0.00143       1         0.00143     0.00126     0.972    
                Q20_4                         0.24764       1         0.24764     0.18378     0.669    
                Q20_5                         1.14318       1         1.14318     1.49302     0.224    
                Q20_6                         0.10933       1         0.10933     0.12502     0.724    
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                Q20_7                         0.06025       1         0.06025     0.07640     0.783    
                Q20_8                         0.80347       1         0.80347     0.67247     0.414    
                Q20_9                         3.40533       1         3.40533     2.94145     0.088    
                Q20_10                        0.22032       1         0.22032     0.17212     0.679    
                Q20_11                        3.22322       1         3.22322     2.69888     0.103    
                Q20_12                        0.94777       1         0.94777     0.84060     0.361    
                Q20_13                        0.77314       1         0.77314     0.61384     0.435    
                Q20_14                        0.30764       1         0.30764     0.25420     0.615    
                Q20_15                        0.36345       1         0.36345     0.29130     0.590    
                Q20_16                        2.92816       1         2.92816     1.99371     0.160    
                Q20_17                        0.20578       1         0.20578     0.15933     0.690    
                Q20_18                        0.46289       1         0.46289     0.41164     0.522    
                Q20_19                        3.63703       1         3.63703     3.42358     0.066    
                Q20_20                        0.09880       1         0.09880     0.08210     0.775    
                Q20_21                        0.03224       1         0.03224     0.02293     0.880    
                Q20_22                        5.50475       1         5.50475     6.43139     0.012    
                Q20_23                        0.46472       1         0.46472     0.41223     0.522    
                Q20_24                        2.63475       1         2.63475     2.14023     0.146    
                Q20_25                        0.93187       1         0.93187     0.76446     0.383    
                Q20_26                        3.02325       1         3.02325     2.77307     0.098    
                Q20_27                        2.23004       1         2.23004     1.72969     0.191    
                Q20_28                        0.81117       1         0.81117     0.63993     0.425    
                Q20_29                        0.00716       1         0.00716     0.00549     0.941    
                Q20_30                        0.04389       1         0.04389     0.03154     0.859    
                Q20_31                        0.17415       1         0.17415     0.11830     0.731 
    
   Residuals     
   Q20_1                              167.88492   144    1.16587                        
                Q20_2                       157.26633     144      1.09213                        
                Q20_3                       164.02150     144         1.13904                        
                Q20_4                       194.03817     144         1.34749                        
                Q20_5                       110.25832     144         0.76568                        
                Q20_6                       125.93131     144         0.87452                        
                Q20_7                       113.55255     144         0.78856                        
                Q20_8                       172.05153     144         1.19480                        
                Q20_9                       166.70941     144         1.15770                        
                Q20_10                     184.32766     144         1.28005                        
                Q20_11                     171.97629     144         1.19428                        
                Q20_12                     162.35863     144         1.12749                        
                Q20_13                      181.36972     144         1.25951                        
                Q20_14                      174.27188     144         1.21022                        
                Q20_15                      179.66885     144         1.24770                        
                Q20_16                      211.49253     144         1.46870                        
                Q20_17                      185.97998     144         1.29153                        
                Q20_18                      161.92785     144         1.12450                        
                Q20_19                      152.97790     144         1.06235                        
                Q20_20                      173.29543     144         1.20344                        
                Q20_21                      202.50595     144         1.40629                        
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                Q20_22                      123.25237     144         0.85592                        
                Q20_23                      162.33780     144         1.12735                        
                Q20_24                      177.27313     144         1.23106                        
                Q20_25                      175.53351     144         1.21898                        
                Q20_26                      156.99111     144         1.09022                        
                Q20_27                      185.65475     144         1.28927                        
                Q20_28                      182.53332     144         1.26759                        
                Q20_29                      187.72704     144         1.30366                        
                Q20_30                      200.35408     144         1.39135                        
                Q20_31                      211.97654     144         1.47206                        
 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
 Summary: Four Types of Public Markets Influencers (ie., Group II) 
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we 
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public 
company experience.  SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to 
Group I respondents. 
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 21 as the dependent variable, only public 
company experience proves to be significant as a covariate.  After re-running the MANCOVA 
tests and factoring out the impact of the sole significant covariate, we observe a significant 
difference remaining between the four types of public markets influencers in the responses to 7 
of the 14 upside public company factors within Question 21 summarized in the following graphs. 
 
 
  
498 
 
 
 
MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
   4 Types of Public Markets Influencers          
 Pillai's Trace         0.409     1.84      42     489      0.001   ** 
             Wilks' Lambda          0.640     1.85      42     478      0.001   ** 
             Hotelling's Trace     0.490     1.86      42     479      0.001   ** 
             Roy's Largest Root     0.277     3.22      14     163     < .001   *** 
   
Significant Covariate                                                                         
     Public Company Experience 
 Pillai's Trace         0.215     3.15      14     161     < .001   *** 
             Wilks' Lambda          0.785     3.15      14     161     < .001   *** 
             Hotelling's Trace      0.274     3.15      14     161     < .001   *** 
           Roy's Largest Root    0.274     3.15      14     161     < .001   *** 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.402), 
Total Career Experience (P=0.063). 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.)  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Dependent Variable          Sum of Squares           df                Mean Square          F           p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers 
            Q21_1                          3.1720       3          1.0573      1.0758      0.361    
                Q21_2                          2.1196       3          0.7065      0.8771      0.454    
                Q21_3                          4.5723       3          1.5241      1.4579     0.228    
                Q21_4                         11.9681       3          3.9894      4.7520      0.003   ** 
                Q21_5                        3.0072       3          1.0024      1.0708      0.363    
                Q21_6                         10.2419       3          3.4140      4.0523      0.008   ** 
                Q21_7                         10.9303       3          3.6434      3.4298      0.018   * 
                Q21_8                          3.9360       3          1.3120      1.2212      0.304    
                Q21_9                         19.5775       3          6.5258      5.8675     < .001   *** 
                Q21_10                         7.9172       3          2.6391      2.5491     0.057    
                Q21_11                         9.7000       3          3.2333      2.9722     0.033   * 
                Q21_12                        11.4293       3          3.8098      2.9758      0.033   * 
                Q21_13                         7.3443       3          2.4481      3.1656      0.026   * 
                Q21_14                         5.1654       3          1.7218      1.5789      0.196    
    
Public Company Experience 
      Q21_1                        0.7455       1          0.7455      0.7585      0.385    
                Q21_2                          0.0415       1          0.0415      0.0515      0.821    
                Q21_3                          3.1619       1          3.1619      3.0246      0.084    
                Q21_4                          2.8155       1          2.8155      3.3537      0.069    
                Q21_5                          0.0852       1          0.0852      0.0910      0.763    
                Q21_6                          9.2679       1          9.2679     11.0008      0.001  **  
                Q21_7                          0.7693       1          0.7693      0.7242      0.396    
                Q21_8                          5.4001       1          5.4001      5.0262      0.026   * 
                Q21_9                          2.5195       1          2.5195      2.2653      0.134    
                Q21_10                        0.9148      1          0.9148      0.8836      0.349    
                Q21_11                        4.6199      1          4.6199      4.2468      0.041   * 
                Q21_12                         4.4435      1          4.4435      3.4708      0.064    
                Q21_13                         2.3746       1          2.3746      3.0706      0.081    
                Q21_14                         3.6104       1          3.6104      3.3108      0.071    
    
Residuals     
   Q21_1                 171.0099     174     0.9828                         
                Q21_2                        140.1629     174          0.8055                         
                Q21_3                        181.8971     174          1.0454                         
                Q21_4                        146.0767     174          0.8395                         
                Q21_5                        162.8853     174          0.9361                         
                Q21_6                        146.5908     174          0.8425                         
                Q21_7                        184.8367     174          1.0623                         
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                Q21_8                        186.9432     174          1.0744                         
                Q21_9                        193.5231     174          1.1122                         
                Q21_10                       180.1401     174          1.0353                         
                Q21_11                       189.2890     174          1.0879                         
                Q21_12                       222.7641     174          1.2803                         
                Q21_13                       134.5604     174          0.7733                         
                Q21_14                       189.7493     174          1.0905                         
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
(PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
The fifth independent variable represents all six of the major demographic respondent groups, 
namely: (i) senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies vs. (ii) senior decision-makers of 
private TSX-eligible companies vs. (iii) securities lawyers vs. (iv) auditors / accountants vs. (v) 
investment bankers vs. (vi) private equity investors.    
All five of the covariates were also included in these MANCOVA calculations.  However, given 
the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R, the 
only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root.  The output of 
the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA 
calculations. 
Two out of the the five covariates tested (total career experience and industry) are significant 
when running the MANCOVA test the first time.  After re-running the MANCOVA test 
eliminating the three insignficiant covariates, Total Career Experience falls below the 
significance threshold.  Re-running the MANCOVA test a third time with the only remaining 
significant covariate (ie., industry), we observe a significant difference remaining between the 
six major respondent groups participants in the responses to the following five sub-questions 
within Question 16: Q16-1, Q16-2, 16-4, Q16-6 and Q16-7. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
   Six Major Respondent Groups          
 Pillai's Trace         0.3894     4.13      35     1710     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.661     4.20      35     1424     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.4398     4.23      35     1682     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.1687     8.24      7      342     < .001   *** 
  
Significant Covariate                                                                         
      Geography 
 Pillai's Trace         0.0461     2.34       7      338      0.024   * 
            Wilks' Lambda           0.954     2.34       7      338      0.024   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.0484     2.34       7      338      0.024   * 
            Roy's Largest Root     0.0484     2.34       7      338      0.024   * 
 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.392), 
Pubco Experience (P=0.280) and SME vs. Non-SME (P=0.379).  After running the MANCOVA calculation 
again, Total Career Experience becomes insignificant and is also removed, leaving industry as the only 
remaining significant covariate. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A (cont.) 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK / 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Note:  Using only Roy’s Largest Root Below 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Dependent Variable            Sum of Squares        df                 Mean Square      F           p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Six Major Respondent Groups          
  Q16_1                  36.4009      5          7.2802      9.2100     < .001   *** 
                Q16_2                         28.2853       5          5.6571      4.7548     < .001   *** 
                Q16_3                          9.8420       5          1.9684      2.1281      0.062    
                Q16_4                         33.8723       5          6.7745      6.3260     < .001   *** 
                Q16_5                         10.5866       5          2.1173      2.0575     0.070    
                Q16_6                         32.7303       5          6.5461      5.9684     < .001  ***  
                Q16_7                         18.2759       5          3.6552      2.8707      0.015   * 
    
Geography   
   Q16_1                             0.0109       1          0.0109      0.0138      0.907    
                Q16_2                         0.1814       1          0.1814      0.1525      0.696    
                Q16_3                          0.2815       1          0.2815      0.3044      0.582    
                Q16_4                         11.9349      1         11.9349    11.1449    < .001   *** 
                Q16_5                         1.6080       1          1.6080     1.5626      0.212    
                Q16_6                          8.8201       1          8.8201      8.0418      0.005   ** 
                Q16_7                          0.0485       1         0.0485      0.0381      0.845    
    
Residuals     
  Q16_1                               271.9187     344          0.7905                         
                Q16_2                        409.2769     344          1.1898                         
                Q16_3                        318.1841     344          0.9250                         
                Q16_4                        368.3865     344          1.0709                         
                Q16_5                        353.9992     344          1.0291                         
                Q16_6                        377.2929     344          1.0968                         
                Q16_7                        438.0061     344          1.2733                         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5B 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
Summary:  
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R, 
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root.  The output 
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA 
calculations. 
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that none of the five covariates 
are significant and they are all elminated in the running the MANCOVA test the second time 
(which essentially becomes an MANOVA analysis).  After running the second MANCOVA test, 
we observe a significant difference remaining between the six major respondent groups 
participants in the responses to Question 18.  As such, we conclude the the six major 
demographic groups are a significant predictor of variability in Question 18. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5B (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS) 
 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                  
  value      F        df1     df2     p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-   
Independent Variable 
   Six Major Respondent Groups          
 Pillai's Trace         0.127     4.49      10     662     < .001   *** 
           Wilks' Lambda          0.875     4.57      10     660     < .001   *** 
           Hotelling's Trace      0.141     4.65      10     658     < .001   *** 
           Roy's Largest Root     0.125     8.29      5     331     < .001   *** 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.277) 
Geography (P=0.177), Pubco Experience (P=0.247), Total Experience (P=0.726) and SME vs. Non-SME 
(P=0.414).   
 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Dependent Variable           Sum of Squares         df              Mean Square     F        p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Six Major Respondent Groups          
      Q18_1                       35.4       5           7.070     7.20     < .001   *** 
               Q18_2                            28.1       5           5.616     6.74     < .001   *** 
    
Residuals    Q18_1                  324.9     331           0.982                      
                Q18_2                           275.8     331           0.833                      
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary: 
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R, 
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root.  The output 
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA 
calculations. 
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that the only significant 
covariate is industry and the other four covariates are all eliminated in running the MANCOVA 
test the second time.  After running the second MANCOVA test, we observe a significant 
difference remaining between the six major respondent groups in the responses to 18 of the 31 
different downside risk factors associated with being public tested in Question 21.  As such, we 
conclude the the six major respondent groups are a significany predictor of variability in 18 of 
the 31 downside elements associated with being a public company tested in the PCD Study. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK / 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
                                  value     F        df1     df2      p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Independent Variable  
     Six Major Respondent Groups  
      Pillai's Trace         0.797     1.77     155     1445     < .001   *** 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.411     1.80     155     1415     < .001   *** 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.998     1.83     155     1417     < .001   *** 
            Roy's Largest Root   0.366     3.42     31      289     < .001   *** 
                                                                           
Significant Covariates  
       Industry  
 Pillai's Trace         0.147     1.58      31      285      0.030   * 
            Wilks' Lambda          0.853     1.58      31      285      0.030   * 
            Hotelling's Trace      0.172     1.58      31      285      0.030   * 
            Roy's Largest Root    0.172     1.58      31      285      0.030   * 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
 
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.249), 
Pubco Experience (P=0.328), Total Career Experience (P=0.444) and SME vs. Non-SME (P=0.484).   
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK / 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Note: The following is run only with Roy’s Largest Root 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Dependent Variable              Sum of Squares       df               Mean Square     F           p         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
  Six Major Respondent Groups         
  Q20_1              18.070      5           3.614      3.1717    0.008   ** 
                Q20_2                          25.224      5           5.045      4.2596     < .001   *** 
                Q20_3                           8.328       5           1.666      1.5802      0.165    
                Q20_4                           3.687       5           0.737      0.5821      0.714    
                Q20_5                          27.501       5           5.500      6.4486     < .001   *** 
                Q20_6                          19.993       5           3.999      4.1197      0.001   ** 
                Q20_7                          19.114      5           3.823      4.7303     < .001   *** 
                Q20_8                          17.185       5           3.437      2.6180      0.024   * 
                Q20_9                          27.541       5           5.508      4.9830     < .001   *** 
                Q20_10                         7.497       5           1.499      1.2635      0.279    
                Q20_11                         8.184       5           1.637      1.4007      0.224    
                Q20_12                         27.862       5           5.572      4.8646     < .001   *** 
                Q20_13                         13.831       5           2.766      2.1932      0.055    
                Q20_14                         13.911       5           2.782     2.3111      0.044   * 
                Q20_15                         9.586       5           1.917     1.5877      0.163    
                Q20_16                          2.288       5           0.458      0.3152      0.904    
                Q20_17                         17.538       5           3.508      2.8612      0.015   * 
                Q20_18                         33.245       5           6.649      5.3049     < .001   *** 
                Q20_19                         26.657       5           5.331      5.0791     < .001  ***  
                Q20_20                         18.887       5           3.777      2.7848      0.018   * 
                Q20_21                         7.766       5           1.553      1.0398      0.394    
                Q20_22                         29.732       5           5.946      6.2225     < .001   *** 
                Q20_23                         11.165       5           2.233      1.9110      0.092    
                Q20_24                         21.291       5           4.258      3.3634      0.006   ** 
                Q20_25                         7.441       5           1.488      1.3242      0.253    
                Q20_26                         13.506       5           2.701      2.4947      0.031   * 
                Q20_27                         36.790       5           7.358      5.3392     < .001   *** 
                Q20_28                         10.073       5           2.015      1.4983      0.190    
                Q20_29                         10.029       5           2.006      1.7174      0.130    
                Q20_30                         29.435       5           5.887      4.4864     < .001   *** 
                Q20_31                          8.769       5           1.754      1.3277      0.252    
    
Industry 
         Q20_1                       0.126       1           0.126      0.1102      0.740    
                Q20_2                           3.505       1           3.505      2.9595      0.086    
                Q20_3                           0.620       1           0.620      0.5879      0.444    
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                Q20_4                           2.294       1           2.294      1.8109      0.179    
                Q20_5                           2.615       1           2.615      3.0664      0.081    
                Q20_6                           7.551       1           7.551      7.7798      0.006   ** 
                Q20_7                           4.423       1           4.423      5.4728      0.020   * 
                Q20_8                           4.299       1           4.299      3.2750      0.071    
                Q20_9                           1.373       1           1.373      1.2418      0.266    
                Q20_10                         0.661       1           0.661      0.5574      0.456    
                Q20_11                         11.943       1          11.943    10.2199      0.002   ** 
                Q20_12                          0.149       1           0.149      0.1304      0.718    
                Q20_13                          0.760       1           0.760      0.6024     0.438    
                Q20_14                          1.166       1           1.166      0.9684     0.326    
                Q20_15                          1.563       1           1.563      1.2942      0.256    
                Q20_16                          2.926       1           2.926      2.0154      0.157    
                Q20_17                          3.740       1           3.740      3.0510      0.082    
                Q20_18                          3.198       1           3.198      2.5516      0.111    
                Q20_19                          1.452       1           1.452      1.3837      0.240    
                Q20_20                          1.641       1           1.641      1.2098      0.272    
                Q20_21                          0.177       1           0.177      0.1185      0.731    
                Q20_22                          0.245       1           0.245      0.2566      0.613    
                Q20_23                          0.668       1           0.668      0.5717      0.450    
                Q20_24                          0.624       1           0.624      0.4927      0.483    
                Q20_25                          2.476       1           2.476      2.2035      0.139    
                Q20_26                          1.614       1           1.614      1.4902      0.223    
                Q20_27                          0.112       1           0.112      0.0810      0.776    
                Q20_28                          0.360       1          0.360      0.2677     0.605    
                Q20_29                          3.530       1           3.530      3.0228     0.083    
                Q20_30                          0.942       1           0.942     0.7175      0.398    
                Q20_31                          1.631       1           1.631      1.2345      0.267    
   
 Residuals    Q20_1                  358.923    315           1.139                         
                Q20_2                         373.072     315           1.184                         
                Q20_3                         331.997     315           1.054                         
                Q20_4                         399.013     315           1.267                         
                Q20_5                         268.667     315           0.853                         
                Q20_6                         305.736     315           0.971                         
                Q20_7                         254.566     315           0.808                         
                Q20_8                         413.537     315           1.313                         
                Q20_9                         348.204     315           1.105                         
                Q20_10                        373.816     315           1.187                         
                Q20_11                        368.109     315           1.169                         
                Q20_12                        360.836     315           1.146                         
                Q20_13                        397.297     315           1.261                         
                Q20_14                        379.200     315           1.204                         
                Q20_15                        380.382     315       1.208                         
                Q20_16                        457.274     315           1.452                         
                Q20_17                        386.151     315           1.226                         
                Q20_18                        394.814     315           1.253                         
                Q20_19                        330.651     315           1.050                         
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                Q20_20                        427.273     315           1.356                         
                Q20_21                        470.532     315           1.494                         
                Q20_22                        301.020     315           0.956                         
                Q20_23                        368.056     315           1.168                         
                Q20_24                        398.797     315           1.266                         
                Q20_25                        353.984     315           1.124                         
                Q20_26                        341.091     315           1.083                         
                Q20_27                        434.096     315           1.378                         
                Q20_28                        423.554     315           1.345                         
                Q20_29                        367.885     315           1.168                         
                Q20_30                        413.338     315           1.312                         
                Q20_31                        416.088     315           1.321                         
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────   
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
Summary: 
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R, 
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root.  The output 
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA 
calculations. 
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that none of the five covariates 
are significant and, as such, they are all eliminated in running the MANCOVA test the second 
time through.  After running the second MANCOVA test, we observe a significant difference 
remaining between the six major respondent groups in the responses to 8 of the 14 different 
downside risk factors associated with being public tested in Question 21.  As such, we conclude 
that reference to the six major demographic groups as an independent variable is a significant 
predictor of variability in 8 of the 14 upside factors assessed in the Question 21 of the PCD 
Study. 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /  
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
 
 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
                                  value     F        df1     df2      p         
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Independent Variable  
     Six Major Respondent Groups  
   Pillai's Trace         0.431     2.06      70     1530     < .001   *** 
           Wilks' Lambda          0.630     2.10      70     1442     < .001   *** 
           Hotelling's Trace      0.495     2.13      70     1502     < .001   *** 
           Roy's Largest Root    0.241     5.27      14      306     < .001   *** 
 
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.460), 
Geography (P=0.473), Pubco Experience (P=0.961), Total Career Experience (P=0.494) and SME vs. Non-
SME (P=0.176).   
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS-  
PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / 
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:      QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED) 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Dependent Variable              Sum of Squares    df                      Mean Square     F         p         
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Six Major Respondent Groups     
 Q21_1   16.11 5   3.221 3.039 0.011   * 
    Q21_2   8.58   5   1.717 1.855 0.102  
    Q21_3   12.27 5   2.454 2.521 0.030   * 
    Q21_4   22.35 5   4.469 5.805  < .001   *** 
    Q21_5   8.61   5   1.721 1.763  0.120   
    Q21_6   11.20 5   2.239 2.356  0.040   * 
    Q21_7   12.42 5   2.484 2.052  0.071   
    Q21_8   7.01   5   1.402 1.166  0.326   
    Q21_9   21.46 5   4.292 3.403   0.005   ** 
    Q21_10 14.51 5   2.901 2.563  0.027   * 
    Q21_11 18.36 5   3.672 3.391  0.005   ** 
    Q21_12 16.60 5   3.319 2.486  0.032   * 
    Q21_13  9.50  5   1.899 2.167  0.058   
    Q21_14  5.21   5   1.042 0.994 0.422  
Residuals    Q21_1 333.84   315   1.060 
    Q21_2   291.57   315   0.926 
    Q21_3   306.67   315   0.974 
    Q21_4   242.50   315   0.770 
    Q21_5   307.60   315   0.977 
    Q21_6   299.42   315   0.951 
    Q21_7   381.34   315   1.211 
    Q21_8   378.95   315   1.203 
    Q21_9   397.28   315   1.261 
    Q21_10 356.55   315   1.132 
    Q21_11 341.06   315   1.083 
    Q21_12 420.54   315   1.335 
    Q21_13 276.03   315   0.876 
    Q21_14 330.45   315   1.049 
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